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BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON RADIATION 

OF THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY 
CONGRESS OE THE UNITED STATES 

EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 
ON 

BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS 
OF NUCLEAR WAR 



JUNE 22, 23, 24, 25, AND 26, 1959 



Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 



NOTED JUL 31 1963 A.Robert 




BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON EADIATION 

OF THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENEEGY 

CONGEESS OE THE UNITED STATES 

EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 
ON 

BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS 
OF NUCLEAR WAR 



JUNE 22, 23, 24, 25, AND 26, 1959 



PART 1 



Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
43338 WASHINGTON : 1959 



BIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF 

NUCLEAR WAR 



MONDAY, JUNE 22, 1959 

Congress of the United States, 
Special Subcommittee on Radiation, 

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 :13 a.m., in Senate 
caucus room, Hon. Chet Holifield presiding. 

Present: Eepresentative Chet Holifield, chairman; Representatives 
Price, Van Zandt, Hosmer, Bates, Westland; and Senators Anderson, 
Hickenlooper, and Aiken. 

Also present: James T. Ramey, executive director; John T. Con- 
way, assistant director; George E. Brown, Jr., professional staff 
member; and Col. Richard T, Lunger, staff consultant; Dr. Carey 
Brewer, special consultant, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. 

Representative Holifield. The committee will be in order. 

Today the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Com- 
mittee on Atomic Energy is beginning a series of public hearings on 
the biological and environmental effects of a possible nuclear war. 

The subcommittee has, for some time, realized that considerable 
confusion exists in the public mind as to the probable effects of 
nuclear weapons and their aftermath in the event of their employ- 
ment in war. 

We believe it is in the national interest to clear up this confusion, 
and we believe that clarification can be accomplished within the limits 
of unclassified information. 

It was apparent from the hearings held by this subcommittee in 
1957, that there is a very large practical difference between the prob- 
lem created by the worldwide fallout coming from a program of test- 
ing nuclear weapons, and those that would result from the use of 
these weapons in an all-out war. Accordingly, the fallout problems 
associated with the testing of nuclear weapons were considered in a 
separate hearing early in May of this year. It is our purpose to 
investigate the problems of nuclear war in the present hearing. 

The contrast between the two types of problems may be illustrated 
by a few examples. The test program involves the detonation of 170 
megatons of total yield. Ninety-two megations of this were due to 
the fisssion yield. " These detonations have occurred over a 10-year 
period. The problems we will consider in the present hearings involve 
the detonation of 3,950 megatons total yield, of which 1,976 megatons 
are fission yield, all detonated within 1 day. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 9 

Biological half life The biological half life of any element 

or radioactive nuclide is the time 
interval required to reduce the num- 
ber of atoms present in the body 
to half of their initial value. The 
biological half life does not include 
the radioactive half life of a radio- 
active element. 

Curie— - Tnat Quantity of a radioactive nuclide 

disintegrating at the rate of 3.70 by 
10 10 atoms per second or 2.22 by 10" 
atoms per minute. Abbreviated: c. 

Micromicrocurie 1 million millionth of a curie or that 

quantity of a radioactive nuclide 
disintegrating at the rate of 3.7 by 
10" 2 atoms per second or 2.22 atoms 
per minute. Abbreviated: ppc. 

Millicurie 1 thousanth of a curie or the quantity 

of a radioactive nuclide distinte- 
grating at the rate of 3.70X10 7 
atoms per second or 2.22 X10 9 atoms 
per minute. Abbreviated: Mc. 

Megacurie 1 million curies or the quantity of a 

radioactive nuclide disintegrating at 
the rate of 3.70 X10" 5 atoms per sec- 
ond or 2.22X10™ atoms per minute. 

Dose- _. Tne radiation delivered to a specified 

area or volume or to the whole body. 

Effective half life The time required for a radioactive 

element in the body to be diminished 
to half of its value as a result of the 
combined action of radioactive decay 
and biological elimination. 

Electron volt A unit of energy equivalent to the 

amount of energy gained by an elec- 
tron in passing through a potential 
difference of 1 volt. Larger multi- 
ples of the electron volt are fre- 
quently used, viz, Kev. for thousand 
or kilo electron volts ; Mev. for mil- 
lion electron volts ; and Bev. for bil- 
lion electron volts. 

Erg Unit of work or energy done by a unit 

force acting through unit distance. 
The nuclear unit of work or energy 
is the Mev. which is equal to 1.6 X 
10~ 8 ergs. 

Gamma ray Electromagnetic radiation resulting 

from radioactive decay. Gamma 
rays have no mass and no charge, 
but have energy which ranges from 
Kev. to Mev. 

Half life The half life of a radioactive atom is 

the time interval over which the 
chance of survival is exactly one- 
half. In any large number of dis- 
integrating radioactive atoms half 
of the atoms present at any time will 
decay during one-half life. The half 
life for a particular nuclide is given 

by 

0.693 

where X is a constant for each nu- 
clide. 



EFFECTS OF ISTUCLEAR WAR 



Nuclide. 



Rad. 



Relative biological effectiveness. 



REM. 



REP. 



Stratosphere- 



Stratospheric half life. 



Strontium unit. 



Tropopause. 



Troposphere. 



A nuclide is the individual species of 
atoms in an element having a cer- 
tain mass and a specific energy con- 
tent. Therefore, more than 1 
nuclide may compose an isotope. 
For example, Ba-137m (radioac- 
tive) and Ba-137 (stable) are nu- 
clides of the same isotope. 

The unit of absorbed dose, which is 100 
ergs per gram. The rad is a meas- 
ure of the energy imparted to matter 
by ionizing radiation per unit mass 
of irradiated material at the place of 
interest. It is a unit that was rec- 
ommended and adapted by the Inter- 
national Commission on Radiological 
Units at the Seventh International 
Congress of Radiology, Copenhagen, 
1953. 

The ratio of gamma or X-ray dose to 
the dose that is required to produce 
the same biological effect by the ra- 
diation in question. 

Roentgen equivalent man: that quan- 
tity of any type ionizing radiation 
which when absorbed by man pro- 
duces an effect equivalent to the 
absorption by man of 1 roentgen of 
X- or gamma radiation (400 KV). 

Roentgen equivalent physical: the 
amount of ionizing radiation which 
will result in the absorption in tissue 
of 83 ergs per gram. (Recent au- 
thors have suggested the value of 93 
ergs per gram.) 

The upper portion of the atmosphere, 
above ( 11 km ) , more or less ( depend- 
ing on latitude, season, and weather) 
in which temperature changes but 
little with altitude and clouds of 
water never form, and in which there 
is practically no convection. 

The time interval required to reduce 
the activity present in the strato- 
sphere to half by removal from the 
stratosphere to the troposphere. 
Stratospheric half life does not in- 
clude radioactive half life of any of 
the radioactive nuclides. 

Formerly sunshine unit. 1 thousandth 
of the maximum permissible body 
level of Sr-90. It is equal to 1 
micromicrocurie per gram of cal- 
cium. 

The imaginary boundary layer divid- 
ing the upper part of atmosphere, 
the stratosphere, from the lower 
part, the troposphere. The tropo- 
pause normally occurs at something 
like 35,000 to 55,000 feet altitude, 
although it depends on season and 
location. 

All that portion of the atmosphere be- 
low the stratosphere. It is that por- 
tion in which temperature generally 
rapidly decreases with altitude 
clouds form, and convection is active. 



43338—59 2 



12 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Representative Holifield. As our first witness I shall call on Mr. 
Eugene Quindlen, of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, 
to state for the record the basic assumptions drawn up by the sub- 
committee and used by the OCDM in their damage assessment for 
these hearings. 

At a later point in the hearings the OCDM will be asked to present 
the results of their computations with respect to the structural damage 
and casualties which would be caused by the hypothetical attack 
presented by the subcommittee. 

Representative Holifield. Mr. Quindlen, we are happy to have 
you before us this morning as the witness from OCDM and 
the chairman wishes to thank you on behalf of the Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy for your cooperation during some 6 weeks we 
have been working to get this program in shape for presentation, and 
we wish to thank you personally for attending this morning. You 
may proceed. 

STATEMENT OE EUGENE aUINDLEN, 1 OFFICE OF CIVIL AND 

DEFENSE MOBILIZATION 

Mr. Qui:nt>len. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and our thanks to the 
members of the committee. 

We are very pleased to be here because we believe, as you do, that 
people must be informed about the nature of the threat and about 
the actions which they take to meet the threat. 

Informing the American people is a major aim of the Office of 
Civil and Defense Mobilization. We believe that an informed 
public — and we try our best to inform the public — will take the action 
which is necessary. We welcome any additional opportunity to bring 
this matter to public attention. 

The attack to be considered during these hearings was specified 
by the committee. The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization did 
not participate in the formulation of the attack pattern, but did do 
the assessment of the effects of this attack upon the United States. 

The attack (Chart No. 1) consists of 263 weapons delivered on 224 
targets in the United States. This is a net attack representing the 
number of weapons reaching the United States rather than the gross 
number with which the aggressor force might have started. 

The total megatonnage of the attack was 1,446. The weapons used 
were 1 megaton in size — that is the equivalent of 1 million tons of 
TNT — 2 megatons, 3 megatons, 8 megatons and 10 megatons. 



i Eugene J. Quindlen is the Deputy Assistant Director for Federal, State, and Local 
Plans of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. He has responsibility for advice and 
guidance to cities, States, and Federal agencies on civil-defense operational planning, for 
the program of providing matching funds to States and localities, for the surplus-property 
program of OCDM and for operational analysis. wrt _ 

Mr. Quindlen has held staff positions with OCDM and its predecessor agency, FCDA, 
since March 1951. He has participated in all phases of the planning of FCDA programs 
and has held responsible staff positions in the annual civil-defense exercise, Operation 
Alert. Previous assignments within FCDA include Deputy Assistant Administrator of 
the Planning Staff and Assistant Administrator of Operations. 

Mr. Quindlen has 17 years of service with the Federal Government, including 4 years of 
active duty as a medical administrative officer with the Army Medical Department. He 
was also employed by the Veterans' Administration and had departmental and field ex- 
perience in the Federal Security Agency, which is now the Department of Health, Educa- 
tion, and Welfare. , ,, . ^ . 

Mr. Quindlen holds a B.A. degree from LaSalle College, an M.A. degree in educational 
psychology and statistics from Fordham, and a law degree from Georgetown University. 
His graduate work included an asslstantship at Fordhani University and research in the 
use of machine methods in the handling of mass statistics. 



EFFECTS OF ITOCLEAR WAR 



13 



I have a chart (table 1) to which I would like to refer, Mr. Chair- 
man, which summarizes these weapon sizes. As I indicated, there 
were 263 weapons used for a total weight of 1,446 megatons ; 60 of 
these weapons were 10-megaton size for a total of 600. This chart 
illustrates the distribution of the other weapon sizes. There were 74 
of 8 megatons for a total of 592, and, as you will see, there was a 
large weight in the higher weapons of 8 and 10 megatons reducing to 
37 of the 2-megaton weapons and 48 of the 1 megaton, for a total 
attack of 1,446 megatons. 

The next chart (table 2) shows the distribution by target; 111 of 
the targets were Air Force installations. Total weight 645 megatons. 
The size of the weapons used on Air Force installations varied; 71 
of the targets were critical target areas. By this we mean concen- 
trations of population and industry. They contain about 68 million 
of the country's population. One hundred and ten weapons were 
used against these areas for a total weight of 567 megatons. I will 
leave this chart up while I talk further, Mr. Chairman. 

(The charts referred to are as follows :) 

Table 1. — Weight of the attack 



Size of weapon (megatons) 


Number used 


Weight of 
attack (mega- 
tons) 


10 


60 
74 
44 
37 
48 


600 

592 

132 

74 

48 


8 


3 


2 - 


1 


Total 


263 


1,446 





Table 2. — Targets of the attack 



Number and type of target 



111 Air Force installations 

71 Critical target areas.. 

21 AEC installations. 

12 Army installations 

5 Navy installations 

4 Marine Corps installations 

224, total... 




Weight 

(megatons) 



645 

567 

168 

24 

28 

4 

1,446 



Representative Holifield. Mr. Quindlen, I think it would be well to 
bring out at this point the fact that the two bombs used oyer the 
Japanese cities were approximately 20,000 tons of TNT equivalent. 

Mr. Quindlen. Yes, in that general area. 

Representative Holifield. In that general area ? 

Mr. Quindlen. Yes. 

Representative Holifield. So, when we talk about a megaton, we 
are talking about a million tons, and then we have to, in our mind, 
compare that with 20,000 tons which destroyed a city of some 100,000 
inhabitants in Japan. 

Mr. Quindlen. Yes, sir ; that is true. 

About 39 percent of the weapons used were used against the indus- 
trial and population areas, about 12 percent were used against Atomic 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 15 

of the subcommittee by Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, U.S. Army, re- 
tired, former Deputy Chief of Staff for Eesearch and Development. 

Deab Mb. Holifield : I have examined the theoretical nuclear attack pattern 
that is to be considered by your committee in the hearings beginning June 22, 
1959. I consider your assumptions to be entirely realistic and well within the 
capabilities of a potential aggressor. 

James M. Gavin, 
Lieutenant General {Retired), 

Are there any questions of the witness ? 

If not, you are excused, sir. 

Mr. Qttindlen. Thank you, sir. 

Eepresentative Holifield. Our next witness will be Dr. Frank Shel- 
ton, Technical Director, Defense Atomic Support Agency of the 
Department of Defense. Dr. Shelton will give a presentation of the 
effects of the different-sized weapons used. 

STATEMENT OP DR. PEANK SHELTON, 1 TECHNICAL DIRECTOR, 
DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OP DEFENSE 

Dr. Shelton-. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before the 
committee. I have a few figures that we will have to put on the easel, 
but I will begin because they are used partially down in the text. 

The effect of a nuclear war is the sum of the effects of the weapons 
employed against the individual targets. The individual weapon's 
effects thus form the building blocks for the sum of the effects. It 
is generally true that the effects of blast, thermal radiation, and 
prompt nuclear radiation (emitted directly from the exploding bomb) 
will not overlap the same areas with important effects unless two or 
more bombs are detonated rather close together on a single target. 
Local fallout from surface bursts is about the only weapon effect 
that can be expected to have overlapping effects from one bomb to 
another and this is especially true in the downwind directions. 

Thus, the total damage to the country from blast, thermal radiation, 
and prompt nuclear radiation is essentially the sum of the individual 
effects on the individual targets. 

In the case of fallout one often has to add the effects of one bomb 
on another in their common fallout areas. Finally, worldwide fall- 
out is the sum of each of the individual weapons contribution.* 

In summarizing the various effects, I would like to draw into per- 
spective, in some small measure, the relatively large areas and are 
also likely to be involved by the other effects. As an example, the 
lethal fallout area giving about 700 rem in 48 hours 

Representative Houfield. Will you please explain rem ? 

Dr. Shelton. Can I hold that? It is in the text, if you will allow 
me to wait until we get to that point. 

Representative Holifield. All right. 

Dr. Shelton. An accumulation of about 700 rem in 48 hours for an 
unshielded person can be expected to occur over about 1,500 square 

1 Technical director of the Defense Atomic Support Agency. He has been active in 
the atomiee energy field since 1952. During the spring of 1955, he served as technical 
adviser to the military effects test group at Operation Teapot, and in 1953 participated in 
Upshot-Knothole. Dr. Shelton was horn in 3924. He received his bachelor of science, 
master's and doctor of philosophy degrees, all in physics, from the California Institute of 
Technology. Prior to joining the Defense Atomic Support Agency, Dr. Shelton was with 
the Sandia Corp. in the weapons-effects field. 



16 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

miles from a 10 megaton surface burst (50 percent fission) ; that is, 
an area that could be about 100 miles long and about 17 miles at the 
maximum width. 

Few people appreciate the fact that, for the same bomb, second 
degree burns on the exposed face and hands and the ignition of fine 
kindling fuels can encompass an area of about 25 miles radius or about 
2,000 square miles in the immediate vicinity and perhaps dense popu- 
lation of the target area. That is, this thermally affected area could 
be substantially larger than that of the lethal fallout area. And, if 
there is some shielding of personnel in the downwind fallout areas, 
the thermal effects area would certainly be the larger of the two. 

Fallout and its potentially lethal areas are imporant, but so are 
the areas of the other effects; the pendulum of interest has swung to 
fallout and there is some tendency to overlook the very important 
other effects. Your expert witnesses in blast, thermal radiation, and 
prompt nuclear radiation also have an important part of the story. 
The results produced in Japan by the two nominal yield bombs were 
from only blast, thermal radiation and prompt nuclear radiation. 
There was no local fallout involved in the nearly 400,000 casualties 
in the tale of those two cities. 

In discussing the effects of a large yield detonation it seems pertinent 
to: 

I. Describe what happens when a nuclear detonation occurs ; that is, 
how the blast, radiant heat, prompt nuclear radiation, and fallout 
are produced, 

II. Next, I would like to describe very briefly the main differences 
in an airburst and a surface burst. I realize that the hypothetical 
attack assumed for these hearings utilizes surface bursts; however, 
a few words about airbursts does not appear out of place. 

III. Finally, I would like a summarize the various weapons effects 
by relating the distances at which certain effects can be expected to 
produce a given level of damage to man or structures. 

I. DESCRIPTION OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION 

At the moment of detonation, a tremendous amount of energy is 
released in an extremely short time and small space. This rapid 
release of energy heats the bomb material and surrounding air to 
temperatures of several hundred thousand degrees, forming a luminous 
sphere of hot gases called the "fireball." The expansion of the air 
heated by the nuclear detonation causes the formation of a shock 
wave. At rather close distances to the burst, the shock wave is ex- 
tremely strong and shocks the air to conditions such that it is radiant — 
that is, glows — and the fireball continues to grow in size. About 35 
percent of the total energy of the explosion is given off as radiant 
thermal energy (see fig. 1) or heat, in essentially the same way that 
the sun radiates heat, although in the case of a bomb it is delivered 
very rapidly. 



22 EFFECTS OF ISTUCLEAR WAR 

overpressure produces a crushing effect on the structure as it engulfs it. 
Since the blast wave is also a mass of air in motion at very high 
velocity, it exerts a dynamic force on the structure, tending to trans- 
late it in much the same manner as a hurricane wind. Such structures 
as multistory brick apartment houses are quite vulnerable to the blast 
wave. (See fig. 4.) All such structures would be destroyed, col- 
lapsed, within a radius of 7 miles from ground zero for a 10-MT 
weapon ; that is, one having a total energy equivalent of 10 million tons 

of TNT. 

If we decrease the yield by a factor of 10, we have a 1-megaton weap- 
on. For this yield, all such structures within a radius of over 3 miles 
from ground zero would be destroyed for a surface burst. Thus, 
a factor of 10 in yield will change the radius of blast damage by a 
factor of little more than 2. 

Senator Hickenxooper. Just a moment, Mr. Chairman. 

Eepresentative Holifield. Senator Hickenlooper. 

Senator Hickenlooper. I am having a little trouble here with the 
verbiage. You say if we decreased the yield by a factor of 10, we have 
a 1-megaton weapon. Then this sentence 

T^TCTTRF 4 

DESTRUCTION OF Bg/OC 
APA2JMENT HOUSES 



1MT 




3 MILES 




10 MT 





7 MILES 



Dr, Shelton - . It refers to the previous sentence. We decrease the 
10 megatons to 1 megaton. 

Senator Hickenlooper. I understand you decrease the 10 to 1, but 

then this sentence. 

For this yield, all such structures within a radius of over 3 miles from ground zero 
would be destroyed for a surface burst. 

As I take it that statement says everything over 3 miles beyond the 
center of the surface burst would be destroyed whether it was a 
hundred miles away or 200 miles away. 

Dr. Shelton-. I can understand the problem there. 

Senator Hickenlooper. We are dealing with a very technical and 
with a very, if I majr use the word, frightening subject here, and I am 
concerned with the literal statements that are made. 






EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



(The information referred to follows :) 

Thermal Ignition of Feamehotjses 

There is some uncertainty as to whether or not persistent ignition can occur 
to w^l naLted good wood, such as the type of siding that is used on frame- 
houses undef the conditions of a nuclear explosion. The following quotations 
w ^ taken from "The ° Effects of Nuclear Weapons," and the referenced para- 

^li^^Ufc&a by exposure to thermal radiation, the .depth of the 
char being closely proportional to the energy received. For sufficiently large 
amounts of energy, wood in some massive forms may exhibit transient flaming, 
Zt wrsistent Sion is improbable under the conditions of a nuclear explosion. 
HoweveTthe tfansitory flame may ignite adjacent combustible material which 
is not directlv exposed to the radiation. * * * . " . ' , 

7 93 "From le evidence of charred wood found at both Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki it was originally concluded that such wood had actually been ignited 
bf thermal radiation and that the flames were subsequently extinguished by the 
blast But it now seems more probable that, apart from some exceptional in- 
stants such as that just described, there was no actual ignition of the wood. 
Se absorption of the thermal radiation caused charring in sound wood but the 
temperatures were generally not high enough for ignition to occur. Rotted and 
checked wood and excelsior, however, have been known to burn completely, and 
the flame is not greatly affected by the blast wave." 

7 82 "The fact that accumulations of ignitable trash close to a wooden struc- 
ture represent a real lire hazard was demonstrated at the nuclear tests carried 
out to Nevada in 1953. In these tests, three miniature wooden bouses, each 
having a yard enclosed with a wooden fence, were exposed to 12 calories per 
souarf centimeter of thermal radiation. One house, at the left, had weathered 
sXng showteg considerable decay, but the yard was free from trash. The next 
house also had a clean yard; and, further the ; exterior siding : was we 1 main- 
tained and painted. In the third house, at the right, the siding, wbich was 
SS maintained, was weathered, and the yard was littered with trash." 

7 38 "The state of the three houses after the explosion was as follows: The 
«,irri hnnso at the right soon burst into flame and was burned to the gronntt. 
m e first houl on th" e«? did ignite but it did not burst into flame for 15 
minutes S well-maintained house in the center with the clean yard suffered 

SC Thernfal 0I effects* comparable to those existing at these three houses would 
pcalr at 13 mnes from a 10-megaton burst and at 6 miles from a 1-megaton 
burst* 

Dr. Shelton. Thus not only may your house be blown down, but 
it mav be on fire due to the ignition of curtains or inflammable mate- 
rials outside the house. There is a chance of a very large general nre 
tbroughout the area, a conflagration or fire storm. A fire storm ex- 
isted at Hiroshima and lasted about 6 hours. 

Representative Holifield. Will you explain for the record what a 

fir© storm is f 

" Dr Shelton. In the case of Hiroshima, the fire storm was a gen- 
eral burning in the area of the target with air sweeping in, feeding 
the fire from all sides, and the heat rising up, a great smoke pall mov- 
ing upward and out of the general area, so that there was a mass cir- 
culation of air. In other words new fresh air was coming m to feed 
the fire. It burned for about 6 hours. At the edge of the fire storm 
there were winds like 30 and 40 miles an hour, and those generally 
subsided and became rather small and variable at the end of 6 hours. 
The reason I mention the fire situation is that a fire that burns for 
times like 6 hours, raging in an area, even shelters there would have to 



gg EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

direction should start about a half hour after the burst In other 
words, you have about a half hour, but I don't know what you are 
going to do with it. You have a half hour if you want to use it before 
the fallout starts. <g t<Mj& «tu^W«^ ^ / O /**>**£ <r P. 

Chairman Anderson. I am going to get under a shower, bome- 
bodv else can do what he wants. 

Dr Shelton. All right. The fallout will start and it won t be very 
intense at a half hour, and it will build up to a peak and it will be 
about 3,000 roentgens per hour or more at the end of the hour it you 
are about 10 miles downwind. It is going to peak and be about 3,000 
roentgens per hour outside on the level ground. You could not stand 
more than about 15 minutes of that radiation until you will probably 
be incapacitated, deathly sick, and terminate in death. 

Chairman Anderson. Thank you. 

3. Worldwide fallout 

Dr Shelton. Moving on from the local fallout it is certainly perti- 
nent to discuss the worldwide fallout in this particular situation. I 
would like to say a few words about the worldwide fallout. It you 
remember, the large particles of radioactive debris were deposited 
locally, and the small minute particles from the explosion that enter 
the stratosphere spread more or less uniformly around the earth at a 
given latitude and fall to earth very slowly. As I said before, about 
50 percent per year will come down to the ground. Here are those 
numbers that we have been discussing and let me say them once again. 
Here we have material away up in the stratosphere. What is going 
to happen to it ? In 7 hours its intensity is down to one-tenth oi the 
activity that we had at 1 hour. After 2 days it is down by a factor 
of a hundred. Two weeks it is down by a thousand. Three months it 
is down by 1 over 10,000. From this it is pretty apparent that the 
worldwide fallout that is coming down at a rate of about one-half per 
vear only contains those elements that are long lived like strontium 
90 cesium 137, and carbon 14. They are the only ones that are left 
with any appreciable activity. To say what is happening in world- 
wide fallout for our hypothetical war situation, let me revert back to 

what we now know. . ™ # 

We expect 5 to 1 micromicrocunes of str ontium 90 per gram pi . 
- ra i ^nm fn h e the ultimate average value Tn t he j a m? B ma n forjhe^ 

- north te mpe rate latitude's a res uglgTestm gJK ) meg at o ns of fission,. 

- TTi ft U W e know the > enWt ilor^0l5egatons L Let us say what we are 
' going to get for a thousa nd megatons. You get about 10 times as 

much So you get 50 to 100 micromicrocuries per gram of bone cal- 
dnm.' I think in our war assumptions we have 2,000 megatons of 
fission products. So one would expect to get something like 200 
micromicrocuries, which is a little larger than the maximum per- 
missible concentration standard for the population as a whole, but 
which is a number, I think, that we recognize to be rather conserva- 
tive. Similarly, let us talk about the genetic dose for a moment. 

In the Northern Hemisphere the genetic dose from past testing 
has been about 0.05 rem over a 30-year genetic time period So m 
the war we would expect about 0.5 rem per thousand megatons of 
fission yield in the weapons. We have 2,000 in our assumed case. So 
w? would expect about one rem genetic dose. This is less than the 



40 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

person. The degree of incapacitation depends on the parts of the 
body exposed and the amount of energy received. For example, sec- 
ond degree burns of the hands are those which cause blistering, and 
are most painful, and will pretty effectively prevent work by that 
individual, and second degree burns of the eye area will certainly 
make one rather ineffective. For 1-megaton surface bursts, a person 
exposed within 9 miles of ground zero and with no shielding can be 
expected to receive second degree burns on any bare skin exposed 
directly to the bursts. For a 10-megaton weapon this range would 
be not quite three times as large in distance, about 25 miles away 
from a 10-megaton bomb. A person with exposed skin could expect 
to receive blistering, and second degree burns. 

Eepresentative Hosmer. In relation to protection against that, the 
areas that were clothed, would they receive any substantial damage? 

Dr. Shelton". The clothing area at this distance should minimize 
the burn to a blistering or sunburn type and not a blistering burn. 
Under clothing at these distances, the skin would have some protection 
and it would be like a sunburn, but not blistering. At closer distances, 
you can get second degree burns under clothing. 

As another example, a person standing out in the open at 25 miles 
from a 10-megaton burst will receive blisters an all exposed skin. 
These second degree burns are the most difficult type to treat clinically. 
I am sure you will have an expert witness to cover this quite thor- 
oughly. . 

Eepresentative Hosmee. The protection factor on this type ot thing 

is minimal. 

Dr. Shelton. Yes. All you need is something opaque between you 
and the bomb, any type of material, and the thermal hazard goes 

away down. 

Representative Holieieux Dr. Shelton, I note there has been no 
discussion of the immediate neutrons. 

Dr. Shelton. They were included and integrated into the dose 
received from the prompt radiation. That last chart still on the floor 
showing the initial radiation resulting in probable death, has prompt 
gamma and prompt neutron added together into that dose. It does 
not matter what does it, if it kills you, and its effect on the tissue 
are very much the same. 

5, Blast 

Blast overpressure is itself not a very significant casualty agent. 
About 100 p.s.i. is required to have a significant effect of ruptured 
eardrums, for instance, and nuclear radiation, thermal radiation and 
fallout will almost certainly produce casualties where 100 p.s.i. can 
reach a man. However, the secondary effects and injuries caused by 
crumbling buildings, flying debris and translation of man himself 
are certainly very significant. Extensive blast injury can be expected 
at distances at which brick apartment houses collapse, and those 
distances were 7 miles from ground zero for a 10-megaton burst, 
and a little over 3 miles for a 1-megaton burst. 

I believe you have a blast biology witness, Dr. White, m the later 
days, and I am sure he will tell you about the hazards of flying debris 
and in particular the hazard of flying glass. I would expect exten- 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



41 



siv e window damage at 25 miles from a l-megaton bursty an d it would 
be an extreme hazard out to about 7 miles, ppn't stand behindy ^ 
"Hows in a n at tack. First you will get burned and then you wiilTmye 
fine glass splinters driven into you very deeply within distances like 
? miles irom a l-megaton burst, , 

— [Representative Molifield. Every schoolroom in the United States 
has tremendous expanses of glass. 

Dr. Sheltoist. Yes, sir. 

Representative Holifield. I think this is a very important point 
you are bringing up, and I am sure it will be gone into in more detail 
when the blast witness appears before us. 

Dr. Shelton. Yes. Glass in any disaster like the Texas City dis- 
aster is one of the primary materials found in the normal home which 
can result in blinding and all other types of effects due to the flying 
small splinters of glass. 

My long acquaintance and friend, Dr. White, will fully expound 
on the hazard of debris, and particularly flying glass. 



IV. SUMMARY OF EFFECTS FOR KTJCLEAR WEAPONS FOR 1 AND 10 MEGATONS 

To summarize the effects of nuclear weapons, they are blast, which 
is primarily a damaging agent to inanimate objects such as buildings, 
and it does produce flying debris which is a hazard to man. 

The cratering effect results in the destruction of even deep under- 
ground structures. Thermal radiation damages both humans and 
combustible structures and materials. Nuclear radiation, including 
both the initial and the local residual fallout are primarily hazards 
to man and animals and can deny man the use of maminate objects. 
For reference, I have included in table 1 the effects that I have been 
discussing for the last hour or so. 

Table I. — Summary of effects of the assumed nuclear weapons 1 to 10 megatons 



1 megaton 



10 megatons 



A. Inanimate objects: 

1. Crater (dry soil) . 



2, Brick apartment houses collapse.. 

3. Ignition of light kindling materials. 
B. Man: 

1. Blast injury (flying debris) 

2. 2d degree burns on bare skin 

3. Initial nuclear radiation (700 

r.e.m.). 

4. Fallout, 15-knot winds (450 r.e.m. 

in 48 hours, no shielding). 



/Radius, 650 feet 

iDepth, 140 feet 

Radius, 3 miles 

Radius, 9 miles 

[Radius, 3 miles 

I Area, 28 square miles 

(Radius, 9 miles 

[Area, 250 square miles 

[Radius, 1.5 miles 

\Area, 7 square miles 

(40 miles downwind, 5 miles 

< cross wind. 

[Area, 200 square miles 



Radius, 1,250 feet. 
Depth, 240 feet. 
Radius, 7 miles. 
Radius, 25 miles. 

Radius, 7 miles. 

Area, 150 square miles. 

Radius, 25 miles. 

Area, 2,000 square miles. 

Radius, 2 miles. 

Area, 12.5 square miles. 

150 miles downwind, 25 miles 

crosswind. 
Area, 2,500 square miles. 



Moving to man, let us just repeat again, blast injury, due to flying 
debris, occurs out to about 3 miles for a megaton weapon, and about 7 
miles for a 10-megaton weapon. The areas there are about 28 square 
miles and 150 respectively. The burn area is a very large area, as 
you see, for a 10-megaton burst, about 2,000 square miles on clear 
days, or when the bomb thermal is easily seen. Fallout ; in this case 



42 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAK 

450 rem in 48 hours, and no shielding, occurs in an area of about 
2,500-square miles for a 10-megaton weapon. 

Running down the columns, you notice that 10 megatons is 10 times 
the energy release of 1 megaton. But notice that the effects only 
reach out sometimes a factor of two, sometimes a factor of three, 
seldom ever a factor of four for the larger yield burst. A 10-megaton 
yield does not reach out to 10 times the distance. The distances are 
rather slow functions of yield, usually a factor of two, sometimes a 
factor of three. This is the variation in distance of a given effect 
from 1 to 10 megatons. 

I did not feel that in the testimony I should cover two, three, and 
eight megatons. They can be interpolated in between the distances 
given and the uncertainties of effects are probably larger than war- 
ranted by exact mathematics for the other yields. 

Representative Holifield. It occurs to me, Dr. Shelton, in the 
responses to Mr. Hosmer's questions, and other questions from mem- 
bers that you might want to prepare a statement in regard to this 
rate dose. You might include in that the factors of difference between, 
let us say, 10, 100-kiloton weapons, and 1 megaton weapon and such 
other pertinent information as you think would clear up and re- 
maining doubts. We realize that we cannot cover the whole field, 
but we will try to do the best we can. 

Dr. Shelton. I will certainly do that, sir. (See table I, p. 41.) 

Representative Holifield. Are there any questions of Dr. Shelton ? 
If not, there is one question I would like to ask you, Doctor. Is it 
not true that if human beings are in the blast area, it is not only the 
external pressure upon the human individual's body which is dan- 
gerous, but also the human being himself becomes a flying missile, and 
is propelled through the air until he does strike an inanimate struc- 
ture? 

Dr. Shelton. That is precisely right, sir. The body is able to 
withstand overpressures quite well. It is the flying debris, the transla- 
tion of the man himself in the hurricane-like winds that accompany 
the bomb. It is this sort of thing that always accompanies the blast 
and produces the blast casualties. 

Representative Holifield. Did you have anything else to add? 

Dr. Shelton. No, sir. 

Representative Holifield. Thank you very much, Dr. Shelton. It 
might be well for the record to show that Dr. Shelton is Technical Di- 
rector of the Defense Atomic Support Agency. He has been active 
in the atomic energy field since 1952. During the spring of 1955 he 
served as technical adviser to the military effects test group at Opera- 
tion Teapot, and in 1953 participated in Upshot-Knothole. He has 
also participated in Operation Redwing in 1956, Operation Plumbbob 
in 1957, and Operation Hardtack in 1958. Dr. Shelton was born in 
1924. He received his bachelor of science, master's, and doctor of 
philosophy, all in physics from the California Institute of Technology, 
and prior to joining the Defense Atomic Support Agency (formerly 
the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project), Dr. Shelton was with 
the Sandia Corp. in the weapons effects field. 



EFFECTS OF 3STUCLEAR WAR 43 

Thank you very much for your testimony this morning. We plan 
to have our next witness at 2 o'clock, Mr. Charles Shafer, from the 
Office of Civil Defense Mobilization. 

The meeting is adjourned until 2 p.m. 

(Thereupon at 12 m. ? a recess was taken until 2 p.m., the same day.) 

AFTERNOON SESSION 

Representative Holifield. The committee will be in order. 

This afternoon we open the session with testimony from Dr. Charles 
Shafer, Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization. 

Representative Holifield. I might note that Mr. Shafer has been 
meteorologist for the U.S. Weather Bureau from 1940 to 1957. He 
served with the Air Force during the war. He was in the FCDA 
and now in the Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization. He heads 
up their meteorological services in the fields of chemical, biological, 
and radiological defense. He testified before this committee in 1957. 

Mr. Shafer, will you please come forward. 

I will say to the members of the committee that copies of Mr. Sha- 
fer's presentation are a little slow in getting here. They will be in 
a little later and they will be distributed as soon as they arrive. 

TESTIMONY OP CHARLES K. SHAKER, 1 DIRECTOR, METEOROLOGI- 
CAL OFFICE, OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION 

Mr. Shafer. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, may 
I first correct the record with regard to the title. It is mister and 
not doctor. I wish it were, but it is not. 

This study, requested by the committee, was undertaken in order 
to indicate the extent and intensity of close-in radioactive fallout 
which might spread across the United States after a specific nuclear- 
attack with the meteorological conditions for a given day. 

This presentation will also indicate the effects of the attack on 
dwellings with regard to blast and thermal factors and with regard 
to fallout. 

To better understand the development of the fallout situation, we 
shall first examine the attack in greater detail. Chart No. 1 indicates 
the attack pattern which was developed and provided by *the com- 
mittee as a basis for the study. Each circle such as at Syracuse, 
Binghamton, Eyansville, Waco, Great Falls, et cetera, represents the 
surface detonation of a 1 megaton nuclear weapon. There are 48 
of these weapons. 



1 Born : May 26, 1918. 

Undergraduate work — New York State College at Albany* N.T. 

Graduate work — College of Engineering, New York University. 

Has participated in weapons detonations during Plumbbob and Hardtack, performing: 
(a) Aerial and surface monitoring; (6) fallout prediction; (c) dose-depth and dose- 
distance relationships ; (d ) shelter evaluation. 

1940-57, Meteorologist with U.S. Weather Bureau. 

(a) On loan to U.S. Air Force during World War II (Wright-Patterson area), 

(b) On loan to the United Nations for meteorological research, 1948^9. 

(c) On loan to OAA and assigned at Athens, Greece, to plan rehabilitation of the 
Greek Weather Service. 1952-54. 

(d) On loan to FCDA to assist in radiological fallout problem, 1955-57. 

(e) Transferred to FCDA (now OCDM) In 1957 to head up their meteorological serv- 
ices in the fields of chemical, biological, and radiological defense. 

43338—59 4 



44 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Each square such as at Jacksonville Navy Base, Kedstone Arsenal, 
Hartford, Minot, Alamogardo, Eglin Air Force Base, et cetera, repre- 
sents the surface detonation of a 2 megaton nuclear weapon. There 
are 38 of these. 

Each triangle such as at New Haven, Worcester, Toledo, Grand 
Rapids, Abilene, San Bernardino, et cetera, represents the surface 
detonation of a 3 megaton nuclear weapon. There are 44 of these. 

Each half circle such at as Patrick Air Force Base, Cape Canav- 
eral, Savannah Eiver, Boston, Rochester, Memphis, Oklahoma City, 
Denver, Berkeley, et cetera, represents the surface detonation of an 
8 megaton nuclear weapon. There are 74 of these. 

Each star such as at Limestone Air Force Base, New York City, 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Chicago, 
St. Louis, Kansas City, Dallas, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland, 
Seattle, et cetera, represents the surface detonation of a 10 megaton 
nuclear weapon. There are 60 of these. 

By States, California has the greatest megatonnage, 19 weapons, 
124 megatons. Texas has the greatest number of weapons, 24 weap- 
ons, 112 megatons. In both States the attacks are primarily on Air 
Force bases. 

There is a marked concentration of weapons along the city complex 
from Washington to Boston. For example, there are 28 megatons 
in the Washington area, 22 in Baltimore, 20 on Philadelphia, 20 on 
New York City, and 22 on Boston. Actually along this line from 
Washington to Boston there are 275 megatons. Other areas of 
weapon concentration are Detroit, Chicago, and Los Angeles with 
20 megatons each and the San Francisco-Oakland Bay area with 
38 megatons. 

The following five maps (Charts 2-6) will indicate our estimate of 
what the fallout situation would be across the United States 1 hour 
after the nuclear attack, 7 hours, 2 days, 2 weeks, and 3 months. The 
maps will also show our estimates of the accumulated, outside, un- 
sheltered radiation doses at various points along the fallout patterns. 

These fallout estimates are developed from the stylized dose rate 
patterns in the "Effects of Nuclear Weapons." ( The stylized dose rate 
patterns in this publication are based upon monitored data from multi- 
megaton detonations in the Pacific Proving Grounds and f rom kiloton 
detonations in Nevada and the Pacific. At any specfic point in these 
fallout areas, the dose rate values are subject to the same uncertainties 
as are all quantitative fallout forecasts. However, they do have suf- 
ficient accuracy for planning purposes, i.e., sufficient accuracy to indi- 
cate the extent and intensity of the fallout problem for which we must 
plan survival actions. 

Further, as instructed by the committee the weapon design has been 
assumed to be 50 percent fission-50 percent fusion. It is further 
assumed that about 80 percent of the radioactivity produced will come 
down as close in fallout during the first 2 days postattack. The 
meteorology selected for the preparation of the fallout charts is 
October 17, 1958. * 

On this day the average wind speed in the deep column of the 
atmosphere from 60,000 feet to the surface on the earth, was about 
60 miles per hour in the upper Great Lakes region and the northern 
plains. It averaged 40 miles per hour over New England, the Middle 



52 EFFECTS OF 3STTJCLEAR WAR 

tion. This is one meteorological condition, and one attack pattern. 

Shall I proceed? 

[Representative Holifield. Proceed, Mr. Shafer. 

Kepresentative Westland. May I ask one further question? 

Representative Holifield. Mr. Westland. 

Representative Westland. How did you happen to choose the setup 
that you did ? 

Mr. Shafer. This attack pattern, sir. 

Representative Westland. Yes. 

Mr. Shafer. It was provided by the committee. 

Representative Holifield. The attack pattern, as shown in the 
handouts, was established as a reasonable type of attack after a great 
deal of consultation on the part of the members of the subcommittee 
and the staff with people who are experts in the field. This study, 
for instance, is approximately 1,500 megatons on the United States 
whereas I believe a previous study by the Civil Defense Administration 
went as high as 2,500. 

Is that not true, Mr. Shafer? 

Mr. Shafer. We have studied attacks of this size and other sizes, sir. 

Representative Holifield. Can you give at this time the different 
operation alerts and the amounts used in those attacks from memory % 

Mr. Shafer. Not very well from memory. I believe Opal 57 was 
about 384 megatons, and Opals 58 and 59 about 675 megatons. 

Representative Holifield. There was one at 2,500. 

Mr. Shafer. This was not an operation alert. This was a special 
internal exercise which we called Sentinel. 

Representative Holifield. Was the 2,500 study effects made 

public ? . 

Mr. Shafer. Yes, to this particular committee in 1957, sir. 

Shall I proceed, sir? 

Representative Holifield. Yes. 

Mr. Shafer. This table shows the effects of the attack on dwellings 
within the United States. It indicates the numbers of units receiving 
severe, moderate, and light blast damage. Further, it shows the total 
units outside the blast areas which would be under fallout intensities 
exceeding 3,000 roentgen-hours ; 1,000 to 3,000 roentgen-hours; 100 
to 1,000 roentgen-hours and less than 100 roentgen-hours when nor- 
malized toH+1 hour. 

Effects on dwelling 
Blast effects : tjmu 

Severe damage H» 800, 000 

Moderate damage 8 » ^SS'SSS 

Light damage 1, 500, 000 

Fallout effects : 

Greater than: ^ rt ^ n 

3,000 r/nr 500, 000 

1,000^3,000 r/hr 2, 100, 000 

100-1,000 r/hr 10, 400, 000 

Less than : 100 r/hr U, 700, 000 

It should be noted that 11.8 million dwellings would suffer severe 
damage— to the extent that they would not be salvageable. This is 
approximately one- fourth of the dwellings in the United States. And 
an additional 8.1 million dwellings or about 17 percent of the national 



EFFECTS OP KUCLEAR WAR 53 

total would suffer moderate damage and would have to be vacated 
for major repairs. Further, 1.5 million dwellings or about 3 percent 
would suffer light damage and could be repaired without being va- 
cated. This totals 21.4 million dwellings damaged. 

Representative Holipield. How does that rate relate to the total 
number of dwellings? 

Mr. Shafer. This is a little less than half, sir. 

Eepresentative Hosmer. Give us the number. 

Mr. Shafer. 46.1 million dwellings total in the United States and 
this is 21.4 million dwellings damaged, a little less than 50 percent. 
Let us say 45 percent. 

Approximately 500,000 dwellings, outside the areas of blast damage, 
would be affected by fallout intensities exceeding 3,000 r/hr. normal- 
ized to H+l hour. These are the red shaded zones on the fallout 
maps. The homes in these zones would have to be evacuated and 
abandoned for probably a year, perhaps longer. 

About 2.1 million dwellings, outside the areas of blast damage, had 
fallout intensities varying between 1,000 and 3,000 r/hr. when normal- 
ized to Hdtl hour. These are the blue shaded areas on the fallout 
maps. The homes in these zones would have to be evaluated and 
abandoned for a period for several months to perhaps a year in some 
instances. Actually, the period of abandonment would depend upon 
this effectiveness of decontamination and the rapidity of radiological 
decay. However, this subject is scheduled for discussion later by 
another group. 

Approximately 10.4 million dwellings 5 outside the areas of blast 
damage, had fallout intensities varying between 100 and 1,000 hr. 
when normalized to H+l hour. These are the yellow shaded zones 
on the fallout maps. If major decontamination efforts were under- 
taken most of the homes in these yellow areas could be made available 
for living by 60 days 7 postattack. 

About 11.7 million dwellings, outside the areas of blast damage, had 
fallout intensities less than 100 r./hr. when normalized to H + l hour. 
These are the green areas and unshaded zones on the fallout maps. 
Although a serious radiation problem would exist in the inner por- 
tions of the green shaded zones, most of the homes in these areas could 
become available by 2 weeks' postattack. 

This totals 24.7 million dwellings outside of the area of blast dam- 
age affected by fallout. 

Let us look at this chart in a little more detail to determine how 
serious the problem would be. This plus this, that is the homes be- 
yond repair, the homes vacated for major repairs, plus those which 
would be denied to us for a period of months to possibly a year because 
of fallout, total about 22.5 million units ; or approximately 50 percent 
of the dwelling units across the United States would be denied use 
for 60 days to some indefinite period of time. 

This completes my formal presentation, sir. If you have questions 
I will be very happy to try to answer them. 

Representative Holifield. Please stand by for questions. 

Are there any questions ? 

Eepresentative Hosmer. Mr. Chairman, I don't have questions at 
this point but the witness has mentioned on two or three occasions 



56 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

TESTIMONY OF LESTEE MACHTA, 1 U.S. WEATHER BUEEATJ 

Dr. Machta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think we are all aware of the fact that from our past experience 
all atomic tests which have local fallout also produce worldwide fall- 
out. There are two main problems in computing this worldwide 
fallout. First, we must know how much radioactivity is available for 
dispersal and, second, we must know how it is distributed. It is the 
purpose of this discussion to describe the assumptions used in prepar- 
ing the maps showing the worldwide fallout. In addition, I will 
describe, in words, the fate of the radioactive carbon 14 created by a 
nuclear war. 

First the production of radioactive debris will be presented. 

For purposes of illustration and because of its familiarity, we shall 
deal with strontium 90 fallout. Later, we can apply the results to 
other long-lived radionuclides. 

The attack on the United States of approximately 1,500 megatons is 
augmented by 2,500 megatons elsewhere in the world for a total of 
about 4,000 megatons. Fifty percent of the energy from each weapon 
was assumed to be derived from fission, for a total of 2,000 megatons of 
energy equivalent of fission products. Each megaton of fission energy 
creates 100,000 curies of strontium 90. Thus, the 2,000 megatons 
energy equivalent of fission produces 200 million curies of strontium 
90. These curies are divided as follows : 80 percent is deposited in 
local fallout, 15 percent in stratospheric fallout and 5 percent in tropo- 
spheric fallout. About 20 percent of the 200 million curies are avail- 
able for worldwide dispersal. 

In the United States, the local fallout deposition has been calcu- 
lated by OCDM based on the AFSWP idealized model. Since esti- 
mates of the total (local plus worldwide) as well as the worldwide 
strontium 90 fallout are desired in the United States, it is necessary 
to convert the external dose to the strontium 90 which is associated 
with the gamma emitting fission products. We assume that 1 roent- 
gen per hour at 1 hour is equivalent to 100 millicuries per square mile 
of strontium 90. This conversion is based on the "Effect^ of Nuclear 
Weapons" plus a small correction for shielding of particles in the 
actual ground since it is not a perfectly smooth surface. 

Second, we will distribute the worldwide fallout. 

The tropospheric strontium 90 is carried rapidly around the world 
in a generally west-to-east direction. It spreadsin a north-south li- 
rection slowly so that the peak fallout is roughly in the latitude of the 
war area. The stratospheric fallout is deposited entirely in the 
Northern Hemisphere peaked at about 45° north and tapering off 

1 Meteorologist, U.S. Weather Bureau; associated with atomic energy and meteorology 
since coming to Washington in 1948, now Chief of the Special Projects Section. Born in 
New York, N.Y., in 1919, graduated cum laude from Brooklyn College in 1939. His 
meteorological training includes graduate work at New York University (master of arts, 
1946) and at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (doctor of science, 1948). During the 
war he taught meteorology in both a civilian and military capacity for the Air Force. 
Member of Sigma Xi, Pi Mu Epsilon, the American Meteorological Society, and the Ameri- 
can Geophysical Society. Eecently been given a gold medal for exceptional service by the 
Department of Commerce. Publications in the meteorological literature are numerous 
and, in recent times, include papers on atomic energy and meteorology. Has been a mem- 
ber of many important Government committees, including the Advisory Committee passing 
on the meteorological safety of tests in Nevada. Has been instrumental in making the 
worldwide measurement of radioactivity part of the International Geophysical Year 
program. 



60 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

We will hear from Dr. Machta again on a paper later on in this 
series of hearings. 

Our next witness is Dr. Terry Triffet, from the U.S. Naval Ra- 
diological Defense Laboratory. 

I may say for the benefit of the record that the U.S. Naval Ra- 
diological Defense Laboratory, which is located at Hunters Point, 
Calif., is an organization of some 600 scientists and other professional 
personnel that have been busy working on the problems of weapons 
effects with particular emphasis in the field of radiation, both on 
human beings, animals, and different types of physical materials, 
such as building materials and textiles, and all other types of mate- 
rials. It is probably the center of our greatest depository for ra- 
diological laboratory information. 

The managers of the laboratory have chosen Dr. Triffet to give us 
this part of the presentation. Dr. Triffet, you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF DR. TEERY TRIFFET, 1 U.S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL 
DEFENSE LABORATORY, HUNTERS POINT, CALIF. 

Dr. Triffet. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen of the committee, I have 
prepared a formal statement which I would like to submit for the 
record. 

Representative Holifield. It will be received. 

(The statement referred to follows:) 



1 Profession : Research engineer. Date and place of birth : June 10, 1022, Enid, Okla. 
Parents : R. B. Triffet, Enid, Okla. Married : Millicent McMaster, May 26, 1946. 
Children : Patricia A. Triffet. Education : B.A. (with honors) Human., University of 
Oklahoma, 1945; B.S. (with special honors) engineering. University of Colorado, 1948; 
M.S., engineering, University of Colorado, 1950 ; Ph. D., engineering, Stanford University, 
1957. Professional and honorary societies : APS, ASCE, Society of Rheology, AAAS, 
Sigma Xi, Phi Beta Kappa, Tau Beta Pi. Work history : 1947-50, instructor, College of 
Engineering, University of Colorado ; .1950-55, rocket research and development, U.S. 
Naval Ordnance Tent Station, China Lake, Calif. : 1955 to present, Head, Radiological 
Effects Branch, U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, San Francisco, Calif. 
Publications : Several papers and technical reports on effects of radiations on materials, 
properties of fallout, and radiological effects. Present residence: Palo Alto, Calif. 



62 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 




66 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 




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68 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



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EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



71 




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72 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

fractionation of fission products: 

numbers, in the general temperature range froni 2000 to 280(0° centigrade. 
Metlals, because oA their high boiling points, may provide such particles 
at early times, while melted soil droplets could drovide them at later 
timeaL ' This means that part of thte radioactive atoms, particularly those 
whichkondense earliest, may beconie bound to small metallic particles 
(Figure 4b), which maW themselves collide with and become trapped in 
the larger liquid soil particles (Figure! 4c). Some of\the remaining atoms 
will also\condense directtly on soil particles and othea available materials. 
These langer particles tl\en fall from the\ cloud to constitute the local 
fallout (Fibure 4d). 

Part of the radioactive atoms are noble gases, however, and thus 
do not become attached to other particles until they have decayed to more 



reactive kinds of atoms -- by which time most of the larger particles 



have already fallen out. The result is a depletion of the decay products 



of these gases in the local fallout and a corresponding enrichment of the 



decay products in the small particles which tend to remain aloft longer 



10 
and be deposited at greater distances. This, process, known as frac 

donation, is an important one since it has been observed to occur for 



several important radioactive products in the fallout from land surface 



bursts -- including strontium-90, which is a decay product of the noble 



gas krypton, and cesium- 137, which also has gaseous precursors and is 
one of the principal gamma-ray emitters at very late times. • 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 75 

land burst close in fallout: 

milliineters to derhaps 1/i millimeter in diameter, with the largest 
partiqles carrying the mosi radioactivity, and y ou ld °© clearly visible 
againsjf most backgrounds \ (Visual Aid 1, demonstrating U 1000 r/hr 
fallout!. The overall impression might be much like being in a mild desert 
sandstorm* While this was happening the concentration of the material 
passing through the air near him and the gamma radiation dose he was 
receiving would be building up steeply to a level of 1000 r/hr or more 

(Figure 5a); also the average energy of the gamma rays, reflected in pene- 

17 
trating power, would probably be higher at these early times ( t* 20 mis). 

After about the same length of time it took for the particles to arrive in the 

first place f l ^ the rain of large particles would diminish; and radioactive 

decay would begin to predominate, as shown in the figure. It is to be 

noted that at first, because of the presence of induced products, the dose 

g 
rate would probably not decrease as fast as the average usually estimated 

• 1 2 
for mixed fission products fx t ), while later it would drop much more 

■a i £ 
rapidly due to an overall decrease in the ionizing power of the radiation J * * 

19»20jp i g Ure £ ; note logarithmic scale). This decay might be interrupted 
by the late arrival of groups of particles from higher altitudes if the high- 
level winds reverse themselves. These large particles would not present 
a serious inhalation hazard, could be easily brushed off clothes and skin, 
and once on the ground would tend to resist movement by surface winds. 



76 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Note: Triffet's 1961 
report WT-1317 shows 
that these curves are 
scaled up from test 
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80 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

References 22 and 4 : 
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and (b) SUGAR 




EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



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EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 83 

Background for Triffet's tables and graphs: 

p£**l6*le to>*1>id vagujrrfess. While they are based on the best experimen- 
tal data and theoretical results available at the present time, they are 
nevertheless interpretive rather than literal -- sometimes utilizing what 
appears to be good data from a single test and other times combining the 
results of many tests and analyses. The data and results are also far 
from complete and, as explained earlier, may not even be strictly appli- 
cable in some cases. It is urged that all possible caution be exercised in 
the use of the stated values, and that the references indicated in the pre- 
ceding discussion be studied before each important application. In general 
only those references which are essential, and which have appeared since 
the first congressional hearings on this subject, have been listed. 

Triffet's tables and graphs follow 



84 



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85 



TEWA shot barge YFNB29 (Triffet, WT-1317) 



IONIZATION RATE 



(R/HR) 




5 MASS ARRIVAL RATE 
( ARBITRARY UNITS) 



150 300 450 600 

TIME SINCE DETONATION (MEN) 



750 900 



TEWA shot ship LST611 (Triffet, WT-1317) 



IONIZATION RAl 1 

(R/hr- 




MASS ARRIVAL RATE 
(ARBITRARY UNITS) 



12 17 22 27 32 

TIME SINCE DETONATION (HR) 



FIGURE 8 LAND SURFACE BURST FALLOUT RATE OF ARRIVAL 



86 



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89 



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FIGURE 9 LAND SURFACE BURST RADIOACTIVE DECAY RATE 



90 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



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31 



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92 



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95 



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FIGURE 11 WATER SURFACE BURST RADIOACTIVE DECAY RATE 



95 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



References 

1. Triffet, T. and LaRiviere, P. D. ; Characterization of Fallout, Volume 
I; Operation REDWING, Project 2,63, Final Report, August 1958; 
SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA. 

2. Tompkins, E. R. and Werner, L. B. ; Chemical, Physical, and Radio- 
logical Characteristics of the Contaminant, Project 2. 6a, Operation 
CASTLE, WT-917, September 1955; SECRET -RESTRICTED DATA. 

3. Strope, W.E. ; Evaluation of Counter measure System Components 
and Operational Procedures, Operation PLUMBBOB Final Report, 
Project 32. 3, {in publication), UNCLASSIFIED. 

4. Laurino, R. K. and Poppoff, I. G. ; Contamination Patterns at Opera- 
JANGLE; USNRDL-399, April 1953, UNCLASSIFIED. 

5. Evans, E, C. Ill and Shirasawa, T. H. ; Characteristics of the Radio- 
active Cloud From Underwater Bursts, Operation HARDTACK Proj, 
2.3, ITR-1621, January 1959, CONFIDENTIAL. 

6. The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and its Effects on Man; United 
States Government Printing Office, 1957; Statement of Dr. Alvin C. 
Graves, pp. 53-88, UNCLASSIFIED. 

7. Knapp, H. A. ; A Review of Information on the Gamma Energy Radia- 
tion Rate from Fission Products, and its Significance for Studies of 
Radioactive Fallout; Office of Operations Analysis and Forecasting, 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, April 1959, UNCLASSIFIED. 

8. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons; U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 
Washington, D. C. , June 1957, UNCLASSIFIED. 

9. Adams, C*E. , Farlow, N. H. and Schell, W.R, ; The Compositions, 
Structures, and Origins of Radioactive Fallout Particles; USNRDL-TR- 
209, February 1958, UNCLASSIFIED. 

10. Stevenson, P. C. ; Measurement of Time of Condensation of Bomb Debris 
by a Radiochemical Technique; University of California Radiation 
Laboratory, Livermore, Calif., UCRL-5079, January 1958, UNCLASSI- 
FIED. 

11. Whitcher, S. L. and Soule, R. R- ; Aircraft and Rocket Fallout Sampling, 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 97 



Proj. 2*8, Operation HARDTACK, WT-1625 (in preparation); SECRET- 
RESTRICTED DATA, published in J. Meteorology 
_ - vl7 (1960), pp. 390-399 

Farlow, N. H. ; Atmospheric Reactions of Slurry Droplet Fallout; 
USNRDL-TR- (in preparation), UNCLASSIFIED. 

Hendricks, J. W. ; Fallout Particle Size Measurements From Operation 
REDWING, Vol. I: An Explanation and Survey of the Data; USNRDL-TR- 
264, May 1959. CONFIDENTIAL (Formerly RD). 

Chan, H. K. ; Activity-Size Relationship of Fallout Particles From Two 
Shots, Operation REDWING; USNRDL-TR-314, February 1959, UN- 
CLASSIFIED. 

Schuert, E. A. ; Fallout Studies and Assessment of Radiological Pheno- 
mena, Operation PLUMBBOB, Proj. 32.4, (in preparation), CONFI- 
DENTIAL. weapon test report WT-1465 (1959) 

The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its Effects on Man; United 
States Government Printing Office, 1957; Statement of Dr. C. F. 
Miller, pp. 309-315, UNCLASSIFIED. 

Mather, R. L., Johnson, R. F., Toranovec, Fc M«, Cook, C.S., 

Gemma Radiation Field Above Contaminated Ground; OT-1225, Operation 

TEAPOT, Proj. 2-3^* «Xune 1959, COMFIEENTIAL 



18. LaRiviere, P. D, ; The Relationship of Time of Peak Activity From 
Fallout to Time of Arrival; USNRDL-TR-137, February 1957, 
UNCLASSIFIED. 

19. Miller, C. F. ; Gamma Decay of Fission Products from the Slow- 
Neutron Fission of U 235 ; USNRDL-TR-187, July 1957, UNCLASSIFIED. 

20. Miller, C*F. and Loeb, P. ; Ionization Rate and Photon Pulse Decay 
of Fission Products from the Slow-Neutron Fission of U 235 ; USNRDL- 
TR-247, August 1958, UNCLASSIFIED. 

21. Larson, K. H. , Neel, J. W. and Associates; Summary Statement of 
Findings Related to the Testing Program at Nevada Test Site; UCLA- 
438, The University of California Los Angeles Campus, School of 
Medicine, April 1959, UNCLASSIFIED. 



98 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



22. Van Lint, V. A. J. , Killian, L, E. , Chiment, J* A. and Campbell, D. C» ; 
Fallout Studies During Operation REDWING: Program 2, Operation 
REDWING; ITR-1354, October 1956, SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 109 

real event. Obviously it is a Pacific test, because it is in the megaton 
rangg <w JDj ijSiS smaller set of contoura jpn ih^nghLreB£esmts_a 
T^roda test. ?,TaM^t>- So&bA , 1^*1+ hi * r J a . 

I have also attempted to show the near station and the distant 
station which I have been discussing in terms of fallout properties. 
These cannot be interpreted too literally but they are at least indica- 
tive. 

Representative Holifield. Is the point you are making here that t he 
actual contour, in th e place of bein^r elongated and more Tike: the 



Ishape of a banana.lfem WT^^ andmore an irregular_ rounds 
type of shape as you have onthe \eft f__T 

Dr. Triffet. There are m fact three points I want to make and the 
first one is that. The contours from the large burst are very jrregular, 

jcomparedjritlxJtS^ mega T 

to n burst produces a cloud which rises intolleTngirTevel win3s, a n|_ 
Th ese may var y indi rection. When they~v,ary in direction the En d, 
^ofapatt ern in aHcaT^agiaXm^ 

Representative Holifield. Will you trace the center roentgen level 
there out to the different contours ? 

Dr. Triffet. That leads directly to the se cond point I wan t to make. 
Near ground zero there is a 1,000 r./hr. at ^hour.contou r)with a 500 
r./hr. contour adjacent to it. Next there are comfcurs which, in gen- 
eral, step down to 250, 100, 50, and 25 r./hr. ^L^SyJ^t >i=£ 

Representative Holifield. That is upwind. Wr**^ y*^* 

Dr. Triffet. Yes, sir. Notice, however, that downwind, because 
of the effect of varying winds at higher levels, there is a 2,500 r*Ar- 
region perhaps 40 nautic al miles from ground zero] Another i,UUU 
T\/hr7area appears further^ out still. 

Representative Holifield. According to that, your high areas of 
intensity may be some distance from point zero. 

Dr. Triffet. That is correct. 

Representative Holifield. What would this do to the maps we saw 
this morning? If this type of contour had been used would it not 
have changed the readings of the maps we had before us this morning? 

Dr. Triffet. Yes, it would. What these two things I have brought 
out mean, is that, inside the fallout area from a real me gaton burst, 
it is altogether possible to r eceive widely different radiation^ doses at 
p oints which are not too faT^g m^ed7f rbm^ohe another. Consider 
~ffie~near station, for exampleT Wifhin about 10 "miles of there, one 
could have received 2,500 r./hr. while within about 20 miles of the same 
spot one could have received less than 25 r./hr. 

I do not want to overemphasize this situation though for the follow- 
ing reason. Notice the contours of the 1 kiloton bu rst. The cloud 
jHd not get into the high- level winds i n_this_cas e; consequently ^JjLis. 
easy tolTee how th^ontourTcouia be generalized into a cigarshape. 
"Representa tive Holifield. lsn % it true that it would be in a ci gar 
"sE^"LTiro!iornoT^oTMoJ^ stratosphere, and if it were below the 
tropospheres 

Dr. Triffet. I cannot say definitely. These contours are somewhat 
irregular, and they would generally be, I think. 

Representative Holifield. We understand that these are idealized 
to a certain extent. They are not absolutely accurate. It is an at- 
tempt to draw the pattern of downwind radioactivity. Any bomb that 



110 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

was low enough in yield to not puncture the troposphere would be 
inclined to have more of a regular downwind pattern than one that 
went above 60,000 feet. Is that not true ? 

Dr. Triffet. Yes. There is another factor that should be brought, 
out, too, and that is that the winds over the iDmwetok Proving 
Grounds have a tendency to vary more Than the winds "over the 
United States— the high-lever winds, that is. This means~"that it" 
might be possible to get a less irregular pattern in the United States— " 
although there is a lot of evidence for removed hot spoti~ahd so mtT 
irregularity in any cage. 

Representative Holifield. This irregular pattern does not neces- 
sarily mean that your spread of radioactive intensity with a multiple 
weapon attack such as we have envisaged here, would not have an 
intense radiation activity which might approximate what was 
given us this morning? 

Dr. Triffet. No, it does not mean that, because of the possibility of 
getting overlapping patterns from different weapons. 

Representative Holifield. You would actually get more overlap- 
ping in a pattern of this type which w T ould be expected from the mega- 
ton and up weapon than you would from the smaller weapons. 

Dr. Triffet. I am not sure of that, and would rather not comment 
on it. 

Representative Hosmer. The matter of fact is that a certain wind 
condition would produce the exact patterns shown on the maps this 
morning. 

Dr. Triffet. Yes, very nearly. 

Representative Hosmer. But nobody can speculate exactly what the 
wind conditions are and as a consequence nobody can predict at any 
time with any degree of accuracy just where the hotspots are going to 
be, but you can in general attain an order of magnitude idea of what 
is going to happen over a particular piece of real estate. 

Dr. Triffet. Yes, that is correct. 

Representative Holifield. If my colleague will change the words 
"any degree" to "some degree" of accuracy, I will go along with him 
on that. 

Representative Hosmfr. I would be happy to accommodate you. 

Dr. Triffet. Dr. Machta did make the point that the patterns 
might well be irregular. They have been idealized and this must, 
of course, be recognized. If there are not further questions, I will 



go on. 



Representative Hosmer. While we are about this, you mentioned 
fractionation again in discussing this phenomenon here. By your 
reference to that twice, is there something about it that you could 
use to actually control fallout to the extent of making more early 
fallout? 

Dr. Triffet. This may be possible, and studies are underway along 
these lines. However, I would rather not discuss them in detail now. 

Representative Holifield. You may proceed. 

Dr. Triffet. I would like in conclusion to mention one or two 
things which are often misunderstood about the radioactivity as- 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 111 

sociated with fallout. These are the following- It should be clear 
Txom what 1 have said that contaminated' "particles and radioactivity 
from contaminated particles are two different things^ jn ie^articles 
are contam ina ted in the sense that they are carry ing^rmioact ive 
atoms wTucTTare'decaying and em it ting nuclear radiations. The 
best analogy, I think, is to comparelTparticle with aT^Hr5u lb jL jn^ 
"the radiations wi t h the light. Thg__^ 

ject, as is a f allou T particle. 'The racKati on, on theTo^ r&^gj^^^a 
concentra tionof "ener^7l lk e ^^ i*g{ lt ._ As you move far therawg^ 
from a lighted bulbTTolTgeriess light~This is truTi^Wnucleaf 
^radiations from fallout particles, too. Some are ver y short ra nge 
1-adiations. called alpha and beta particles. Gamma rays are not 
like this, however; they are~long-range radiations w hjg^ penetrate 
large distances. 

Perhap s this will make it clear that internal and external radia- 
tion hazards are also two different things. If one is exposed to a 
"contaminated particle which is a long dist aji^jVEg^^ 
external radiation hazardj ronT^ On the other 

hand T if one has suclTa particle on his TsEm^Chere is a contact^azard 
from the short-range beta radiation. Even worse, if the particle is 
[swallowed or inhaled an internal hazard is created from all of the 
radi ations the par ticle is emitting. There are some radio active prod- 
ucts which do not emit gamma rays at all, and therefore po se prac- 
tically ncT external radiation hazard. I T makes absolutely no sense 
to compute an external radiation dose for these nuclides ; but they 
may represent a serious internal hazard, nevertheless. Strontium 90, 
and carbon 14 are two of the principal culprits in this case. 

Representative Holifieux This is because these nuclides, as you 
say, do not emit long-range energy particles where if they are taken 
internally and become a part of the bone or muscle structure, then 
their radiation is for a limited distance in their environment within 
a person. 

Dr. Triffet. That is correct. Radiations always damage the body 
in the same way — or damaging the individual cells through ionization. 
It is mostly a question of whether the radiation can get to the cells 
or not. For the gamma rays the source may be a long way off; for 
beta particles it has to be close. 

I 'think this concludes my remarks, but I will be glad to answer 
any questions. 

Representative Holifield. Thank you very much. Are there any 
questions ? If not, then we thank you very much for your presenta- 
tion. I am sure the scientific material you have given us will be 
very valuable. 

Before Dr. Machta begins, I have a paper by Dr. Knapp, of the 
AEC, for insertion in the record at this point. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



121 




"where n ( \ ,tfl is the numbe/ of nuclei of decary con- 
stant A existing at time t .after a fission. Evaluation 
of this expj/ession gives, yfor times greater ^nan one day, 
the result 

Mev/sec/fissi/n = 3.75t~ 1 * 2 + 96}r 1 *^ 

where y is measured itf seconds. For shorter times a 
curve Is given. This is the total energy emitted, in- 
cludjng that carried by neutrinos. Agreement with 
experimental resumes is fairly good. / Handy rules of/thumb 
giylng correct values within a factor of two for times 
between 10 seeon/s and 100 days arj 

/3+fl \ Mev/sec/fissijta * 2.66t~ 1-2 

/ ; Mev/sec/fis/ion = 1.26f 1- ^ 

gy per fission /urns out 



The total (disintegration 
to be 22 J 3 Mev." 



ene: 



The expression 

Mev/sec/fissicfa = 1.26t~ 1#2 Ut in seconds) 
is equivjH-ent to 

Mev/sec/lQn' fissions =^^t" 1#2 (t in h^urs), 

so tnfct the / energy radiation rates predicted by ttfis formula 
are/Uniformly 17$ greater than those Obtained *from/ f The Effects 
of /Nuclear Weapons." 

In § snmmArv of t he wartime experimental res ult§_, 
jy t-h* - rat-fl Qf p;amma energy r a cU ay^n_fr om I'i'ss ion^piiSuGLts. 

givenq in their 1948 Physic al Revie V~paper. _way~and Wignen 
^list three^_ex per ipLental results which app Xy ' to^tTmeT intervals 
~of interest ^n^^ioiit^Tfiaggj^li^ ^As^given in Physical Review 

vol. 73 page 1329, these i*esulTs are 

— ^„__^^* q»gW I Egg 



Function of Time 
t after Fission 
(t in seconds) 



When Valid 



References 



Y energy in 
Mev/fission/sec = 



-1,20 




10 sec - 1 day/ S. Katcoff , B, Finkle, 

JC^^^ 1 — /Ot) N * EL 110 ** J - Knight, 
TK>T %* J N. Sugarman 
■, -T~ ~TTZl> a s Metallurgical Laboratory 

Atf UC*Tt£/v/ , ( cc _ U2j&t Dec> u# m3 



4.2t' 



-1.28 



49. Ot" 1- ^ 



20 m - 3 days 
50 - 100 day§; 



L. Borst, Metallurgical 
Laboratory CL-697 
VIII, C4 



140 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Representative Holifield. The next witness is Dr. G. S. Hurst from 
the Oak Rid^e National Laboratory. Dr. Hurst, will you please come 
forward at this time ? 

STATEMENT OF G. S. HURST, 1 HEALTH PHYSICS DIVISION, OAK 
RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, OAK RIDGE, TENN. 

Dr. Hurst. Mr. Chairman, I have no visual aids. We had planned 
to show slides, but these facilities are not available, so if the com- 
mittee and members would look at the document which we brought, 
it contains all the illustrations. 

This presentation is entitled, "Application of Radiation Dosimetry 
Studies to the Evaluation of Environmental and Biological Conse- 
quences of Nuclear War." 

This paper is in two parts. I will read part A. Part B, by J. A. 
Auxier, will be turned in for the record. 

Part A is entitled "Dosimetry of Direct Radiation from Nuclear 
Weapons." 

Section 1 is the introduction. 

The main objective of the dosimetry program, currently in effect at 
AEC contractor sites in the United States and at the Atomic Bomb 
Casualty Commission (ABCC) in Japan, is to provide a basis for the 
correlation of the biological effects of radiation on the Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki populations with the radiation dose. Two types of results 
from this study have important application to the problem of the 
evaluation of biological consequences of nuclear war : 

(1) Before a complete evaluation of the consequences of nuclear 
war can be accomplished, one must know the relationship of biological 
damage in man to the radiation dose. The group of exposed individ- 
uals in Hiroshima and Nagasaki presents a unique opportunity for a 
study of the medical response of a large number of humans to radia- 
tion. A long-term study of medical effects in this group is in progress 
in Japan at the ABCC, operated by the U.S. National Academy of 
Sciences, National Research Council. The program is conducted in 
cooperation with the National Institute of Health of the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare of the Japanese Government, with participation 
of interested Japanese scientists. 

(2) The program initiated for the determination of the radiation 
doses for individuals located in Japanese houses in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki was designed so that results from it may be applied to any 
problem concerned with protection against prompt weapons radia- 
tion. With this more general objective in mind, weapons effects 
studies were set up to obtain (a) the neutron and gamma dose as a 
function of distance from various kinds of fission weapons, (b) the 
energy spectrum of neutrons and its dependence on distance, (c) the 
angular distribution of neutron and gamma radiation arriving at 
points located at various distances from the detonation, and (d) the 
shielding characteristics of various materials for prompt weapons 
radiation. These data are basic to the consideration of the protection 
afforded by any type of shielding structure, e.g., homes, offices, indus- 
trial buildings, and shelters for the general population, and by fox- 



a Born: PineviUe. Ky., Oct. 13, 1927; B.A., Bjerea College, 1047 ; M.S., University of 
Kentucky, 1948 ; Ph. D. t University of Tennessee, 1959 (Capture of Electrons in 
Molecular Oxygen) ; Health Physics Division (Section Chief, Radiation Dosimetry Sec- 
tion), Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1948 to present. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



141 



holes, armored vehicles, and special shelters for the military popu- 
lation. 

Section II is basic radiation data. 

In this section we give examples of weapons effects results which 
illustrate the type of data referred to in the introduction. All the ex- 
amples are quoted for nominal fission devices (10 to 20 kilotons). 

A . Gamma dose a function of distance 

Figure 1 shows a typical air dose versus distance relationship for 
gamma rays. The gamma dose d(E) in rads is multiplied by the 
square of the slant range (R), in yards, from the point of detona- 
tion to the point of measurement and is divided by the weapon yield 
in kilotons (kt.). This quantity is then plotted as a function of the 
slant range in hundreds of yards. To obtain the gamma dose per kt. 
at some distance of interest, one reads the quantity d(R)R 2 /kt. at 
the distance of interest and divides by the square of the slant range in 
yards. For example, the gamma dose at 1,000 yards is approximately 
300 rads per kt. 

OfUL-LR-DMS 30048 
Unclassified 




4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 
SLANT RANGE R IN HUNDREDS OF YARDS 

FIG. I GAMMA AIR DOSE vs SLANT RANGE FOR A 
TYPICAL NUCLEAR DETONATION 



28 



142 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



B. Neutron dose and neutron energy spectrum as a function of distance 

Figure 2 shows the same type of presentation of the neutron dose 
for a typical weapon. For example, it is seen, using the scale to 
the right, that the neutron dose at 1,000 yards is approximately 350 
rads per kt. Figure 2 also shows the energy spectrum of neutrons 
as a function of distance. The scale to the left represents the neutron 
flux f (R) (n/cm. 2 ) multiplied by the square of the slant range and 
divided by the weapon yield in kt. Reading from the top curve down 
shows f (R) times R 2 /kt. for the total number of fast neutrons, slow 
neutrons, neutrons of energy greater than 0.75 Mev., neutrons of 
energy greater than 1.5 Mev., and neutrons of energy greater than 
2.5 Mev., respectively. The fact that these curves are approximately 
parallel shows 'that the neutron energy spectrum is approximately 
independent of slant range. 



OftfL-LR-DWG 30049 Unclassified 




10 20 

SLANT RANGE R IN HUNDREDS OF YARDS 

FIG. 2 NEUTRON AIR DOSE AND FLUX vs SLANT 

RANGE FOR. A TYPICAL NUCLEAR DETONATION 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 147 

E. Mutmal shielding in a cluster of light frame houses 

In the Hardtack Phase II Operation (Nevada, 1958) seven houses, 
representative of Japanese design but constructed of substitute Amer- 
ican materials, were used in three different experiments. The houses 
consisted of three sizes: (a) a medium-sized single story, (&) a large 
two story, and (c) a small single story. These houses were used in 
various arrangements to determine (a) the effect of house size and 
(&) the effect of mutual shielding. Some of the neutron data are 
quoted as an illustration of the type of results obtained. 

The small single-story house attenuated the neutron dose to 0.51 
(numbers given are the ratios of the doses inside the houses to the 
doses with no houses present) when used alone, but when placed 
behind the medium-sized single story house, i.e., the side farthest 
from the detonation, the neutron dose was reduced to 0.33, and when 
placed behind the large two story house the neutron dose was reduced 
to 0.29. When the large two story house was used alone the neutron 
dose on the first level was reduced to 0.41, and on the second level the 
neutron dose was reduced to 0.45. When the medium-sized single story 
house was placed alongside the large two story house, the dose on the 
first level was reduced to 0.35 and the dose on the second level was 
reduced to 0.44. Likewise, when the medium-sized single story house 
was used alone the neutron dose was reduced to 0.43, and when placed 
at the side of the large two-story house, the neutron dose was reduced 

It is seen from these studies that even if a large house is placed m 
front of a small house the neutron dose inside the small house is not 
reduced by a large, factor, which is consistent with the angular dis- 
tribution work reported above. 

More details of the information presented in this section can be 
found in an article by E. H. Ritchie and G. S. Hurst ("Health physics 
1," 390, 1959) and in Weapons Tests Reports WT-1504 and WT-1725, 

In conclusion, the angular distribution data, together with experi- 
mental data on the attenuation of plane slabs, were used to calculate 
the attenuation by the light frame structures. Theoretical and experi- 
mental results were in good agreement; thus it is reasonable to expect 
that the radiation protection afforded by various other kinds of struc- 
tures can be obtained from the basic data on angular distributions and 
plane slab attenuation. 

The main uncertainty in the present knowledge of the dose received 
by individuals being studied in Japan lies in the air dose. The most 
effective way to normalize the basic information presented above to 
the Japanese cases would be to detonate reconstructions of the two 
weapons fired over Japan. Air dose measurements from these de- 
vices would then complete the information needed on radiation dose 
and w-ould provide a basis for the correlation of medical effects in 
Japan with radiation dose. 

That completes the formal presentation, Mr. Chairman. 

Representative Holifield. You have asked that part B be placed 
in the record at this point ? 

Dr. Htjrst. Yes, sir. * 

Representative Holifield. Without objection, that will be done at 

this point. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 151 

Calculations based on these data, or normalized to them, permit extrapolation 
to a large variety of houses. In addition to the evaluation at ORNL, calcula- 
tional programs of two different types are underway at NBS and at Project 
Civil. In addition, a theoretical study is underway in England and the work- 
ers there are utilizing the data available in the report of this experiment. 

III. SHIELDING EXPERIMENTS WITH OAK RIDGE HOMES 

To evaluate existing homes complete with normal furnishings and built on 
uneven and sloping terrain, a corollary experiment is being conducted in Oak 
Ridge, Tenn., by ORNL in collaboration with the AEC and local homeowners. 
Although not so basic as the study at the Nevada test site, the measurements in 
Oak Ridge will permit an extension of calculations based on the earlier funda- 
mental data and will yield experimental information for analyzing the shield- 
ing already generally available to the population. In addition, the data will be 
directly applicable to many homes in the communities which were initially 
established because of the atomic energy program, and in which the AEC neces- 
sarily has a vital interest. 

Mr. Holifield. I would like at this time to introduce a paper by Dr. 
Charles M. Eisenhauer of the Atomic and Radiation Physics Division 
of the National Bureau of Standards. 

Shielding From Fallout Radiation 

(By Charles M. Eisenhauer 8 ) 

In any realistic appraisal of the casualties that might result from fallout 
radiation, we must know how radiation dose rate levels are modified inside of 
buildings. Significant progress has been made during the past year, both in 
calculations and experiments, in obtaining answers to this question. I would 
like to indicate the nature of these calculations and experiments and to show 
some of the results which have been obtained. 

I. THEORETICAL STUDIES AT THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 

For many years the National Bureau of Standards has been engaged in a 
program to study the basic penetration properties of nuclear radiations. About 
3 years ago the Bureau undertook a study of the penetration of gama radiation 
in order to provide data on the penetration of fallout radiation into buildings. 
This work has been sponsored by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobiliaztion. 

The penetration of fallout radiation into buildings is illustrated schematically 
in figure 1, In calculating the dose rates inside of a structure it has been assumed 
that fallout particles are uniformly distributed on the roof and on the ground 
surrounding the structure. It has been further assumed that no fallout particles 
lie inside of the building. Under these assumptions, all radiation that reaches a 
person inside of the building must originate from radioactive particles outside 
and must penetrate through the walls and roof of the building. 



9 Born in New York City in 1930, Mr. Eisenhauer graduated from Queens College In 
1951, where he majored in mathematics. He also did graduate work in physics at Columbia 
University. ,He has worked at B,rookh a ven . National Laboratory in the field of experi- 
mental neutron physics and at the Armed Forces special weapons project on problems in 
gamma ray penetration. Now on the staff of the Atomic and Radiation Physics Division 
at the National Bureau of Standards, he is coordinating theoretical and experimental 
research on protection afforded by existing homes and structures against nuclear radiation. 
He is a member of the Radiation Shielding Subcommittee of the National Academy of 
Sciences Advisory Committee on Civil Defense. 



156 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 




0.001 



BARRIER THICKNESS IN INCHES OF CONCRETE 



Figube 4.— Attenuation of gamma radiation dose as a function of concrete barrier 
thickness for three different gamma ray source energies. The units of Eo are 
Mev. The curves were calculated for gamma radiation perpendicularly 
incident on the barrier 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



157 



0.00M 




BARRIER THICKNESS IN INCHES OF CONCRETE 



Figure 5. — Attenuation of gamma radiation dose as a function of concrete 
barrier thickness for three different angles of incidence. The curves were 
calculated for the energy distribution of fission product gamma rays at 1 hour 
after weapon burst. 



158 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 




O.OOI 



BARRIER THICKNESS IN INCHES OF CONCRETE 



Figuee 6. — Attenuation of gamma radiation dose as a function of concrete bar- 
rier thickness. The curve labeled "roof" gives attenuation of radiation from 
roof sources as it penetrates the roof and floors. The curve labeled "walls" 
gives the attenuation of radiation from ground sources as it penetrates the 
walls. Both curves were calculated for the energy distribution of fission 
product gamma rays at 1 hour after weapon burst. 

Shielding calculations have been made for the combination of angles 
corresponding to radiation from fallout on the roof and radiation from 
fallout on the surrounding ground. Attenuation curves for the two types 
of sources are shown in figure 6. Although these curves were calculated 
for the energy distribution of 1-hour fission products, the qualitative differ- 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



161 



HI. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL DEFENSE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RADIATION SHIELDING 

In the problem of shielding from fallout radiation, as well as in all scientific 
work, it is important that the theoretical and the experimental work be closely 
coordinated* With this in mind, the Advisory Committee on Civil Defense of 
the National Academy of Sciences formed a Subcommittee on Radiation Shield- 
ing. This subcommittee is composed of people who are actively engaged in 
either calculations or experiments. It includes representatives from the Office 
of Civil and Defense Mobilization, the National Bureau of Standards, Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory, the Defense Atomic Support Agency, the Naval Radio- 
logical Defense Laboratory, Technical Operations, Inc., and the University of 
California. It was formed last October and has met approximately once every 
3 months. This subcommittee also serves in an advisory capacity to OCDM in 
directing its research efforts on radiation shielding. 

Table 1. — Categorization of shelter areas 



Category 



A 

B 
C 



D. 



E. 



F. 



Protection factor 



1,000 or greater 

250tol,000_— 
50 to 250 _. 



10 to 50 - 



2 to 10 - 



lHto2 



Typical examples 



1. OCDM underground shelters. 

2. Subbasements of multistory buildings. 

3. Underground installations (mines, tunnels, etc.). 

1. OCDM basement fallout shelters (heavy masonry residences). 

2. Basements (without exposed walls) of multistory buildings. 
OCDM basement fallout shelters (frame and brick veneer resi- 
dences) . 

Central areas of basements (with partially exposed walls) of multi- 
story buildings. 

Central areas of floors near midheight of large multistory buildings 
with heavy exterior walls and floors. 

Basements (without exposed walls) of small 1- or 2-story buildings. 

Central areas of floors near midheight of large multistory buildings 
with light exterior walls and floors. 

1. Basements (partially exposed) of small 1- or 2-story buildings. 

2. Central areas of lower floors in large multistory buildings. 

3. Central areas on ground floor in 1- or 2-story buildings with heavy 

masonry walls. 
1. Aboveground areas of low buildings, in general, including residences 
stores, factories, etc. 



Table 2. — Shielding factors in some typical tight residential structures 1 

[Values deduced from experiment] 





Location 


Reduction factors 3 


Protec- 


Structure 


Roof 
contri- 
bution 


Ground 
contri- 
bution 


Total 


tion 
factor* 


2 story wood frame house 


2d floor center.. . 


0.076 
.034 
.015 
.10 
.034 
.015 


0.50 
.57 
.028 
.54 
.14 
.021 


0.58 
.60 
.043 
.64 
.17 
.036 


1.7 


1st floor center ■- - 


1.7 


1 story wood rambler 


Basement center,- _ 

1st floor center 


*23 
1.6 


2 story brick veneer house 


.... do 


Eg 




Basement center _ _ - 


*28 









i Values in this table are from an NBS report, to be published. (Ref. 17.) 

2 Reduction factor is denned as dose rate at the specified location divided by the dose rate outside at 3 feet 
above the ground. JJ xU 

* Protection factor is defined as dose rate at 3 feet above the ground, outside, divided by the dose rate at 
the specified location. 

* This factor applies to basements with no exposed walls, 

5 This factor applies only for detector locations below window sill level 



162 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF REPORTS ON STRUCTURE SHIELDING 

Experimental data 

1. J. A, Auxier, et al., "Experimental Evaluation of the Radiation Protection 
Afforded by Residential Structures Against Distributed Sources," CEX-58.1, 
January 1959. 

2. F. Titus, "Penetration in Concrete of Gamma Radiation From Fallout, 
NBS Report 6143, September 1958. 

3. J. R, Cunningham, et al., "Protection Factors for Houses Using Radioactive 
Sources/' Report DRCL-260, November 1957. 

4. R. T. Graveson, "Radiation Protection Within a Standard Housing Struc- 
ture," Report NYO-4714, November 1956. 

5 A G McDonald, "The Penetration of Gamma Radiation From a Uniform 
Contamination Into Houses—A First Report on Some Field Trials," Report 
CD/SA-69 (home office), January 1956. 

6 N. G. Stewart, et al., "The Shielding Provided by a Brick House Against 
the Gamma Radiation From a Uniformly Deposited Source. Experiments With 
Co 60 ," Report FWE-104, October 1955. (Official use only.) 

Calculations 

7 "Guide for Fallout Shelter Surveys" (preliminary edition ), Executive Office 
of the President, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, Washington, D.C., 
April 1959. 

8 R. R. Putz and E. Kuykendall, "A Comparison of Computed and Experi- 
mentally Observed Intensity Levels for Various Gamma Radiation Source Dis- 
tributions and Shielding Conditions in Residential Structures," University of 
California, Institute of Engineering Research, February 1959. 

9 R R Putz and A. Broido, "A Computation Method for Gamma Radiation 
Intensity in the Presidence of General Shielding and Source Configurations," 
Institute of Engineering Research, University of California, December 1957. 

10 "A Method for Evaluating the Protection Afforded by Buildings Against 
Fallout Radiation" (draft), Executive Office of the President, Office of Detense 

Mobilization, September 1957. .*.,,*.-« i 

11 C W. Malich and L. A. Beach, "Radiation Protection Afforded by Barracks 
and Underground Shelters," Report NRL-5017, September 1957. 

12 C. W. Malich and L. A. Beach, "Fallout Protection Afforded by Standard 
Enlisted Men's Barracks," Report NRL-4886, March 1957. 

13. Bureau of Yards and Docks, "Studies in Atomic Defense Engineering, Re- 
port NAYDOCKS-P-290, January 1957. ,_«**■ 

14. Home Office, Scottish Home Department, "Assessment of the Protection 
Afforded by Buildings Against Gamma Radiation from Fallout," May 1957. 
(Official Use Only.) 

Reports to be published 

15. L. V. Spencer, "Shielding from Fallout Radiation," OCDM publication. 

16 "Design and Review of Structures for Protection from Fallout Gamma 
Radiation," Executive Office of the President, Office of Civil and Defense Mobili- 
zation, 

17. C. Eisenhauer, "Analysis of Experiments on Light Residential Structures 
With Distributed CO m Sources", NBS report. 

18. J. F. Batter, Jr., A. Kaplan, Eric T. Clarke, "An Experimental Evaluation 
of the Radiation Protection Afforded by a Large Modern Concrete Office Build- 
ing," Technical Operations Inc., Report TOB-59-5. 

19. E. T. Clarke, J. F. Batter, Jr., A. Kaplan, "Measurement of Attenuation in 
Existing Structures of Radiation From Simulated Fallout," Technical Opera- 
tions Inc., Report T05-59-4. 

NB8 reports on penetration of gamma radiation 

20. L. V. Spencer and J. C. Lamkin, "Slant Penetration of Gamma-Rays : Mixed 
Radiation Sources," NBS 6322, February 1959. 

21. M. J. Berger and D. J. Raso, "Backscattering of Gamma Rays," NBS 5982, 
July 1958. 

22. L. V. Spencer and J. C. Lamkin, "Slant Penetration of Gamma-Rays in 
H 2 0." NBS 5944, July 1958. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 163 

23. A. T. Nelms and J. W. Cooper, "U ** Fission Product Decay Spectra at 
Various Times After Fission,*' NBS 5853, April 1958. 

24. M. J. Berger and J. C. Lamkin, "Sample Calculations of Gamma-Ray 
Penetration into Shelters : Contributions of Skyshine and Roof Contamination." 
NBS 5297, May 1957. 

25. J. H. Hubbell, "Dose Due to Distributed Gamma Ray Sources," NBS 
4928, November 1956. 

Representative Holifield. Are there any questions? Congress- 
man Hosmer? 

Representative Hosmer. No, sir. 

Representative Holifield. Thank you very much, sir, for your 
presentation. 

The meeting of the committee will be in this room in the morning. 
It has been previously announced publicly that we will go to the 
Supreme Court room, but we have been fortunate enough to obtain 
this larger room so we will have our hearings tomorrow in this room. 

Our first witness tomorrow morning will be Mr. Myron Hawkins, 
of the civil defense research project, University of California. There 
will be more testimony on the behavior of radioactive deposits. Then 
there will be a roundtable discussion on the basic properties and effects 
of radioactive fallout in which Dr. Paul Tompkins, Dr. Terry Triffet, 
Mr, Myron Hawkins, Mr. Joe Deal, Mr. Charles Shafer, Dr. Lester 
Machta, and Dr. Ralph Lapp will take part. Following that we will 
start in on the biological effects, and we have a number of witnesses 
on the biological effects. 

The committee stands adjourned. 

(Thereupon at 4:45 p.m., Monday, June 22, 1959, a recess was 
taken until Tuesday, June 23, 1959, at 10 a.m.) 



EFFECTS OP NUCLEAR WAR 



169 



Myron B. Hawkins (b. 1920), Engineer, University of California: 



most difficult problems are those associated with applying the theory to specific 
situations. The applications of theory to generalized environmental conditions 
in a valid manner is even more difficult. Many of the variables that must be 
considered in practical applications are not well defined and described. One 
example of this uncertainty is the characteristics of the fallout material. It is 
obvious that if we are to predict the behavior of fallout around terrain features 
accurately, we must be able to describe the fallout material. However, as 
Dr. Triffett has mentioned, the size of the radioactive particles may vary consid- 
erably for different types of detonations (5). For instance, if the detonations 
are in deep water the particles will generally be small, whereas if the detona- 
tions are on sandy soil, a wide variety of sizes will be produced with the mean 
particle size being larger than that from a sea-water detonation. Intermediate 
conditions may occur with detonations in harbors or on the surface of clay soils, 
and we do not know how to predict what sizes may occur. Another variation is 
related to the * 'stickiness" which is considerable for some types of fallout 
particles but negligible for others. 

After the period of the initial cloud formation, the particles resulting from the 
detonation are acted on principally by two forces : gravity and the force of the 
wind. The following table indicates the approximate angle from the horizontal 
at which fallout particles approach the surface of the earth. 

Table I. — Trajectory angles {in degrees from horizontal) for various size 
spherical particles (spgr.—8) in 70° F. air at sea level 

[In degrees] 





Particle size, microns 




30 


100 


300 


1,000 


Horizontal wind velocity: 


m 


13^ 
4^ 
2H 


45 

18H 
9H 


71 




UH 




26H 







Only for the largest sizes and under very low wind speeds do the particles 
approach the earth at a steep angle. Otherwise, the angle of approach and contact 
with the earth is small. 

As is well known, the wind patterns near the surface of the earth are modified 
by terrain features as well as by manmade structures (6). The air flows up, 
over, and around any obstruction. Small particles tend to follow the path of 
the air whereas the larger heavier particles tend to continue in their trajectory 
in spite of changes in the direction of airflow. This effect is, of course, related 
to inertia and if the change in air direction is gradual, there is a greater tendency 
for all of the particles to follow the air, although gravitational forces continue to 
influence the overall resultant trajectory. 

Around very small objects, such as twigs and small branches, the changes in 
air direction are very sudden and even very small particles will impact on the 
objects. If the obstructions are somewhat larger, say up to the size of large 
buildings, the changes of air direction are less sudden, and we can expect only 
the larger particles to be impacted on the obstructions. The smaller particles 
will follow the air and not contact the obstruction. It should be noted that 
although a particle impacts on a vertical surface, it will not stay there unless the 
surface or the particle is "sticky" or the surface has near-horizontal irregulari- 
ties, or the electrostatic forces are large. Dr. Corcos has summarized the 
impaction phenomena with some idealized examples : 

(a) For terrain consisting of horizontal areas and solid vertical cylindrical 
obstructions about 5 feet in diameter, particles 75 microns and less in diameter 
will deposit only on horizontal surfaces and will not be impacted on the ob- 
struction, except when the wind velocity exceeds 30 knots. Larger particles will 
impinge on the obstruction, with the amount of "catch" increasing with particle 
size. 

(.6) Similarly, if the solid obstruction is 100 feet in diameter, particles up to 
350 microns in diameter will bypass the obstruction if the wind has a velocity 
of 10 knots or less. 



172 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

The basic natural forces of prime importance in migration appear to be wind, 
rain, and waterflow. 

All of us are aware of the general phenomena of soil erosion by wind. Dr. 
W. S. Chepil, of the Agricultural Research Service, has studied this phenomenon 
extensively (16, 17). Briefly, his conclusions are as follows: 

(a) If a smooth surface of noncohesive soil is exposed to winds, particles 
in the size range 50 to 500 microns are highly erosible. Both larger and smaller 
particles are difficult to erode. 

(6) If the area is sufficiently large, the erosive action of the 50-500 micron 
particles will dislodge smaller particles and break up the larger particles by 
impaction. 

(c) The larger particles of eroded material will not travel far but will be 
redeposited generally in the surface depressions throughout the area ; whereas 
the very small particles (i.e., less than 20 microns or so) that are "kicked up" 
by other particles may form dust clouds that are carried great distances from 
their source 

(d) Erodibility tends to decrease with increase in surface roughness and with 
the amount of vegetation present. The erosion of soil from a grassy plot is 
negligible. 

(e) Only dry soils are moved by the wind. 

(/) The lowest wind velocity that can produce soil erosion is 9 to 10 miles 
per hour (measured at a 12-inch height), and under field conditions, erosion 
usually does not become perceptible until the velocity exceeds 13 miles per 
hour. 

These findings can be applied qualitatively to the erosion of fallout by wind as 
follows : 

(a) One would expect the dry fallout to be eroded from tilled fields or 
fields with sparse vegetation in a manner similar to soil of the same particle size 
range. Similarly, dry fallout particles on paved areas would be blown to areas 
where the surface roughness, vegetation, and obstructions trap them more 
permanently. If the areas are small, however, many of the very small and 
the very large particles may remain in place. 

(ft) Fallout on areas covered with vegetation will not appreciably be carried 
off by wind. 

These conclusions are supported in general by others (10, 18, 19). Dr. Dun- 
ning (20) reports that the maximum radiation intensities from a narrow 
fallout pattern on the Nevada desert were reduced considerably by the action 
of strong winds. Such results are to be expected if the fallout path is narrow, 
e.g., that produced by a very small surface detonation. 

The action of rain is much more complex. At the civil defense research 
project, we have studied this problem in connection with hazards of fallout in 
water supplies (21, 22), Fallout from a detonation on a land surface tends to 
separate into three parts upon contact with water: settleable solids (particles 
larger than 0.1 micron in size), nonsettleable insoluble colloids (particles 
between 0.001 and 0.1 micron in diameter), and soluble materials. It is pri- 
marily important to know the fraction of radioactive material associated with 
each part. If fallout lands on a body of water, the basic separation takes 
place rapidly (23). Subsequently, the large particles may settle out but the 
solubles and colloids tend to follow the water unless some physical action 
removes them. 

Unfortunately, we know very little about how to predict for any given 
fallout deposit what fraction of the radioactive material is in each of the 
three parts. The information we do have is meager. It appears, however, that 
about half of the radioactive material in the fallout from a detonation in deep 
sea water is of the soluble or colloidal variety (5). If this is the case, it is 
largely in a form that after deposition would adsorb on soil or vegetation. 
The close-in fallout from surface and underground detonations in Nevada 
appears to have less than 2 or 3 percent of the radioactive material in a soluble 
form (5), although some fallout fractions collected at greater distances from 
the detonation by Dr. Larson's group have been "soluble" to the extent of 40 
percent (7). It has been reported that the long-range fallouts landing on 
Great Britain is about 50 percent "soluble" (24) . 

If the detonations occur on or near the surface of clay soils (which are 
common in the United States), we cannot predict the size distribution or solu- 
bility of fallout with any degree of reliability (5). Most of the following dis- 



174 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Engineering Research, University of California. Series 2, issue 20. (In prep- 
aration.) 

3. Read, R. R. : "Interim Report : Technique for Designing and Employing a 
Radiological Monitoring System for the Event of Attack." Civil Defense Re- 
search Project, Institute of Engineering Research, University of California. 
Series 2, issue 22. (In preparation.) 

4. Corcos, G. M. : "On the Small-Scale Non-Homogeneity of Fallout Deposi- 
tion." Civil Defense Research Project, Institute of Engineering Research, 
University of California. Series 2, issue 2, October 30, 1958. 

5. Triffett, Terry : USNRDL, personal communication, June 1959. 

6. "Meterology and Atomic Energy." Atomic Energy Commission, AECU- 
3066, July 1955. 

7. Nishita, H. and K. H. Larson : "Summary of Certain Trends in Soil-Plant 
Relationship Studies of the Biological Availability of Fall-Out Debris." UCLA- 
401, July 18, 1957. 

8. Brittain, R. W. : "The Effect of Plant Surfaces on Pesticidal Dust Deposi- 
tion." Thesis, Michigan State College, 1954. 

9. Langbein, W. B. et al. : "Annual Runoff in the U.S." U.S. Geological Sur- 
vey Circular No. 52, June 1959. 

10. Machta, L. and K. M. Nagler : "Meteorology—Fallout and Weathering/' 
In "Symposium — The Shorter Term Biological Hazards of a Fallout Field," 
AEC-DOD. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 

11. Broido, A. and A. W. McMasters : "The Influence of a Fire Induced Con- 
vection Column on Radiological Fallout Patterns." Civil Defense Research, 
Institute of Engineering Research, University of California. Series 2, issue 13, 
February 2, 1959. 

12. Sheffield, E. T. : "Buffer Zones Required in the Reclamation of Radiologi- 
cally Contaminated Areas." USNRDL-TR-31, January 1955. 

13. Ksanda, C. F., A. Moskin and E. S. Shapiro : "Gamma Radiations from a 
Rough Infinite Plane." USNRDL-TR-108, January 18, 1956. 

14. "Proceedings of the Shielding Symposium Held at the U.S. Naval Radiologi- 
cal Defense Laboratory, October 17-19, 1956. USNRDL-RLr-29, February 1, 

1957. 

15. Hill, J. E. : "Effects of Environment in Reducing Dose Rates Produced by 
Radioactive Fallout from Nuclear Explosions." Rand Corp., RM-1285-1, 
September 28, 1954. 

16. Chepil, W. S. : "Soil Conditions that Influence Wind Erosion." USDA 
Technical Bulletin No. 1185, June 1958. 

17. Chepil, W. S. and N. P. Woodruff : "Estimations of Wind Erodibility from 
Farm Fields." USDA Agricultural Research Service, Product Research Report 
No. 25, March 1959. 

18. Hilst, G. R. : "Measurements of Relative Wind Erosion of Small Particles 
from Various Prepared Surfaces." HW-39356, October 5, 1955. 

19. Healy, J. W. and J. J. Fuquay: "Wind Pickup of Radioactive Particles 
from the Ground." Second U.N. Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy, A/Conf . 15/P/391, June 1958. 

20. Dunning, G. M.: "Radiations from Fallout and their Effects," in "The 
Nature of Radioactive Fallout—," p. 170, JCAE, 1957. 

21. Kaufman, W. J. and H. F. Dennin : "Interim Report on Radiological De- 
fense of Water Utilities." University of California Project "Civil," April 15, 

1957. 

22. Hawkins, M. B. : "Summary of Problems Relating to Local Fallout Con- 
tamination of Water Supplies." Civil Defense Research Project Institute of 
Engineering Research, University of California. Series 2, issue 14, February 24, 

1959. 

23. Lowe, H. N., Jr., et al. : "Solubility Characteristics of Radioactive Bomb 
Debris in Water and Evaluation of Selected Decontamination Procedures." 
ERDL, February 1959. 

24. Medical Research Council (Great Britain) : "The Hazards to Man of Nu- 
clear and Allied Radiations," London, 1956. 

25. Hoyt, W. G. and W. B. Langbein : "Floods." Princeton University Press, 
1955, 

26! Duley, F. L. and L. L. Kelly : "Effect of Soil Type, Slope and Surface Con- 
ditions on the Intake of Water." University of Nebraska, Agricultural Experi- 
mental Station Research Bulletin No. 112, May 1939. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



175 



27. Whittaker, J. R. and E. A. Ackerman : "American Research." Harcourt, 

1951. .,.„„„ 

28. Hawkins, M. B. and W. S. Kenrer : "Feasibility and Applicability of Roof 
Washdown Systems." USNRDI^TR-232, May 7, 1958. 

29. Ellison. W. D. : "Soil Erosion Studies," parts I-VI. Agricultural Engineer, 
vol. 28, No. 4^10, pp. 145-146, 197-201, 245-248, 297-300, 349-351, 402-408, 
442-450, April-October 1951. 

30. Straub, C. P., and L. R. Setter : "Distribution of Radioactivity from Rain." 
Transactions, American Geophysical Union, vol. 39, pp. 451-458, July 1958. 

31. "Report of the Joint Program of Studies on the Decontamination of 
Radioactive Waters." ORNLr-Taft S.E.C., ORNI^-2557, February 9, 1959. 

32. Ijacy, W. J. : "Removal of Radioactive Fallout from Contaminated Water 
Supplies," "The Nature of Radioactive Fallout—," p. 2054^-2058, JCAE, 1957. 

33. Baum, S. : "Adherence of Fallout to Trees and Shrubs." Enclosure to let- 
ter, USNRDL to OCDM, January 20, 1959. 

Mr. Hawkins. If, for instance, we have an object sitting on the 
surface of the ground and the wind is blowing, the wind will pass 
around either side of such an object. The amount of material that 
is impacted on the front surface is dependent primarily on the size of 
the particles, the speed of the wind, and the size of the object. If 
the object itself is a small twig the wind patterns will pass around 
it like so (fig. II) . The wind may be highly turbulent on the lee side. 
Very small particles tend to follow the airflow closely. A large particle 
because of its inertia is not going to turn the corner and may be cast 
out by "centrifugal" force, and be impacted on the surface of such an 
object. If the objects are very small (in dimension A), say the size 
of twigs, these changes in wind direction are very sudden and even 
very small particles may impact a twig. 



SnaU particles tend 
to follow air flow 



Large particles tend 
to impact on cylinder 




Figure II 
Idealized pattern of air flow around a cylindrical object, plan view. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 187 

Basic Properties and Effects of Radioactive Fallout 

factors modifying the behavior of deposited contaminants 

(By Sanford Baum, 1 U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory) 

Estimates of the radiological hazard caused by the fallout from megaton-range 
weapons are usually obtained either from measurements carried out in the 
Pacific or by the application of fallout prediction methods. In general, neither 
of these sources involves direct measurement of fallout which is actually de- 
posited on a land surface. In the case of measurements from the Pacific area, 
most of the fallout is deposited in the ocean. It is necessary to reconstruct, 
from measurements of the activity left near the ocean surface, the radiation 
contours which would have resulted had the same deposition occurred over 
land. Descriptions of the hazard produced by megaton weapons must contain 
an assumption about the land surfaces over which fallout is expected to occur. 
The assumption most frequently made is that the fallout producing the hazard 
in a given locality is uniformly distributed over an infinitely large plane. Occa- 
sionally, this assumption is modified to take the roughness of the terrain into 
account. A second assumption is that, once the fallout is deposited on the 
plane, it remains fixed and the only changes in radiation intensity are due to 
radioactive decay. 

When potential targets in the United States are considered, neither of these 
assumptions is necessarily justified. The targets contain both natural and man- 
made objects which obviously depart from the conditions of the first assumption. 
Wind, rain, or snow can either move the deposited contaminant or cover it with 
inert material such as snow or sand. It is recognized that all of these factors 
can modify the predicted degree of hazard. 

The effect of weather on the deposited contaminant has been discussed by 
Machta and Nagler (1). Fallout particles in the atmosphere may be trapped 
in rain or snow. Once they reach the ground they can be washed into the 
ground or carried away by runoff. The latter effect is more important usually, 
because, once the airspaces in the ground are filled with water, most of the addi- 
tional water will run off into streams, carrying along more of the radioactive 
particles. 

Fallout deposited in the dry form can be affected by rain or snow. Significant 
transport will result when raindrops dislodge particles in strong winds or on 
slopes with as little as 10-percent grade. The winds can move the particles 
directly. The primary factor here is size of the fallout particle. Particles 
whose diameters range from 50 to 500 microns are the most easily moved. In 
areas of significant hazard particles in this range are responsible for most of 
the radiation { 2 ) . In general, the movement of these particles will result in a 
net lowering in the regions of high intensity and some extension of the fringe 
areas. 

There is little quantitative information on these topics. Qualitative evidence 
which, in the main, supports the above conclusions have been described by 
Strope (3). The problem is complicated because of the variability in the meteor- 
ological parameters. In general, the effect of weather is to reduce the predicated 
intensities. 

Experiments to determine the change in hazard caused by gross differences 
in natural terrain have been performed. Equal amounts of a radioactive isotope 
were placed in an identical manner on equal areas with varying degrees of 
roughness. The roughness ranged from that of a smooth concrete slab to that 
of a wooded hilly field. It was found that the hazard decreased with increasing 
roughness. At the standard height of 3 feet, the radiation from the roughest 
surface was two-thirds that of the smoothest. Differences caused by varying 
surfaces of measurement tend to disappear with increasing height. Comparisons 
have been made between a fallout-contaminated Nevada area and computed 
results based on the flat plane assumption (5). It was found that in the real 
case, the deposited fallout behaves as if it were uniformly mixed to some shallow 
depth, of the order of an inch, in the soil. This implies that the flat plane value 
will be too high (4, 5, 6). Another consequence of this difference is that in an 



1 Chemist, Military Evaluations Division, U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, 
San Francisco, Calif. Date of birth : Oct. 22, 1924. Married : Two children. Educa- 
tion ; B.S. in chemistry, University of California, 1951. 

43338—59 13 



Igg EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

area partially free of fallout, the radiation intensity first increases and then 
decreases as the height of measurement over the cleared area increases- The 
latter consequence is of importance in considering the shelter afforded by multi- 
story buildings. Comparisons between calculated values obtained on the basis of 
the infinite plane and observed radiation intensities were possible for one event 
and location in the Pacific (7) . It was found that the ratio of observed to calcu- 
lated intensities varied with time. Ratios of 0.45, 0.66, and 0.56 were found at 
11.2, 100 to 200, and 370 to 1,000 hours, respectively. 

The role of vegetation and trees, which could in effect elevate some ol the 
fallout above the surrounding ground level, has been examined by Baum (8) 
It was concluded that the amount of radiation contributed by the fallout at- 
tached to vegetation or trees would be small when compared to that emanating 
from the ground. This situation was considered by Lindberg (9), whose worfc 
(10 11) in Nevada, provided much of the data used by Baum. Lindberg also 
concluded that the contribution from contaminated plants would be small. It 
was recognized by all concerned that rather large extrapolations were required 
to reach the conclusion and that more direct evidence was desirable. 

When the fallout occurs over a community, a number of departures from the 
infinite plane case are encountered. Part of the fallout that would have been 
deposited on the ground is now resting on roofs. This has the effect of reducing 
the predicted intensity by (1) placing the fallout a greater distance away from 
the standard measuring point near the ground, and (2) interposing material 
between the fallout and the measuring point. Walls interpose material between 
the measuring point and fallout deposited on streets and unpaved areas. The 
reductions achieved are dependent on the dimensions and composition of the 
structures and in their placement relative to one another. Methods for predict- 
ing these reductions have been published (12, 13, 14). An indication of the 
effect of adjacent structures, in heavily built-up urban areas, is given by the 
following numbers. The values listed are the reductions in intensity in an 
area adjacent to one or more streets. 

Number of adjacent streets 1 2 3 4 

Reduction of predicted intensity 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 

Application of these numbers should be made with discretion and only after 
reference to the original source (12). This requirement holds for all such 

numbers. . 

In the presence of even moderate winds, vertical surfaces such as walls intro- 
duce an additional perturbation. Under these conditions more particles are, in 
essence, flowing toward the walls than are falling to the ground. In spite of 
this fact, it has been observed that the ratio of horizontal to vertical contamina- 
tion may vary between 5 to 1 and 300 to 1 (3). Either the particles strike the 
vertical surfaces and then fall to the ground at its foot, or because of airstream 
effects, the particles flow around the vertical surfaces. Comparisons have been 
made (3) between the contamination found on horizontal surfaces at the head 
and foot of vertical surfaces. No significant differences were found. The inves- 
tigation also found that there were no differences between the front and back 
sides of vertically oriented surfaces. These observations can be explained on 
the basis of flow around the surfaces. A theoretical study of airstream phe- 
nomena has been published (15). It predicts that 75-micron particles will de- 
posit only on horizontal surfaces and that inhomogeneites will occur rarely and 
over small areas. Inhomogeneites in deposition are expected to occur with par- 
ticles around the 350-micron size. The most common effect will be a decrease in 
deposition on the roof and lee of large buildings. No upper limit can be set on 
the maximum concentration which may be found under adverse circumstances. 
It has been reported that the best available estimate of the range of significant 
particle sizes in areas of hazardous fallout is 50 to 400 microns (2) . 

Most of the experimental evidence quoted was obtained under the conditions 
that exist at the test sites. Extrapolation to U.S. targets involves the deposi- 
tion of a possibly different contaminant into an environment very unlike that en- 
countered at the sites. Hopefully, the difficulties inherent in the latter circum- 
stance can be surmounted by investigations now underway at NRDL or else- 
where. Lack of knowledge concerning the basics of the fallout formation 
process precludes any definitive statement about the probable nature of the 
fallout from U.S. targets. Consequently the extrapolation cannot be performed 
with confidence. Within this limitation, it has been found that the overall 
effects of terrain and weather reduce the hazard predicted on the basis of cur- 
rent assumptions. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 189 



REFERENCES 



1. Proceedings from the symposium on "The Shorter-Term Biological Hazards 
of a Fallout Field," edited by Dunning, G. M. and Hilcken, J. A. ; Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. (Decem- 
ber 12-14, 1956). 

2. Baum, S. "Current Status of Contaminant Phenomenology" USNRDL re- 
port in final preparation for OCDM. 

3. Earl, I. R., et al. "Protection and Decontamination of Land Targets and 
Vehicles," project 6.2, Operation Jangle, WT-400 AFSWP (June 1952) secret, 
R.D. 

4. Mahoney, J. J., and Price, R. B., "Experimental Tests of Shielding and 
Attenuation of Gamma Radiation From Radioactive Tantalum Versus Infinite 
Plane Theory," CRLIR-94 (January 1952) secret, R.D. 

5. Ksanda, 0. F., et al. "Gamma Radiations From a Rough Infinite Plane," 
USNRDI^TR-108 (January 1956) . 

6. Ksanda, C. F., et al. "Gamma Radiations From Contaminated Planes and 
Slabs," USNRDL-TM-27 (January 1955). 

7. Triffet, T., and La Rivere, P. D., "Characterization of Fallout," volume I, 
project 2.63, Operation Redwing, final report in review by AFSWP (August 
1958) , secret. 

8. FF letter to OCDM, from CO, USNRDL, "Adherence of Fallout to Trees 
and Shrubs," WES : 910 (January 1959) . 

9. Letter to OCDM, from R. G. Lindberg, University of California Medical 
Center, Department and Laboratories of Nuclear Medicine and Radiation 
Biology, Los Angeles, Calif., dated March 26, 1959. 

10. Lindberg, R. G., et al. "The Factors Influencing the Biological Fate and 
Persistence of Radioactive Fallout," Operation Teapot, ITR-1177 (August 1955), 
confidential, R.D. 

11. Lindberg, R. G., et al. "Environmental and Biological Fate of Fallout 
From Nuclear Detonations in Areas Adjacent to the Nevada Proving Grounds," 
Operation Upshot-Knothole, WT-812 (February 1954) confidential, R.D. 

12. "Guide for Fallout Shelter Surveys, Interim Edition," Office of Civil and 
Defense Mobilization, Battle Creek, Mich. (February 1959). 

13. "Radiological Recovery of Fixed Military Installations, Interim Revision " 
TM 3-225 or NAVDOCKS-TP-PI^13, Departments of the Army and the Navv 
(April 1958). 

14. "A Method for Evaluating the Protection Afforded by Buildings Against 
Fallout Radiation," Office of Defense Mobilization, Washington, D.C. (Septem- 
Der ±t/0 i / * 

15. Corcos, G. M-, "In the Small-Scale Nonhomogeneity of Fallout Deposition" 
University of California, Institute of Engineering Research, Berkeley, Calif 
(October 1958). 

Eepresenf ative Holifield. At this time I will ask the panel mem- 
bers to come forward. 

KOUND TABLE PANEL DISCUSSION ON THE BASIC PEOPEETIES 
AND EFFECTS OF RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT 

Participants : Dr. Paul Tompkins, Naval Radiological Defense Lab- 
oratory; Dr. Terry Triffet, Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory; 
Mr. Myron Hawkins, civil defense research project, University of 
California; Mr. Charles Shafer, Office of Civil Defense Mobilization- 
Dr Lester Machta, U.S. Weather Bureau; Mr. L. Joe Deal, Division 
of Biology and Medicine, AEC ; and Dr. Ralph Lapp, independent 
pnysicist* 

Representative Holifield. The panel has been convened in an effort 
to clarify and consolidate an understanding of the specific technical 
points upon which an agreement exists and a clarification of those 
areas in which disagreement is apparent. In line with the commit- 
tee s objective in bringing before the public, in an understandable 



EFFECTS OF 1STUCLEAR WAR 197 

of the induced radiation in uranium 238. We can refer to a British 
report which indicates that around 60 percent of the total activity 
at 4 davs— activity m this case is the number of disintegrations — is" 
due tothe uranium 239 and neptunium 239~that are produced, as the 
^British say, m either large or small weapons. I believe part of theT 
hump on the curves m tne early times, say around 4 days, is largely 
due to this. The neptunium does not have extremely energetic radia- 
tions so that, the radiation intensity is not quite proportionate to the" 
disintegration. But, nevertheless^ it does have a significant i nfluence 
at those tim es., ~~ ~ 

Representative Holifield. It seems to me this makes a great deal 
of difference in the protection of survivors in case of nuclear attack. 
The accumulation of roentgens being more intense at first, if shelter 
or shielding could be provided from those effects for the immediate 
intense period, then there would be lesser danger in the latter 6 months 
of the year or in the following year. Is this not true ? I am going 
to get back now to Mr. Shafer because I know he has something to 
say. 

Mr. Shafer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to point out 
actually the degree of difference with regard to what Dr. Lapp dis- 
cussed and what t -1 - 2 would indicate. 

Dr. Lapp indicated that with his assumption the dose during the 
first 24 hours, with an initial dose rate of 2,500 roentgens per hour at 
H plus one, would be 8,150 roentgens. The t* 1,2 indicates that the 
dose during the first day would be 6,000 roentgens. This is 6,000 
versus 8,150. That is not much of an increase, but this is not the main 
point I am bringing up. The point I am emphasizing is that within 
OCDM we are well aware of these uncertainties. This is why we have 
recommended a shielding factor much greater than would be required 
based on the t~ 12 assumptions. 

With regard to the latter part of the spectrum, the period subse- 
quent to 2 weeks, you will recall that I stated yesterday, Mr. Chairman, 
we have little confidence in the dose calculations indicated on the 3- 
month chart. We showed an increase between 2 weeks and 3 months 
of about 2,000 roentgens in the most intense area. In these time periods 
beyond 2 weeks I stated that we had very little confidence in any dose 
computations and perhaps in lieu of 2,000 this dose might well be as 
low as 1,000 roentgens during the period from 2 weeks to 3 months. 
We are fully cognizant of these uncertainties, sir, and take them 
fully into account in our OCDM survival and recovery planning. 

Eepresentative Holifield. Did you have any comment on that, Dr. 
Tompkins? 

Dr. Tompkins. I think, Mr. Holifield, the main point I wanted to 
bring ouMs that the application of this type of information since 
1957 has improved to the point where one should recognize openly 
that the t" 1 - 2 law is not a basic law. It is an approximation. As long 
as people understand it is an approximation and use it correctly and 
intelligently, this will be all right. 

Eepresentative Holifield. This is why, if I had been in Mr. Shaf er's 
position, I would have said, according to the data of 3 years ago, this is 
the reading we have, but according to newer data it may be twice that 
much. Then we would have had figures, I think, which would more 
approximate the new data. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 205 

Dr. Tkiffet. Yes. I thought this might be an appropriate place to 
comment on the variation of the averagj"energy. it is clear when 
voirthink of shielding, because the effectiven^soF shielding depends 
directly on the average energy ra.diflf.ion from tiie deposiiSamaterial. 
As 1 mentioned, l)r. (Jook at our laboratory has done quite a bit _o£. 
work on this. What it amounts to is that at one hour the awage 
energy is about one Mev. This appears, by the way, in the tables that 
are in my written statement but that I did not present orally. 

Eepresentative Holifield. Mev. means ? 

Dr. Tkiffet. Million electron volts. At 2 hours it drops to 0.95. 
At a half day, to 0.6. At 1 week it drops to 0.35. Then it begins to 
go up again. At 1 month, it is 0.65, 2 months 0.65. The meaning of 
this is simply that there is a period around 1 week when if induced 
pro ducts are important in the bomb, there are~alot of radiations 
l^namttlng from these, but t h e energy is low so"ir5perates to reduce 
the average energ y in this period and sh ielding is imnimsely_mo^ 
effective. 

"Representative Holifield. Did you have an additional comment on 
that, Dr. Lapp ? jsr~L&ff TfiftM& ~%> &£~T /U<r&£ JftT& I 

Dr. Lapp. I think you would not include sodium in that category. 

Dr. Triffet. No. This is an environmental effect. The activity I 
was referring to is an induced activity in the weapon. 

Eepresentative Holifield. I believe it was testified yesterday that 
the buildings 25 miles away would suffer a great deal of glass damage 
from a 10-megaton weapon. In view of the fact that we have several 
million schoolchildren in schools throughout the Nation and most of 
these schools have a very high percentage of exterior walls and glass, 
will not this constitute, within itself, one of the great hazards in this 
type of war? I am thinking of the areas that are far removed, as 
far as 15 or 25 miles, from the immediate blast damage in the central 

area. 

Would this not constitute a tremendous damaging factor ? 

Mr. Deal. Mr. Chairman, I might be stealing some of Dr. White's 
thunder, who is testifying on the blast problem this afternoon 

Eepresentative Holifield. We will withhold that because we don't 
want to steal anybody's thunder. It is bad enough to steal their 
radioactivity. There is one factor we considered on all these different 
bombs. They have been surface bursts. The factor of extension of 
the heat of the fireball has been predicated upon the surface atmos- 
phere, the close-to-ground atmosphere, the thickness or humidity or 
other qualities in the earth's atmosphere. Would there be a difference 
in a bomb exploded, let us say, 25 miles in the air. I am thinking of 
heat transference, or 40 miles in the air, as against the transference of 
heat along the ground level. If so, what would that factor of five be ? 
We recognize that the air gets thinner as it goes up and there would 
be less resistance to heat transference. I think Dr. Shelton testified 
to that. He is not here today. 

Is there anybody who would like to pick that up ? 

Dr. Tompkins. I will start in qualitatively, Mr. Holifield. I think 
what would happen is that as the altitude went up the increased frac- 
tion of the total energy going out in the thermal would increase the 
amount of heat generated. 



208 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAE WAR 

because we can put a hole in it. The second thing that it does is that 
it gives maximum blast pressures. By being close to the ground it 
also maximizes the fallout radiation problems. 

The attack pattern we have more or less evens out all of the effects 
and gives a good coverage of each. 

Representative Holifield. From the standpoint of striking a bal- 
ance, then, you would say that this attack pattern the committee has 
presented is a balanced attack pattern and takes into consideration 
most of these factors ? 

Dr. Tompkins. From the standpoint of the relative weapons effects 
it is a good balance. This is quite apart from any military character- 
istics. 

Eepresentative Holifield. Mr. Shafer, you had your hand up a 
moment ago. 

Mr. Shafer^ With regard to irregularities of fallout deposition, 
Dr. Triffet shm ged_ y ester day an a nalysis of a multime^atoi^detona- 
tion in the Pacific in which tlierlTwas a 1555 ^^ 
jthe fall ou t with sever alhot sp ots. 7" — — 

" 1 woulpriike to make i t clear^to^tlie committee that this part icular. 
jypQ pJ^^^^^avi O-r, sudG^asexSteln^e So uthT^inA is verj^ypi- 
,cal as far as the ^^^^S^^^Ts^m ^ ^^dT We dojiotlhaye TtKFtype 
of wi ndnSStavTor in the JJnitedHStates except T polgsiMy in the (xuT T 
"States in the summertime, only ongs gason out of four. In the partic- 
ular season we had under study, the^fall seasdnptXctober 17, 1958, 
the tropical easterlies did not exist anywhere in the United States and 
up to 60,000 feet altitude there were no easterlies even in the high 
stratospheric regions. So that the pattern which Dr. Machta showed 
would be more typical of what we could expect. But the primary 
thing that I want to point out is that in the event of an actual emer- 
gency we would not go through this theoretical approach to determine 
the location of fallout. We would do this by monitoring. To this 
effect we have distributed some 90,000 survey meters to the States and 
the local governments, some 60,000 to the Federal Government, and 
an additional 60,000 to the high schools. In the event of an emer- 
gency all of these 200,000 plus instruments would be used to rapidly 
monitor the fallout. 

Eepresentative Houfield. Are these mostly instruments that show 
radioactivity but do not quantitatively measure it ? 

Mr. Shafer. They do both, sir. They detect it and indicate the 
dose rate in roentgens per hour, both gamma and beta discrimination 
and they indicate the accumulated dose. 

Eepresentative Holifield. How often are they calibrated, and are 
they depen dable ? 

Mr. Shafer. At the present time we are developing a calibration 
program. Some of the States, California, New York, and others are 
doing very well in calibrating their instruments. We are developing 
a calibration instrument using 20 curies of cesium 137 which will 
allow all of the States to calibrate their instruments. Further, our 
monitoring instruments are very dependable. 

As you know, we do^ have before the Congress at the present time 
legislation to get sufficient funds to procure monitoring instruments. 
Additional instruments will be needed this year to set up some 37,000 
monitoring points across the United States. We have asked for $8.5 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



217 



the "Effects of Nuclear Weapons" must be looked upon as a practical lower 
limit. 

Local fallout consists of relatively heavy debris which is deposited near the 
site of detonation within 1 day. The fission yield curve is characterized by 
high yields in the vicinity of mass numbers 85 to 100 and 135 to 145. In the 
first group of mass numbers there are many primary fission products belonging 
to the elements bromine and krypton, while in the other group iodine and 
xenon head up the fission chains. Strontium 90, for example, has 33-second 
krypton as its birth predecessor ; cesium 137 derives from a fission chain headed 
up by 22-seeond iodine, followed by 3.9-minute xenon. Because of their vola- 
tile or gaseous ancestry in the fireball or bomb cloud a number of the high- 
yield fission products are formed in finely divided particles. Some of these are 
so small that they are not subject to gravitational settling, and in fact they 
remain suspended in the earth's atmosphere for many years, providing 8 that 
they reach the stratosphere at the proper latitude. In any event such fission 
products would be depleted in the local fallout. It is difficult to allow for this 
depletion since it depends upon the magnitude and mode of the detonation as 
well as upon local meteorology. 

ADDITIONAL RADIOACTIVITY 

Little attention has been given to the hazards presented by radioactive prod- 
ucts produced in nonfission reactions in the bomb itself, or in the local environ- 
ment. In the case of the bomb material there is the hazard formed by the 
transuranic elements. For example, the irradiation of uranium 238 w ithjow . 
Mev. neutrons forms neptunium SsJOn? *?„;3ay_j^L^^ 




would rise to 23 perce nt, reachin ^^j^jaj^inTUjn^ofJjO percent at 4 day&__ There-. 
"afterjt would fa ll to"4^pereent"at 1 week, to 12 percent at 2 w^eeks aM^oJLess^ 
~ than^Tperce nt by l^molu c lir~~Th^r rliaTaTimn~lTu¥To neptunium is by no means" 

insignificant althoughTxTcloes turn out to be less than the dosage from fission 

products. This will become clear when we examine the rate of decay of the 

fission products. 
At_higher neutron energies, such as ce rta in ^ypes_of thermonuclear weapons 

produce" natural uranium unde rgoes a rTTm^i^ 
~TasF SsT on in TT*" .The data of B. jrHowe rtc^Siow thatTu 238 hasjTft ^on" 

cross^ section of 0.6Jbarn fromJ^o6M^ 



j^ ue oTljBarn^for neutrons uyfoTJllev, "At 6.6 Me y^ there is a threshoIcTTor 
The (^n,2n j^reaction and the reaction has a_cr^£sec tion~of 1.4 b arns inTh e range 
j2 LIOLSS^" -Phe rea dy identification o f U 237 _ in fallo ut pointsTo fastH Tssion of 
IJ 2 ^ 8 a,s aj riaih energy source in high-yield megaton-class weapons. 

Nucle^F*weapons ne^essarily^cohtain significant amounts of elements ( stain- 
less steel, for example) which may add to the bomb's radioactivity. This in- 
duced activity is probably small although certain long-lived emitters such as 
cobalt 60 may be produced in significant amounts if small amounts of nickel 
and cobalt are present. P. O. Strom 9 and his associates have observed the pres- 
ence of cobalt isotopes in local fallout from the Redwing series of tests in 1956. 
Presumably this radiocobalt originated in the bomb environment. The amounts 
of cobalt in ocean w^ater are too small to account for the observed activity. It 
is interesting to note that the locally deposited cobalt 60 contributed largely 
to the 1- to 10-year activity in the Redwing sample. 

Weapons burst close to the ground will produce a variety of induced activities. 
The hazard will depend upon the weapon yield, the neutron spectrum, the chem- 
ical composition of the substratum, and the depth of the burst. A harbor burst, 
for example, would induce the 14.8-hour sodium-24 activity which involves very 
energetic gamma radiation. There is a considerable range of induced activities 
possible, but it is futile to attempt any specific calculations since they would de- 



6 See E. A. Mar tell, "Atmospheric Circulation; and Deposition of Strontium 90 Debris," 
Air Force Cambridge Research Center paper (July 1958). See also W. F. Llbby, "Radio- 
active Fallout," speech of Mar. 13, 1959. 

1 Variation of Gamma Radiation Rates for Different Elements Following an Underwater 
Nuclear Detonation," J. Colloid, Science, 13 (1958), p. 329. 

s "Reaction Cross Sections of U 238 in the Low Mev. Range," UCRL 5323 (Aug. 15, 1958). 

9 "Long-Lived Cobalt Isotopes Observed in Fallout," Science, 128 (Aug. 22, 1958), p. 417. 



218 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



pend so strongly upon the factors enumerated above. In general it would be 
expected that they would add significantly to the fission product radioactivity 
but would not exceed it in radiation dosage. 

Comparison of the role of fission product versus induced activity naturally 
depends upon the percentage contribution of fission to the total yield of the bomb. 
The fo regoing has assumed a thermonuclear weapon in which the ratio of fission 
to fusion is 2 : 1. Weapons with a ratio of 1 : 10 may be thought of as relatively 
"clean" but this is subject to qualification, depending upon the operational con- 
ditions under which the bomb is burst. Even a 100 percent intestinally clean 
weapon (as defined by a test in empty space) becomes significantly dirty if the 
material close to the bomb is irradiated with the bomb's neutrons. This shows 
the fallacy of the clean bomb concept because for many military applications the 
detonation has to be so close to the ground that the neutron-induced activities 
will pose a real hazard to friend and foe alike. 

THE FALLOFF OF FAIXOUT 

Assuming that our estimate of 7,000 roentgens per hour represents the in- 
tensity of the fission products 1 hour after detonation, let us project the dose 
rate into the future. Naturally at the short-lived emitters die out the activity 
of the fission products will fall off rapidly. This exponential decay follows a 
T~ 1,2 law first pointed 10 out by K, Way and E. P. Wigner. If one examines 
the average number of photons per disintegration, it drops from a value of 
1.2 at 1 hour to below 1.0 at 10 hours, rises to 1.1 at 100 hours and thereafter 
decreases to 0.2 at 10 years. The average photon energy for U 235 fission products 
drops from 0.92 at 1 hour to 0.7 at 12 hours thereafter decreasing to 0.5 at 
100 hours; it climbs to 0.6 for 9-month-old fission products, dips to 0.36 at 2 
years, and levels off at 0.6 Mev. at 10 years. These fluctuations reflect the 
varying isotopic composition of the fission products as a function of time. 



10 "The Kate of Decay of Fission Products," Phys. Review, 73 (1948), p. 1318. 



f 




(AC 



222 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



Core samples 19 taken on Gejen Island in 1955 showed the following beta 
activity : 



Soil layer 


1st 


2d 


3d 


4th 


5th 


6th inch 


Activity 


37,000 


37,000 


8,000 


4,000 


4,400 


3,400 




betas/min/gm 



Data taken from soil on other islands indicate a similar soak-in of fission 
debris down to a depth of 6 to 8 inches. The 1956 resurvey of Gejen soil (table 
18 in the reference 18) shows that the residual activity concentrates in the upper 
inch of soil. Although the data on soil uptake of fission debris are not firm, it 
appears that, at least in the case of Marshall Island soil, weathering is not se- 
verely cumulative in effect. If we compare curves B and C without making 
allowance for terrain effects, then up to 2 years there is a difference of a factor 
of about four. A British estimate * assumes a "protection factor of three" for 
British soil contaminated with stratospheric fallout. 

Weathering effects beyond 2 years will depend very critically upon the nature 
of the radioelements which then predominate in the fallout debris. And as we 
have seen, this is likely to be quite variable. For a normal mixture of fission 
products, the long-term radiation dosage would depend upon the weathering of 
cesium in the soil. Cesium should be quickly fixed a in the upper soil surface, 
probably in the first inch. Fixation is assumed to be proportional to the colloidal 
content of the soil and would be greatest in clay soils and least in sandy loams. 
Radiocesium would be expected to resist leaching even under conditions of heavy 
(tropical) rainfall. 

THE GAMMA HAZARD 

The foregoing discussion makes it appear reasonable to use curve C in esti- 
mating the radiation dosage to which people might be exposed from a repre- 
sentative fallout field corresponding to a 1-hour level of 4,000 roentgens per 
hour. We make use of a t -1 * 3 relation up to 3 weeks and a t~ 1,6 up to 3 months, 
Previous articles in the Bulletin have already spelled out the nature of the 
fallout radiation dosages during the first day, so these data will not be repeated. 
Beginning with the second day table I lists the gamma doses for various time 
intervals. 

Table J 



Gamma dose, 
Time interval : roentgens 

2d day 950 

3d day 500 

4th day 300 

5th day 225 

6th day 175 

7th day 120 

2d week 535 

3d week 285 

4th week 140 



Gamma dose, 
Time interval— Continued roentgens 

2d month 220 

3d month 100 

4th month 60 

5th month 40 

6th month 25 

6th to 12th month 60 

2d year 20 

3d year . 6 

4th year 3 



Use of the t -1 * 2 law involves a great overestimate of the actual radiation 
hazard over long periods of time. For example, the 1 to 4 years dose is 27 
times higher than that represented by curve C. Since the dose beyond 4 years 
is very cesium-sensitive, any estimate must depend upon assumptions about 
the degree of fractionation of Cs 187 in the fallout and degree of weathering. 
If one assumes no fractionation and a uniform deposit over a hard, flat plane 
then the level corresponding to 400 curies of Gs" 7 per square miles would pro- 
duce a dose of 380 roentgens over a period of 50 years. No experimental data 



»From table 15 of AEC publication, "Radioactive Contamination of Certain Areas in 
the Pacific Ocean From Nuclear Tests," Editor G. Dunning (August 1957). 

*> N. G. Stewart, R. N. Crooks, and E. M. R. Fisher, "The Radiological Dose to Persons 
in the United Kingdom Due to Debris From Nuclear Test Explosions Prior to January 
1956/' AEREHP/R 2017 (1957). tm M n ^ *,««,.,*«.». *. 

21 W. Langham and E. C. Anderson, "Entry of Radioactive Fallout Into the Biosphere and 
Man," Bull. Swiss Acad. Med. Sci. 14 (1958), p. 434. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 227 

F. P. Cowan n has investigated the buildup of fallout on construction materials 
and he has found that smooth-surfaced materials such as aluminum accumulate 
the least fallout and yield most quickly to decontamination, whereas asphalt and 
asbestos shingles hold the fallout more tenaciously. 

After 1 week a properly indoctrinated householder might attempt to reduce 
the contamination on the roof. A twentyf old reduction of the roof contamination 
(as compared with open field levels) seems feasible. Since the roof contami- 
nation contributes as much radiation dose to the basement as the skyshine of 
radiation from adjoining land 15 an overall tenfold dose reduction for base- 
ment dwellers is possible. 

Decontamination of ground areas and pavements will involve an organized ef- 
fort and substantial equipment. The U.S. Navy has had practical experience 
in radiological decontamination as a result of the Bikini bomb tests in 1946. 
Data 1 * from the U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory show that fire- 
hosing of asphalt surfaces contaminated with dry fallout can reduce the level 
of radioactivity thirtyf old. 

In the absence of extensive decontamination it would appear wise to live very 
cautiously during the 1-week to 1-month period after attack. The second week 
dose of about 500 roentgens should be kept below 20 roentgens and preferably 
below 10 roentgens. The same rule applies to the third week. The 140 roentgen 
dose which would be accumulated by full above ground exposure during the 
fourth week can be cut to 7 roentgens by an overall reduction factor of 20 ; this 
still requires basement living unless decontamination has been effective. 

BEYOND 1 MONTH 

Once the challenge of the first month of postattack living has been met, the 
radiation hazards in the following months can be put into manageable propor- 
tions by cautious living. At about the time the outdoor levels will be about 
10 roentgens per day — still too high for long-term above-ground movement. 
However, local decontamination and restricted movement plus indoor living as 
much as possible should make it possible to keep the radiation dose below 10 
roentgens for the second month. Thereafter the radiation exposures call for 
caution but the problem is clearly no longer an acute one. 

After 4 months the maximum 24-hour dose for a man in the open would be 
about 1 roentgens although it might be 10 times less in a decontaminated area. 
At the end of 1 year an untouched area should exhibit about 0.1 roentgens per 
day and the total dose in the second year after attack would be about 20 
roentgens so that return to ordinary life as far as the external hazard is con- 
cerned would be indicated. For people who had accumulated 100 roentgens in 
the first year an additional 5 roentgens in the second year (allowing for 
shielding) would not constitute undue risk. Since the impact of the attack 
might replace our industrial economy with a colonial type of existence mil- 
lions of people would have to till the soil, this would involve greater exposure 
but it would not be prohibitive. 

These conclusions apply to the radiation field specified by a fallout of 2 kilotons 
of fission products per square mile. It would seem that this kind of a fallout 
field is a reasonable projection through the early sixties. 



u "The Accumulation of Radioactive FaUout on Typical Materials of Construction.'* 
BNL-497 (March 1958). 

13 J. A. Auxier et al., "Experimental Evaluation of the Radiation Protection Afforded by 
Residential Structures Against Distributed Sources," CEX-58.1 (Jan. 19, 1959). See also 
M. J. Berger and J. C, Lam kin, "Simple Calculations of Gamma-Ray Penetration Into 
Shelters : Contribution of Skyshine and Roof Contamination," Report NBS-2827 (February 
1958). 

14 "Radiological Recovery of Fixed Military Installations," USNRDI* report dated August 
1953. 



230 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM T, HAM, J&, 1 DEPARTMENT OP BIO- 
PHYSICS, MEDICAL COLLEGE OF VIRGINIA; GEORGE MIXTER, 
JR., 2 ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF SURGERY, NEW YORK UNIVER- 
SITY POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL OF MEDICINE; AND COMDR. 
CHARLES H. FUGITT, 3 U.S. NAVY, RADIATION CONSULTANT 

Eepresentative Holifield. We are glad to have you three gentlemen 
here, and Dr. Ham, will you please take the lead in the presentation. 

Dr. Ham. Mr. Holifield and members of the committee, I feel it a 
very responsible position in which I am placed in trying to present to 
you gentlemen the thermal effects of radiation from 1- to 10-megaton 
weapons. In a certain sense, in the discussion so far, I cannot help but 
feel that the cart has been put before the horse in the sense that we 
have got to survive first before we can be subjected to the effects of 
fallout. 

I should like to ask the indulgence of the committee in being able 
to refer to my two colleagues on questions if they come up during the 
testimony which might be more appropriately answered by them 
than by me. 

Eepresentative Holifield. This is in order. 

Dr. Ham. Thank you, sir. With that I will read my text or testi- 
mony, and if there are questions I will do my best to answer them. 

THERMAL INJURY FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

The use of fire as a weapon in warfare has been traditional since the 
earliest historical times. Burn injury is painfully familiar to all of 
us. However, the advent of nuclear weapons in modern warfare has 
introduced thermal injury on a scale outside our previous experience. 
The sudden production of severe burns on a mass casualty basis pre- 



1 Dr, Ham was educated at the University of Virginia, receiving the doctor of philosophy 
degree In physics. He has been on the faculty of Columbia University and the University 
of Virginia, where he also worked on special investigations for the OSRD and Manhattan 
project. He served in the U.S. Marine Corps in the Pacific during World War II as a 
radar officer and has been professor and chairman of the Department of Biophysics and 
Biometry at the Medical College of Virginia since 1953. Dr. Ham is a fellow of the 
American Physical Society and several other scientific societies. He is a consultant of 
the Atomic Bomb Casualty Committee of the National Academy of Sciences — National 
Research Council, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the Army Medical Service 
Graduate School. He Is the author of numerous articles on radiobiology and thermal 
Injury, and has participated in nuclear weapons tests. 

*Dr. Mixter was educated at Harvard College and Harvard Medical School, receiving 
the degree of doctor of medicine, and has been certified by the American Board of Surgery. 
He served with the U.S. Marines in the Pacific during World War II as a medical officer. 
He has been a research fellow in surgery at the Boston University School of Medicine and 
chief resident in surgery at Massachusetts Memorial Hospital. He has also held other 
research fellowships in medical and surgical research at Western Reserve University and 
Cleveland City Hospital. Dr. Mixter has been on the faculty of the University of 
Rochester School of Medicine, and was the responsible investigator on a series of flash 
burn studies for the Atomic Energy Commission. He is currently associate professor of 
surgery at New York University Post-Graduate Medical School and visiting surgeon at 
Bellevue Hospital, and attending surgeon at University Hospital and Manhattan Veterans 
Hospital. He is also consultant in biomedlclne to the Navy Materials Laboratory, and has 
published many papers on surgery and thermal injury. 

8 Commander Fugitt was educated at the George Washington University, the Massa- 
chusetts Institute of Technology, and the University of California at Berkeley, receiving 
the doctor of philosophy degree from the latter Institution In biophysics. He has been a 
teaching fellow and a member of the Laboratory for Nuclear Science at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, and Chief of the Biophysics Division of the Aviation Medical 
Acceleration Laboratory at the Naval Air Development Center. He has also participated 
in nuclear weapons tests in the Pacific and in Nevada. Concurrent with his present 
military assignment to the Defense Atomic Support Agency, he has been a professional 
lecturer in the School of Medicine of the George Washington University, Commander 
Fugitt has published papers on the thermodynamic and spectral properties of biological 
materials. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 241 

Senator Hickenxooper. I was wondering if there might be a vac- 
uum effect which would have a substantial effect on body tissues and 
life itself. If there is a sudden vacuum created as a result of this 
explosion, that is what I have in mind. 

Dr. Ham. I don't know, sir. I think this is something that in- 
volves the blast effect which Dr. White is going to testify to and 
I prefer to leave that to him. I am here in the unfortunate role of 
being an apostle of fire and I think I had better stick to that, sir. 

Representative Holifield. You may proceed. 

Dr. Ham. When one compares this factor with the lethal fallout 
area resulting from the same surface detonation, one is immediately 
impressed by the fact that fire, in many cases, will impose a much 
greater hazard to many more people and buildings than the fallout. 
If one envisions a city complex of appproximately 25 miles in radius, 
in which the enemy is successful in detonating a 10-megaton surface 
burst near its center, then the entire complex will be at risk from 
fire, while only about 20 or 25 percent will be inside the lethal fallout 
area, most of which will be disposed downwind outside the highly 
populated area. The complete blast destruction zone is considerably 
smaller than either of the other two areas, being a circle about 7 
miles in radius, or about 150 square miles. 

Actually that area which Dr. Mixter has outlined is about one-sixth 
of the total area of 2,000 square miles encompassed by the outside red 
circle. 

It is believed that fire storms are an almost inevitable consequence of 
a megaton drop on a large American city. Just what measures can be 
adopted for survival during a fire storm are not readily apparent. 
Survivors of the initial effects of blast, thermal and ionizing radiation 
from a megaton burst must cope also with the incinerating heat of fire 
storms. Severe burn casualties from secondary fires will outnumber 
vastly flash burn casualties from the fireball. 

Thermal injury to the eye: The hazards of flash blindness and 
retinal burns from nuclear explosions have received increasing atten- 
tion during the past few years because of the extremely long distances 
over which these phenomena have been produced. Neither flash 
blindness nor retinal damage constitute major hazards during the 
daytime because of the restricted pupillary diameter which limits the 
amount of light entering the eye ; furthermore, the blink reflex, 100- 
150 milliseconds, protects the eye from undue amounts of radiation, 
except in those cases where the thermal pulse is delivered within 
extremely short times. This is the case for low-yield weapons on the 
ground and for weapons of any yield exploded at very high altitudes. 
Under the conditions stipulated in this investigation, the hazards of 
flash blindness and retinal damage would be negligible. 

Eepresentative Holifield. On that point, let me ask you, what hap- 
pened in the case of the eyes of the animals that were exposed to the 
Johnston Island test ? Can you testify on that ? 

Dr. Ham. Sir, with your permission I would like to defer that until 
we have completed the paper and then Col. John Pickering is in the 
audience here and has some slides and, if you would permit me, I 
would very much like to call Colonel Pickering to give some testimony 



246 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



Figure IV 




17 mm 



d i* d F^ 



Representative Holhteijx You have used the term "greatly exceed," 
Do you have any experimental knowledge which enables you to put 
that into specific focus? . 

Dr. Ham. I do have some, sir. I think Colonel Pickering will speak 

about this again, too. 

Representative Holttceld. That is fine. 

Dr. Ham. If we could defer that, I would prefer it. 

Representative Holifieu). Go right ahead. 

Dr. Ham. Retinal burns from viewing the sun during an eclipse 
are well known to ophthalmologists. The fireball of a nuclear weapon 
is many times brighter than the sun and will produce severe retinal 
damage if viewed deliberately. 

BURN" TREATMENT 

Nuclear warfare on the scale being discussed here would produce 
severe burn casualties out of all proportion to any previous medical 

experience. , 

Figure V illustrates the mortality to be expected from burns as a 
function of burn area and age of patient. These mortality figures 
apply only to people who receive optimum care in a hospital burn 
clinic where complete resources of medical science are devoted to the 
burn patient. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAB WAR 249 

high-yield nuclear detonation. Rabbits were placed at distances nn fro 300 
nautical miles from the point of detonation in order to obtain the necessary data. 
Tne niomettical project ShOwM that a very high altitude nuclear explosKET 
can be particularly damaging to the eye because of the rapid rate at which the 
power pulse delivers thermal energy and the relatively low atmosphere attenu- 
ation encountered. A high-altitude detonation in the megaton yield range, smoh 

- as Te ^ k > delivers a great percentage of its thermal energy during a small f rac- 
tion or a second after the detonatiom ^Conse quentl.v. with a blink-reflex g5EI 
of just over a quarter or a second ror tne rabbit and less than aquarter of a 
gecona ior inall near ly ail Of T;nT radiant expo sure :5oia~irTeWTn^^ 
burst is _r^c^jy^dJxsL-^e r etina before the eye_can he protected jiy^^jHriffJ^ 
the person js looking directly at the burst at the time of de tonjrtif^^jajSjn^ 

_ contrast to low a ltitude detonations of the sam e size , whe re the power pulse is 
much s lower in overall delivery of its thermal componenT XCTlPh~ere~Tnir pTin^~ 
reflex can provide a measure of protection. _ *ffi AX \ » ft /H,WcS :?=?*«.« 
SmalL-retinal burns were producer! fiTThe rahhits at distances up to 300 
nautical miles. Burn diameters consistently correlated with distance fromjfte 
burst, w itn progressively smaller les ions ^ being encountereoTat incre ase d dis- 
tances. Fpr example, theburn lesions were^j^roximately 2 millimeters in 
d i ameter- ^t about4 m p^s^^hceT^^creasing to 0.5 millimeter aTTOO^milesT 

_ Corresponding lesion s~oT^malIer diameter might W^^^^n^^3^ ^^m" 
provided ^e burst heighT were great eno ugh to allow a direct vWnfn^fi^r 
ball ov^tEe edge or tne H orizon. "CurVature of the earth wrii cause IhlposF" 

— ~ on ot tIie firep ffl **> m below the hor iz on, and therefore incapa ble of inflicting 
retinal damage. „ ™" — — £— 

in ordej^to_BrJ£lujie damage lojhe sooty tern, a large bird in digenous to 
_ the Johnston Islands, special precautions wereTaken during the Orange shot 

— AwMerspraxsimugKa55sZ^i# t theTirds^Founded. Smoke^together with"" 
local clouds fuxthe FattenuaTed therma l eftects. ~~ — .... ~- 

--^^Si-mm ^^^w^^n^S i^eiTj iwHEeTSS. shot due to its hi ghe r altitude^ 
The protective measures fo r the ~Orah g e~sloT werTsu^eBf u^^^^^^^^^ 

SUMMARY OF TEST OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS REGARDING FLASH BLINDNESS AND 

RETINAL BURNS 

The effect of nuclear detonations on human eyes was recognized early in the 
testing procedures when the Aviation School of Medicine of the U.S. Air Force 
performed Project 4.3, "Flash Blindness," in Operation Buster. The objective 
of this project was to evaluate the visual handicap which might be expected in 
military personnel exposed, during daylight operations, to the flash of an atomic 
detonation and to evaluate devices developed for the purpose of protecting the 
eyes against visual impairment resulting from excessive exposure to light The 
data obtained on this test, as revealed in the test report, showed that no serious 
handicap is encountered during exposure to atomic detonation during daylight 
operations at the distance from the detonation which would be safe from the 
standpoint of other hazards. This conclusion was subsequently disproved by the 
recent Hardtack test series in the Pacific, using rabbits as specimens. 
«. In 4 the TuInDler - SD apper test series retinal burns were not investigated wiui 
the Air Force School of Aviation Medicine this time investigating flash blindness 
However, on this series some work was done on atmospheric transmissivity 
which has proved subsequently to be of some help in the problem of retinal burn 
prediction. 

In Operation Upshot-Knothole, research was conducted to determine to what 
degree the flash of an atomic detonation impairs the vision and reduces the 
efficiency of military personnel during nighttime operations. This is a serious 
problem because the individual has pupils which are more or less widely dilated 
depending upon the amount of light to which the eye is being exposed prior to 
detonation. The conclusion was that a significant loss of central peripheral 
vision occurs temporarily following exposure to an atomic detonation. It was 
also concluded that the types of filters tested served to shorten by about 30 
percent the normally long period of incapacitation in unprotected individuals as 
measured in the previous Tumbler-Snapper operations. 

The objective of the retinal burns portion of this test was to find the extent 
of damage caused by exposure of the dark-adapted rabbit eye to the high 
intensity illumination of an atomic detonation, with appropriate evaluation 
to determine whether human eyes might suffer similar injuries under the same 



EFFECTS OF mXCLEAR WAB 251 

Dr. Mixter. The exact number is presumably incalculable. In any 
case the number is mentioned only as an indication of the complete 
hopelessness of the problem confronting the medical profession. 

(The following was subsequently handed to the chairman of the 
subcommittee :) 

Dear Mr. Holifield: There are 226,625 physicians in the United States, of 
which 16,598 are in Government service, that is, Army, Navy, Air Force, Public 
Health Service, Veterans' Administration, and Indian Service. Figures are for 
the year 1958. 

Frank Barton, 
Secretary of the Council on National Defense^ 

American Medical Association. 

Representative Holifield. Proceed, Dr. Ham. 
Dr. Ham. Yes, sir. It is obvious that under such conditions it 
would be impossible to give burns or any other casualties such treat- 
ment as is now known to result in minimal mortality. The surviving 
doctors' primary responsibility must be to select those^casualties rea- 
sonably capable of ultimate survival, and to concentrate every efforF 
" upon their survival. This means that under conditions of inadequate 
"supplies of opiates, dressings, and sterile fluids, the vast majority 
of casualties will receive only token treatment. It is not the province 
of the present discussion to define accurately either the number of 
casualties or how they will be treated, but it must be unequivocally 
stated that, under the conditions predicated for this investigation, only 
a small percentage of the injured population could, or indeed should 
receive even an approximation to adequate medical treatment. 

Burn victims might be sorted into three groups according to per- 

""centage burn area, 25 percent or le ssQjj) to 50 percen t v and greater than 
50 percent Those having burns covering 50 percent of the b ody 
area or more wou] 
having 25 to 50 percent 



would be 



resources in the Held ; the 2 5 percent or less groups woulc 
_o rai "electrolyte treatment, opiates for pain, and dism iss ed. 

"Representative Holifield. Would you please tell me what oral elec- 
trolyte treatment is ? 

Dr. Ham. Dr. Mixter will. 

Dr. Mixter. Thievery simply means salt water mixed in a pro- 
portion which will not make the person ill but will supply tnenT 
"with the salt, and if you have the soda bicarb, which is the ide aT 
fluid, to allow their life to be prolonged. Exte nsively burnedTpeo- 
plp> firft pot EapaE E f»f eat ing any solia food . They won't accept itT 
Various emergency fluids have been worked out. jffiisTnformation 
should be a part of the information of any one concerned "with any" 
typ e of disaster work. It should be known because the fluidsused for 
"Intravenous use will be in short supply, Indeed if Jbhtg-gar e any. 
Even pure water suitable for drinking will be in short su pply^ Ural" 
electrolyte is salt water. ---.-__._. 

Representative Holifield. That is very plain. Even I understand 
that. 

Dr. Ham. Burns involving more than 25 percent of the total body 
area represent severe traumatic cases demanding at least five details 
nf empfgencv treatment: (1) relief of pain; (2) emergency dressmgT 
if possiB le ; (3) prevention and treatment of burn shock; (4) salt and 

43338—69 IT ~~ 



252 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

water requirements to insure adeguato^imMI^Mmit ; ( 5) the most 
T^IEIeantibiotic therapy t o~ai d in combating inf ectJom " Ui ail tiie 
types "of traumatic injury following a nuclear attackTsevere burns 
make perhaps the greatest demands upon medical personnel and re- 
sources. Successful treatment requires stockpiles of plasma, whole 
blood, plasma substitutes, antibiotics, emergency dressings, narcotics, 
et cetera. The treatment period is long and arduous. Burn wounds 
greater than first degree always become infected and prolong tiie treaty 
jTTftTTjjTJI^ ionizing rachation complicates the pi cture, 

•^ecauselhe b ody's jEfe^es^agajj^ infection and hleedingHave been 
TrnpaTrearnDom^ 

"p^sents graveproElmisln ther ajgyT7^^U£?r "A/O Cayffrk. 
""T'Eeconclusion seems inevitable that millions 01 severe burn casual- 
ties would overwhelm our capacity for adequate medical treatment. 
Mortality figures for burn victims would be extremely high. It is no 
exaggeration to say that, after nuclear attack, burn casualties rep- 
resent the most serious immediate medical problems facing the Nation. 

Representative Holifield. Thank you very much, Dr. Ham. 

Are there any questions of the witness ? 

Representative Westland. Mr. Chairman. 

Rcpresentative Holifield. Mr. Westland. 

Representative Westland. The nations have been using fire as a 
weapon for hundreds of years, all the way from the Indians using 
bow and arrows with fire on them to set the house on fire, up to recent 
wars with flamethrowers, napalm bombs, and so forth. Isn't what 
you are really saying here is that man has now created a weapon with 
which he can destroy his fellow man in greater quantities and with 
greater efficiency? Is that not just about the size of it? 

Dr. Ham. Yes, sir; I think that is, with very great efficiency, espe- 
cially in terms of magnitude of something that we have never had 
previous experience in. In modern warfare in the past there have 
been filled hospitals and bad burns have been able to be treated because 
they came in in small numbers. But you are here faced with the 
instant production, so to speak, of perhaps millions of burns casual- 
ties, and the question is what can we do about it. The answer we are 
trying to drive across is that the ordinary treatments that we do adopt 
under the best conditions for burns would be absent and that the 
mortaility figures for burns would be much greater under such con- 
ditions. It is our estimate and feeling that burns would produce a 
tremendous amount of mortality in the country under nuclear attack. 

Representative Westland. You are saying that the medical pro- 
tection would simply be unable to cope with such a situation. 

Dr. Ham. Exactly, sir. 

Representative Westland. I would assume that this same informa- 
tion which you have presented here so well this afternoon is available 
to other nations, too, who possess this lethal weapon. 

Dr. Ham. Yes, sir; I think that is correct. 

Representative Bates. Doctor, could not a lot of these things which 
* you have suggested iiere be don^y first aid treatment bx J^QEkuwJiQl 
have had a, f ittle experience in this fieldJL ~ 

Dr. Ham. Yes, I think that is verytrue. I think Dr. Mixter would 
prefer to speak to you about that, Mr. Bates. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 311 

STATEMENT OF DR. CLAYTON S. WHITE/ DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH, 
LOVELACE FOUNDATION FOR MEDICAL EDUCATION AND RE- 
SEARCH, ALBUQUERQUE, N. MEX. 

Dr. White. Thank you, Mr. Holifield, members of the committee 
and ladies and gentlemen. Initially I wish to make a few preliminary 
remarks. First, it is a pleasure to express my appreciation to the 
committee and to the staff for making it possible for me to appear 
today, which is later than the original schedule. This was very help- 
ful. Secondly, I want to acknowledge the aid of Mr. I. G. Bowen, 
who is head of the physics department of the Lovelace Foundation in 
Albuquerque, whose knowledge and computational skill contributed 
to the analytical work that was incorporated in the prepared statement. 

Thirdly, the work in blast biology with which I have been asso- 
ciated since 1952 has been sponsored mostly but not entirely by the 
Atomic Energy Commission under contract with the Division of 
Biology and Medicine. ■ 

Fourthly, I welcome the opportunity to talk about biological blast 
effects which certainly comprise one of the major early weapon effects 
responsible for hazard to man. 

Fifthly, with regard to formalities, you have already mentioned 
the biography that was available for the record and I have furnished 
a prepared statement and wish to say that that is also for the record, 
if this is your pleasure. 

Representative Holifield. It will be accepted in its entirety for the 
record. 

( The statement referred to follows : ) 

1 Born, 1912, Fort Collins, Colo. A.B., University of Colorado, 1934 (State scholarship) ; 
instructor, psychology, University of Colorado, 1934-35 ; B.A„ University of Oxford, Eng- 
land, 1935-38 (Rhodes scholar) : instructor, physiology, University of Colorado School of 
Medicine, 1938-40 and 1941-42; member of faculty, Department of Physiology and 
Pharmacology, University of Colorado School of Medicine, 1940-41 : M.D., University of 
Colorado School of Medicine, 1942. Internship, University of Colorado School of Medicine 
and Hospitals, Colorado General Hospital, Denver, 1942-43 ; course in aviation medi-, 
cine, U.S. Naval School of Aviation Medicine, Pensaeola, Fla., with flight training, and 
designation as flight surgeon in January 1944. Medical officer and flight surgeon, Medical 
Corps, U.S. Navy, July 1943 to August 1947. Staff, Lovelace Clinic, Albuquerque, N, Mex., 
1947-50. Director of Research, Lovelace Foundation for Medical Education and Research, 
Albuquerque, 1950 to present. Project officer, AEC projeet, Lovelace Foundation, deal- 
ing with the biological effects of blast from bombs, 1952 to present. Participated in 
1953, 1955, and 1957, Nevada test series, under the administrative direction of Mr. R. L. 
Corsbie, director, civil effects test group. Director, program 33 (blast biology), CETG, 
Nevada test operations, 1955 and 1957. Chairman, AEC Ad Hoc Committee on Blast 
Biology, 1958 to present. Consultant, Douglas Aircraft Co. ; Consolidated Vultee Aircraft 
Corp. Chairman, Aeromedical and Biosciences Panel of the U.S. Air Force Scientific 
Advisory Board. Fellow : American Association for the Advancement of Science ; Aero 
Medical Association. Member : Phi Beta Kappa, Alpha Omega Alpha ; Sigma Xi ; Nu 
Sigma Nu ; Society for Experimental Biology and Medicine ; New Mexico State Medical 
Society ; New Mexico Society for Biological and Medical Research ; Bernalillo County 
Medical Society ; Bernalillo County Heart Association ; American Medical Assoiation ; 
American Board of Preventive Medicine, specializing in aviation medicine ; Space Medicine 
Association of the Aero Medical Association. Present : Director of Research, Lovelace 
Foundation. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR' 



319 




330 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



Table 5 



The Velocity-Mass -Probability Relationships Required 

for Small Window Glass Fragments to Traverse the 

Abdominal Wall and Reach the Peritoneal Cavity of Dogs* 



Mass of 
glass fragment 
gms 


Impact 
probabi 

1% 


velocitie 
L lities of 


;s in ft/sec for 
penetration in 


indicated 
per cent 


50% 


" 94% ' 


0.05 


320 


570 


1000 


0.1 


235 




410 


730 


0.5 


160 




275 


485 


1.0 


140 


- 


245 


430 


10.0 


115 




180 


335 



*Data from Bowen, et al. , AECU-3350 

The reader will note that a 10 gm glass fragment, having a velocity of 
115 ft/sec has only a 1 per cent probability of traversing the abdominal wall 
of a dog. Since clothing will degrade the velocity of small missiles moving 
relatively slowly, and because of the less serious nature of skin and tissue 
lacerations, an impact velocity of 115 ft/sec for a 10 gm glass fragment has 
been arbitrarily chosen as the threshold for human casualties from glass 
and other frangible materials. Such a decision may well have to be modified 
later, since a quantitative study of eye injury from glass and other small ir- 
regular missiles has not yet been done. However, the 10 gm-115 ft/sec 
criteria is strengthened somewhat by the data of Journee (5) who noted that 
spherical bullets weighing 8. 5 gm only produced a contusion of the skin when 
fired at human cadavers at velocities up to 150 ft/sec, whereas a velocity of 
128 ft/sec for 6 to 12 mm caliber rifle bullets was set as the lower limit at 
which penetrating wounds begin in man (5). 

The realistic nature of the masses and velocities of glass fragments 
noted in Table 5 is established by the figures in Table 6 which details the 
masses and velocities for glass, stone and irregular steel objects empirically 
observed at stations located from the 1 . 9 to 17. 3 psi lines during full-scale 
nuclear explosions at the Nevada Test Site. Unfortunately, to date, no full- 
scale missile experiments have been carried out to determine the expected 
missile environment inside a variety of industrial plants, office buildings 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



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332 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

and other structures much larger than the "typical" brick and wooden frame 
houses to which past studies have been limited. 

Objects striking the human head may cause skull fracture and concus- 
sion, both potentially dangerous experiences. Fortunately, quantitative in- 
vestigations by Gurdjian, et al. (70), using human material, are available 
to support an estimate of the skull -fracture hazard. Using the data of these 
authors and adopting a missile of 10 lbs, which is near the average weight of 
the adult, human head, Table 7 was computed to state the impact velocities 
that can be associated with skull fracture. The table shows considerable 
variation in velocities required for fracture; e.g. , the minimum impact velo 
city associated with fracture was near 15 ft /sec, while the maximal without 
fracture was computed to be 23. 1 ft/sec. 

Table 7 



Average Minimal Impact Velocities From a 10 lb. Missile 

Expected to Cause Skull Fracture and 

Maximal Velocity Without Fracture 



Impact velocities expected to 
fracture the human skull* 



Region of blow ft/ sec mph 

Posterior midline 16.6 11.3 

Frontal midline 17.4 11.8 

Above ear 18.2 12.4 

Top midline 19-4 13.2 

Maximal without fracture 23. 1 15.7 

Minimal with fracture 14. 6 9.9 



^Computed from the data of Gurdjian, et al. (70) 

Although damage to the thorax and lungs from the impact of 0. 4 and 
0/8 lb. nonpenetrating missiles have been studied, information for heavier 
and lighter objects is lacking (64,82). Also unavailable, are quantitative 
figures for missile impact velocities near and over the regions of the liver 
and spleen that will rupture these friable organs and produce hemorrhage 
often severe enough to require early surgery if fatality is to be avoided. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 333 

Under such circumstances, 10 ft /sec has been adopted tentatively as 
the impact velocity for a 10 lb nonpenetrating missile, below which the 
number of human injuries will approach a minimum* 

Tertiary Effects 



To deal simply with the hazards of displacement from blast -produced 
winds 9 it has been assumed that significant human injury will occur mostly 
during decelerative impact with solid objects having a mass much greater 
than that of man. Data from four sources has been selected as guides in 
estimating threshold conditions for injury. 

First, it is useful to note an animal study involving decelerative impact 
which reported the impact velocities associated with 50 per cent mortality in 
mice, rats, guinea pigs, and rabbits to be 38, 44, 31 and 31 ft/ sec, respec- 
tively. Extrapolation of these figures to man predicts that on the average an 
impact velocity of 27 ft/ sec or 18 mph would be associated with death of half 
the individuals (82). These are interesting figures because National Safety 
Council reports on urban automobile accidents have associated a mortality 
of 40 per cent with automobile accidents at speeds of less than 20 mph and a 
70 per cent fatality rate with speeds of less than 30 mph (69). Table 8 sum- 
marizes the above data. 

Secondly, Black, et al. (76) dropped human cadavers feet first with 
knees locked onto a hard surface from heights of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 feet and 
concluded that the threshold for fracture of the heel, foot and ankle bones lay 
between impact velocities of 1 1 and 16 ft/ sec. Draeger, et al. (79) using an 
impact table and human cadavers to study ankle and foot fracture* demon- 
strated an impact velocity of 12-13 ft/ sec (8-9 mph) to be near the threshold 
for skeletal fracture of the lower extremities. 

Thirdly s Gurdjian, et al. (70), by drops onto a solid surface, subjected 
heads of human cadavers to impact loading and defined conditions for experi- 
mental skull fracture. The findings have been summarized in Table 9 in 
terms of impact velocity. Fracture was produced at a minimal impact velo- 
city of 13,5 ft/sec (9.2 mph) s while the maximal velocity without occurrence 
of fracture was 22.8 ft/sec (15.5 mph). These findings are fairly consistent 
with British work done during the Second World War (76, 78). 



334 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



Table 8 

Average Velocities of Impact Against a Hard Surface 

Associated with 50 Per Cent Mortality of the Indicated 

Species of Animals with Extrapolation to Man* 



Species 
of 


Average 
animal 


Average impact velocity 
for 50 per cent mortality 


Equivalent 
height of fall 


Animal 


mass 
gms 


ft/sec 




mph 


(approx. ) 
ft 


Mouse 


19 


38 




26 


22 


Rat 


180 


44 




30 


30 


Guinea pig 


650 


31 




21 


15 


Rabbit 


2,600 


3i 




21 


15 



Man 72, 574 

(computed) (160 lbs) 



27 



18 



11 



National Safety Council release on urban automobile accidents shows 40 
and 70 per cent of fatalities were associated respectively with speeds of 
or less than 20 and 30 mph. - Quoted from De Haven. 

*Data AEC Project, Lovelace Foundation » Albuquerque, N*M. 



Table 9 

The Ranges of Impact Velocities Associated with 
Experimental Fracture of the Human Skull 



Range 

impact 

velocities 

ft/sec 



13.5-14.9 
15-16.9 
17-18.9 
19-20.9 
21-22.9 



Total 



Approx. 
velocity 
in 
mph 



9.5 

10,9 
12.2 
13.6 
15.0 



Approx 
height 
of fall 



in. 



37 
48 
61 
75 
91 



Number of 
subjects 



Fractures 

in 
per cent 



9 
10 
12 
11 

4 



19 
22 
26 
24 
9 



46 



100 



Minimum velocity with fracture - 13. 5 ft/sec (9. 2 mph) 
Maximum velocity with fracture - 22,8 ft/sec (15=5 mph) 
Maximum velocity without fracture - unstated. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



335 



Fourthly, from the findings of Ruff (84), it is possible to deduce a 
velocity of about 8 ft/sec (6 mph) as likely to produce spinal fracture 
assuming impact with a solid surface in the sitting position. 

The above data encourages one to adopt an impact velocity of 10 ft/ sec 
as a tentative threshold criteria for human damage from abrupt decelerative 
impact following displacement by blast -produced winds* Though arbitrarily 
chosen, the 10 ft/sec (6.8 mph) figure is quite likely low enough to avoid any 
significant number of casualties and if serious injuries occur, they are likely 
to be few indeed. 

Empirical work by Taborelli, et al. (5i f 52) in the 1957 Nevada Test 
Series, using 160 lb anthropometric dummies exposed at stations where 
measured overpressures were 5. 3 and 6. 9 psi, demonstrated the displace- 
ment possible to humans from nuclear blast. Table 10 summarizes the 
findings . 

Table 10 



Blast Displacement of 160 Lb Anthropometric Dummies 



Max 
pressure 

psi 



Max 

Max Initial horizontal 

Q dummy velocity 
psi position ft/ sec 



Time to 

max 
velocity Displacement 
sec in ft 




Standing 

Prone 

Standing 

Prone 



21.4 

zero 

not known 



0.5 



not known 



not known not known 



21,9 downwind 

None 

256 downwind 
44 to right 

124 downwind 
20 to right 



Even at 5 psi the maximal velocity attained in 0, 5 sec by the dummy was a 
little over 21.4 ft/sec, which speed is well above those required to fracture 
the skull and lower extremities. Though the displacement velocity at 6.9 
psi was not obtained in the Nevada studies, the total displacement of 124 and 
256 ft for the prone and standing dummies, respectively, demonstrates the 
unequivocal displacement hazard which can occur following nuclear explo- 
sions . 



336 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



Miscellaneous Effects 

. --.- m — 

No attempt has been made to deal with the threshold for human casual- 
ties as a consequence of miscellaneous blast effects. Those, however, who 
wish to explore the dangers from dust are referred to the publication of 
Desaga (80). 

Summary 

The tentative criteria described above for primary, secondary, and 
tertiary blast effects representing those conditions thought to be near the 
human casualty threshold are summarized in Table 11. It is the current 
opinion of the writer that the data in Table 11 represent best estimates for 
conditions at which human casualties will approach a minimum; e.g. , some 
individuals situated where the indicated overpressures, missile and displace- 
ment velocities exist will escape damage because of fortunate local geometry; 
many persons will be injured, but only to the extent that they can care for 
themselves; others will become casualties in that they require care from 
their associates, but these will be relatively few indeed. 

Table 11 



Threshold Criteria Estimated to be Near Conditions at Which 
Casualties Will Approach a Minimum or be Absent 



Blast 
Effect 



Criteria adopted as indicated 



Primary Lung damage 15 psi incident and maximal 

overpressure 
6 psi incident reflecting to 
1 5 psi maximal 

Eardrum rupture 5 psi incident and maximal 

overpressure 
2.5 psi incident reflecting to 
5 psi maximal 



Secondary Penetration into 115 ft/sec for a 10 gm glass 

abdomen missile 

Nonpenetrative 10 ft/ sec for a 10 lb masonry 
skull fracture missile 



Tertiary 



Skull fracture 
from impact 



10 ft/ sec for 160 lb man 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



349 



Incident 
over- 
pressure 
psi 




Table 16 

Comparative Weapons Effect Data 
Applicable to Indicated Blast Criteria 
for a 1 MT Surface Burst at Sea Level 



Initial 
Range ionizing 
in radiation 

mi rem 



5.5 



<10 



C 2 - 1 J 


5.1 


<10 


<rr?> 


4.9 


<10 


q£T^> 


4.9 


<10 


<2D 


4.6 


<10 


2.5 


4.6 


<10 


4.3 


3. 1 


<10 


5.0 


2.8 


<10 


6.0 


2.6 


<10 


15.0 


1.5 


500 



Thermal 

radiaticoi 

cal/cm 



Blast criteria for primary, 
secondary and tertiary 
effects 



7.2 

8.4 

9.3 

9.3 

10 

11 

25 

31 

37 

120 



f 



Displacement of man 160 lb 
10 ft/ sec in 28 ft 

Displacement of man 160 lb 
10 ft/ sec in 10 ft 

Missiles (glass) 10 gm 
115 ft/sec in 10 ft 

Missiles (masonry) 10 lbs 
10 ft/ sec in 26 ft 

Missiles (masonry) 10 lbs 
10 ft/ sec in 10 ft 



Eardrum rupture assuming 
pressure reflection 

Displacement of man 160 lb 
10 ft/ sec in 1 ft 

Eardrum rupture, assuming 
no pressure reflection 

Lung damage assuming 
pressure reflection 

Lung damage assuming 
no pressure reflection 



Computed and prepared by Bowen(86) 



M^/weS STAWttfe faS?f* e '> 



350 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



Incident 
over- 
pressure 
psi 



Table 17 

Comparative Weapons Effect Data 
Applicable to Indicated Blast Criteria 
for a 10 MT Surface Burst at Sea Level 



Initial 
Range ionizing 
in radiation 

mi rem 



Thermal 
radiation 
cal/cm 



Blast criteria for primary, 
secondary and tertiary 
effects 



<££> 




2.5 
4. 3 
5.0 
6.0 
15.0 



16 



<10 



14 


<10 


12 


<10 


11 


<10 


11 


<10 


9.7 


<10 


6.8 


<10 


6. 1 


<10 


5.5 


<10 



3.3 



10 



7.2 

9.5 

13 

16 

16 

21 

46 

58 

74 

220 



Computed and prepared by Bowen(86) 



Displacement of man 16T) lb 
10 ft/ sec in 58 ft 

Missiles (masonry) 10 lb 
10 ft/sec in 58 ft 

Displacement of man 160 lb 
10 ft/ sec in 10 ft 

Missiles (masonry) 10 lb 
10 ft/ sec in 10 ft 

Missiles (glass) 10 gm 
115 ft/ sec in 10 ft 

Eardrum rupture assuming 
pressure reflection 

Displacement of man 160 lb 

10 ft/ sec in 1 ft 

Eardrum rupture assuming 
no pressure reflection 

Lung damage assuming 
pressure reflection 

Lung damage assuming 
no pressure reflection 









352 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

incident and maximal pressure of 15 psi and at 6 psi 
incident overpressure for conditions wherein a reflection 
to 15 psi max occurs, and (2) rupture of the eardrum be- 
ginning at an incident and maximal overpressure of 5 psi 
and at an incident overpressure of 2.5 psi under circum- 
stances where reflection to 5 psi max will occur. 

b. Secondary blast effects for penetrating and nonpenetrating 
missiles; the former referred to a 10 gm glass missile 
having a velocity of 115 ft/sec which has a 1 per cent 
probability of traversing the abdominal wall of a dog and 
entering the abdominal cavity; the latter was estimated 
considering a 10 lb masonry missile travelling 10 ft/ sec 
as having only a slight chance of producing significant 
head and body injury. 

c. Tertiary blast effects assumed damage only on decelerative 
impact, and displacements involving velocities of 10 ft/sec 
for a 160 lb man were considered low enough to avoid 
significant numbers of serious head and skeletal injuries, 

8. The tentative criteria arbitrarily adopted to "fix 11 the threshold for 
blast casualties were related to nuclear weapons of 1 and 10 MT yield, sur- 
face detonated at sea level, in terms of overpressures, ranges and areas 
involved. 

9. The maximal ranges at which primary effects would be noted were 
estimated as follows: 

Effect i MT 10 MT 



Eardrum rupture 4. 5 mi 9. 7 mi 

Lung damage 2. 6 mi 5. 5 mi 

10. The estimated maximal areas involved for primary effects were 

Effect 1 MT 10 MT 

Eardrum rupture 64 sq mi 300 sq mi 

Lung damage 21 sq mi 95 sq mi 



364 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



the masonry missile, nonpenetrating, 10 pounds in weight also 

Senator Hickenlooper. Would you mind an interruption, Dr. 
White? 

Dr. White. No, sir. 

Senator Hickenlooper. Just to make clear your table here, do I 
understand that a 10-gram glass missile, under the heading "Distance 
to impact," means that if you are 4.9 miles away from the center of the 
blast and the glass missile is 10 feet away from you 

Dr. White. That arose 10 feet away from you. It started to move 
at that distance from you. 

Senator Hickenlooper. It started to move a distance 10 feet aw T ay. 

Dr. White. It would have a velocity of 115 feet per second when it 
hit you. 

Senator Hickenlooper. So that the 10 feet is not 10 feet from the 

point of blast. 

Dr. White. No. 

Senator Hickenlooper. But the 10 feet from the point of casualty ? 

Dr. White. The 10 feet refers to distance of missile travel before 
impact. 

Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you. I just wanted to get that clear. 

Dr. White. Yes, sir. For the 10-pound masonry missile, also trav- 
eling 10 feet before impact with the target, the ranges were estimated 
at 4.6 and 11 miles for the two yields under consideration. If one 
allowed the 10-pound masonry missile for the one MT case to move 
until it reached a 10 feet per second maximum velocity, it would move 
26 feet where the range was 4.9 miles. The same missile for the 10 MT 
case would reach a velocity of 10 feet per second after 58 feet of travel 
at 14 miles from the epicenter. This means that the overpressure 
would be lower if you allow the winds to act on the missile longer. 
It keeps accelerating until maximum velocity occurs. If one wants 
to put this in terms of range and keep the velocity at 10 feet per second, 
the farther you let the missile move — up until it gets maximum 
velocity — the less the overpressure and the greater the range. 

The expected corresponding areas over which missile casualties could 
be expected were, for a glass missile, 10 grams in weight, again travel- 
ing 10 feet before impact : 75 square miles and 380 square miles for the 
1 and 10 MT yields respectively. For masonry missile of 10 pounds, 
also moving 10 feet before impact at 10 feet per second^ the correspond- 
ing areas involved were estimated at 66 and 380 square miles. If one 
lets the missile move 26 and 58 feet for the 1 and 10 MT case, respec- 
tively, the corresponding areas are 75 and 620 square miles. 

Casualties due to displacement— among other things as was the case 
with the missiles— were noted to involve the distance of travel before 

impact. 
Kepresentative Holifield. You mean by displacement changing 

positions of the human body ? m 

Dr. White. I mean actual picking up of a man and , mpvin^Jimi_ 
Jfrrou gh the airT Thisi^o nc eptfflWsone to "treat" man as a missile^ 

We were fortunate enough at a 5 p si station in oneofthe 1957_s hots. 

in Nevada to photograph the time-displacement history of a ISO-pound 

dummy, and were able from a nalys is of the movies to determine the 
^Wiayiniarvftlocity reached bv this "crelitye^^at about 21 feet per second. 

This vg loci^dg[dojgg d in five-tenths of a second. The totaldisplace- 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 365 

fri ent o fjjie dummy was ne ar 22 fee t down w ind. It was this piece of 
^mpiricaLiniormation that Jhelped^reatly Jn getting an analytical 
"handle" on the "treatment" of man «■« a l^iRsjIe. 
__ Likewise in the JNeva da expiES^^ the oygrr. 

pressure was about 7 pounds per squar^ncB ^e^max imal velocities 
re acned by stand ing and prone iliimmks^ were not determine d . But, 
the total displacement ofthe standing dumm yi was 256 feet downwind, 

"""^Representative Holifield. This is what size bomh, if you remember ? 

Dr. White. I think I will ask Mr. Corsbie if he knows the yield of 
that shot. 

Kepresentative Holifield. Mr. Corsbie, do you remember that 
yieldl 

Mr. Corsbie. That was a 43 kiloton fired from about a T OOJfoot 
;"towef: ~> fL\jr*&g&&- S/HOttV 3/ ffWOTrTTTf^T 

Representative Holifield. Mow far was the dummy from the 
tower ? 

Dr. White. This was approximately — I may have to correct this — 
either 3,406 feet or 3,604 feet. The correct distance was 3,406 feet. 

Representative Holifield. More than a half mile ? 

Dr. White. The measured pressure there was 6.9 pounds per square 
inch and the pressure of the wind, which is the difference between the 
pressure measured head on to the advancing shock front and the pres- 
sure measured side on, was 15.4 pounds per square inch. For orienta- 
tion it is useful to know that hurricane winds of about 120 miles an 
hour have a dynamic pressure or "Q" of approximately 0.2 of a pound 
per square inch. These are tremendous winds. 

Representative Holifield. Then the wind is much greater than the 
worst hurricanes that have hit our coasts? 

Dr. White. Yes. This, ignoring other factors, is a function of the 
overpressured yield and the range, of course. The usual quoted 
dynamic pressure for 5 pounds per square inch for small yields is 
approximately 0.5 or 0.7 pound per square inch. 

Kepresentative Holifield. How high does it go in the case of a 
10 megaton ? 

Dr. White. I can't answer that out of my head. I would have to 
look it up. I don't think that the Q's associated with, a given over- 
pressure like 5 p.s.i. which will occur at considerable range will be 
much higher than for small yields. I am no blast physicist, but I 
think this is the case. But the winds, however, will last much longer. 

Representative Holifield. Does the lower chart on page 33 mean 
that a body 5.5 miles from point zero would travel 28 f eet \ 

Dr. White. Yes, which is the best current estimate for the 1 MT sur- 
face burst. That range, of course, fixes an overpressure, but that 
range also "fixes" a velocity of 10 feet per second, which was adopted 
in the criteria. Ten feet per second was chosen as the velocity at 
impact for just beginning casualties based on what biological informa- 
tion is known about impact loads necessary to fracture the skull, to 
fracture the heel bones and the bones of the feet, and the lower 
extremeties. 

Representative Holifield. And in the case of the 10-megaton bomb, 
a body would travel 58 feet over a range of 16 miles ? 

Dr. White. At 16 miles. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 373 

STATEMENT OF DR. VICTOR BOND, 1 DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION 01 
MICROBIOLOGY, MEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER, BROOKHAVEN 
NATIONAL LABORATORY 

Dr. Bond. Thank you, Mr. Holifield. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my topic is confined to 
the high-level fallout field itself, since, of course, beta lesions are not 
a problem in the absence of high-level fallout. 

The- relative importance of beta, compared to gamma radiation in 
fallout material in terms of casualty production, has been subject to 
debate. Before the accidental exposure of the Marshallese and the 
Japanese fishermen in March of 1954, the tendency was to ignore fall- 
out in general, and beta radiation from fallout in particular, as 
formidable injurious agents. 

The events in March of 1954 served to demonstrate conclusively, 
first, that high level radioactive fallout can result in extremely wide- 
spread serious injury and even death, and second, that extensive beta 
lesions of the skin can result, in the absence of a lethal exposure to 
penetrating gamma radiation, in an unprepared population exposed 
to large amounts of radioactive fallout. 

In the time allotted me I propose to review the nature and the ex- 
tent of skin damage that might result from exposure to large amounts 
of radioactive fallout. In doing this I shall rely rather neavily on 
the Marshallese data, although other examples are, of course, avail- 
able. I shall do this since the data represent a well documented ex- 
ample of fallout beta lesions in a sizable population of human beings, 
and since I observed and helped care for the individuals involved and 
thus can speak from personal experience. 

With respect to the lesions that we saw in the Marshallese, and I 
shall use the term "beta lesions" since a very large percentage of the 
dose received by the skin surface in these individuals resulted from 
beta radiation, the Marshallese were showered with radioactive fall- 
out following the detonation in March 1954 of a high yield thermo- 
nuclear device during weapon testing in the Pacific proving grounds. 

The wind shifted unexpectedly following the detonation, leading to 
unexpected fallout in significant amounts being deposited on the 
atolls of Eongelap, Rongerik, and Uterik. 



1 Born : Santa Clara, Calif., Nov. 30, 191ft. 

Education : San Jose High School, California, 1937 ; University of California, Berkeley, 
A.Bj., 1943 : University of California, San Francisco, M.D., 1945 ; University of California. 
Berkeley, Ph. D. in medical physics, 1952. 

Positions: Head, Experimental Pathology Branch, U.S.N. Radiological Defense Labora- 
tory, San Francisco, Calif., 1948-54; scientist, Medical Research Center, Brookhaven 
National Laboratory, Upton, Long Island, N.Y., 1955-57 ; head, Division of Microbiology. 
Medical Research Center, Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1957 to present. 

Military : Medical officer, U.S. Navy, 1945-54, highest rank, lieutenant, Marine Corps, 
U.S. Navy ; presently, lieutenant commander, Marine Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve, retired. 

Fields of interest: Medicine, radiobiology, effects of radiation. Twelve years of re- 
search experience on the effects of radiation, both in the laboratory and in field testing 
of atomic devices. 

Other activities and information : Participant and project officer in biological work in- 
volving field testing ; deputy director of the medical team that cared for the Marshallese 
following exposure to fallout radiation. In 1958, chairman of subcommittee on bio- 
medicine, NAS— NRC, to evaluate adequacy of research in nonmilitary defense. Presently 
member of the National Advisory Committee on Radiation, Public Health Service; Sub- 
committee on Hematology of the NAS-NRC Committee To Investigate the Effects of Atomic 
Radiation ; Subcommittee on RBE of the NCRP ; Subcommittee on Radiological Dosimetry, 
IC/RU. 

Professional organizations: American Physiological Society, New York Academy of 
Sciences, Radiation Research Society, Sigma Xi, and AAAS. 



380 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Beta Radiation Skin Lesions (Beta Bubns) From Fallout Radiations 
~PK r oQftT'i introduction 

The relative importance of beta, compared to gamma radiation In fallout mate- 
rial in terms of casualty production has been subject to debate. Before the acci- 
dental exposure of the Marshallese (1) and the Japanese fishermen in March of 
1954 (2), the tendency was to ignore fallout in general, and beta radiation from 
fallout in particular, as formidable injurious agents. The events in March of 
1954 served to demonstrate conclusively, (1) that high-level radioactive fallout 
can result in extremely widespread serious injury and even death in an affected 
population, and (2) that extensive beta lesions of the skin can result, in the 
absence of a lethal exposure to penetrating gamma radiation, in an unprepared 
population exposed to large amounts of radioactive fallout. In this presentation 
the nature and extent of skin damage that might result from exposure to large 
amounts of radioactive fallout will be reviewed. In doing this heavy reliance 
will be placed on the Marshallese data (although other examples are available), 
since these data represent a well-documented example of fallout beta lesions 
in a sizable population of human beings, and since the author observed and 
helped care for t he indivi duals involved a nd t hus c an speak from first-hand, 
" experience. Following this review of the naTure~of skin linage" that "can result 
from radioactive fallout, the possible degree to which the Marshallese situation 
might pertain under circumstances in the United States rather than in the 
mid- Pacific, and under circumstances in which the exposed population is better 
informed and better prepared, will be considered. Finally, an attempt will be 
mad** to place the potential beta lesion problem in perspective with regard to 
its seriousness compared to the hazard from the penetrating gamma radiation, 
which of course is invariably present. 

THE MARSHALLESE INCIDENT 

Now with respect to the beta lesions in the Marshallese (the affected areas 
are termed "beta lesions" since a very large percentage of the dose received by 
the skin surface resulted from beta radiation). These individuals were show- 
ered with radioactive fallout following the detonation in March 1954 of a high 
yield thermonuclear device during weapons testing at the Pacific Proving 
Grounds. The wind shifted unpredictably following the detonation, leading to 
unexpected fallout in significant amounts being deposited on the atolls of Ronge- 
lap, Rongerik and Uterik. The 64 Marshallese individuals on Rongelap a t the 
time, 105 nautical miles from the detonation , received the largest exposure an* 1 
I shall confine my remarks to this group. iThe fallout was visible on Ron gelap, 
described as snowlike, and began falling app roximat ely_5 __hojH*s_ after^Eej^gto^" 
nation. The ma terial was deposited on~t he grouOT jind on^thethatcjted-roog 
houses, as wel l asron thlTcTotKes, hair,' and sjdn_c^tM.i>eopIe- ThfeiMiyiduals 
remained on the islancTTor ^a^r^ximaleiy^g^ys^^yiMc^j time they were t ranS-^ 
ifer^ed to^The~TT^ for me^c^Lo^erVadonj^ 

""No ctasimeters were present on the island, anc TthV doses of gamma radiation_ 
received were estimated from average readlng sof survey instruments neiq 3 feeF 
jiboye the ground, of the order of a weeOolKwin^lh e detonation. From the se 
"readings it wa s estimated that the Rongalapese received approximately 175 r. 
or penetraT3n7TgaimTianrao^^ m easured essentiairy free in air. In addi- 

tion to gamma exposure, these individuals received large doses of beta Radiation 
i n areas o rn EhTT>o^y ln~^which the £a_Uout material was adherent to the skin. It 
is not possible to calculate with any reasonable degree of accuracy the dose to 
the skin from beta radiation. Estimates involving the known minimal dose of 
radiatioiL to - cause hair loss j)r~epilation _ indicate that the surface of the skin 
)robably received of tEe^ofdeFof 5,000 or more rads. 



jtro papj 

"With regard to symptomatologyT witn tne exception of nausea in some two- 
thirds of the individuals during the first 2 days, and vomiting and diarrhea in a 
smaller percentage, no symptoms developed that could be ascribed to penetrating 
gamma radiations. However, the penetrating radiation did result in marked 
peripheral blood count changes. No deaths occurred as the result of irradiation 
and all signs and symptoms except the initial gastrointestinal symptoms re- 
ferred to were related to beta lesions of the skin. ^C&LCi>*f*> ftHSfccVtM htiUvtf 
Within the first 2 days of exposure a number^xperienced transitory itching. 
an<L burning of the skin, and some complained of lacr ymati on. 3Vo further signs 
or symptoms referable to the"ikin were notidj ^HTabou t^ weeks after exposure. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 381 

when akin lesion s and epilatio^or loss of hair, was noted. _ Approxima tely^ 
rereenTof the individua ls showeoTsome damage of this n ag^ejo^ejgm, and 
a smaller number show ed spotty epilation. The skiFlesTonsTrrst appeared as 
small, raised pigmented areas, which later coalesced to form more extensive 
lesions. The nature of these lesions is indicated in figures 1 to 6 (pp. 384 to 389) . 
Most of the lesions were superficial and exhibited dry desquamation or loss of 
skin surface much like a fairly severe sunburn. Essentially all l_es lQn_sjwere jq. 
cat ed in skin areas not cove re d by clothi ng, andthey were^apst jyevalentjp jhe 
foloed areas of skin where'^ spi^ation wSuIg]Iend to coUect. Even thin cjoth^ 
Tng appare ntly served" ^rprev ^FvIslDle jlamage. _The superficial lesions re- 
-qulrea no therapy beyond blanoTsoHElnlf prepara^^ 

healing; - occu rreoT vyTth^nalew'wee gsr "Some of the lesions were deeper, however, 
and showed weF aesquamation or loss of skin. Such lesions became infected, 
and required treatment with antibiotics. t The affected areas, with the exception 
of one, also healed in a matter of weeks, with some residual scarring, atrophy 
and depigmentation. On followup examinations in the 5 years since_theacci- 
dent (3-7). none of the lesions has shown a tenden^H:on5Tea¥^gown^nor^has 
premallgnant or malign ant change^occurred. 

■ — in the"course of Initial observation it was~not necessary to hospitalize any of 
the patients. Some itching, but no pain was associated with the superficial 
lesions ; however by no standard could these people be considered incapacitated. 
Mild pain was associated with the deeper lesions and some difficulty with walk- 
ing resulted with the deeper lesions located on the feet. Here also, however, it 
would have been difficult to classify ,these individuals as incapacitated. If 
necessary, they could have performed essentially any task associated, with daily 
living and survival. 

APPLICATION OF THE MARSHALLESE RESULTS TO FALLOUT SITUATIONS IN GENERAL 

So much for the Marshallese accident indicating that extensive beta skin 
lesions can occur in the face of sublethal gamma exposure ; now let us consider 
to what degree the Marshallese incident may be considered typical of what might 
occur in case of widespread fallout in populated areas of the United States from 
deliberate attack, or from accidental nuclear weapon detonation. And I wish 
now to make it perfectly clear that I speak of a disaster situation, not routine 
peacetime operations and certainly not the long-range fallout that has resulted 
in essentially worldwide, very low-level contamination. There are several fac- 
tors that would make one consider the Marshallese incident the worst that could 
reasonably pertain with respect to the hazard of beta radiation relative to that 
of gamma radiation (of course, populations might be exposed to considerably 
larger doses of both beta and gamma radiation than were the Marshallese). 
These people were not alerted to the possible hazards of fallout and had no 
comprehension of what was happening; thus they took no evasive action and 
made no effort to decontaminate themselves. American servicemen on a nearby 
contaminated island, who were more alert to the danger and added clothing and 
decontaminated themselves showed considerably less effect than did Marshallese 
comparably exposed. The Rongalapese were not evacuated from the contami- 
nated island, and thus were not decontaminated for 2 days, at which time a 
large percentage of the dose from the rapidly decaying fission products had 
been received. It is clear that the great bulk of the beta dose was derived fron x 
material de posited on the skin, and the habits of the Marshallese tendeO o 
maximize the depo sition of the material on the skin. They wore rather scanty 
cjlgthing anTjacTlhoes. and jjppFa TgoWliel^^ The us e of 

IhTcTHiaTroilai^ material on the~heaHT The TOgE humidity 

and sweating contributed by encouraging the mati rJaTtQ c oUect_on the skin, 
Thusone might conclude^jhatj^^ ^ would constitute an^extensive 

"pro blem 'only unde r Jh &_ rather "favor able conditions i~for~lt thaTTwefe present ihj 
t he MarsfaaiieBe, and that the"" problem ^ w ould_ essentiall y notexisTs houToTant 
"£mericairclty be' subjected to " fallout radiati6nTrA,nd fuTtherT"bne~couiq con^ 
"elude thaTsfneeTwfa »\\x\ lesions might be cl a ssified more as a minor effect and 
jjTnuisan cejra ther than an incapacitati ng or dea dly one, that one mig nn^sen^ 
lially ig n ore the pro ble m In the face of the known seri ous conse quehces^oFlEe 
penetrati ng gaiqma~TadTatio n and Qther potentia lly Jethal JmolaCTjieg^ "This 
evaluation could perlain ; however, it is necessary to inject a word of caution. 



382 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

It is quite true that Americans spend a good deal of time inside; however, 
under some circumstances (warmer regions, summertime) sizable numbers could 
be outside, with portions of the skin exposed. Also, especially in the peripheral 
zone from the point of detonation where windows may be shattered without 
other serious structural damage, it may not be necessary to be outside to have 
material deposited on one. Fallout on a previously devastated area would pre- 
sent a like picture. The fallout was visible in the Marshalls ; it might not b e_jn^ 
continental surroundings. Even a thin~Tayer of clot nl^__prj)tecteiL_Jbhe 
"Marsnailese from visible damage from fallout from the particular device em- 
J?loyed^ I ^o nonJm?wTb what degree the^beT^rener gv^ spectrum_f£om this device 
would represent closely That from more r ecent devices. jOne j?annqt Jgnore the 
possibility of f allo ut coming down in rain7~Th~ which event c lothing, if not re^_ 
"mov ed, might provide the ideal situation for severe be ta les ions. It is entirely, 
"possible unaerThe chaot ic conditions thaF would exist "followin g a ttackjthat no 
facilities for ade quate decontamination may be a vailable T^ An^eoTucated, pre- 
"parea popumi lon~under almost any circulmitances can do much to lessen the de-_ 
- gree Of damage or avoid damage co mpletely : however^Jjjbhe^au thor's opinion,- 
~tfTe vast .majorit y or A^meric ans are neither prepared for, nor educated to ffie 
danger of fallout in gene ral, let alone the possible hazard fro m be ta radiation. 

The main point to be ma^efrom the aboveTemarSs is that~while beta lesions, 
considered in the overall possible casualty situations, undoubtedly is a lesser 
consideration, it is still possible that appreciable segments of the involved popu- 
lation might develop beta lesions if exposed to fallout and no preventive measures 
were taken. If this be the situation, the results potentially could be more 
serious than in the Marsnailese, and much more than a mere nuisance, for the 
following reasons: jn the _M flrR hn ll p se. while the white count of the blood was 
markedly depressed, this and other immune mechanisms app arently were never 
^ujaired to the Pgigtat which the individual, wjis_not able to ward~off pogsible~ 
Invading organisms, _ Further, the point of maximum effect on th e w Mtelcount 
occurred relatively late, in the fifth ana six tn week , after TmTWTa les ions were 
well on the way to healing, with a Iarger~dose of gammXTacilaTmn, and ^jujuT 
the Marsnailese been only a lew mile s i'u^the^jmrfe^thaijrth ey were aQEe^K e' 
or iaU o ut they would have received """a considerably Jarger_ doseZ the situagfon 
might have been di fferent. The white count would„.ha ve fallen faster, and it 
and oth e r immunlTmeffianismgrwould ha yejbe^n^gerioiisly affec ted. T hen more_ 
of the lesions might have become infected, and f in addition the ope^Jesions 
would provide a portal of entry for invading organisms, heading potentially 
to generalized infection^ _jnfection^is_the problem of perhaps greatest magnitude 
y?]tt } ma ssive t otal bodfy galmnir exposure^ an tT with open skfn lesions many 
might succumb that other wis e might survive. T hl s^speciaT Iy under conditions 
that imdoubtedly wouldpertajn^in which no, o rTnadeqiiate, medical care would 
be availabl e, xnus. a Tm^esent, I do not think we should ignore completely the 
Jbela jesio n problem. 

In summary, there can be no doubt that in a fallout field, within hours and 
perhaps days of detonation, penetrating gamma radiation is the controlling 
hazard. Gamma radiation is the agent that kills primarily. However, there 
also is no doubt that extensive beta lesions have occurred, and might occur under 
some conditions in a fallout field. In an unprepared population unaware of the 
potential danger, beta skin lesions could represent a potentially serious hazard 
to appreciable numbers of individuals exposed. In a well-prepared population 
educated to the potential hazard, the beta skin lesion problem would be minimal 
indeed. 

SUMMARY 

The Marsnailese accident in March 1954 demonstrated clearly that extensive 
beta lesions of the skin, in the absence of a lethal dose of gamma radiation, 
can occur under some conditions in an unprepared population exposed to a 
high-level fallout radiations. The fallout began on Rongelap Atoll in the 
Marshall Islands approximately 5 hours after the detonation of a high yield 
thermonuclear device, and the 64 individuals on this atoll were evacuated 
approximately 2 days later. An estimated 175 r, of penetrating gamma radiation 
was delivered to the entire body, in addition to large doses of beta radiation 
to exposed areas of skin to which the fallout material clung. Beginning approxi- 
mately 2 weeks after exposure, lesions of the skin appeared on some 90 percent 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 383 

of the individuals. The affected areas included the head, and other locations 
where the material had deposited. Most of the lesions were superficial and healed 
rapidly. Some were deep and painful, and healed more slowly with some 
residual scarring. There has been no evidence to date of secondary breakdown 
or malignant change in these lesions. 

Several factors pertained that made the Marshallese incident possibly the 
worst that could happen with respect to the relative importance of the beta 
hazard under conditions of fallout (of course populations could be exposed to 
much larger total doses of both beta and gamma radiations than were the Mar- 
shallese). The people were not educated nor prepared for the danger, and pro- 
longed exposure without evasive action or decontamination occurred. The 
climatic conditions, conducive to relatively scanty clothing and outdoor existence 
also increased the degree of exposure. Under conditions of living in a tem- 
perate climate, many of these adverse factors would not normally be operative, 
and thus the beta problem would be expected to be minimal. However, it must 
be pointed out that exposure to contact beta radiation of a sizable number of in- 
dividuals might occur in an uninformed population under some conditions (area 
of milder climate or in summer, individuals in buildings with shattered windows, 
fallout on a previously devastated area, clothed individuals caught in radio- 
active rain), or under chaotic conditions in which decontamination might not be 
possible. In these affected individuals, in the absence of decontamination, the 
resultant skin lesions in some could be much more serious than those seen in 
the Pacific islands. If the concomitant gamma exposure were higher than that 
received by the Marshallese, which it could easily be, the resultant depression 
of the white blood cell count, and of other immune mechanisms necessary to 
combat infection would be correspondingly more severe. Under these circum- 
stances the open skin lesions could serve as a portal of entry for organisms, 
leading potentially to fatalities in individuals that might otherwise survive. 
Thus while the penetrating gamma hazard would by all odds be the most lethal 
agent in a fallout field, the beta skin hazard cannot be ignored and must be 
guarded against. Only in a population that is informed of the potential danger 
and is prepared will beta hazard be reduced to a minimum. 

REFERENCES 

1. Cronkite, E. P. et al. The Effects of Ionizing Radiation on Human Beings : 
A Report on the Marshallese and Americans Accidentally Exposed to Radia- 
tion from Fallout and a Discussion of Radiation Injury in the Human Being, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1956. 

2 Tsuzaki, M. Radioactive Damage of Japanese Fishermen Caused by Bikmi 
Ashes. Munch.med.Wochschr., 97: 988-94 (1955). Also, Proceedings of First 
International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Geneva, 1955 

(United Nations). . „ . T ™ , , 

3 Bond V. P., Conard, R. A., Robertson, J. S., and Weden, E. A., Jr. Medical 
Examination of Rongelap People 6 months After Exposure to Fallout, WT-937, 
Operation Castle Addendum Report 4.1 A, April 1955. 

4 Cronkite, E. P., Dunham, G. L., Griffin, D., McPherson, S. D., and Wood- 
ward, K. T. 12-Month Postexposure Survey on Marshallese Exposed to Fallout 
Radiation, BNL 384 (T-71), August 1955. 

5. Conard, R. A., Huggins, C. E., Cannon, B., Lowrey, A., and Richards, J. B. 
Medical Survey of Marshallese 2 Years After Exposure to Fallout Radiation, 
J.A.M.A. 164, 1192-7 (1957). r.««««« 

6 Conard, R. A., Meyer, L. M., Rail, J. E., Lowrey, A., Bach, S. A., Cannon, 
B., Carter, E., Eicher, M. and Hechter H. March 1957 Medical Survey of Ronge- 
lap and Utirik People 3 Years After Exposure to Radioactive Fallout, BNL 501 
(T-119), June 1958. w __ __ _. _- 

7 Conard, R. A., Robertson, J. S., Meyer, L. M., Sutow, W. W., Wolins, W., 
Lowrey, A., Urschel, H. C. Jr., Barton, J. M., Goldman, M., Hechter, H Eicher, 
M Carver R. K., and Potter, D. W. Medical Survey of Rongelap People, March 
1958 4 Years After Exposure to Fallout, BNL 534 (T-135) (1958). 



384 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



Figure 1 





Figure 1. — Extensive lesions, 46 days after exposure, on a young boy who wore 
little clothing at the time of exposure. Note particularly the lesions on the 
neck, in the armpits and at the beltline — areas where the fallout material 
tended especially to collect. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



385 



Figure 2 




Figure % — Extensive neck lesions on a woman approximately 30 days after 
exposure. Note the superficial nature of the lesions, resembling severe 
sunburn. 



386 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAB WAR 



Figure 3 




mS m 30 m £§ W 




Figxjre 3. — Deeper, more severe lesions that healed more slowly. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



387 



Figure 4 




» * jt 



Figure 4. — The same lesion shown in figure 3, 6 months later. Healing is com- 
plete, with residual scarring, atrophy, and depigmentation. 



388 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Figure 5 




Figure 5. — Head lesions, and spotty epilation in a young girl 28 days after 

exposure. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



389 



FlGUBE 6 





Figure 6. — Complete regrowth of normal hair in the same girl shown in figure 

5, 6 months after exposure. 

Representative Holifieux At this point I would like to submit for 
the record, a statement by Dr. Conard, and his associates on the Medi- 
cal Survey of the Rongelap People, March 1958, 4 years after exposure 
to fallout ; and the report of the Medical Status of the Rongelap Peo- 

Ele 5 Years After Exposure to Fallout Radiation, by Dr. Conard, 
ead of the Marshall Island surveys. 
(The material referred to follows :) 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 393 



MEDICAL SURVEY OF RONGELAP PEOPLE, MARCH 1958, 
FOUR YEARS AFTER EXPOSURE TO FALLOUT 

Robert A. Conard, M.D., 1 James S. Robertson, M.D., Ph.D., 1 Leo M. Meyer, M.D., 2 

Wataru W. Sutow, M.D., 3 William Wolins, M.D., 1 Austin Lowrey, Col. (MC) USA, 4 

Harold C. Urschel, Jr., Lt. (MC) USN, 5 Johnny M. Barton, Capt. (MC) USAF, 6 

Morris Goldman, Ph.D./ Hyman Hechter, 8 Maynard Eicher, 5 

Russell K. Carver, 7 and David W. Potter 1 



wilk the technical assistance of 

Clyde R. Sipe, 1 James S. Otto, HMC, USN, 9 Marion L. Hartley, HMC, USN,* 

Pacifico A. Tenorio, HMI, USN, 5 William G. Murray/ 

William A, Scon, 1 and Irving Jonis* 



^rookhaven National Laboratory , Upton, New York 

2 South Nassau Communities Hospital, RockviHe Centre, New York 

3 M.D. Anderson Hospital, University of Texas, Houston, Texas 

4 Walter Reed Army Hospital, Washington, D.C 

5 Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, Maryland 

'Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, Washington, D.C. 

'Communicable Disease Center (Public Health Service), Chamblee, Georgia 

8 Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, San Francisco, California 

'Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland 



BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY 
Upton, N. Y. 






394 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



MEDICAL SURVEY OF RONGELAP PEOPLE, MARCH 1958, 
FOUR YEARS AFTER EXPOSURE TO FALLOUT 



Background 

This report presents the results of a medical 
survey carried out in March 1958 on the Marshal- 
lese people of Rongelap Atoll who were acci- 
dentally exposed to radioactive fallout in March 
1954. The accident occurred following the detona- 
tion of a high yield thermonuclear device during 
experiments at Bikini in the Pacific Proving 
Grounds. An unpredicted shift in winds caused a 
deposition of significant amounts of fallout on four 
inhabited Marshall Islands nearby and on 23 
Japanese fishermen aboard their fishing vessel, the 
Lucky Dragon (see Figure 1.) Sixty-four inhabit- 
ants of the island of Rongelap, 105 nautical miles 
away from the detonation, received the largest 
fallout exposure: an estimated dose of 175 r whole- 
body gamma radiation, beta burns and epilation 
from contamination of the skin, and slight internal 
absorption of radioactive material. Another 18 
Rongelap people away on a nearby island (Ailing- 
nae), where less fallout occurred, received only 
about half this exposure. Twenty-eight American 
servicemen on the island of Rongerik further away 
received about the same amount of radiation as 
did the 18 people on Ailingnae (about 70 r). 
Lastly, 157 Marshallese on Utirik, about 200 miles 
distant, received only about 14 r whole-body radi- 
ation. The fallout was not visible on this island 
and no skin effects were seen. 

The exposed people were evacuated from these 
islands by plane and ship about two days after the 
accident and taken to Kwajatein Naval Base 
about 200 miles to the south, where they received 
extensive examinations for the following 3 months. 
In view of the generally negative findings on the 
American servicemen, they were returned to their 
duty stations. The Utirik people were repatriated 
to their home island, where the radioactivity was 
considered to be low enough for safe habitation. 
Because Rongelap Atoll was considered to be too 
highly contaminated, a temporary village was 
constructed for the Rongelap people on Majuro 
Atoll several hundred miles to the south, where 
they remained for the following 3 l /2 years. In July 
1957, after careful evaluation of remaining radio- 
logical hazards, Rongelap Island was found safe 



for habitation. A new village was constructed, and 
the Rongelap people were moved there by Navy 
ship. The present survey was therefore carried out 
at Rongelap Island. 

SUMMARY OF PAST FINDINGS 

Reports have been published on the findings of 
surveys made at the following times after expo- 
sure: initial examinations, 1 6 months, 2 1 year, 3 2 
years, 4 and 3 years. 5 The following is a brief sum- 
mary of these findings. 

During the first 24 to 48 hr after exposure, 
about Vi of the Rongelap people experienced 
anorexia and nausea. A few vomited and had 
diarrhea. Many also experienced itching and 
burning of the skin and a few complained of lach- 
rymation and burning of the eyes. Following this, 
these people remained asymptomatic until about 
2 weeks after the accident, when cutaneous lesions 
and loss of hair developed due largely to beta ir- 
radiation of the skin. It was apparent when the 
people were first examined, a few days after ex- 
posure, that the lymphocytes were considerably 
depressed and that significant doses of radiation 
had probably been received. In addition to the 
whole-body dose of radiation and the beta irradia- 
tion of the skin, radiochemical analyses of the 
urine showed that significant amounts of radio- 
active material had also been absorbed internally. 
The effects of the radiation can best be sum- 
marized under three headings according to the 
mode of exposure: penetrating irradiation, skin 
irradiation, and internal irradiation. 

Penetrating Irradiation 

The changes in the peripheral blood of the more 
heavily exposed Rongelap people who received 
175 r will be reviewed below (see Figures 7, 9, 12 
and Tables 3, 4, 5), The changes in the Ailingnae 
and Utirik groups were similar but less marked. 
Certain unexplained fluctuations have occured 
from year to year in the peripheral blood levels of 
the comparison populations as well as of the ex- 
posed groups. Depression of the peripheral blood 
elements as represented by mean population levels 
occurred as follows. 



416 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



iooooe r 



1000 



i r 



-p. ,- 



i r 




CHANNEL WIDTH 0.020 Mev 
I 1 I L_ 



02 0.4 0.6 OS 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2J0 
GAMMA RAY ENERGY IN Mev 



Figure 16. Background counting rates 
at Rongelap Atoll. 



lOOOOpr 




02 



CW 0.6 OS 1.0 12 
GAMMA RAY ENEROY IN Mev 



Figure 17. Rongelap subject #50, May 1958, 
total 43,260 cpm above background. 



toooo^-| — i — i — [ — i — i — i — [ — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i i i n 



1000 



6 ioo 



MAY 1958 




0.2 0.4 0.6 OS 1.0 1.2 1.4 t,6 1.8 2.0 
GAMMA RAY ENERGY IN Mev 



Figure 18. Rongelap subject #79, total 66,974 cpm 
above background (analysis No. 4). 



Findings. Figure 16 compares the background 
gamma-ray spectrum of March 1958 with that of 
May 1958. (A few background data, plant and 
marine specimens, and data on one of the American 
subjects had been carried separately and hence 
were not lost at sea.) In addition to its being high, 
the May background shows a peak at 1.6 Mev, 
which was attributed to Ba-La 140 . Except for this 
one peak, the background spectrum is essentially 
continuous. This, plus the fact that external pro- 
cedures were effective in reducing the background, 
whereas cleaning the inside of the steel room and 
removal of unnecessary articles from within the 
room were ineffective, indicated that the con- 
taminating radioactivity was outside the room. 

Figure 1 7 shows the net gamma-ray spectrum 
of a representative Marsh all ese subject after ap- 
propriate correction for analyzer dead time and 
subtraction of the background. The Cs 137 and Zn 65 
peaks are seen to be prominent, and in this case 
there is also a net peak at 1.6 Mev which has been 
attributed to Ba-La 140 and which obscures the K 40 
peak. The latter was not a constant finding, but 
even in the spectra without it, the K 40 peak was 
usually obscured by the high background. It had 
been hoped that the spectra could be examined for 
other peaks, but, since the method of analysis re- 
quires the high energy peaks and their associated 
Gompton scattering spectra to be subtracted out 
first, the difficulties introduced by the high back- 
ground, the 1.6 Mev peak, and the masking of the 
K*° peak render the entire procedure very uncer- 
tain. Similar difficulties prevented examination 
of the spectrum for possible contributions from 
Sr 90 bremsstrahlung. If future surveys show the 
presence of additional nuclides, the 1958 data may 
be re-examined. For the present, however, only 
the Cs 137 and Zn 65 values, based on peak heights, 
are reported here. 

Figure 18 shows the spectrum for another sub- 
ject in 1958 compared with his spectrum in 1957. 
Because of the narrower channel width used in the 
1958 study, the activities are even higher relative 
to the 1957 levels than the graph indicates. 

The body content of Cs 137 and Zn 65 and the 
urinary concentrations of Cs 137 , Zn 65 , K 40 , and Sr 9 * 
are presented in Table 15. Since the urine speci- 
mens were obtained in March, they may not cor- 
respond strictly to the body data obtained in May. 
The subjects are divided into groups on the basis 
of their island of residence. The data are presented 
in this way rather than on the basis of exposure 



420 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



1954 
1st DAY 




RARE EARTHS""1| (312) 




[174} 



n 



1956 



n 



1957 



1958 



Ba-140 g (134) 



1 Sr " 90 < 7 1 

Cs-137(33) 
| Sr -90(1.4) 

Ce-144 | (123) 

| Cs-137(76) 
| Sr- 90 (.3 -1.4) 
£ Zn-65(?) 



Sr-90{21) 



POST REDWING 



RETURN TO RONGELAP 



1 8/00 1 
1 3,080 1 



100 



200 300 

d/m/24 HR SAMPLE 



400 



Figure 19. Urinary excretion of isotopes by Ron gel ap people. 



1954 




1957 



Cs-137(.01 -.02) 
Sr - 90 (?) 

Cs-137(.02) 
| Zn-65 
f Sr-90(?) 
l",. Ce-144(?) 



POST REDWING 



1958 




RETURN TO RONGELAP 



1.0 



1.5 



2.0 



Figure 20. Estimated body burden of isotopes of Rongelap people. 



430 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Medical Status of Rongelap People 5 Years After Exposure to Fallout 

Radiation 

Robert A. Conard, M.D., jHead, Marshall Island Medical Surveys 

In March 1959 the regular annual medical survey was carried out on the 
Rongelap people who had received the heaviest exposure to radiocative fallout 
5 years previously in the accident which occurred following the experimental 
detonation of a nuclear weapon. 

The examinations were conducted on Rongelap Island to which the people 
had returned in July 1957. On their return, they were accompanied by an 
equally large group of unexposed relatives. This latter group has served as a 
comparison population for the medical studies. The Navy kindly furnished an 
LST for the survey. 

These annual surveys are carried out under the direction of Brookhaven 
National Laboratory and sponsored by the Atomic Energy Commission with the 
support of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Department of Defense, 
and other governmental agencies. A team of 20 physicians, scientists, and tech- 
nicians, specialists in the field of radiation medicine, carried out the survey on 
Rongelap Island. 

On arrival of the team at Rongel ap there was some question, Ijl jthe minds 

^ofso me of the people as to~the necessity of navmgjfurther examinations. <3b- 

^jections to the examinations were mainly directeoTtoward their dislike of the 

blood sampling. It was also evident that the need for the examinations create d 

_Rome rpncerp in thp Tninris pfjHiP^j^plp ^^ 

were concerned about the radiological safet y of their r*oodPand water for con- 
"IHmap^^ good and 

~fh~e ir 'food" and water safe~ folF^consumption, and^tne Importance of Continued] 
"examinations and treat ment in-order to help 'InsuWjjieir continued good' health 
was~ st _ggsegT33 i &ggfi. explanations appeared to~al!eviate ~ tnerf fears and the 
people cooperat ejl j^remejy^wg U with the me^flcjfl^einn^n : carryi^ ourTHe 
^examinations., ^-HI^lT^ ttfitoVS' ?tfTAv$T~ IM iq%0^f%ES&*TT 

The examinations included medical histories, complete physical examinations, 
and blood and other laboratory examinations. In addition spectrographs of 
gamma ray activity were obtained from individuals measured in a steel room 
and from radiochemical analysis of urine samples in order to determine their 
body burdens of radionuclides. Analyses of the data are not complete and those 
data referring to this recent survey must be considered as preliminary in nature. 
In conjunction with the examinations, considerable medical and dental treatment 
of the people was carried out to the extent possible under field conditions. 

Following the accident, the Rongelapese had shown signs of significant ex- 
posure to radiation such as short-lived loss of appetite, nausea, vomiting, de- 
pression of their blood forming tissues, multiple burns of the skin from beta 
exposure and internal absorption of fission products. 

Findings on the past survey revealed that the people have recovered from the 
acute effects of their radiation exposure. No diseases, illnesses, or deaths have 
occurred which could be directly related to their radiation exposure. The inci- 
dence of all diseases noted has been about the same in both the exposed and 
unexposed groups examined. The general physical condition of the exposed 
and unexposed people on the island appeared good and their nutritional status 
was satisfactory. During the past year one death occurred in a 35-year-old man, 
bringing the total deaths in the exposed group to 3 for the 5-year period. This 
represents a death rate about equal to that of the Marshall Islands as a whole 
(about 7 deaths per 1,000 population per year) . 

Findings, previously reported, which were interpreted as suggestive of a slight 
lag in growth and development of the children during the first few years after 
exposure are being reevaluated based on more exact age data obtained on the 
past survey. The results of this evaluation are not complete enough to make 
any statements at present. 

One case of cancer (ovarian) developed in a 61-year-old female during the past 
year, the first case of cancer noted in either the exposed or unexposed popula- 
tions. There is no reason to believe the cancer is related to radiation effect. 

Fertility does not appear to have been affected since the birthrate has been 
higher in the exposed than in the unexposed Marshallese. A somewhat increased 
prevalence of miscarriages and stillbirths has been noted in the exposed group, 
but due to the paucity of vital statistics on the Marshallese and the small num- 
ber of people involved, no statistical analysis is possible. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 431 

Recovery of the blood-forming tissues is judged virtually complete based on 
studies of the peripheral blood counts. A possible exception is seen in the blood 
platelets which are slightly below the levels in the unexposed group but still 
within the normal range. There is no evidence of any untoward effect associated 
with this finding. 

The beta burns of the skin healed rapidly during the first few months after 
exposure. In 12 cases there remain slight scarring of the skin and pigment 
changes at the former site of deeper burns. However, no evidence of any can- 
cerous change in these scars is noted. In those that lost hair, regrowth of normal 
hair was complete by 6 months after exposure. 

Very little is known about late effects of radiation in human beings. In- 
creased incidence of leukemia in the exposed Japanese people has been noted 
and, in animal studies, the following late effects of radiation may result: Life 
shortening, premature aging, increase in degenerative diseases, increased in- 
cidence of malignancies, opacities of the lens of the eyes, and genetic changes. 
The Marshallese have been examined for evidence of such changes, but none 
have been seen. Radiation-induced leukemia is known to appear relatively soon 
after exposure and other types of malignancy at later times. Therefore, con- 
tinued examination are essential in order to detect and, if possible, treat such 
effects should they develop. 

The radioactive fission products that had been absorbed internally by the 
Rongelap people were never sufficient in amount to result in acute effects. These 
radioactive materials were excreted rapidly during the first 6 months after ex- 
posure. The island of Rongelap remains slightly radioactively contaminated, 
but careful surveys showed the island to be safe for habitation by the summer 
of 1957 when the people were returned to Rongelap. Studies of the body burdens 
of radioactive materials in these people is an important part of the medical 
surveys. A 21-ton steel room with very sensitive radiation-detecting equipment 
has been used in the past two annual surveys at Rongelap to determine the body 
burdens of radionuclides. In addition numerous urine samples have been 
analyzed for radioactivity. The results of these studies show that there has 
been an increase in body burdens, principally of cesium 137, zinc 65, and 
strontium 90 since their return to Rongelap. About the same levels of these 
isotopes have been noted m those exposed and unexposed. 

During the first 8 months after th eir retu rn to Rongelap jheir body burden. 
TiTjceiiui^^ up to~TgrTresulting 

in j^_jpaean body burden of 0.68 /xc) ; zinc 65 is estimated to have shown __a_ 
[ cmicomitanTl ncrea se Quea]^ bojjy burden of 0.36jac) ; strontium '90 showed about 
3_twentyfoid_incre ase rate of excret io h~m~the ur ine/ ^jyfone sample of bone is 
^available., f or _estimating_the _]x»dyJurd,en^o|^ strontium 90. This is Jfrom a 
Rongelap man w ho died in AprijjL 958 (9 months af ter ^Is return to Rongelap) 
which jiowed„3,6 w*c/Sr w /gm Ca (strontium uniMX T^n^e^ M^s_of ^Sfcrth 
jgHeric^n data, Tt is exp ec ted that theT value s jfor^ijdTen would be higher. 

"TBa^Mn^n^prel^S^S^analy sis^>f djta_fromjtnejnost X^^lIly^Y^yLi-^i^ ?$_ 

'^^^^^^^S^LSS^^i^S^^^^h^J^VV^ [ ^ tfiat the peopl e have j jggun. 

"toTaTtamequilibrium with their lightl y coh tamlna^e^^nTiron]&ehT. The cesium 

" 137 Ievels^appeaT^tcn5e slightly lower than the year before, wnlhTthe zinc 65 has 

increased slightly. The strontium 90 analyses, unfortunatley, are hot available 

yet. The body burdens estimated above are far below the maximum permissible 

levels; cesium 137 is about 2 percent of the MPL, and zinc 65 is 1 percent of 

the MPL. 

In summary, a medical survey of the Marshallese people in March 1959, 
5 years after exposure to fallout radiation, showed that the people had recovered 
from the acute effects of their radiation exposure and appeared to be generally 
in good health. The following specific statements can be made in regard to 
their radiation health status : 

1. No illnesses or diseases were found that could be directly associated with 
acute radiation effects. 

2. One case of cancer and three deaths have occurred, but with no direct 
relation to radiation effects. 

3. Fertility does not appear to have been affected. The incidence of mis- 
carriages and stillbirths appears to be somewhat higher than in the unexposed 
Marshallese, but a deficiency of vital statistics precludes definite conclusions as 
to whether or not this is a radiation effect. 

4. Suggestive evidence of slight lag in growth and development of exposed 
children noted previously is being reevaluated on the basis of better age data 
obtained during the past survey. 



432 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

5. Blood platelet levels are within the normal range but somewhat below 
those of the unexposed population. 

6. Only 12 cases show residual changes in the skin from beta burns. None 
show any evidence of cancerous change. 

7. Possible late effects of radiation such as shortening of lifespan, premature 
aging, increased incidence of leukemia and malignancies, increased incidence 
of degenerative diseases, opacities of the lens, and genetic changes have not 
been observed. 

8. The original body burdens of internally absorbed fission products appears 
to be too low to have produced any acute or long-term effects. 

9. The return of the people to the slightly contaminated island of Rongelap 
has caused some increase in body burdens of cesium 137, zinc 65, and strontium 
90. However, the levels are far below the accepted maximum permissible dose 
and it is not believed any untoward effects will result. 

In view of the limited knowledge of the late effects of radiation in human 
beings, it is considered essential that medical surveys of the Rongelap people 
continue to be carried out in order to detect and treat immediately any possible 
further effects of radiation that might develop. Though body burdens of radio- 
active isotopes are well below the accepted permissible dose levels and no further 
significant increase in these burdens is anticipated, a close check on these levels 
during future medical surveys is indicated. 

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene 
at 2 p.m., the same day.) 

AFTERNOON SESSION 

Representative Holifield. The committee will be in order. 

Our first witness will be Dr. Gordon Dunning of the Division of 
Biology and Medicine of the AEC. Dr. Dunning will present a 
short summary of the effects of injection. We will accept his detailed 
statement for the record, and insert it at the end of his testimony. 

Representative Holifield. Dr. Dunning, the Chair wishes to apolo- 
gize for the necessity of asking you to summarize your testimony. As 
you can see, we are running late. We are going to have to carry over 
some of our witnesses until Friday morning. In the morning we plan 
to start on article X of the outline, which will have casualty estimates, 
human beings in the United States, and article XIII. We will try 
to cover that on Thursday. If we fail to get to some of the witnesses 
between now and then, we are going to have to carry over. We are 
running behind, and we have made commitments to members and 
others to have such data as is available on Thursday. 

So at this time, Dr. Dunning, we will ask you to proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. GORDON M. DUNNING, 1 DIVISION OF BIOLOGY 
AND MEDICINE, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 

Dr. Dunning. Mr. Holifield, in my written testimony I have cov- 
ered the subject of ingestion, what organs are most greatly affected, 
the relative amount of exposure to these organs, and the possible bio- 
logical effects. I will summarize the principal statements in this 
written record. 



1 Date and place of birth : September 11, 1910 ; Cortland, N.Y. Education : State 
Teachers College, Cortland, N.Y., 1929-33; New York University (6 weeks), 1933; State 
Teachers College, Cortland, N.Y., 1934-36; M.S. (Sci. Edu..), Syracuse University, 1941; 
doctor of education. 1948. Work history : Teacher, Mlddletown, N.Y., 1937^1 ; U.S. 
Army (lieutenant colonel), 1942-46; instructor, New York Agricultural and Technical 
Institute, Alfred, N.Y., 1947-48 ; teacher, Fhy. and Phy. Sci., Indiana, Pa., 1948-51 ; 
AEC, Biophysics Ren. Anal. Div. B. & M„ 1951-53 ; AEC, Bio physicist, Division of Biology 
and Medicine, 1953-55 ; AEC, Radiation Effects Specialist, Division of Biology and 
Medicine, 1955 — . 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 445 

Iodine- 131 

1. 2 KT/mi 2 -> 2 x 10 5 curies I 131 /mi 2 

-> 7,7 x 10 4 u c I 131 /M 2 

2. Based on Vlndscale experience 

1 uc I 131 /M 2 > 0,1 uc I 131 /liter of milk< 5 > 

For one liter of this milk > 2 rad dose to infant's thyroid. 

For continuous consumption of milk from cows grazing on pasture 
until I 131 activity essentially zero — > 22-44 rad dose, 

3. Arithmetically - 

(7.7 x 10 4 ) (22-44) > (1,7-3,4) x 10 6 rads total dose to thyroid of 

children. 

4. Based on data from nuclear weapons tests, the cow's thyroid might theoreti- 

cally receive a dose two orders of magnitude higher than the numan.V") 
Actually, of course, the external gamma exposure and the dose to the cow's 
dlg£*tive organs would guarantee its death. If milk were obtained before its 
death there might be enough I 131 activity in a single pint of milk to com- 
pletely destroy the infant's thyroid. 

(7.7 x 10 4 ) (1-2 rads) > (7.7-15) x 10 4 rads 

The short-lived isotopes of radioiodine could contribute more dose to the thy- 
roid than does I 131 for the first day or so 9 but their activity would decrease 
rapidly with time ^ Milk as a food ltcm should be avoided until the iodine 
activity levels dropped to acceptable limits, or canned or powdered milk (pre- 
pared before the fallout occurred) should be substituted. 

5. If one assumes all contaminated milk is eliminated from the diet there 
remains the general I* 3 ! contamination of the environment including exposed 
foods and water. 



446 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

The principal potential source of intake of the I 131 would be leafy vege- 
tables and other similarly exposed foods. This I "1 contamination would be 
reduced by washing the foods , since the water supply would be expected to 
contain less I 1 ^! activity due to dilution factors. However, the reduction 
would have to be considerable since a single intake of I"l from one square 
meter of surface during the first week after the fallout occurred might pro- 
duce a thyroid dose of more than 10 5 rads to the adult thyroid. It is not 
being postulated here that persons normally lick over a square meter of sur- 
face , but it illustrates the very heavy contamination that might exist in the 
environment, and that prevention of entry of significant amounts into the body 
would be a serious consideration. 

6. Based on radiological decay only, it would require about 80 days for 
the I 131 activity to decay by a factor of 1000. Even considering weathering 
effects it is doubtful if pasture lands would be useable by then, since doses 
in the order of a few hundred rads to the infant's thyroid may be carcino- 
genic. < 8 > 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 447 

Thyroid Dose From Continuous Intake of 1^31 at a Daily Rats 
Decreasing Proportionally to the Radiological Decay 

Assumptions 

1. An infant will drink 1000 milliliters of milk per day from the 
same source. 

2. The mass of the infant's thyroid is two grams. 

3. Thirty percent of the Ingested 1*31 ^n be deposited in the 
thyroid* (This is on the low side. Studies have shown twice 
this value for seme children). (9) 

U* The thyroid is uniformly irradiated. (Some areas may receive 
higher than this "average* dose). 

Step 1. Calculate the initial dose rate to produce 1.0 rad total dose 
to the thyroid. 

D * Rq 

(X r ) Ur + *b) 

where D = total dose 

Rq * initial dose rate 

\ m radiological decay constant 

X fe - biological decay constant 

1 - R o 

(8.66 x 10-2) (8.66 x 10*2 + 3 .85 x 10*3) 

Ro ■ 7.8 x 10 "3 rads/day 

Step 2. Calculate the uptake of 1*31 by thyroid to produce 
7.8 x 10"3 rads/day 

x (nc) (2.2 x 10 6 x 60 x 2k) (d/day/tic) (0.22) (Msv) (1.6 x K)" 6 ) (ergs) (Kev) 

100 (ergs/gm/rad) (2) (©ns) 

- 7*8 x 1D-3 rads/day 

x - lJt x 10"3 jic 



448 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Step 3. Calculate the concentration per liter to result in uptake of 
1.1* x 10*3 (ic to the thyroid. 

(l.li x 10-3) (3.3) - U.6 x 10"3 i*c intake to body to result in on rad 

doae to thyroid 

0.1 p.c/1 • 22 rads (kh rads if 60% uptake is assumed) 

For the case of a single intake of I 1 ^ 

D « R o 

Thus, 0*1 p.c/1 — ™> 1.9 rads (3*8 rads if 60$ uptake is assumed} 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 449 

Gross Fission Products 

1. Accompanying the Ingestion of I 131 would be the other radioisotopes 
found In mixed fission products. The beta emissions from these Isotopes 
would Irradiate the gastrointestinal tract. Based on un fractionated mixed 
fission product^,* the radiation dose to the lower large Intestine would 
be roughly a factor of two less than to the adult thyroid from I 131 for 
Intake during the first weeks after the fallout occurred* After this period 
the relative dose to the intestine from gross fission products would exceed 
that to the thyroid from 1 131, The adult intestine is a much more radio- 
sensitive organ than the thyroid, with 1000 - 2 000 rad dose seriou sly threat- 
enin g Ilfe : (l0) 

2. Very roughly - 

a. At, say, one week after fallout occurred 
2 KT/mi 2 > 5 x 10* uc/ft 2 

b. Beta activity intake at one week to produce 1 rad to 
lower large intestine>*l) 

> 25 uc 

c. Based on above figures - 

If the activity from one square foot of surface were 
ingested, death would be Imminent. 

3. Althougb'this paper doesynot consider direcj>£y the effects on lijpj 
stock, it ytxl be realized tKat the doses frora^external gamma radiation in 
these jsrreas of heavy fallout will essentially guarantee elimination of animals 

i, A quantitative evaluation of the^use ability of 



*This condition might be approached for surface contamination but would not 
hold for milk contamination due to the discriminatory effect tn the cow. 




EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 453 

0. Strontlum-90 
1. General. 

2 KT/ral 2 > 200 curies Sr^O/mi 2 

Due to fractionation there may be 2 - 3 times less than this 



for the close-in areas, i.e. 67-100 curies Sr^Q/mi 2 



2. 80 mc/mi 2 > 8 S.U, in children (in equilibrium)* < l7 > 

or 10 mc/mi 2 > 1 S.U. in children. This is based on 

U.S. diet including milk as a major source of calcium. 
Use of other foods as a source of calcium would increase 
the Sr^ intake due to less discriminatory factors.' 1 ' 

3. Using 200 curies Sr'^/mi 2 and conversion factor 

10 mc/mi 2 > 1 S.U. at equilibrium. 

20,000 S.U. > 20 r/yr to bone marrow** 

> 470 r in 35 years '(assuming' 3 ) mean life of 

surviving population in 35 years, and a radiological 
decay of Sr 7U in environment and in man) . 

4. The above estimates do not consider any decontamination measures, 

selection of lesser contaminated foods for consumption, or 
use of foods from lesser contaminated areas. One, may assume 
these factors will reduce the above estimates by whatever 
degree we wish to postulate the effectiveness of the factors. 



* Equilibrium in children might be reached in 2 - 3 years. Equilibrium 
would be approached in adults only after many years and to this extent 
calculations overestimate the effect. 

** This may be a somewhat low estimate. 

***The biologically available strontium would be expected to decrease 

naturally with time faster than its radiological decay would indicate, 
therefore, the assumption used here tends to overestimate the exposure 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



455 



Where 3 R, 



1 initial dose rate to bone 
marrow (20 r/yr). 

t « time (years) after start 
of irradiation* 

X - radiological decay 
constant* 



D r - yrs - /**, e^f# - t J dt 



r - yrs » 35 R Q 



A- 



/ 



Xt dt - R A jT"te* xt dt 



35 R, 



-Xt 



- a 



35 



-xt -xt 

te + e 



\2 



— 3? 



9,ll00 r - years 



456 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

E. Other Bone Seekers . 

The two other principal bone seeking radioisotopes (strontium- 89 and barium- 1^0 
lanthanum- 140) are not included since they contribute such a relatively small addi- 
tional dose when intake is considered over a period of time. 

RELATIVE DOSES TO THE BONES FROM 

,(a) 



STRONTIUM- 90. STRONTIUM- 89 , BARIUM- 140- LANTHANUM- 140 

Continuour Intake 
Single Intake at D + 1 day from 1st day - 35 yrs. 

Relative Relative Relative Relative total 

activity dose rate total doses to bones 

tt D f 1 to bone^) closes to 

day — __^^ bones v ' 



(c) 



Sr 90 



Sr 89 180 100 1.9 0.018 

Ba 140 -La 140 1100 320 1.4 0.0033 



(a) No fractionation assumed. 

(b) Considering relative half- lives, energies and percent uptake to the bones. 

(c) Assuming radiological decay of isotopes in the environment. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 457 

Fo Cesium- 137 (external) 
1. General. 

2 KT/mi 2 > 400 curies Cs 137 /mi 2 

Due to fractionation this may be 2 - 3 times less for the 



**— 



close-in areas, i.e. 133 - 200 curies Cs 137 /mi 2 . 



9 



2. External exposure. 

Roughly 1 megacurie Cs^ 7 /mi 2 -----> 4r/hr 

R = (4 x 10- 4 ) (4) > 1.6 x 10" 3 r/hr 

»35 7*- ' 38 1 - e "(7.03 x 10^ (365) (35)' 

7.03 x 10" 5 *~" 

= 3.20 x 10 5 mr 

■ 320 r per 35 years 

3, These calculations are based on an infinitely flat plane and no 

account is taken of weathering and shielding effects oir of decon- 
tamination measures. Actual exposures might be as much as an 

(13) 
order of magnitude less than the theoretical dose. * Based on 

similar calculations as for Sr^ irradiation of the bone marrow 
and a reduction factor of about 7** for shielding and weathering 
effects: 

Leukemia -v* 0.137. 

Bone Cancer **/ 0.037<> 



* Gamma dose from shorter lived isotopes is included in the section 
"External Gamma Exposure." 

** To simplify calculations this factor is applied starting the first 
year although weathering effects would not be completed by "then. 



om 



458 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

4. Internal exposure. 

a. Intake of Cs* 37 is more a function of the rate of fall than 
total deposition. This is because Cs 137 is very poorly absorbed fn 
the soil and the intake is more a function of surface contamination 
than of foodstuff. Estimates of dose from internally deposited Cs iJ/ 
is quite tenuous. Reference Thirteen suggests the relationship: 

10 millicuries of Cs 137 /mi 2 /yr ~ > 0.5 - 2.0 mrem year. 

Shortly after the attack some 400 curies of cesium- 137 per square 
mile (assuming no fractionation) would fall in the area under consid- 
eration, This is a somewhat different situation than the one upon 
which the above relationship was based, inasmuch as this is a single 
fallout (the Cs 137 dribble from the stratosphere and troposphere would 
contribute relatively little). However, additional dosage will come 
as the cesium is being eliminated from the body after reaching equili- 
brium with the intake. Also, with such a heavy contamination in the 
environment as postulated here, there will be some re-suspension of the 
cesium after deposition on the ground. 

As great, or greater, an uncertainty would be the contribution of 
the shorter lived isotopes present in the fallout. Time has not per- 
mitted an analysis of this factor, Whereas, the theoretical external 

137 
gamma dose from shorter lived isotopes may be 2 1/2 times that of Cs 

(see page 27 for further discussion), their absorption into the body is 

much less, In addition there undoubtedly are other gross fission 

products that are absorbed into the body yielding a beta whole body dose. 



462 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



(a) 
E. Gene tics v 7 

(b} 
Assume doubling dose — «~> 50 r then, 

A. Additional tangible defects 

670^ XI X 256 — ~-~> 2,755 or less tb) of all live births 
50 10 first generation^) 

B. Additional stillbirths and childhood deaths 
2-I/2 times tangible defects^) 

(2.5) (2.?£) ----- > 6.7# or less^ of all pregnancies first 

generation*"/ 

C. Additional embryonic and neonatal deaths 

(19) 

$ times tangible defects 

(5) (2.730 ----- > 11$ or less* b ' of all conations first 

generation 



(a) The following estimates generally apply to relatively large 
populations and therefore would not be so appropriate to the more 

, limited numbers of persons being considered here. 

(b) Recent data from Di^Jlu££iliJL^ t 
genetic defects "at Slower dose rate s^bY a. factor of ^b put four. 
The above estimates, therefore^ may be high. ___ __^~— — * 

(c) Total genetic exposure. 

(d) With decreasing effects in succeeding generations. 

(e) Normal rates today * 

2% (of all live births) - tangible defects 

5% (of all pregnancies) - stillbirths and early childhood deaths 
lOJt (of all conceptions) - embryonic and neonatal deaths 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 463 



Carbon- 14 

26 
1* Assume: 1 M.T. (total yield) > 2 x 10 neutrons (Outside bomb) 

-> 4,7 Kg C 14 

If one-half of neutrons "lost" to ground (i,e, surface bursts), 
then -> 2.4 kg. C l4 /M,T, 

2. 3953 M.T. (total yield) -™-> 9.3 x 10 kg. C 1 

3. There are two reservoirs for freshly produced C . ' 

4.4% in reservoir A( a > with Tm of 8070 yrs. 
95.6% in reservoir A with Tm of 27.2 yrs. 

4. There are 3200 kg, C normally present in reservoir A\*i 

( 9.3 x 10 3 ) (4.4 x 10" 2 ) x 8070 x 1.5 (c) * 1550 mr 
3200 

( 9.3 x 10 3 ) (9.6 x 10" 1 ) x 27.5 x 1.5 = 120 mr 

3200 ™ _ , , ,__ ~ , _ 

Total 1670 mr or^w/1.7r 

5* Assuming that transmutations account for roughly the same number 

(22} 
of genetic defects as does radiation, x J then: ^^3. 4 r "effective" 

over 8000 years. 
6. During the same period of time (8000 years) the dose from naturally 
occurring radioisotopes in the environment and from cosmic rays 
might amount to 800 r (assuming no change in the present rate). 
The effect from C* 4 would not be zero but would not constitute a 
problem to the same degree as other factors. 

(a) The atmosphere, the land biosphere, and humus. 

(b) This assumes uniform distribution over the world which may not be too 
greatly in error for C^ 4 . 

(c) Yearly dose from C present in environment. 



470 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



REFERENCES 

X, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons * June 1957* Prepared by the Department 
of Defense, published by U.S. Atonic Energy Commission. For sale by the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, 

j3.C* 

2, Ionization Rate and Photon Pulse Decay of Fission Products From The 
Slow-Neutron Fission of U-235 . Killer, C. F. and Loeb, P. U.S. Naval 
Radiological Defense Laboratory, San Francisco 2k, Cal. August 1958. 

3 # A Review of Ihf ormation on the Gamma Energy Radiation Rate from Fission 
Products and its Significance for Studies of Radioactive Fallout l Knapp, 
Harold A., Statement before the Joint Atomic Energy Coranittee , Hearings on 
Fallout, 1959. 

U. "Local Fallout Radioactivity", Lapp, Ralph E., Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists , Vol. XV, No. 5, May 1959. 

5. An Assessment of Hazards Resulting From The Ingestion of Fallout by 
Grazing Animal s". Russell, R. Scott, Martin, R. P., and Wortley, G. 
ARC/HBC/> AERE, Harwell 9-17-56. 

6. "Radioactivity in Thyroid Glands Following Nuclear Weapons Tests," 
Van Mddle sworth, L. Science # June 1, 1956, Vol. 123, No. 3205. 

7. "Two Ways to Estimate Thyroid Dose From Fallout". Dunning, G. M. 
Nucleonics , Feb. 1956, Vol. 1U, No. 2. 

8. Pathologic Effects of Atomic Radiation , National Academy of Sciences - 
National Research Council, 19^>. Washington, D. C. 

9. "Radioactive Iodide Uptake of Normal ffewbom Infants", Van Middle svortfa, L. 
A.M. A., American Journal of Diseases of Children, Vol. 88, Oct. 195u. 

10. "Some Effects of Ionizing Radiation on the Physiology of the Gastro- 
intestinal Tract." A Review. Lecture and Review Series No. 56-2. Conard, 
Robert, Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, Maryland, March 1956. 

11. "Criteria for Establishing Short Term Permissible Ingestion of Fallout 
Material". Dunning, G. H. American Industrial Hygiene Journal , April 1958, 
Vol. 19, No. 2. 

12. Civil Defense in Western Europe and the Soviet Union . Fifth Report on 
Committee on Government" Operations . April 27, 1959. U. S. Government Printing 

office. S'sridf Ua^ (fi&4 ate*A &? \t*&& wtTk Oi^ d^^il 

13. Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of 
Atomic Radiation. Supplement No. 17 (V3838). New York, 1958, p. 170. 






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EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



Reprinted from American Industrial Hygiene Association Journal 

Volume 19, No. 2, April, 1958 

Printed in U.S.A. 



Criteria for Establishing Short Term Permissible 
Ingestion of Fallout Material 



GORDON M. DUNNING 

Division of Biology and. Medicine Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D. C. 



THE CRITERIA for establishing permissible 
ingestion of radioactive fallout material 
under emergency conditions for several weeks 
following a nuclear detonation are dependent 
primarily on exposures to the, 

a. gastrointestinal tract from the gross fission 
product activity, 

b. thyroid from the isotopes of iodine and, 

c. bone, principally from Sr 90 -^, Sr 86 , Ba 140 - 
La 140 . 

I. Doses to the Gastrointestinal Tract 

The following principal assumptions are used 
in calculating the doses to the gastrointestinal 
tract of adults: 

a. The calculations are based on the methods 
contained in reference one. 

b. The fallout material is 90 per cent insoluble. 
(See IV. Discussion below). 

c. The activity decays according to the prin- 
ciple of (time)" 1 - 2 . 

d. The energy delivered is all derived from 
the beta emissions, having a mean energy of 
0.4 Mev when in the lower large intestine. (See 
Graph I) 2 

e. The total daily consumption of food and 
water is 2200 grams or milliliters. 

The method of calculation is according to 
the following equation: 

(Total number of disintegrations 

occurring in organ) (Energy of 

emissions) (8.0 X 10" 9 ) 



Mass of Organ 



= Dose (rads) (1) 



The number of disintegrations taking place 
in the organ may be calculated according to 
equation two: 

Total number of disintegrations — 

oAa U lA [U** - U^- 2 ] (2) 

Where: A«, = number of disintegrations 



* The rad is the unit of absorbed dose equal to 100 ergs 
per gram. 



1.6 X 10" 8 (ergs/Mev)0.5 (proportion of 

total energy to gastrointestinal tract) 

100 (ergs/gm-rad) 



"a" 



ta 
tb 



per unit time at time 

after detonation. 

time "a" after detonation 



= time "6" later than "a' 



One of the more useful forms for the criteria 
would be in units of permissible concentrations 
at time of intake. This will somewhat compli- 
cate the calculations since there will be a de- 
crease in activity as the material passes along 
the gastrointestinal tract. When such calcula- 
tions are made according to the above assump- 
tions and equations, it may be seen that the 
critical organ is the lower large intestine ex- 
cept for the first hours immediately following 
the detonation. (Table I shows the relative 
doses to parts of the gastrointestinal tract as a 
function of time.) Therefore, Graph 2 is based 
on the activity at time of ingestion to produce 
one rad of dose to the lower intestine. 

For example, Graph 2 shows that if about 
48 microcuries are ingested on the 24th hour 
after detonation, the lower large intestine may 
receive one rad of radiation dose. This was 
calculated in the following manner. 

Step 1. Determine the total number of dis- 
integrations in the lower large intestine neces- 
sary to produce 1.0 rad. 

From equation (1) 

(Number of disintegrations) (0.4) 8.0 X 10" 9 ) 



150 



= 1 



Number of disintegrations = 4.7 X 10 10 
Step 2. Determine the activity at time of in- 
take to produce 4.7 X 10 10 disintegrations within 
the large intestine. 

4.7 X 10 10 

= 5.2 X 10 10 Disintegrations intake re- 
quired (assuming 10% solubility). 



.0.9 



From equation (2) 

5.2 X 10 10 = 

(5) (A 37 ) (37 1 - 2 ) [37-" 

A &7 & 3.7 X 10° d/hr, 
A M ££ 6.2 x 10 6 d/hr. 
A Zi & 47 pc 



55-0.2] * 



8.0 X 10-> 



* If the time of intake is the 24th hour, then the start 
of irradiation of the lower intestine is 24 + 13 — 37th 
hour, according to reference one. 



EFFECTS OF NtJCLEAR WAR 



473 



■* m m o 




1000 



Graph 1 



Table I 

Relative Doses to Gastrointestinal Tract from 

Ingestion of Fallout Material 





Time After Detonation 
That Ingestion Occurs 




1st 
Hour 


1st Day 


Limit- 
ing 
Case* 


Lower Large Intestine 
Upper Large Intestine 
Small Intestine 
Stomach 


1.0 
1.3 
0.26 
0.86 


1.0 
0.71 
0.054 
0.063 


1.0 
0.40 
0.03 
0.03 



at time of ingestion to produce 1.0 rad to the 
lower large intestine. 

From Graph 2 take the mid point of in- 
take period (72nd hour) -^ 31 jnc. (This is 
obviously an approximation since the exact 
times of intake during the four-day period will 
be unknown.) 

Step 2. Determine the activity at time of 
intake. 

From equation (2) 

31 = 5A 24 24 1 -* [24-°-* - 120"*- 2 ] 

A ai £_ 0.94 pic/hr 

Since there is assumed a 2200 ml/day intake 



* Based on assumption that there is no significant decrease in 
activity during time of passage through gastrointestinal tract. 
After a week following detonation the decrease in activity be- 
tween the stomach and the midpoint of time in lower large intes- 
tine is within about 20%of this condition. 

Graph 2 has been used in estimating radia- 
tion doses to the lower large intestine for pro- 
longed periods of ingestion (Table II). The 
following calculations are illustrative for the 
period of 24th to the 120th hour (start of intake 
at the beginning of the 2nd day after detonation 
for a duration of four days) . 

Step 1. Determine the number of microcuries 



0.94 X 



24 

2200 



^ 0.010 /*c/ml or gm 



IL Doses to the Thyroid 

The following principal assumptions are used 
in calculating the doses to the adult thyroid 
from intake of activity from fallout material: 

a. The percentages of the isotopes of iodine 
in mixed fission products are according to 
Hunter and Ballou. 3 

b. Twenty percent of the ingested I m reaches 
the thyroid. 



474 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 




t — i — rnr « 

Graph 2 



1000 



c. The mean energy is 0.22 Mev. 

d. The thyroid weight is 20 grams. (See IV. 
Discussion below) 

e. The percentages of shorter-lived isotopes 
of iodine that reach the thyroid and their doses 
are according to reference four. 

The method of calculation of doses to the thy- 
roid is illustrated by computing that amount of 
intake of fission products at the 48th hour to 
produce 1.0 rad. 

Step 1. Determine the dose rate on the day 
of intake of I ]al to produce 1.0 rad to the thy- 
roid. 

D = (EM 

Where: D ~ dose (1.0 rad) 

R — dose rate on initial day 
\ e — effective decay constant (radio- 
logical and biological) 

1.0 = (fl/0.09) 

R = 0.09 rads/day 

Step 2. Determine the number of microcuries 
of I m to produce 0.09 rad/day 



Table II 

Approximate Fission Product Activities (Micro- 
curies per Milliliter of Gram X 10 2 ) to Produce 
one Rad Dose to Lower Large Intestine* 



Dura- 




Start of Intake (Days after detonation) 












Inges- 

tion 

(Days) 


1 

(1st 

Hour) 


2 

(24th 
Hour) 


3 
1.9 


4 
1.7 


5 


10 


15 


20 


1 


35 


2.5 


1.4 


1.1 


1.1 


1.0 


2 


24 


1.7 


1.1 


0.89 


0.81 


0.62 


0.57 


0.53 


3 


15 


1.3 


0.82 


0.65 


0.56 


0.41 


0.40 


0.37 


4 


13 


1.0 


0.65 


0.53 


0.46 


0.33 


0.30 


0.29 


5 


12 


0.9 


0.57 


0.44 


0.39 


0.28 


0.25 


0.22 


10 


9.2 


0.64 


0.40 


0.29 


0.25 


0.17 


0.14 


0.13 


15 


7.8 


0.53 


0.33 


0.26 


0.21 


0.13 


0.11 


0.097 


20 


7.5 


0.49 


0.29 


0.21 


0.18 


0.11 


0.089 


0.079 



XQ*c)(2.2 X 10 6 )(60 X 24)(1.6 X 10-')(0.22) 
(100)(20) 

X = 0.16 /ac to thyroid or 
(0.16) (5) = 0.80 M c I 1 * 1 ingested 
Step 3. Determine relative doses from I 1 
r b0Tt according to Graph 3. 4 



0.09 



and 



* a. Activities computed at start of intake period, 
b. Based on intake of 2200 milliliters or grams of water 
and food per day for adults. 

At 48th hour, the relative contribution to total 
dose from I 131 and I* 1 "" 1 is about 1/1. 

Therefore, ingestion of 0.4 itc I 1S1 (equivalent) 
at 48th hour will produce 1.0 rads to thyroid. 

Step 4. Determine the number of microcuries 
of fission products required to yield the required 
I 181 activity. At 48th hour, I 131 constitutes about 
2.35% of total activity. Therefore, 

(0.4/0.023) ^ 17 fiQ of fission products. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



475 



3 4 5 (7191 




0.0* 



HOOBS AFTER DKTOKaTIOK 

that mucE occurs 
Graph 3 



Graph 4 shows the number of microcuries 
of fission products ingested at times after deto- 
nation to produce 1.0 rad to the thyroid. 

Ill, Doses to the Bones 

The three principal bone-seeking isotopes of 
concern are Sr^Y**, Sr 89 , and Ba 14W -La 140 . Evalu- 
ation of these may be made in terms of amount 
deposited in the bones versus maximum per- 
missible body burdens, or in rads of dose that 
they deliver after deposition. Since values for 
maximum permissible body burdens are based 
on the concept that these will be maintained 
indefinitely in the body, they are not so valid 
for Sr 39 and Ba 140 -La 140 when considering short 
periods of emergency intake. 

The following principal assumptions are used 
in calculating the doses to the bones of adults: 

a. The percentages of the isotopes of Sr^-Y 90 , 
Sr 89 , and Ba 140 -La"° in mixed fission products are 
according to Hunter and Ballou. 3 

b. The percentages of intake of these isotopes 
that are deposited in the bones, the energies of 
emissions, and their effective half lives are ac- 
cording to reference five— except for Sr 90 where 
a 27.7 year radiological half life is used here. 

c. The mass of the bones is 7,000 grams. 

The method of calculation of doses to the 
bones is illustrated by computing the dose from 
Sr 89 from the intake of 27 microcuries (See IV 



Discussion below) of mixed fission products on 
the I20th hour. Similar calculations were made 
for Sr^-Y 90 and Ba"°-La 140 and then the three 
doses were added for each intake of fallout ma- 
terial. 

Step 1. Determine the Sr 8 * to reach the bone. 

According to reference 4 : 

The Sr 8B content in mixed fission products on 
the 120th hour is 1.6%. 

According to reference 5 : 

The intake of Sr* 9 to reach to the bones is 25%. 

Therefore: 

(27) (0.016) (0.25) = 0.108, to the bone. 

Step 2. Determine the dose rate to the bones. 

With an assumed effective energy of 0.55 Mev 
(reference 5) : 

(0.108) (2.2 X 1Q 6 )(60 X 24) (1.6 X 10«)(0,55) 
~~ (100) (7,000) 

= 4.3 X 10~ 4 rads/day or 0.43 millirads/day 

Step 3. Determine total dose. 

D total s= (R/Xe) 

where: R = initial dose rate 

\e = effective decay constant 
D total = (0.43/0.0133) gg 32 millirads* 



* The relative total doses from these isotopes are as follows: 
Time of intake St™ St& Ba li0 - La l « 

24 th hour 0.6 1.00 0.6 

20th day 1.00 1.00 0.3 



476 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



1000 




Graph 4 



IV. Discussion 

A. Solubility 

The solubility of fallout material varies, de- 
pending among other factors upon the surface 
over which the detonation occurred. The fallout 
material collected in soil samples at the Nevada 
Test Site has been quite insoluble, i.e. only a few 
per cent in distilled water and roughly 20-30 
per cent in 0.1 N HC1. However, it would be ex- 
pected that the activity actually present in 
drinking water supplies would be principally in 
soluble form. The water collected from a well 
and a cistern on the Island of Rongelap (Table 
III) about 21 months after the March 1, 1954 
fallout, was found to have about 80 per cent of 
the activity in the filtrate, but there was an un- 
determined amount that settled to the bottom. 
Other data suggest the material to have been 
about 10-20 per cent soluble in water. 

In the event contaminated food is ingested it 
is possible that the total activity — soluble and 
insoluble — may find its way into the gastro- 
intestinal tract since at times immediately follow- 
ing a fallout most of this activity probably would 
come from the surface contamination rather than 
the soil-plant-animal cycle. There may then 
follow some solubilizing in the acid stomach with 



Table III 

Concentrations in Water on Islands in the Pacific 

and Estimated Gamma Dose Rates at D + 1, 

Three Feet Above Ground 







Gross Fission 


Date 


Location 


Product 

Activity 
(rf/m/ml) 




Rongelap Island 






(3.5 roentgens per hour) 




D + 2 


Cistern 


—50,000-75,000 


D + 34 


" 


—5,500 


D + 34 


Openwell 


—2,000 


D + 300 


Cistern 


—3 


D + 330 


" 


^^4 


D + 600 


" 


—5.5 


D + 600 


Openwell 


—0.5 


D + 600 


Cistern 
(With cotkpsed roof J 
Kabelle Island 
(19 roentgens per hour) 


—1.3 


D + 330 


Ground water 

Eniwetok Island 
(8.5 roentgens per hour) 


—48 


D + 330 


Cistern 

Bnibuk Island 
(1.3 roentgens per hour) 


—25 


D + 600 


Standing water from can, drum, etc. 


—1.4 



subsequent removal from the tract before reach- 
ing the lower large intestine. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR "WAR 



477 



It is assumed for these calculations that (a) 
907c of the fallout material is insoluble when 
computing doses to the gastrointestinal tract, 
and (b) that the isotopes of iodine, strontium, 
and barium are all soluble when computing doses 
to the thyroid and to the bones. These assump- 
tions are probably conservative, i.e. they may 
overestimate somewhat the radiation exposures. 

B. Biological Significance 

After the estimation of radiation doses by any 
procedure the final step is an evaluation in terms 
of biological effects both for short and long 
terms. 

1. Gastrointestinal Tract 

There have been few experiments where the 
gastrointestinal tract has been exposed in a man- 
ner similar to the one assumed here. One experi- 
ment" indicates lower doses to the intestine than 
the model proposed in reference 1. 

In another experiment/ rats were fed 1,0 to 
6.0 millicuries of ytcrium-90 in a single feeding. 
Four of the 33 animals died of adenocarcinoma 
of the colon and additional animals died with 
acute and chronic ulceration of the colon. A sec- 
ond group of rats was given 0.46, 0.20, or 0.06 
mc of Y Bl per feeding over a period of three 
months with total accumulated amounts of 31.2, 
15.6 and 4.68 mc respectively. Six of the eight 
animals at the two higher levels died with carci- 
noma of the colon and no malignancies were ob- 
served at the lowest level. The authors made no 
estimate of radiation doses. 

In another experiment, 8 rats were kept alive 
by the use of parabiosis or para-aminoproprio- 
phenone either pre or post whole-body irradi- 
ation of 700-1000 roentgens. Four of the 21 rats 
developed tumors along the gastrointestinal tract 
(one each jejunum, ileum, duodenum, and colon) , 
with four additional animals showing tumors in 
other organs. However, in comparing gastro- 
intestinal versus whole-body irradiation, the 
question has been raised as to a possible indirect 
carcinogenic action in the latter case.* By using 
fast neutrons, lesser doses have been shown to 
produce an appreciable percentage of intestinal 
carcinomas in mice, but this is not so relevant 
to the present discussion of beta exposure. 10 

One summarizing statement of the short-term 
effects stated, ". . .though the gastrointestinal 
tract is one of the sensitive systems to ionizing 
radiation, it also has a most remarkable regenera- 
tive and reparative capacity. It takes doses of 
well over a thousand roentgens to damage the gut 
permanently in most mammals studied, and it is 
capable of rapid, dramatic recovery of anatom- 



ical and functional integrity with doses in the 
lethal range" 11 Evaluating the data from dogs 
exposed to whole-body X-radiation the authors 
said, "... it is suggested that doses of approxi- 
mately 1,100 to 1,500 r may represent the upper 
limit of the possible efficacy of supportive meas- 
ures in the treatment of the syndrome of acute 
radiation injury. With greater doses the damage 
to the intestinal mucosa appears irreparable and 
of an extent incompatible with life." 12 At the 
same time, it has been repeatedly indicated that 
the irradiation of the gastrointestinal tract plays 
a major role in gross whole-body effects associ- 
ated with radiation syndrome."' 12 * 13 ' tt ' * lft ' 17 ' 18> 
19, * In fact one author 13 summarizes several ex- 
perimental findings, "In producing acute intes- 
tinal radiation death, irradiation of any major 
portion of the exteriorized small intestine alone 
is almost equivalent to whole-body irradia- 
tion " 

Graph 5 suggests the relative doses to the 
parts of the gastrointestinal tract, from ingestion 
of fallout material. The available experimental 
data does not permit a conclusive statement as 
to whole-body effects to be expected from such 
ratios of exposures. Most of these experiments 
are related to the criterion of death, but they do 
suggest that the major contributory factor to 
such effects such as nausea and vomiting asso- 
ciated with whole-body exposures of 100-200 
roentgens, may be the result of the gastrointes- 
tinal reaction. Possibly a few hundred rads to the 
lower large intestine together with the concomi- 
tant lesser exposures to the upper large intestine, 
the small intestine and the stomach (according 
to Graph 5) may be in the range where ra- 
diation sickness might occur. 

2. Thyroid 

The study and treatment of disorders of the 
thyroid gland with radioiodine has led to con- 
siderable information on doses and their effects 
to this organ. (Only a partial list of references 
is noted.) 21 ' 22 ' 23 ' 24 ' 25 Whereas these treatments 
have been principally with abnormal thyroids, 
much of the information may be extrapolated to 
normal thyroids for the purposes of this discus- 
sion. In addition there are other data based on 
normal thyroids in patients suffering such ail- 
ments as congestive heart failure. 2 * 

The picture clearly presented is that the adult 
human thyroid is relatively insensitive to ra- 
diation. For example, Freedberg, Kurland, and 
Herman, 20 report, "...Seven days after ad- 
ministration of 17 and 20 millicuries of P 31 , 
which delivered 14,500 and 31,000 rep, respec- 
tively, to the thyroid gland, no histologic 



478 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



in 1 




; 


• 


j 


i 


i < 


| ] 


' 1 


t ' 






i 


■ 


1 




1 


, 1 


i I 


1 


1 


1 


i 








1 




l 


' 


\ i 
















Relative Eoeee to Adult Thyroid, Qaatro- 
inteatlnel Tract, and Bonee Baaed cm Sing: 
Intake of JeUout lfcterlal. 




t, .L..J 






















i 


1 1 




















j 


i - - 1 




* 

• < 


h 


















i 




— - 


• 


















i 

i 


i 




. , . . j . 


. . 














1 

I 

| 




j 




i 




4 














- j 












■■ 


■ ■ 


... 














: 




1 






I 










' :!;. 






































tL 




: 








— 


.] 


t 


2 :.|, . 


i : 




: 


































Thyroid 


! 

i 


i 










• i 


\ 


1 






















































■ 


,f 


Z 


i 


( 


1 














-J 






















:: " ; : 












! 

i 


' 


■4 
i 






1 1 


: 


























■ 1 ; 






■ . 














■ 




sj ** 




T 


_ . . ... 

- 1 - 


1 
j 


j 




Lower Large Isteitlnt 


-IN ! 






i 




, 










































f r '• 










v i 


i 


' : 


















1 




























■ 


* 






^ j 






"^Sy^ ! 


i 


j 














































0. 






1 


IV i 








. , y 
































■' tfpper large Inteetin* 


» 


9 ! 
















P\ 


i 


I 


































. - 




s 




























^^i 


Stameh 






































1 ' 
























: 


:> 


^ : 






































* 


F 




























i 
















































' 




















* 


P 








































- . : 




























K* 


^** 


1 




























' 1 












:-V: 




















» 




■■ ■ 




1 


js 
















' ! 






"' 




.'■'. 




X-. 








: ! ! i 
■ 1 i 1 




> . 














.... 








0.1 






1 

! 

< 
1 

F 


i 
















■ . II ■ . ■■ ill: 

! • 

Tine After Detonation (Hour*) j i 

f ' • 


':'•-■ 
























, 


» i 




• J 


1 4 


I 


t 1 


> 




J 


\ 


. 






i i 


1 J 


> 


f 


i 


. 










J 




I : 


1 


> 


f . 


« 




1 



10 



100 



1000 



Graph 5 



changes were noted which could be attributed 
to I B1 . . . . Fourteen and twenty-four days, re- 
spectively, after administration of 59 and 26 
millicuries of I m , marked central destruction of 

the thyroid gland was noted " Since the 

first two patients expired seven days after ad- 
ministration of the l m from pulmonary edema, 
it does not eliminate the possibility that the 
destructive changes might have appeared in the 
thyroid if these patients had survived. However, 
the evidence from other studies strongly in- 
dicates that if any pathological effects were to 
be noted in the thyroid after an exposure of some 
10,000 reps they would be minimal. Likewise, 
the possibility of serious damage to other organs 
of the body, such as parathyroids and trachea 
which are simultaneously exposed to the I 1 * 1 
radiations, would be exceedingly small. 

On long terms effects, two summarizing state- 
ments may be made. "No thyroid neoplasm was 
found which could be attributed to l m / m after 
doses to normal thyroids running into many tens 
of thousands of reps and after periods of ob- 
servation up to more than eight hundred days. 
"In a series of over 400 patients treated with 
radioactive iodine at the Massachusetts General 
Hospital during the past ten years no known 



carcinoma of the thyroid attributable to this 
agent has developed. Definite answers to the 
question of carcinoma formation must await 
prolonged observation of treated patients." 83 
Here the average treatment dose of I 131 was 10 
millicuries and of I iao 25 millicuries. 

However, significantly lesser doses may be 
carcinogenic in children. 37 ".. .It has been sug- 
gested that the human thyroid is less radiosensi- 
tive than other tissues, such as bone, since after 
many years of treatment of Graves' disease with 
radioactive iodine, no cases of resulting carci- 
noma have been reported. The customary dos- 
ages of l m in such cases yield at least 4000 rep 
to the gland. On the other hand, carcinoma of 
the thyroid found in children and young adults 
has almost invariably been preceded by x-ray 
treatment to the upper part of the body, in 
amounts such as to yield as little as 200 r to 
the infant thyroid. It has been estimated that 
less than 3 per cent of such treated cases yield 
carcinoma; nevertheless, the data suggest that 
200 r is a potentially carcinogenic dose to the 
infant thyroid. While the possibility exists that 
the carcinogenic action may be an indirect, hor- 
monal one, it must still be recognized that this, 
like leukemia, is an instance of significant car- 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



479 



einogenesis by less than 1000 rep. It seems likely 
that the infant thyroid is unduly susceptible, but 

that the adult thyroid is not MSS 

Table II indicates the amount of ingested 
fission product activity to produce one rad dose 
to the lower large intestine and Graph 5 
shows the relative doses to the gastrointestinal 
tract and the thyroid. It may be seen that in- 
gestion -of a given activity on the fourth and 
fifth days may result in nearly two and one-half 
times the dose to the thyroid as to the lower 
large intestine. For a continuous consumption of 
fallout material from the first hour to the 30th 
day the ratio of doses is about 1.7. 

3. Bones 

It is recognized that the intake and deposition 
of strontium-S9 and 90 are intimately associated 
with the calcium in the diet. Whereas it has 
been assumed here that a fixed percentage of the 
strontium intake is deposited in the bones (ref- 
erence 5). It is realized that this method in- 
volves uncertainties, as would the necessary as- 
sumptions to generalize for a wide variety of 
calcium — strontium ratios and intakes to cover 
multiple categories. In situations where doses to 
the bones appear to be the critical criterion 
(such as later times after detonation than con- 
sidered here), it would be necessary to make a 
more precise evaluation. 

Unequal distribution of isotopes in the bones 
has been observed. Thus, the dotted line in 
Graph 5 is included to suggest a possible larger 
dose to those regions. 

Considerable datff have been collected on ra- 

Table IV 

Some Possible Biological Effects from Radiation 

Doses to Specific Organs* 



^— «, 








n 








eg 


Gastrointestinal 
Tract 


Thyroid 


Bones 


Q 








10,000 




Minor changes in 






- 


structure 






Serious damage 




Tumorproduc- 




— survival 




tion. 




threatened 






1,000 


Tumor Production 








Immediate effects 


Potential carcino- 


Minor changes 




such as nausea 


genic dose to 
few percent of 


in structure 






children 




100 









* Lesser short term effects would be expected from the same 
doses distributed in time. 



diation produced bone cancers. One summariz- 
ing statement that places this in proper perspec- 
tive with the other factors discussed above is 
"...Visible changes in the skeleton have been 
reported only after hundreds of rep were ac- 
cumulated and tumors only after 1,500 or 
more ."** When one examines Graph 5 for rel- 
ative doses, and reviews the data on doses 
versus effects to the gastrointestinal tract and 
possibly children's thyroids (Table IV), it 
would appear that exposure to the bones is not 
the critical factor for ingestion of fallout ma- 
terial under emergency conditions, for the first 
few weeks after detonation. 

4. Summary of Biological Effects 

Table IV summarizes some possible biologi- 
cal effects from radiation exposures. Due to in- 
herent uncertainties in such analyses together 
with expected wide biological variances among 
individuals, Table IV is intended only to sug- 
gest a generalized picture of doses versus effects. 

The physical calculations of radiation doses 
made above were for adults. For equal intakes 
of radioactivity, children probably would receive 
higher exposures due to the smaller organ 
masses, and in the case of bones a greater dep- 
osition would be expected. Also, there is the 
possibility of tumor production in the thyroids 
of some children at relatively low radiation ex- 
posures. It would appear wise therefore to es- 
tablish lower limits of intake of radioactivity 
for children. 

C. Permissible Intake 

The preceding discussion attempts to give 
estimates of radiation doses resulting from in- 
take of fallout material, together with some 
possible biological effects. How much intake is 
actually permitted depends upon many factors 
including the essentialness of the food and water 
to sustaining life, and one's philosophy of ac- 
ceptable biological risks and damage in the face 
of other possible hazards such as mass evacu- 
ation. Table II and Graph 5 give estimates 
of the amount of contamination in food and 
water to produce certain radiation doses to the 
critical organs. Table IV indicates possible 
biological effects from given doses. Using these 
references, command decisions may be made as 
to permitted intake of radioactivity. 

Such evaluations as attempted here are neces- 
sary and valuable for planning purposes, but 
once the fallout occurs the emergency of the 
situation may preclude immediate analysis of 
the food and water supplies. Further, abstaining 
from ingestion of food and water because it 



480 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



Table V 
Mean Body Burden of Rongelapese 



Radioisotopes 


Estimated Activity at One 
Day C*c) 


Sr*» 


1.6-22 


Ba»° 


0.34-2.7 


Rare earth group 


1.2 


I»i (in thyroid) 


6.4-11.2 


Ru l0 » 


0,013 


Ca« 


0.019 


Fissile material 


0.016 (jigm) 



might be contaminated could not be continued 
indefinitely* Therefore, the following three com- 
mon sense rules are suggested: 

1. Reduce the use of contaminated food and 
water to bare minimum until adequate monitor- 
ing can be done ; use first any stored clear water 
and canned or covered foods; wash and scrub 
any contaminated foods and; 

2. If the effects of lack of food and water be- 
come acute, then use whatever is available but 
in as limited quantities as possible. Whenever 
possible select what seems to be the least 
likely contaminated water and/or foodstuffs; 
and 

3. Since it is especially desirable to restrict 
the intake of radioactivity in children, give them 
first preference for food and water having the 
lowest degree of contamination. 

In an area of heavy fallout one matter to con- 
sider is the relative hazards from the external 
gamma exposure versus internal doses from in- 
gestion of the material. (Inhalation is thought 
to contribute only relative minor doses under the 
conditions discussed here). The best evidence on 
this point is the fallout that occurred on the 
Rongelapese in March 1954. Those in the highest 
exposure group received 175 r whole-body ex- 
ternal gamma exposure yet their body burdens 
of internal emitters were relatively low (Table 
V). 30 These and other data suggest that: 

If the degree of contamination of an area is 
such that the external gamma exposure would 
permit normal and continuous occupancy after 
a fallout, the internal hazard would not deny it. 

This is based on such reasonable assumptions 
of (a) about 50% reduction of gamma ex- 
posure from out-of-doors doses afforded by 
living a part of each day in normal family 
dwellings, (b) washing and/or scrubbing con- 
taminated foods, and (c) excluding areas where 
relatively little fallout occurred, but into which 
may be transported highly contaminated food 
and/or water. After longer periods of time 
during which the gamma dose rates in an orig- 
inally highly contaminated area have decreased 



to acceptable levels, it probably would be neces- 
sary to evaluate the residual contamination for 
the bone seeking radioisotopes, especially stron- 
tium-90. 

References 

1. Maximum Permissible Concentration of Radioisotopes 
in Air and Water For Short Period Exposure. Morgan, 
K. Z., Snyder, W. S., and Ford, M. R. International 
Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, July 
8, 1955, Paper A/Cong. 8/P/79. 

2. USNRDL-394. The Ratio of Lung Beta Dose to Whole 
Body During Given Intervals After Atomic Detonation, 

(Confidential) Sondhaus, C A., 1952, 

3. Simultaneous Slow Neutron Fission of t/ 235 Atoms I. 
Individual and Total Rates of Decay of Fission Products, 
Hunter, H. F. and Ballou, N. E., U S. Naval Radiological 
Defense Laboratory. April 1949. 

4. "Two Ways to Estimate Thyroid Dose From Radioiodine 
in Fallout," Dunning, Gordon M., Nucleonics Vol, 14, No. 
2, February 1956, 

5. Maximum Permissible Amounts of Radioistotpes in the 
Human Body and Maximum Permissible Concentration in 
Air and Water. Handbook 52, National Bureau of Stand- 
ards, March 1953. 

6. "Estimated Tissue Dose From Internally Administered 
Radioisotopes/' Final Progress Report Dec. 1, 1956-Nov. 
30, 1957. Cpmar, C. L., Nold, M. M. and Hayes, R. L. 
Medical Division, Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear 
Studies, Oak Ridgej Tennessee. 

7. "Carcinoma of the Colon in Rats Following the Feeding 
of Radioactive Yttrium," Lisco, H., Brues, A, M., Finkei, 
M. P. and Grundhauser, W,, Cancer Research 1947, Vol. 
7 p. 721, 

8. "Neoplasms in Rats Protected Against Lethal Doses of 
Irradiation by Parabiosis and Para-Aminoproprio-phe- 
none," Brecher, G., Cronkite, E, P., Peers, J. H., Journal 
of the National Cancer Institute, August 1953, Vol. 14, 
No. 1, p. 159-167. 

9. "Radiation as a Carcinogenic Agent, " Brues, A. M. 
Radiation Research, November 1955, Vol, 3, no. 3, p. 272- 
280. 

10. "Induction of Intestinal Carcinoma in the Mouse by 
Whole-Body Fast- Neutron Irradiation," Nowell, C, 
Cole, L, J., Ellis, M. E., Cancer Research, October 1956, 
Vol. 16 No. 9, p. 873-876. 

11. Some Effects of Ionizing Radiation on the Physiology of 
the Gastrointestinal Tract, A Review. Lecture and Re- 
view Series No. 56-2. Conard, Robert, Naval Medical 
Research Institute, Bethesda, Maryland, March 1956, 

12. "Lesions of the Alimentary Tract of Dogs Exposed to 
Whole Body X-Radiations of 300 to 3,000 R." Brecher, 
G., and Cronkite, E. P., American Journal of Pathology, 
1951, Vol. 27, p. 676-677. 

13. "The Nature of Intestinal Radiation Death," Quastler, 
H. Radiation Research, April 1956, Vol. 4, No. 4. 

14. "Effects of Partial Shielding of Rat Intestine During 
X-Irradiation." Swift, M, N., Taketa, S. T., and Bond, 
V. P., Federation Procedures, 1954, Vol. 13, p. 523. 

15. "Prevention of Intestinal Radiation Death by Removal 
of the Irradiated Intestine," Osborne, J. W., Radiation 
Research, June 1956, Vol. 4, No. 6. 

16. "Sensitivity of Abdomen of Rat to X- irradiation", Bond, 
V. P., Swift, M. N., Allen, A. C. and Fischler, M. C„ 
American Journal of Physiology, Vol. 161, 1950, p. 333-330, 

17. "Acute Intestinal Radiation Death. Studies on Roentgen 
Death in Mice, III." Quastler, H., Lanzl, E. F., Keller, 
M. E. and Osborne, J. W., American Journal of Physiology, 
February 1951, Vol. 164, No. 2, p. 546-556. 

lfy "Observations on Gastrointestinal Function After X-Ray 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



481 



and Thermal Column Exposures," Woodward, Kent T. 
and Rothermel, Samuel, Radiation Research, October 
1956, Vol. 5, p. 441-440. 

19. "Modification of Acute Intestinal Radiation Syndrome 
Through Shielding," Swift, M. N. and Taketa, S. T., 
American Journal of Physiology, April 1956 Vol. 185, No. l f 
p. 85-91. 

20. "Lethal Effects of Intragastric Irradiation in the Dog." 
Littman, A., Fox, B. W., Schoolman, H. M. ( and Ivy, 
A. C, American Journal of Physiology, 1953, p. 347-351. 

21. "Radioiodine in the "Study and Treatment of Thyroid 
Disease >A Review." Kelsey, M. P., Haines, S. F., Keating, 
F, R., The Journal of Clinical Endocrinology, Vol. 9, No, 
2 February 1949, p. 171-210. 

22. Radioisotopes in Medicine, Andrews, G. A., B nicer, M. 
and Anderson, E. (Editors) , September 1953. Superin- 
tendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington 25, D. C. Chapter 18-27. 

23. "A Critical Analysis of the Quantitative 1-131 Therapy 
of Thyrotoxicosis," Freeberg, A. S., Kurland, G. S., 
Chamovrtz, D. L., "tireless, A. L. Journal of Clinical 
Endocrinology, Vol. 12 1952, p. 86-111. 

24. "Functional and Histologic Effects of Therapeutic Doses 
of Radioactive Iodine on Thyroid of Man." Dobyns, B. 
M., Vickery, A. L. ( Maloot, F., and Chapman, E. The 
Journal of Clinical Endocrinology and Metabolism, Vol. 
13 No. 5, May 1953, p. 564. 

25. "Biological Hazards and Toxicity of Radioactive Iso- 
topes", Brues, A. M., The Journal of Clinical Investiga- 
tion. Nov. 1949, Vol. XXVIII, No. 6, p. 1286-1296, 

26. "The Pathologic Effects of 1-131 on the Normal Thyroid 
of Man". Freeberg, A. S., Kurland, G. S. and Blumgart, 
H. L., The Journal of Clinical Endocrinology and Metabo- 
lism, Vol. 12, 1952, p. 1315-1348. 

27. "Association of Irradiation with Cancer of the Thyroid in 
Children and Adolescents," Clark, D. E., The Journal of 
the American Medical Association, Nov. 1955, Vol. 159, 
p. 1007-1009. 



2$. Pathologic Effects of Atomic Radiation. National Academy 
of Sciences— National Research Council, 1956, Washington , 
D. C. 

29. The Biological Effects of Alo?nic Radiation— Summary 
Reports, National Academy of Sciences— National Re- 
search Council, 1956, Washington, D. C. 

30. Some Effects of Ionizing Radiation on Human Beings, 
Cronkite, E. P., Bond, V. P., and Dunham, C. L. (Edi- 
tors) . Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. 

Acknowledgment 

Acknowledgement is gratefully made for the 
kind asistance in reviewing the manuscript and 
offering many helpful suggestions: Dr. Charles 
L, Dunham, Director, Division of Biology and 
Medicine, AEC, Washington, D. C; Dr. Forrest 
Western, Assistant Director Division of Biology 
and Medicine, AEC, Washington, D. C; Dr. 
Karl Z. Morgan, Director, Health Physics Di- 
vision, Oak Ridge National Laboratory; Dr. 
Victor P. Bond, Brookhaven National Labora- 
tory; Dr. George V. LeRoy, Associate Dean, 
School of Medicine, The University of Chicago; 
Dr. C. L. Comar, Director, Laboratory of Ra- 
diation Biology, Department of Physiology, State 
Veterinarian College, Cornell University; Dr. 
Stanton H. Cohn, Head, Internal Toxicity 
Branch, U. S. Naval Radiological Defense 
Laboratory, San Francisco 24, California; Mr. 
Charles Sondhaus, University of California, 
Berkeley, California. 



482 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Representative Holifield. Dr. Stanton H. Cohn will present testi- 
mony on the evaluation of the hazards from inhaled radioactive fall- 
out. Dr. Colin is presently with the Medical Physics Division, Medi- 
cal Research Center, Brookhaven National Laboratory. He is a 
member of the Subcommittee on Inhalation Hazards of the Pathologi- 
cal Effects of the Atomic Energy Radiation Committee of the National 
Academy of Sciences. He was a member of the U.S. Naval Medical 
Team which provided emergency medical treatment to the Marshallese 
accidentally exposed to fallout from operations in 1954. He studied 
the internal radioactive contamination of the exposed Marshallese. 
He was also a member of the AEC medical team which made the 
5-year medical survey of the Marshall Islands in 1959 and studied 
the internal radioactive contamination by measuring body burdens 
of various fission products of 250 Marshallese using a whole body 
gamma scintillation counter. He participated in the direction of the 
study of the residual contamination of plants and animals of the Mar- 
shall Islands in two surveys in 1 955 and 1956. 

Dr. Cohn, we are happy to have you before us today and you may 
now proceed, 

TESTIMONY OF DE. STANTON COHN, 1 BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL 

LABORATORY 

Dr. Cohn. An individual exposed to an atmosphere contaminated 
with airborne radioactive particles will be subjected to both external 
and internal radiation. This contaminated atmosphere, which would 
most likely be an area of local fallout produced by a nuclear detona- 
tion, would subject the individual to penetrating gamma and super- 
ficial beta radiation from the exterior. Particles which become inter- 
nalized as a result of inhalation and/or ingestion would subject the 
internal tisues and organs primarily to beta radiation, and to a lesser 
extent, to gamma radiation. Unconsumed fissile material may, in 
addition, supply internal alpha radiation. 

It is difficult to determine the exact degree to which radiation from 
external and internal sources contribute to the total radiation an 
individual receives. It is even more difficult, and in fact, rather 
arbitrary (as will be shown later) to separate the contributions deriv- 



1 L, Experience : Scientist, Medical Physics Division, 1958 to present, Medical Research 
Center, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, Long Island, N.Y. Head, Internal 
Toxicity Branch, 1950-58, Biomedical Division, U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Labora- 
tory, San Francisco, Calif. Research assistant, 1949-50, Crocker Radiation Laboratory, 
University of California, Bierkeley, Calif. Biochemist, biomedical division, 1946-49, 
Argonne National Laboratory, University of Chicago, Chicago, 111. Biochemist, laboratory 
of the 203d General Hospital, Paris, France, 1943-46, U.S. Army. Chemist, explosives, 
1942-43, Kankakee Ordnance Works, Joliet, III., and Lake Ontario Ordnance Works, 
Niagara Falls, N.Y. 

,11. Education : University of California, Berkeley, Calif., 1952, Ph. D., physiology- 
radiobiology (Dr. Hardin Jones and Dr. D. H. Copp)i. University of Chicago, Chicago, 
111 1949, S.M* physiology (Dr. Franklin McLean) ; 1946, S.B,., Biochemistry. 

II L Additional qualifications : Member of the Subcommittee on Inhalation Hazards of the 
Pathological Effects of Atomic Radiation Committee, National Academy of Sciences, 1956 
to present. Member of the U.S. Navy medical team which provided emergency medical 
treatment for the Marshall Islanders accidentally exposed to fallout from Operation Castle, 
March 1954. (Studied the internal radioactive contamination of the exposed Marshallese. 
Also member of the, AEC medical team which made the 5 -year medical survey of the 
Marshall Islands in 19 59-. Studied the internal radioactive contamination by measuring 
body burdens of 250 Marshallese using a whole body gamma scintillation counter. 
Participated in the direction of the study of the residual contamination of plants and 
animals of the Marshall Islands in two field surveys, 1955 and 1956. Member of the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Defense, 1958. 

IV. Scientific Societies, memberships : Radiation Research Society, Ajnerican Physiologi- 
cal Society. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



485 



The Respiratory Tract 



OLFACTORY AREA 



CONCHAE 



VESTIBULE 



EPIGLOTTIS 



LARYNX 



TRACHEA, 20mm. -5^- 



LUN6 



BRONCHUS 8mm 



PULMONARY 
ARTERY 



LYMPHATICS 

PULMONARY 
VEIN 



LYMPHATICS 




NASOPHARYNX 



ORAL PHARYNX 



LUNG 



BRONCHIAL 
ARTERY 



TRACHEO- BRONCHIAL 
LYMPH NODES 
0.5 TO 1.5 cm. 



CONDUCTING 
BRONCHIOLE, 0.6 mm. 

TERMINAL 
BRONCHIOLE, 0.6 mm. 

RESPIRATORY 
BRONCHIOLE, 0.5mm. 

ALVEOLAR 
DUCT, 0.2 mm. 

ALVEOLAR 
SAC, 0.3 mm. 

ALVEOLUS 



LUNG LOBULE 



486 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



When inhaled fallout material enters the respiratory tract, a frac- 
tion of the material is retained. Some of this material is subse- 
quently removed, but a portion may remain for an appreciable period. 
Probably the most important property of fallout which influences 
the fate of the particles in the respiratory system is the size of the 
particle. 

Both experimental and theoretical data on the deposition of par- 
ticles with respect to particle size are summarized in figure 2. For 
decreasing particle size, as would be expected, deposition occurs deep- 
est in the lung. With the increasing particle sizes, deposition occurs 
in the higher areas of the respiratory tract. A minimum in lung 
deposition occurs at 0.5 micron, and a maximum at 5 microns. Par- 
ticles larger than 5 microns are retained by the upper respiratory 
tract and do not reach the lung. The nasal air passage acts as a trap 
or filter for these larger particles. 



Figure 2 




0.5 



-5 



Particle Size (Microns) - Log 



Deposition in Respiratory Tract 

The rates of clearance of material from the respiratory tract are 
also important because they influence the tissue exposure time and 
thus determine the degree of radiation hazard to the lungs. The 
clearance of material from the lungs has not as yet been clearly de- 
lineated. However, it is thought that three mechanisms play a role 
in the removal of particulate material. These are ciliary action, 
transfer of soluble material across the alveolar membrane and phago- 
cytosis. The action of ciliated epithelium in combination with 
mucous secretion results in a rapid "escalatorlike" upward movement 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 487 

of material deposited in the respiratory tract above the terminal 
bronchioles. Materials in the ciliated upper portion of the respira- 
tory tract are removed to the G.I. tract within hours, or at most, a 
few days. Ciliary action is a continuous process and accounts for the 
removal of the largest fraction of particles from the respiratory 
tract. 

Relatively soluble material is transferred across the alveolar mem- 
brane, into the bloodstream, and thus enters the circulation in minutes, 
or at the most, a few hours. The material appears equally rapidly 
in the organ of ultimate deposition. The radiation dose to the lungs 
from such soluble material is much less than that received by the 
organ of ultimate deposition, which is usually the skeleton, because 
of the brief transit time in the lungs. 

To a limited extent, the so-called insoluble materials are also ab- 
sorbed through the lung and the G.I. tract. 

The third method for removal of particulate material from the lung 
is phagocytosis, that is, engulf ment of a particle by a phagocytic cell. 
A phagocytized particle may be moved into an alveolus and trans- 
ported upward, or the phagocyte may enter the lymphatic circulation 
and be transported to the lymph nodes. 

To provide a basis for estimating the accumulation of the many 
types of radioactive material in the lung in situations where actual 
data are not available, the International Committee on Radiation 
Protection (ICRP) has derived a model to describe general respir- 
atory characteristics of deposition and clearance, as shown in figure 
3. The total deposition of (50 percent plus 25 percent) or 75 percent 
for readily soluble compounds is conservative for most size ranges. 
The figure is 25 percent for deposition in the lung is based on animal 
studies, and may vary widely. For insoluble material, in addition 
to the 50 percent which is removed from the upper respiratory tract 
and swallowed, an additional 12.5 percent is removed from the deeper 
portions of the lung by ciliary action and swallowed. 

The overall elimination rate of fission products from the lung can 
be described by a series of exponential functions (rate proportional 
to level), and over a longer period of time by a power function (rate 
of removal decreases geometrically with time). These rate values are 
needed to provide meaningful calculations of radiation dose. 

Figure 3 
Distribution of particulates in respiratory tract 



Distribution 


Readily 

soluble 

compounds 


Other com- 
pounds 


Exhaled 


Percent 
25 
50 
1 25 


Percent 

25 


Deposited in upper respiratory passages and subsequently swallowed 


50 


Deposited in the lungs (lower respiratory passages) _ 


1 25 







1 This is taken up into the body. 

* Of this, half Is eliminated from the lungs and swallowed in the first 24 hours, making a total of 62.5 percent 
swallowed. The remaining 12.5 percent is retained in the lungs with a half-life of 120 days, it being assumed 
that this portion is taken up into body fluids. 

It can be seen from the preceding discussion that the body has cer- 
tain natural defenses against inhalation of fallout. First, the nasal 
passages and lungs act as a filter against large particles. Secondly, 
the alveolar and G.I. tract membranes filter on the basis of solubility. 



488 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Finally, much of the material which gains entry into the lungs is 
transferred to the intestinal tract where it is lost through normal elim- 
ination. In addition to these physiological protective factors, many 
of the fallout fission products produced have very short radioactive 
half-lives. 

Very few data exist correlating a given amount of an internal emit- 
ter and a specific pathological response. Information on pathologi- 
cal injury to the lungs of human beings is derived largely from data 
on the effect of external radiation in the treatment of cancer of the 
breast and intrathoracic neoplasms. Two main types of lesions are 
formed, radiation pneumonitis and radiation fibrosis, representing 
different types of damage to the alveolar cells and wall. While indi- 
vidual variation in response to radiation are very large, there is a 
definite correlation of the frequency of the above lesions with exter- 
nal dose. 

Clinical experience on the effects of radioactive material deposited in 
the lungs is derived primarily from miners who were exposed for 
long periods to radium dusts and radon gas in mines. The best known 
cases of lung cancer caused by radium are those that occurred in the 
miners of Joachimsthal and Schneeberg in Czechoslovakia. While 
an increase in the occurrence of lung caner of the order of 50 percent 
was observed as compared with the general population, the etiology 
of the cancer is linked only circumstantially to the radium. 

Other date on the pathological effects of radiation to lung are 
meager, and are based in part on experience with individuals exposed 
accidentally to radiation or radioactive materials or to high doses 
of therapeutic radiation. In accidental cases, the radiation dose re- 
ceived is most often unobtainable. Data on the late effects resulting 
from radiation therapy are very scarce, as frequently the f ollowup on 
such effects is not made, and further, the study requires difficult statis- 
cal analysis. 

The best source of data is the study of radiation effects on labora- 
tory animals. From animal experimentation it is concluded that 
lung as a tissue has only moderate radiosensitivity. Damage is ob- 
served in lung tissue only after a large acute dose or repeated smaller 
doses of external radiation. 

There is no question that radiation from internal sources can pro- 
duce lung cancer, but it is jiot as yet possible to equate the changes 
produced w T ith given levels of radiation dose. The best estimate of 
the external dose required to produce pulmonary fibrosis and pneu- 
monitis lies in the range of 800 to 2000 rads, with a mean dose of 
about 1,000 rads. The induction of pulmonary cancer from radioac- 
tive material in experimental animals requires a dose of about the 
same order. The smallest dose to the lung which produced malignant 
tumors in mice was reported as 115 rad, following administration of 
0.003 /ac Pu 239 2 , and 300 rads after administration of 0.15 pc Ru 106 O 2 . 
However, other studies w T ith mice have indicated that 2,000 rad was 
the threshold dose for lung tumor formation. Actually, almost all 
of these studies utilize intra-tracheal administration of the material 
for experimental ease. It is difficult to compare such an exposure to 
one deriving from true inhalation. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



493 



Figure 6 

Internal radioactive contamination of Marshallese pigs exposed to fallout from 

the Mar, 1, 1954, nuclear detonation * 



Beta activity d/m/total sample X 10" 3 



Gross 
activity 



Sr« 



Ba»° 



Rare 
earths 



Skeleton 

(Total, percent) 

Lungs (alveolar) 

Stomach 

Small intestine 

Large intestine. 

Liver__ 

Kidney 

Remaining carcass 

Thyroid dose. 

Total external gamma dose 
Internal beta activity 



8,745 

(100) 

1.3 

1.6 

2.5 

14 

20 

3.2 

455 



5,380 
(62) 
0.24 
0.26 
0.73 
5.0 
0.47 
0.18 



595 
(6.8) 
0.22 
0.62 
0.69 

2.8 
0.27 
0.30 



850 
(0.7) 
0.57 
0.80 
0.69 
4.0 
5.9 
0.61 



100-150 rep — (estimated from early analysis of 

urine). 
330 r. 
4pc. 



1 These values are the average of 2 young adult pigs which were analyzed 3 months after detonation. 

It can be seen that I 131 and the shorter-lived I 132 , I 133 , and I 135 con- 
tribute the highest individual tissue dose (100-150 rep to the thyroid) . 
Although this is a large dose, studies with sheep indicate that doses 
of 16,000 r. are required to produce minimal changes in cell structure, 
and 50,000 r. are required to produce definite acute cell damage and 
hypothyroidism. Of the remaining fission products, Sr 89 contributed 
the major portion of the beta dose to the skeleton. Thus the contribu- 
tion of the total internal contamination in the Marshallese was small 
as compared to the 175 r. external gamma dose which they received. 

In laboratory experiments designed to reproduce exposure to early 
fallout from various types of nuclear detonation, products from 2-day- 
old neutron bombarded uranium associated with various types of car- 
riers were employed as fallout simulants. 

In these inhalation experiments mice received an acute exposure 
from many of the short-lived radioisotopes not previously studied. 
The distribution, retention, and clearance of the fission products in 
these animals confirm the fact that the uptake and metabolism of 
the inhaled radioactive particles depend largely on the physical and 
chemical characteristics of the carrier material. The internally de- 
posited radioactivity in the lungs, as well as in the skeleton and soft 
tissues (as shown in figure 7) decayed rapidly because the activity 
of the aerosol was contributed chiefly by short-lived radioisotopes and 
the biological loss of material from the lungs and soft tissues was very 
rapid. 

While, as mentioned previously, the calculation of the internal radi- 
ation dose from fallout w T ith any degree of precision is difficult, a 
rough approximation based on the experimental data here is feasible. 
To evaluate dose to individual tissues following this acute inhalation 
exposure, the activity per gm tissue as a function of time was de- 
termined. The greatest activity per gm tissue was observed in the 
thyroid at 1 hour following exposure. The total dose received by each 
organ for comparable energies is proportional to the area under its 
curve. 



494 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



Figure 7 



o vo 






> 
o 




100 



200 



300 
TIME (HR) 



400 



500 



600 



TIME (HR) 

UPTAKE & RBTEHTIOH BY MICE OF A SIMOLAHT OF FALLOUT 
PRODUCED BT A LAHD BASED HUCLEAR DETOKATICM. 



RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD EVALUATION - 
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF PRESENT CONCEPTS 
AND A NEW APPROACH THERETO 



by 



E. L. Alpen 



U. S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory 
San Francisco 24, California 



511 



524 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



In the older approach, discussed in the previous section, the same 
basic set of effects data was applied in all of the above three situa- 
tions. As the problems are more or less unique for each category some 
flexibility might be gained by altering the judgement criteria for the 
needs of the system. 



QENKRAL BASIS FOR APPROACH 

Before making this subdivision it is probably worthwhile to first 
state a more or less unified concept of hazard and then adapt it to each 
situation. 

When an individual is exposed to mixed ionizing radiations two spec- 
ific organ systems are conceivably affected to an extent capable of 
causing either death or incapacitation. These organ systems are the 
bone-marro w-intestinal complex which may suffer physiological failure 
from the result of penetrating ionizing radiation; and the skijL which 
can as the result of the loss of its integrity, cause death or severe 
incapacitation. The latter organ can respond to radiation of all ener- 
gies which penetrate to effective depths in the epithelium. If these 
are designated respectively dee p effect **a «irfa M effect it is possible 
then to organize our thinking on the basis of two response criteria, one 

- associated with the deep effect and one associated with Hffifagfi % f * ct t ' 
We shall refer to these as " deep hazard " and "surface hazard". They can 
be treated more or less independently in terms of acute effects as long 
as either one is relatively large with respect to the other. Data have 
been developed to show that the response to penetrating ionizing radia- 
tion is not detectably altered by superficial radiation as long as severe 
skin damage is not p^sent^ In the presence of severe skin damage, on 
the other hand, it has been shown by Alpen, et al x? and Br ooks and Evans « 

-gprf^^i hums of thirty percent or more of the body area reduce the _ 
X-ray Sen a DDreciabLvT 1 ^ 15 ./ Except for this limiting case we shall 
consider W two effects to b e independent. When this assumption is 
made, an instrumental requirement is established for a detection device 
capable of Assessing deep hazard independent of energy of the radiation 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 525 



THE DEEP HAZARD 



In Figure 3 is shown the relationship between the energy of the ion- 
izing radiation and the dose effective in producing lethality in dogs. 
The data are for bilateral exposure to X-ray sources with rather broad 
energy bands, but it is reasonable to assume that only minor readjust- 
ments would need be made for more restricted energy limits. From the 
relative body and bone dimensions of dog and man it is possible to de- 
rive a curve of energy vs, effectiveness for lethality in man. This 
curve is also shown in the same figure. For estimation of hazard the 
instrument used in measuring dose, either portable radiac, pocket dos- 
imeters or film badges should have a sensitivity which is reciprocal to 
this curve. We might state the requirement as follows. ftie instrument 
must have unit sensitivity for gamma radiation above approximately 80 KEV. 
At 30 KEV the sensitivity must be reduced to 5056 of the maximum and it 
must detect no more than 1% of the gamma radiation of 15 KKV or less. 

The principal basis for this requirement is the need to appropriately 
weigh whatever small amount of low energy gamma radiation is present, 
and, of much greater importance, to insure that none of the beta radia- 
tion present in the same environment is measured. 

It has been mentioned in preceding sections that when radiation is 
from an extended plane surface or a ring type source that on the purely 
physical basis of depth dose enhancement the radiation will be 20 to 30?6 
more effective than unilateral radiation at the same total dose. With 
this consideration in mind it is necessary to adjust the dose levels which 
will be predicted to yield a given response and also to require a geometrical 
responsiveness within the instrument that yields equal meter deflection 
for radiation from any angle. It has been shown that existing instrumen- 
tation is seriously deficient in this latter regard. Work 11 has shown 
that the shielding of the detector provided by the instrument case and 
the operator leads to a drop in detection sensitivity in the rearward 
quadrant. It seems that one of the more pressing requirements in radiac 
development at this time is correction of this deficiency. 

Assuming that the requirements of energy and geometrical dependency 
of sensitivity are met in the detector, it remains for us to establish 
a series of standards of biological response that might be useful in 
implementing the three problems outlined in the previous section. 



526 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



S 
8 



Pi 



5000 



SB F 

1 



1000 



CO 

s 
a 

s 

a 



500 














co 

53 






8 


— 


5000 


14 






S 

55 












8 

5= 




1000 


3 


*~ 




tf 






O 






fc* 






CO 






o 



50 



100 



100 



200 300 

_I L_ 



500 



1000 2000 

_l I 1 100 



ENERGY, KIL0V0LTS, PEAK 



^7 



l 



30 



90 



350 



EFFECTIVE KNfitGX (from HVL in Cuj , KEV 



700 



Fig. 3 Lethality of Ionizing Radiation as Related to Energy. 

Solid line connects measured values of the LDcq for dogs, 
bilateral radiation. The dotted line connects the estimated 
values for man assuming a phantom thickness of 27 cm and an 
average bone thickness for marrow shielding of twice the 
value which would be found in the dog# 



534 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



Given the data presented in Table 3 it is possible to construct an 
operational table similar to that formulated for deep hazard. Again 
it is possible to divide the dose range into two regions using the 
same criteria as were applied for the deep hazard. If severe erythema 
is accepted as the acute effect which will incapacitate, then a dose 
of 600 rad is set as the upper limit for operation based upon the cri- 
teria of maximum acceptable acute effects. The same reasoning holds 
as for the 9-150 r region of deep effects. Hazard is linearly propor- 
tional to accumulated dose up to this maximum figure , For doses over 
600 rad the following table should be applied in accepting or reject- 
ing m a yir wy n exposure levels. 



Table 4 

ACUTE EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION ON SKIN 



Estimated Dose 
Required (SIR) 
in < 1 week 



Effect 



0-600 rad 
600-2000 rad 
2000-4000 rad 



4000-10,000 rad 



10,000-30,000 rad 



30-100,000 rad 



No acute effects. 

Moderate early erythema. 

Early erythema under 24 hours. Skin breakdown 
in 2 weeks* 

Severe erythema in 4 24 hours. Severe skin 
breakdown in 1-2 weeks. 

Severe erythema in ^ 4 hours. Severe skin 
breakdown in 1-2 weeks. 

Immediate skin blistering (less than 1 day). 



Modifying Factors 

Recovery rates for skin are as yet not extensively determined but 
one published report on rat skin 20 indicates that recovery is probably 
more rapid for skin than for deep effects. No information is available 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 535 



as to permanent non-recoverable fraction. As a rule of thumb it is 
probable that a factor of 2 could be applied to the above tabulated 
values to get equivalent BER's for 1 month exposure. The same remark 
is appropriate here that was mentioned under deep effects; the time 
schedule indicated in the table will not hold for protracted radiation. 

Shielding is of critical significance for protection from the 
surface hazard. The dose rate to clothed surfaces of the body will be 
appreciably reduced by the shielding afforded by the covering • Condit, 
Dyson and Lamb 2 ^ have measured the absorber characteristics of several 
military uniform fabrics as shown in Table 5* 



Table 5 
ABSORBER CHARACTERISTICS OF FABRICS 



Material Wt/unit Area 
Denim work pants 31 mg/cm 2 
Cotton work shirt 17 
Woolen pants 34 

Knitted wool (sweater) 31 
Close woven rayon 6.3 



A normal two layer fatigue uniform would have absorption charac- 
teristics approaching one half -value layer for mixed fission products. 
Heavy clothing will be equivalent to roughly two half -value layers. 
Protection factors of 0.5 and 0.25 are then applicable to measured dose 
rate for areas covered with clothing. 

Attenuation in air of beta radiation provides protection for 
upper portions of the body. However, direct measurement of the dose 
rate at the point of interest makes the necessary correction for this 
variable . 



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The Determination of Internally Deposited Radioactive Isotopes 

in the 

Marshal lese People 

by 
Excretion Analysis* 



Kent T\ Woodward, Ariel G. Schrodt**, James E, Anderson, 
Harry A. Claypool v and James B 4 Hartgering 

Division of Nuclear Medicine 
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research 
Washington 12 9 D. C. 



* Work done under the auspices of The Surgeon General, United 
States Army, and in conjunction with the Division of Biology 
and Medicine, Atomic Energy Commission 

** Fresent Address: Nuclear-Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 



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TIME IN DAYS 

Figure 2. Excretion Levels of Urinary Strontium? at Various Times After Exposure 



The metabolic behavior of strontium as outlined in Supplement #6 of the 



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excretion levels of strontium? (Appendix). The fraction of s trontium absorbed 
from the gas tro- intestinal tract is 0.6 and the biological excretion rate from 



the total body is 190 days. Of the absorbed fraction, 0.25/0.60, about k2 per- 
cent is deposited in bone and the biological half -life is ^000 days. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



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644 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

STATEMENT OF EUGENE ftTJINDLEN, 1 OFFICE OF CIVIL AND 

DEFENSE MOBILIZATION 

Mr. Quindlen. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, this 
presentation is an analysis of the effects of the attack specified by the 
committee on the people of the United States. 

As you recall, from our discussion of the other day, this is an attack 
of 263 weapons ranging from 1 to 10 megatons upon this country for 
a total megaton average of 1,446. 

The figures which I will present today are national figures only 
(p. 650). 

As you requested, we are preparing a State and metropolitan area 
breakdown of these figures and will present them to the committee as 
requested, tomorrow morning. 

There are many variables in placing an attack of this type and these 
variables can affect the final nature and place of an attack and can 
affect the number of casualties produced by an attack. 

The specific attack described by the committee on these targets and 
under these circumstances, could have killed about 19.7 million per- 
sons the first 24 hours. An additional 22.2 million persons would 
have been so badly injured that they would subsequently die of the 
injuries, and there would have been about 17.2 million additional per- 
sons injured who could be expected to recover from the injuries 
received. 

The chart which we have there summarizes these figures. Of those 
killed, about 25 percent would have died as a result of radiation alone, 
and about 75 percent as a result of blast and thermal injuries, com- 
bined to a great extent with radiation injuries. 

Many of those people close in to a weapon who would die of blast 
and thermal injuries would also have received sufficient radiation to 
kill them. We have listed these, however, as blast and thermal 
injuries. 

Of the surviving injured of 17.2 million, about 6.3 million would 
have had blast and thermal injuries and about 10.9 million would 
have had fallout injuries alone. This would be a serious blow, but 
even with this weight of attack we should look to the question of what 
is left, what does the country look like at this point. 

First of all, about three out of every four persons in the United 
States would survive this particular attack. On the other hand, one 
out of four wQuld not survive. These are the facts of life if a nuclear 
war should ever qome to our borders. 

This is the picture which OCDM has been portraying for the Amer- 
ican people over and over again in speeches, in pamphlets, on the 
radio, on television, and in the newspapers. 

This threat and means to meet it were highlighted in the pamphlet 
"Facts About Fallout," of which 8 million copies have been distrib- 
uted since its initial publication in 1958, and in "Handbook for Emer- 
gencies," distributed in 42 million copies. 

It is reiterated ill the new OCDM pamphlet, "The Family Fallout 
Shelter," which is now being distributed in total number of 50 million 
copies. 



1 See biography, p. 12. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAK 665 

Dr. Dunning. No, sir ; I don't know how we can do it. 

I can give a personal opinion as to its desirability. 

Senator Hickenlooper. Do you agree it would be highly desirable 
if the Kussian people could have it thrust upon them what the re- 
sults of an atomic attack would be in their own country ? 

But we do not seem to be able to get that across. We only seem 
to be able to get out to our own people what would happen to us in 
case of atomic attack. 

The other fellow does not seem to get very much concerned about 
what would happen to him, which has something to do psychologi- 
cally with attitudes toward international association, I am afraid. 

Thank you very much. 

Representative Holifield. Thank you, Dr. Dunning. 

Dr. Dunning. Thank you. 

(The complete formal statement of Dr. Dunning appears starting 
on p. 436.) 

Representative Holifield. Our next witness is Mr. W. E. Strope, 
National Radiological Defense Laboratory. 

He will speak on survival measures. 

Representative Holifield. Mr. Strope, we are glad to have you 
back again. You testified for our committee before. We will be 
glad to hear from you at this time. 

STATEMENT OF WALMER E. STROPE, 1 HEAB MILITARY EVALUA- 
TIONS DIVISION, U.S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LABORA- 
TORY 

Mr. Strope. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the com- 
mittee. Prior testimony has established the dimensions of the at- 
tack under consideration and the number of casualties that might be 
expected. It is my purpose to summarize the possibilities of defense 
against this threat with emphasis on the problem of protection against 
radioactive fallout. 

I propose to start by indulging in a little survival arithmetic in 
order to illustrate the nature of the defense problem. I have taken 
here (fig. 1, p. 683) initially the heavy fallout area, approximately 
3,000 r/hr at 1 hour. 

In this attack approximately 20 percent of the population was in a 
region of this level. On the other hand, 80 percent are not in so 
serious a condition. I will cover them shortly. But let us consider 
the heavy fallout area and what the nature of our problem is. 

In this area the dose during the first year — this is without counter- 
measures, simply in the open — is approximately 12,000 roentgens. 
This, of course, is more than is necessary to kill a person. 

Now of this first year's dose — which is the only period that we will 
consider, because the doses in subsequent years are so very much 
smaller they can be neglected in this argument— the dose in the first 
2 weeks is about 10,000 roentgens. 



iRorn in Mason, Mich., Apr. 9, 1918; married, 2 children; BB, Webb Institute of 
Naval Architecture, 1942; engineer, Bureau of Ships, Washington, D.C., 1942-^8; head, 
Military Evaluations Division, USNRDL, 1948 to present. AAAS ; ORSA. Navy Dis- 
tinguished Civilian Service Award* 1957, for contribution in field of atomic defense. 



672 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Ultimately it is hoped to prove-test the shelter by occupying it for 
a 2- week period with the full complement of 100 persons. 

The end result will be the first fully tested design of a high perform- 
ance fallout shelter available in this country. 

Now, I would like to turn to the postshelter problem of recover inj 
the us e of essential facilities needed to reconstruct the economy. 
~ would l ike to expand briefly on my previous statement that we think 
we can get a factor of 10 reduction at the present time. This state- 
" ment is based, on a considerable history of experimentation beginn ing 
with Operations JANCxLE in 1952, and more recently field experi- 
ments have been conducted at Camp IStoneman in California, u sing_ 
smiulated land "^louTT" W ork of this type will contmueunder 
OCJJM sponsorship at tarks Air Force Base. Areas of this base, 
which is being turned over to the Army shortly, have been set aside 
for USNRDL research work. 

The principal weakness in present knowledge in reclamation stems 
from the fact that no experimental reclamation of actual facilities 
such as industrial plants, oil refineries, residential areas and the like, 
has actually been accomplished. All of our previous studies have 
been confined to typical elements such as streets, roofs, and so forth. 
Experimental decontamination of complex target facilities are 
planned for the near future. The results should indicate to what 
extent the effectiveness we have seen on typical elements, that is, a 
reduction factor of 100, can be expected in real situations. 

The work should also result in well-designed procedures that can 
be used to train recovery crews on a countrywide basis. Meanwhile, 
we are estimating for OCDM, based on our present knowledge, the 
effectiveness 'and cost of reclaiming specific facilities considered essen- 
tial for post- attack recuperation of the economy. 

Now, continuing consideration of the fallout pix>blem, I would like 
to consider the effects of various levels of protection on the human 
casualties caused by this particular attack for the committee. One 
of the difficulties here hinges on the definition of the term casualty. 
One interpretation might be whether a person lives or dies during the 
attack period, On the other hand, some criterion of injury might be 
selected that would consider either radiation sickness or the longer 
term effects that have been discussed in prior testimony, perhaps even 

genetic effects. .-„*.- 

I shall avoid an arbitrary definition of radiation casualty by pre- 
senting calculations for this attack showing the fraction of the total 
population receiving various radiation doses, these doses being ones 
that might be used to define a casualty. 

In making these calculations I consulted Dr. Joseph Coker, who is 
director of the National Damage Assessment Center, and who actually 
ran these calculations, and obtained an estimate of the fraction of the 
population located in areas that received various levels of fallout. 

Using this information I obtained the results shown in my last 
chart (fig. 4 p. 692). 

In the Dody of the table are the percentages of the total population 
of the country that would be found in various conditions. The table 
is broken into two parts. First the dose in the first 2 weeks is shown. 
This is the emergency phase and this is where the question of living 
and dying is decided in the main. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



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684 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



Useful Radiological Defense Systems 
Heavy Fallout Area: 3000 r/hr at 1 hr 



Sty-stem 

Number 


Emergency Phase 
Countermeasures 


Operational Recovery 
Phase Countermeasures 


Dose during 
First Year 
(roentgens) 


1. 
2. 

3. 
4* 

5* 
6, 


6-month shelter with 
0.01 residual number 

6-month shelter with 
0*001 residual number 

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0.001 residual number 

2^week shelter with 
0.01 residual number 

2-week shelter with 
0*001 residual number 


None 

None 
0*1 reclamation 
0.1 reclamation 
0.01 reclamation 
0.01 reclamation 


320 
210 
300 
210 
120 
30 



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EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



739 



50-1 



45- 



40-' 



35- 



30- 



25— 



20- 



(5- 



10- 



5- 



o- 



5- 



10- 



20- 



25— » 




r 

25 



T 

20 



15 



10 




MILES 



10 



15 



20 



"I 

25 



Figure 3 

COMPARATIVE EFFECTS FOR A 20 MT SURFACE BURST 

Residual radiation data— one hour reference dose rates — computed for a 
fission yield of 10 MT and an effective wind of 15 mDh 

\jj\fa£stf Sax^S (ffwiNT f-A%Mv\rr f&o?^ 



r— 50 



— 45 



•40 



— 35 



—30 



25 



— 20 



— 15 



-10 * 



— 5 



— 



-5 



-10 



— 15 



-20 



•—25 



740 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Representative Holifieljx We will adjourn now until 2 o'clock this 
afternoon. 

(Thereupon, at 12 :40 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed, to recon- 
vene at 2 p.m., the same day.) 

AFTERNOON SESSION 

Representative Holifield. The committee will be in order. 
We will begin testimony this afternoon on environmental contami- 
nation resulting from nuclear war. 

We will consider the following categories of environmental con- 
tamination : 

1. Effects on animals. 

2. Effects on soils and crops. 

3. Effects on foods. 

4. Experimental results of long-term effects. 

5. Long-range implications* 

Our first witness is Dr. Bernard Trum, director of the Animal 
Research Center of Harvard University Medical School. 

Dr. Trum has had years of actual field and laboratory experience 
in conjunction with the AEC on the effects of radiation on animals. 

Dr. Trum, we are happy to have you before us. You may proceed, 

STATEMENT OF BERNARD P. TRUM, 1 D.V.M., DIRECTOR OF THE 
ANIMAL RESEARCH CENTER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY MEDICAL 
SCHOOL 

Dr. Trum. Thank you very much. 

I appreciate the privilege of presenting this statement before the 
subcommittee, and although I shall limit my remarks to the effects 
of nuclear radiation on animals, I take the opportunity to express the 
deep interest of myself and my professional colleagues in veterinary 
medicine to the relation of this effect to man. However, that will not 
be a part of this paper. 

The cattle of Alamogordo, as you know, were the first casualties 



1 Boston College, 1931 (B.A.). 

Now York State Veterinary College, Cornell University, 1935 (D.VJkL), 

Veterinary Corps, U.S. Army, 1935-58. 

Professor of zoo teen ia, University of San Simon, Cochabamba, Bolivia, 1949-50. 

Professor of zootechnics, University of Tennessee (1951-56) (director of total body 
irradiation project (No. 10), UT-AEC, Agricultural Research Laboratory). 

Veterinarian, Division of Biology and Medicine, Atomic Energy Commission. Washing- 
ton. D.C., 1956-58. 

Representatve from American Veterinary Medical Association to the National Com- 
mittee on Radiation Protection and Measurements. 

Director, Animal Research Center and lecturer on Veterinary Medicine in the Depart- 
ment of Pathology, Harvard Medical School, Boston, M&ss., 1958 to present. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



745 



^J £ -*~[fl\J?^\ TOTAL BODY IRRADIATION 



In 1912, Regaud et al, wrote about the effect of ionizing radiation on the 
intestinal mucosa of the dog. Since that time many domestic animals have served 
the investigator in his quest for knowLedge concerning the biologic effects of 
radiation. It is enigmatic that massive doses of radiation are required to pro- 
duce observable chemical changes and yet relatively small amounts of radiation 
kill* If the total exposure is accomplished in less than 2k hours, between 300 
tp 600 r usually destroys about $0% of mamnals. The midlethal dose for coiranan 
species of livestock at 30 days (LDjqAjq) maybe found in Table I. Some species 
seem to be more radiosensitive than others. However, considerable variations in 
lethal response are found in families or even among individuals of the same 
species (Kohn and Kallman, 1956a), Vegetative forms such as bacteria are more 
radio-resistant than mammalian. Physical as well as biologic variations make 
comparisons of results from different laboratories difficult. 






TABUS I 
HEDIETHAL EOS^S OF IONIZING RAEEAIION 



Species 



LD 50/30( 



)# 



Radiation/ 



References 



Dog 


. 228-252 




265-312 




335-530 




335 


Rabbit 


767 




1633 




109k 


Swine 


618 


Sheep 


52U 


Burro 


78U 




651 




585 


Bacteria 


50,000-500,000 


Parasites 


25,000 



X-ray midline dose 
X-ray air dos© 
X-ray, 21-500 r/hr 
CooQmidline dose 
250 kvp 
80 kvp 
C06O 

C06O £p r/hr. 
Zr-Nb?5 
C06O 50 r/hr, 
Tal82 18-23 r/hr, 
Zr-tfb95 3 20 r/hr* 
X or gamma 
X or gamma 



Bond et al. (1956) 
Bond et al, (1956) 
Casarett (1950) 
Shively et al. (1956) 
Grahn et al, (1956) 
Grahn et al. (1956) 
Rust et al. (1955a) 
Rust et al. (195Uc) 
Trum (1955) 
Rust et al. (l95Ua) 
Rust et al. (1953) 
Lane et al. (1956) 
Schweigert (195U) 
Alicata (1951) 



*LD 50/30 = The quantity of radiation in roentgens (r) that killed $0% of the 
test animals within 30 days after exposure, 

LD5O/30 has not been determined for bacteria or parasites and the near sterili- 
zation doses quoted for them above are given only to show the relative radio- 
resistance of these foims. 

jfeev = Million electron volts; kvp z kilovolt potential; r/m z roentgens per 
minute, a dose rate. Midline dose Z dose measured at the approximate physical 
midcanter of an animal torso. Air dose Z dose measured in air appoint where 
the approximate physical midcenter of animal Txsuld have been during irradiation* 



746 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



1. Dose 

The expression of dose as used is itself variable since the roentgen, by 
definition, is an expression of quantity of energy absorbed by air. It is used 
to designate "free in air dose," "midline dose," and "absorbed tissue dose" as 
in Table I. Regardless of these variations, the biologic effects are in rela- 
tion to the expressed dose. The dose is additive with various radiations 
(Vogel et al., 1955) and cumulative in a certain sense in so far as effects of 
previously received irradiations have a demonstrable effect upon the response 
to subsequent irradiations* The LD50/3O for rats was reduced by 60# when re- 
exposures were made at 60 days (Hursh et al., 1955)- 

2. Intensity 






In man, it has been found that radiation of low intensity has little 
recognizable effect on the skin uhich has been explained as meaning that the 
lesions are being repaired as fast as they are produced. However, with radia- 
tions of moderate intensity at least, the effect is proportional to the dose* 

TABLE II 
LETHAL EFFECTS OF TKCLE BODY RADIATION OF DOGS 

Rate frprTJ LD 50/30 ^ r ^ 

U56.6 335 

160.0 U30 

21 to 25 530 



3. Dose Rate 

Henshaw et al. (19^7) reported a reduction of lethality by 70? of a given 
dose tfien the exposure time (dose rate) was increased tenfold. The amount of 
radiation to elicit a cutaneous reaction in man was doubled when doses were 
lengthered thirty times (McKee et al., 19^3) • Casarett (1950) found that the 
LD50/30 for dogs at various roentgens per hour varied considerably (T aDle !!)• 
Mice exposed to similar doses in 90 rainutes and in 2k hours from Co 50 had an 
^50/30 of 93° r in one case and 1325 r in the latter (Vogel et al., 1956) 1 

km Fractionation of Dose 

Fractionated doses or the continuous administration of radiation may differ 
in their effectiveness. However, if the fractionation is net great the difference 
may be insignificant* It may be possible to measure these differences but it is 
difficult to explain thenu 

Hursh et al. (1955) exposed rats to acute and fractionated exposures and 
found that a 600 r acute dose reduced the life span by 19$. When the dose was 
given in 10 daily doses of 60 r each, the life span was reduced 5»8% whereas 
there was no significant redaction in the life span of rats given 600 r in 
increments of 20 r a day. Kaplan and Brown (1952) reported that the fractionation 
and periodicity of exposure of black mice to radiation extended survival times 
and decreased the lethality of specific doses. Ellinger and Bamett (1950) 
demonstrated the effect of dose fractionation on mice. Brues and Rietz (19U8) 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 747 



reported that chickens given 1000 r at a rate of U3 r/minute had 100}J mortality 
in Hi days. However, if the dose was given in two equal exposures with a 2x0- 
irdnute interval, the mortality was reduced to 88£. Four exposures of 25& r xn.Hi 
20-minute intervals between them reduced the effect to 8l$£ mortality. The burro 
has been given fractionated doses of whole body radiation until death (Table III) 
(Trum et al., l°53j Rust et al., 195U, 1955b, Haley et al., 1955). 

TABLE HI ^ 

LETHAL EDSE FRACTIONATED TOTAL BODY IHRADUTECN OF BURRO (CO 60 ) 

Dose/day Survival time (days) Mean lethal dose (r) 

— TJ55 B.3 £ 1.1* 3355 

200 Hul 7 3.3 2820 

100 23.3 7 1*0 2330 

50 30.2 7 3.3 1510 

25 63.0 2 13.2 1575 

SUBLS IV 

MEAN SURVIVAL TTiiE FOR ANftiALS EXPOSED TO DAILY DOSES OF IONIZING RADIATIONS 



Mean Survival (days) 



Daily dose Burro Rat Guinea pig 

90-loo r 5£3 CO 252 

20-30 r 63.0 332.6 66.8 

Swine have been given fractionated doses of 50 r/day until death (Truro, 
1956) and accumulated a mean lethal dose several times greater than the burro. 
Thus we find that one domestic aniinal that seems to be more resistant (burro, 
11)50/30, 78U) than another (swine, LD50/30, 200-1*00 r) and the burro, although 
quite different in their response to acute whole body irradiation, have a similar 
response to the fractionated doses (Table IV) while the rat is quite different 
than either, 

%fhm continuously irradiated a dose of 11*0,000 r caused death of mice within 
20 minutes (Henshaw et al., 1°U6). However, after massive doses of 3500 and 
Ut,000 r all mice lived k to 5 days. Burros, sheep, and cows lived in a constant 
flux of C<r° gamma radiation (UO-50 r/hour) for 90 to 120 hours before total 
physical collapse (Trum and Rust, 195&; 1J asserman and Trum, 1 Q 55)« 

5. Quality of Radiation 

The qiality of the radiation is a factor in biologic effects. By quality, 
we mean the type and energy of radiation or, in the case of X-rays, the character* 
istic spectral energy distribution. Arbitrarily, v© will speak of low- energy 
X-rays as those under lUO Kev, relatively high- energy X-rays as those between 
li*0-250 Kev, high-energy X-rays as those between 250 and 3000 Kev. All gamma 



748 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



energies of nuclides used in whole body radiation studies have been in the high- 
energy range • 

Generally, the term quality refers to the penetrating power of the radiation 
which is directly related to energy. However, biolcgic effects are caused, as 
mentioned previously, by energy transfer or total absorbed dose. This depends 
not only on the quality of radiation as the initial energy of photon, but also 
the degradation of photons and geometry and tissue characteristics of the animal 
target. Cronkite and Bond (1956) have emphasized the importance of depth dose 
and dose distribution "studies in large animal experiments, stating that the effec- 
tiveness drops off at the point that the distribution of the dose departs from 
uniformity whether due to energy of the photon or unfavorable geometry of the 
target. 

6. Relative Biological Effectiveness (REE) 

The inverse ratio of the closes required of different radiations to produce 
a standard amount of given biologic effect is the relative biological effective- 
ness (RBE) of the radiations. Ihe difference in properties of radiation can only 
be determined properly when the physical measurements throughout the target are 
accurately known - a most difficult task. RBE is often used to express differen- 
ces measured by "biological dosimeters" and "air dose" comparisons. It will be 
recognized at once that the RBE for various radiations will be greatly influenced 
by the "end point" observed. The lethality of a radiation is perhaps the most 
common reference, however, carcinogenesis, cataract formation, and erythema are 
other biologic phenomena which have been used as "end points." 

Evidence of experimental biologic effectiveness of various radiations has 
been offered by many. Boche and Bishop (19l*6) reported that the LD50/30 for dogs 
exposed to 250 kvp X-radiation was 300 r and when exposed to 1000 kvp X-ray it was 
335 r. They concluded that the relative biologic effectiveness of the 1000 kvp 
beam was 0,81. On the other hand, Bond et al. (1956) found no significant 
difference in the lethal response of dogs when midline doses from 250, 1000 and 
2000 kvp X-rays were compared, the LD5O/3OS °eing 2 52, 255* and 268, respectively, 
Shively et al. (1956) found the midline tissue dose for LDjo/3p of dogs ex P osed 
to Co™ gamma radiation to be 335 r. Since this is signif ica ntly higher than 
reported LD50/3O midline doses for dogs exposed to X-rays under similar conditions, 
they concluded that the RBE ofCo 60 was # ?5 of the 250 kvp. Upton et al. (1956) 
found similar figures when Co°° gamma rays and X-rays were compared in their effect 
on mice. Kohn and Kallman (1956b) found the RBE of the 1000 kvp and 250 kvp X-ray 
in mice to be 0.839. Fuller et al. (1955), comparing the effect of 18 Mev elec- 
trons and U00 kvp X-rays on rats, concluded that the b00 kvp was 30$ more lethal 
in the WtQ range. T e suspect that the LB50/30 for swine exposed to C06O gamma, 
radiations (618 r) indicates the greater biologic effectiveness of the 1000 and 
2000 kvp X-radiation shown by Tullis et al, (1952) to have caused an LD50/3O of 
350-510 r. The difference in dose rates and depth dose were considered and may 
explain some of the observed differences. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



749 



TABLE V 
COMPARATIVE LETHALITY 07 AIR AND TISSUE DOSES OF QEFEEKENT !$&& RADIATION IN 

ANIMALS 



LDtjo Kabbits 



Energy (kvp) 



Air dose 



Tissue dose 



LDcjq Mice 



Air dose 



Tissue dose 



250 

100 
80 



805 
1332 
2525 



767 
1022 

1633 



63U 
663 

810 



$90 
617 
727 



The studies cited generally indicate a decrease in RBE as the energy of the 
radiation increases. However, the results of Bond et al. (1956) cannot be dis- 
regarded nor can we ignore the limitations of this generalization. Grahn et al. 
(1956) have pointed out that the implication of nonuniformity of depth dose 
accounting for variations in the RBE of X-rays has not been well established. 
Variations in LDjjQ of mice were found with different energies in which very 
little difference was noted in depth dose (Table V). In both species cited in 
Table V, the higher energies were most effective biologically. 

Burros were exposed to gamma radiation from 3 radionuclides, each with a 
different mean energy (Lane et al., 1956* Rust et al., 1953* 195Uc). The re- 
sults, given in Table VI, show a variation in LD50/30 Since the slower dose 
rate or the lesser depth dose of diminishing energies should have reversed the 
results we may assume that a more important factor was involved. If it were a 
physical factor, then we may assume it to be a function of linear energy trans- 
fer (LET). 

T&BLE VI 
LE1KAL RESPONSE OF BURROS TO NUCLEAR RADIATIONS 



Lethal dose (95% confidence} Rate (r/hr.) 



Source 



1'iean energy 



Co 6 ? 

Ta 182 
Zr95-Rb9$ 



1.25 

1.2O-0.18 

0.7U 



78U(7$3-8ltf) 
651(621-683) 
585(530-627) 



50 

I8-23 
19-20 



To recapitulate, the physical factors of type and quality or radiations, 
dose, dose rate, dose fractionation, and relative biological effectiveness de- 
termine the response of the mammal to radiation. In addition to these factors, 
there are physiologic factors that must be taken into consideration. 



750 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



7. Physiologic Factors 

The body size of the animal seems to have very little to do with the re- 
sponse to ionizing radiation, as a perusal of the LDeJq/^O (Table I) will indi- 
cate. The metabolic rate of species has little to do with radio-resistance al- 
though both of these factors may have slight bearing on survival of individuals* 
Sex differences in radio sensitivity have not been consistently demonstrated in 
the larger domestic animals. Mice under 15 days old survive longer than 30-day- 
old mice when irradiated but animals over 30 days old become increasingly more 
radioresistant . Mice from h$ days to a year old show little difference in re- 
sponse to radiation (Abrams, 1951; Furth and Furth, 1936; Quastler, 19U5; 
Zirkle et al., 19U6). Results of Kursh and Casarett (1955) indicate that per- 
haps the middle-age group is the more radioresistant, for older rats have a lower 
LD50/30 than ^"to^ young rats, 

"When it was found that swine may survive several times as long as burros 
while receiving the identical daily dose of gara.ia radiation (Trum, 1956), it was 
assumed by some that the fat of the swine protected in acme manner. Spiers (19u6) 
reports that because of the low effective atomic number of fat, it can account 
for a small difference in sensitivity. In the case of the swine, however, the 
acute radiation studies indicated they were more radiosensitive than the burro 
(Rust et al., 195Uc); thus the fat was not a factor involved. 

Hibernation has an effect upon the latent response to irradiation. Bie 
effect is not clear cut. Some marmots lived longer ^ien irradiated during hi- 
bernation than controls which were not hibernating. However, even hibernating 
animals irradiated with 650 to 800 r died within lh days with characteristic 
blood changes (Smith and Grenan, 1951). 

8. Biochemical Changes 

Only a few of the biochemical changes will be mentioned to show the 
possible" ramifications. The effects on pure or simplified systems, for example, 
are not to be discussed. An understanding of the biochemistry of the irradiation 
injury is the best hope for a rational and effective approach for the alleviation 
of the radiation injuries. So far, with some few exceptions, these hopes have 
not been realized. The studies made with the changes in enzymes and enzyme sys- 
tems should hold considerable promise but to date little has been accomplished. 
Feinstein (1956) lias expressed the opinion that, with rare exceptions, increases 
and decreases in enzyme activity in irradiated animals are artifacts. It must 
be emphasized, however, that any biochemical alteration must, in the final analy- 
sis, be associated \±th changes in enzymes, coenzymes, substrate, or habitat. 
Therefore, the efforts in this field must continue in spite of the present lack 
of success. 

It is only the in vivo studies which clearly point out that there are enzyme 
system disturbances following irradiation. For example, in spite of an apparent 
radioresistance the functioning of the liver in carbohydrate metabolism is cuickly 
altered. In a series of papers Lourau-Pitres and Lartigue gLourau and Lartigue, 
1950a, 1950b, 1951a, 195lb, 1952; Lourau-Pitres, 1955) show that, shortly after 
total body irradiation, there is a striking elevation of blood glucose. This is 
eventually corrected by glycogenesis and not by loss via the urine ro by catab- 
olism. Irradiation did not alter the laydown of glucose as glycogen but there 



796 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

STATEMENT OF K H. LARSON, 1 CHIEF, ENVIRONMENTAL RADIA- 
TION DIVISION, THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 

Dr. Larson. Thank you, sir. 

Gentlemen, it is indeed encouraging to note the progress that has 
been made with respect to this very complex problem of environ- 
mental contamination. From 1946 to 1959, only a few of us were in 
this field of research of radiation ecology. Since then, much has been 
learned. However, as in the case of any field of research, many pre- 
viously unrecognized problems are now ready for the effort available 
for their solutions. These and previous hearings by this subcommittee 
will contribute to the forthcoming answers. 

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I submit my prepared formal 
statement for the record. 

Eepresentative Price. Very well. 

Dr. Larson. I would like to spend the time allotted discussing 
certain highlights of the data and observations that we have made 
since. 

During the last decade the environmental radiation division has 
been involved in progressively intensified programs designed to an- 
swer one principal question, viz, "How much manmade radioactivity 
distributed in the environment can be tolerated safely by man and his 
economy?" 

The more specific objectives of our effort within this broad con- 
text include : 

1. Delineation of fallout patterns and their characteristics with 
respect to particle size through which the mechanics of fallout can 
be more accurately defined. This, in turn, leads to a comparison of 
the effects of the yield of device detonated, type of device support, and 
the relation of the detonated device to ground surfaces upon the re- 
sultant fallout radiation intensity including the residual radioactivity 
per unit surface area within the fallout pattern, 

2. A detailed study of the chemical, physical, and radiological 
characteristics of fallout debris relative to its particle size and occur- 
rence within the fallout pattern. 

3. Determination of the biological availability, rate of accumula- 
tion, and retention of the fallout debris in various native and do- 
mestic plants and animals, as well as the persistence and redistribution 
of residual contamination in the total environment. 

The data to be presented are not directly applicable to the prob- 
lems resulting from nuclear war primarily because continental testing 
has been limited to low yield devices. Further, tests have not been 



*Date and place of birth; May 7, 1915, Epworth, N. Dak. Education: B.S., University 
of North Dakota, 1937 ; M.S., University of North Dakota, 1939 ; graduate work, University 
of California, 1947-58. Work history : Chief chemist, director of research, director of 
engineering, development and chemical research, North Dakota Mill & Elevator, Grand 
Forks, N. Dak., 1939-44 ; Tests Able and Baker, Operations Crossroad^ Bikini bomb tests, 
1946 ; chemist, Crocker Radiation Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, 1946-48 ; 
chief, radiochemistry unit, atomic energy project, University of California, Los Angeles, 
1948 ; acting chief of Alamogordo section, atomic energy project, University of California, 
Los Angeles, 1949 ; chief, Alamogordo section ; field director, Nevada test site fallout 
group, atomic energy project, University of California, Los Angeles, 1951 ; chief, radio- 
ecology division : director, program 37, Nevada test site, atomic energy project, University 
of California, Los Angeles, 1952 : chief, environmental radiation division ; adviser, environ- 
mental radiation, Division of Biology and Medicine, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission ; 
director of radioecological and fallout phenomenology studies (program 37), Nevada test 
site, department and laboratories of nuclear medicine and radiation biology, University 
of California, Los Angeles, 1957^present ; associate in biophysics, department of bio- 
physics, School of Medicine, University of California, Los Angeles, 1958-present. 



800 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

to the t to the minus 1.2 relationship. A dose-rate decline with time 
according to the Plumbbob gamma decay (PGD) curve yields cal- 
culated doses which are 1.5 to 2 times greater than those calculated 
by the t to the minus 1.2 relationship from different fallout times to 
approximately 400 days 1 after shot. 

Deposition of radiostrontium in areas adjacent to Nevada Test 
Site: A balloon-mounted detonation, whose fireball intersected the soil 
surface, deposited approximately 0.13 percent of the total amount of 
St 89 produced within the area limits denned previously. Two 
balloon-mounted detonations, whose fireballs did not intersect the soil 
surface, deposited 0.004 and 0.008 percent within the above perimeters 
of the total amount of Sr 89 produced. Tower-mounted detonations 
deposited from 0.5 to 2 percent of the Sr 89 produced and from 1.6 
to 7.2 percent of the total amount of Sr. 90 produced. 

This means, then, that of the strontium produced by the detona- 
tions at Nevada, less than 10 percent remains within 200 miles. The 
90 percent is somewhere else, perhaps, in the United States, or cir- 
cling the world. 

This fractionation of strontium 89 and strontium 90 with regard 
to particle size may be predicted on the basis of the different half- 
lives of their noble gas precursors, krypton 89 and krypton 90, and 
the physics and the chemistry of the particle formation. 

Biological availability is the next section of my discussion this 
afternoon. And I will limit our figures, our statements, to that which 
we have observed out to 400 miles from NTS. 

In the undisturbed areas, the radioactive debris from fallout is con- 
fined to the surface 2 inches of the soil profile even after 9 years 
following fallout contamination. 

This particular statement is based on the observation at Alamo- 
gordo, N. Mex. . 

Representative Holifield (presiding). This is an area which has 
very little rainfall. This would not be true in an area that has con- 
siderable rainfall, would it? 

Dr. Larson*. This area has between 8 and 9 inches annual rain- 
fall. 

Representative Holifield. That is very little in comparison to the 
average. I-^imagine we will have close to 50 inches here in Wash- 
ington. 

Dr. Larso^st. That is right. . / . 

In agricultural areas under cultivation, the distribution of activity 
is found down to 'depths of 4 to 8 inches, due to plowing, harrowing, 
and other farm practices. Laboratory soil leaching experiments using 
the equivalent of 84 inches of water translocated the surface activity 
only about a half inch in the soil column. 

Representative Holifield. That is the answer right there,, then. 
Apparently even in areas where you have up to 84 inches, you only 
displace it about a half inch. 

Dr. Larson. That is right. 

Surface-deposited fallout tends to become mechanically trapped in 
the soil environment. The amount that is redistributed declines with 
time. Natura} disturbance, however, causes material to be redistrib- 
uted at levels approximating the initial contamination of medium and 
long-lived fission products. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 801 

Particles 44 to 88 microns in diameter contributed an average of 9.7 
percent of the total redistributed fallout following Priscilla (balloon) 
as compared to 21 percent following Smoky (tower) of the Plumbbob 
test series. Particles less than 44 microns in diameter contributed an 
average of 85.8 percent following Priscilla compared to 68.3 percent 
following Smoky. 

During the Plumbbob test series, it was found that the gamma radio- 
active decay measured in the field was similar to the decay of com- 
parable fallout samples measured in the laboratory. Also, the aerosol 
concentrations were similar following both Priscilla and Smoky 
despite significant differences in initial contamination. 

Forage plants are recontaminated due to redistribution of selected 
particulates. This provides a continuous source of internal emitters 
to grazing animals, and a persistent low radiation field which is de- 
pendent on the changing proportions of medium to long-lived fission 
products. During the Teapot and Plumbbob test series, it was found 
that the principal source of activity found on forage plants is due to 
particulate fallout in the less than 44 micron size fraction, that is, 
vegetation within fallout patterns out to 300 miles from Nevada Test 
Site is a "selective" particulate collector. The number of particles 
retained by the foliage is dependent upon its characteristics, such as 
hairs, glands, and other mechanical traps. 

The fallout contamination of native plant material persisted 
through the 18-day period following both Priscilla and Smoky deto- 
nations, the only change being that due to radioactive decay. 

A negligible fraction of the total contamination of the soil by fall- 
out debris from tower supported detonations was accumulated 
through the root systems of native forage crops and alfalfa and so on. 

One of our principal biological indicators in our fallout studies is 
the kangaroo rat. This is an example of one of the animals that we 
have. Another one is the antelope ground squirrel. These animals 
are abundant in any areas that w r e would care to work. 

During the 1955 test series the concentration of ra dioiodine 131 in 
t he thyroids of rab bits and other native rodents was found to be a 
f ifction of distanceT" The ma ximum concentrations were found at ap- 
proximately 60 miles-. This maximum concentration was a factor of 
two to seven tim es higher than that do cum ented at 20 miles or at 16l) 
"miles. Twelve months alter the Upshot-Knothole series,~a^umu la^ 
tion of radiostrontiu m wasaJso found to be a function~of di stance, 
"with the maxim u m bone"cjc5Tcent rati ons in rab bits at 130 miles alon g 
previously documj ^ed ffl 

Six ^n^ ^S^fteFTEe^ Teapot series in 1955, again, the radio- 
strontium in the bones of the jac krabbit s was found to be a maximum 
"at 150 miles. This was five timesHhtigher than either at 30 miles or 
at 400 miles. 

Of the several fission products accumulated in bone, 12.5 to 40 per- 
cent was accounted for in terms of radiobarium and radiostrontium by 
D plus 20 days. 



802 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Maximum tissue accumulation of biologically available fission prod- 
ucts occurs at locations corresponding to fallout times of H plus 2 to 
H plus 3 hours. Fission product concentrations then decreased with 
increasing time of f allout. In the single balloon supported detona- 
tion studied, the decrease was constant between locations correspond- 
ing to H plus 2 to H plus 12 hours. In tower supported detonations, 
however, biologically available fission product concentration tended 
to be uniform over distances corresponding to H plus 5 to H plus 14 
hours; 

For any given location the relative tissue accumulation of biologi- 
cally available fission products resulting from Priscilla and Smoky 
fallout contamination was similar with the maximum values occurring 
by D plus 7 days. 

Biological hot spots were identified geographically in the Boltzmann 
(78 miles from Ground Zero), Diablo (60 miles from Ground Zero), 
Smoky (70 miles from Ground Zero), and Shasta (172 miles from 
Ground Zero) patterns. 

This concludes my statement, sir. 

Representative Holifield. Thank you. 

Your prepared statement will appear in the record in full. 

(The statement referred to follows :) 



814 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



solubility of fallout material in water and 0.1 N hydrochloric acid (HC1). 

The fallout material from balloon -supported detonations was more 
soluble in both water and acid than that produced by other types of detonation. 
The solubility of fallout from tower-supported detonations increased with 
decreasing particle size. However, in the case of balloon- supported detonations, 
the smaller particles were somewhat less soluble than larger particles. 



Fallout Mat erial from: 
Tower shots \ Balloon shots 

Water solubility expressed as 
per cent total beta activity: 

greater than 44 micron fraction 

less than 44 micron fraction 

0.1N HC1 solubility expressed as 
per cent of total beta activity: 

greater than 44 micron fraction 

less than 44 micron fraction 



It should be noted that fallout from the underground shot, Jangle 




Series (1951) had a solubility greater than tower ^mounted detonations but less 



than balloon -mounted detonations for the particle range of less than 44 microns 



It was 5. 4 per cent soluble in water and 25 per cent soluble in 0, 1 N HC1. 



5. Radiochemical Properties of Fallout Materials: Fallout particles 



less than 44 microns had greater percentages of radiostrontium and radio- 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR "WAR 



829 



Table 1 



&T&* <fr fUKjJiflrfr 



Sr90 Levels by Fusion Analysis at Eleven Selected Areas in Nevada and Utah 



Area 



Cultivated Agricultural Areas 



Date of Collect ion, August, 1958 

Sr9Q Activity (0 - 1" Depth) 
mc/sq mi f4*c/g Ca 



Alamo, Nevada 
Moapa, Nevada 
Riverside, Nevada 
St. George, Utah 
Hurricane, Utah 
Enterprise, Utah 
Cedar City, Utah 
Vernal, Utah 



Location 



1 Jill 3 


21.3 


7.7 mi NW 


16.3 


0.1+ mi S 


22.7 


1 mi SE 


14.4 


1 mi SW 


12 A 


0.7 mi N 


7.46 


2 mi SW of Enoch 


16.7 


4 mi S 


13-8 



6.8 

2-5 
9.6 

3.5 
8,6 
U-.6 
8.7 



Virgin Undisturbed Area, Fallout Midline Locations 
Moapa, Nevada 8 mi N 

Elgin, Nevada 3,5 mi SW 

St. George, Utah 5 ^i ft 

Enterprise, Utah 9 ^ii K 



Panguitch, Utah 



Sunnys ide , Utah 



City limit, NW 
corner 

3.1 mi S of 
Columbia, Utah 



142 

114 
45.6 
41.2 

3^9 
67.2 



38.3 

140 
406 
51.2 

14*9 

202 



830 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

in the chemical composition of the soils as the organic matter decomposed.* 

The addition of lime (CaC03) and gypsum (CaSO^) to acidic soils low in 



, . _ 



native Ca reduced Sr uptake by plants. Greatest inhibition occurred at 



treatment levels equivalent to from 2 to 5 tons per acre. At these levels 



90 
CaCOg reduced Sr uptake about 60 per cent; CaS04 caused an 80 $er cent 

reduction „ These Ca amendments to the soil had little or no influence on 



QO 

the uptake of Sr™ from neutral and alkaline soils 



1 37 
The uptake of Cs occurring as a contaminant increased as the K 



concentration in the soil was reduced by prolonged cropping. The addition 



of K to contaminated soils low in potassium content reduced the uptake of 



137 
Cs by plants 



These radioecological studies have clearly revealed that (1) biological 
effect (or hazard) cannot be realistically assessed on the basis of measurement 
of only the gamma radiation field. Fission products from radioactive debris 
produced by man dan be assimilated by animals with the maximum degree of 
accumulation not necessarily near the source of the nuclear reaction. Further, 
within a distance of 400 miles from the Nevada Test Site, the plant foliage is 
a selective particle collector. There has been no significant accumulation of 
activity through the root system. (2) Biological availability of fallout debris 



is strongly influenced by the conditions of contamination and by the physical and 



chemical nature of the contaminating material and its interaction with 

89 
environmental factors. (3) Within 200 mile s from the Nevada Test Site Sr 

and Sr^ are estimated to be less than 10 per cent of the total theoretical Sr 



and Sr 90 generated by all detonations at the Nevada Test Site since the Ranger 

Test series - ffacHoNfrT^ ^ s*$iA • ir/ 



832 EFFECTS OF NTJCLEAR WAR 

STATEMENT OF JOHN N. WOLFE, 1 CHIEF, ENVIRONMENTAL 
SCIENCES BRANCH, DIVISION OF BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE, U.S. 
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 

Dr. Wolfe. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a 
rather considerable privilege to appear before your group, because I 
may be perhaps the only ecologist that has ever been in here, although 
you have received a considerable amount of ecological testimony from 
time to time. 

Representative Durham. I think you are the first. 

Dr. Woufe. I do not know whether any of the other witnesses would 
want to be called ecologists. 

What I have to talk about is the long-time effects of nuclear war. 
And ecologically, this is very difficult to assess. 

In the first place, I am talking in terms of broad general landscape 
processes, such as erosion, fire, and all the other processes that go to 
make the landscape. In the second place, I am talking about things 
for which we have no experimental data. 

Our detonations, first of all, were on the desert, and if I remember 
the map not many of your devices will be dropped on the desert. In 
the second place, where we have the opportunity to study the biology 
of a region or an area most significantly from a human relations view- 
point there have been no nuclear detonations, that is, in any humid 
region, such as the deciduous forest region of eastern North America. 

In the third place, there has never been an opportunity to totally 
survey, from a biological point of view, a landscape or a seascape prior 
to a detonation. 

Our evaluations have had, therefore, to come from the studies after- 
ward, not knowing what ground zero is biologically. 

Therefore, it is only possible to paint a picture in broad strokes. Per- 
haps it is only possible to raise questions that would put us in some 
perspective as to the kinds of things that w T e w r ould be concerned with. 

Vicissitudes of the environment and long-time processes such as 
mountain building, erosion, emergence, and submergence of the land, 
fire, climatic fluctuations, and glaciation, have all played a role in the 
history of the biota of this continent. Included in that list would be 
vulcanisms (volcanoes) . And life has managed to survive. 

It therefore would appear to me that even in any kind of nuclear 
war, there would be survival of life. And what the condition of 
man would be, I am not able to predict, and leave that for others. 
But there would not be complete obliteration. Even in local areas, 
there would be readvancement of living things. 

I think that even the radiation effects which have been described 
here by more competent people than I am in this field, as in the past, 
would perhaps result in the survival of the fittest, the elimination of 



1 Date of birth : Dec. 2, 1910, Logan, Hocking County, Ohio, Education : B.A. 1933, 
M. Sc. 1934, Ph. D. 1937, the Ohio State University. Experience : Instructor, Ohio State 
University, 1937-43, ecological research and teaching freshman botany, floristics, field 
ecology ; assistant professor, 1944-47 ; associate professor, 1948-53 ; research in vegeta- 
tion, vegetational history, bioclimatology ; graduate student program in ecology (8 Ph. D.'s, 
13 M. Sc.'s) : teaching plant ecology, botanical exploration in Mexico, Greenland, and 
eastern North America. Professor, 1954 — ■; ecologist, division of biology and medi- 
cine, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1955-56. At Ohio State University, 1957. Affilia- 
tions: Ecological Society of America, Botanical Society of America, Sigma Xi, American 
Association tor the Advancement of Science, American Institute of Biological Sciences, 
associate editor (Ecological Monographs), "American Men of Science." 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 839 

That would be my judgment on it, and I am certainly not equipped 
professionally to substantiate that, except from the volumes of 
testimony. 

Dr. Wolfe. I thought I would have less trouble with that state- 
ment than any of the ones I have made. You can strike that one 
out. The principle is more important. 

Representative Hosmee. It might be our confusion on the point 
where somebody had been exposed to radiation, that it is like a dis- 
ease, to be passed on. That is simply not true. You do not have 
to be worried about someone catching radiation from one who has 
been exposed. 

Dr. Wolfe. I did not mean to imply that. 

Representative Holifield. Proceed, Doctor. 

Dr. Wolfe. I visualize those people unsheltered in heavy fallout 
areas after 3 months, to be dead, dying, sick, or helpless; those shel- 
t ered, if they can psychologically withstand confinement for that 
period, to emerge toa strange landscape. 1'ne sun will shine through 
a dust-ta den atmosphere, the landt&ape in mid- January would be 
snow -covered or blackened by tire m a mosaic. 1 do not mean it will 
nt>e snow or black. There would be a mosaic of burned areas. 

At higher latitudes blizzards and subzero temperatures would add 
death and discomfort ; botlTf ood and shelter would be inade quate ancT 
pi 'oduc tion incapacitatedr " 

In Dr. Keitemeier's remarks, he seemed to think that the harvest 
would mostly be over and the foodstuffs put away. As I gather, this 
attack is not going to be announced, if it becomes reality, and a lot 
of food would not be put away, and would be lost by fire. 

Representative Holifield. I think he was depending on the time 
of the year. October 18th is a date by which much of the hay and 
wheat and barley and oats have been harvested. That was his refer- 
ence to that. Any left out in the open would be subject to fife and 
contamination, certainly, even though it had been harvested, if it 
were in stacks. 

Dr. Wolfe. It was a minor point. 

Representative Holifield. But I think y our reference there to "the 
sun will shine throu gh a dust-laden atmosphere^ is very correct. And 
I am iyohiff to ask Colonel Lunger to state what happened jji the 
Mike shot. 

You'were^there, Colonel Lunger, and participated in that test. 

Colon el Lung er. I think th e chairman is referring to the time when 

we detonated th'e^r lr^ ^theTmo nnclear device^rTl^JLMl^^^ very 

clearly we fired from afloat, it was the first time in t he histo ry— of 

^test operations that we had to go afl oatT^We shot earlyin the morn^ 

in g and the entire task force was~stea mmg north ana^utIT"trying 

ToAeep~ olnr_fro m under the local fallout. Late in the e vening of 

shot da y I remember w e wereTn the waM "fo^^^et^ti^^our first hot 

meal,^ahd they'came down and told us t here wa s a phenomenon on 

deck we should see. It was jus t abou t sundown. We got on deck, 

and there was an am ber glow along t he entire horizon. It was the 

Ihost artificial thmjTl have ev er s een a n oT^ el i^or m_my"lifer" We had 

displaced many millio ns of_tpn s of coral debris that had been lifted 

up to forty and fifty_tjiousand feet by t he blast. The crater formed 

' by the detonation was approxfmately lSFTeeF^eepn^li mile anoTiT 



840 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

quarter across. You can visualize the displaceme nt. This phenom^ 
gnon jvas caused by t hTdTffusTon of light t'hrouglTThe^par ticles in the 
^mospnere. Keep in mind too it wa s a oTetMaTion ot only about 10 
megatonSs.^^ 
— So the picture that Dr. Wolfe has presented here is very real. 

When you multiply this phenomenon I have described by approxi- 
mately 200 weapons in this hypothetical attack, it would be a psycho- 
logically unreal world for quite a period after the attack. 

Dr. -Wolfe. I thought somebody would disagree with that. 

Representative Holifield. Well, you see, you were nearer right 
than you thought. 

Dr. Wolfe. I told you at the start that this was difficult of assess- 
ment. 

Come then spring floods, and soon after, adding measurably to 
the disrupted pattern of human existence, are the weather events 
such as hurricane and tornado, for which there is no defense, and 
after which there will be little aid. 

Perhaps we have dwelled too long on the immediate effects, but it is 
these that trigger the longtime processes that result in environmental 
changes of long duration — and therefore changes in the biotic com- 
position of communities that can live under these changed conditions. 

But as I suggested at the outset, long-term ecological effects of 
nuclear war are difficult to assess, however, with the advent of that 
first spring, I would assume the beginnings of a gradual return to 
equilibrium of the biological environment. I would anticipate that 
in springs and summers in the decades that follow biotic succession 
would continue, leading to full ecological recovery. 

The role of North American man in this long-term view of environ- 
ment — his nationality, genetic constitution, psychological makeup, and 
creative potential, 3, 10, or 100 generations later, I leave for others 
to predict. 

Representative Holifield. Thank you very much. 

This was our last witness for today. The morning session tomorrow 
will be opened with a presentation of detailed casualty estimates by 
target area. Testimony will be given by Mr. Eugene Quindlen of the 
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. 

Dr. Willard Libby, Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commis- 
sion, will discuss emergency protection measures. 

Mr. Herman Kahn of the Institute of International Studies of 
Princeton University will make a presentation on the major implica- 
tions of these hearings. 

And following this, a panel, the members of which will be an- 
nounced later, will discuss these implications. That will close the 
hearings. 

The meeting is adjourned. 

(Dr. Wolfe's prepared statement follows :) 

Longtime Ecological Effects of Nuclear War 

John N. Wolfe, Chief, Environmental Science Branch, Division of Biology and 

Medicine, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 

ABSTRACT 

The longtime ecological effects of nuclear war are nearly impossible to assess 
and even difficult to speculate about. One can only think in terms of major 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 841 

ecological factors that would be intensified or triggered, and follow the chain 
of cause and effect to some plausible ultimate set of environmental conditions. 
Bather than a catalog of effects, only a general picture can be painted, and that 
in broad strokes. 

The obliteration of life in all its forms in continental areas is almost incon- 
ceivable and the ultimate recovery of the landscape would be certain in some 
pattern, probably not unlike the primeval distributions of forest, woodland, 
desert, and grassland on this continent. 

Let us begin with the impressive facts that life in North America and in the 
adjacent seas has undergone a considerable array of environmental changes 
since biotic beginnings. Submergence and emergence of the land masses, ero- 
sion to base level, mountainbuilding, multiple climatic fluctuations, glaciation, 
not to mention invasion by the Europeans are major examples. All of these 
processes are still in operation. 

Nuclear war, as it is possible for me to visualize it within my limitations, 
would scarcely match the effects of these processes on life in the total picture — 
although landscape recovery in some areas might be in terms of decades or 
centuries. 

Even radiation effects on genetic systems might be considered in the long 
run to result in only the elimination of the unfit — i.e., the organisms' (bio types) 
unfit for the environment brought about by this kind of environmental modi- 
fications. 

However, omitting consideration of radiation for the present, widespread 
damage due to the thermal and blast components of the bomb would occur in 
many kinds of biotic systems. 

Fire, for example in the dry season of mid-October, would spread over enor- 
mous areas of dry western coniferous forests and in the grasslands, with con- 
comitant destruction of natural living resources and their habitats. It is most 
likely, in my opinion, that these fires would go unchecked until quenched by the 
winter snows, spreading over hundreds of thousands of square miles. In east- 
ern United States, the dry oak and pine forests of the Blue Ridge and Appala- 
chians from New England to Virginia, adjacent to multiple detonations, would 
undergo a like fate, as well as the pine on the southern Atlantic and Gulf 
Coastal Plains. In the agricultural land of the Mississippi Valley, with the 
crops harvested, fire is likely to be more local, less severe, but widespread. Add 
to this denuding effects of radiation and/or chemically toxic materials. 

With the coming of spring thaws, especially in the mountains, melt water 
from the mountain glaciers and snowfields would erode the denuded slopes, 
flood the valleys, in time rendering them uninhabitable and unexploitable for 
decades or longer. Removal of the turf by fire and erosion on plains and prairie 
would result in uncheckable erosion by wind, with subsequent expansion of 
present "dust bowls" and creation of new ones of wide extent. Emergency over- 
grazing, and cultivation (if there were those to work) would wreak further 
havoc. 

This seems a simple concept but the effects are indescribable in their im- 
mediate implications, almost incalculable in their lingering results before 
ecological processes attain ascendancy and begin the long march back to equilib- 
rium. It would be almost ludicrous to assess present losses of natural living 
resources resulting from cigarette butts and camp fires against those that would 
be generated by surface-detonated nuclear devices, the latter augmented by 
absence of any effort of control. 

Along with fire, flood, and erosion, which would also decrease productivity 
of the landscape or render it inaccessible to people in uncontaminated refugia, 
would come intensification of disease, plant and animal, including man. More- 
over, Jjitlu^lejssjn^ of deletenomsjmimals, especially 
insectK wouict jmove in— a Yurthe r de^i menTlo f ooprTTrod ucjionjaj^^ 
turtner to its unavai la bility to '^ul*v jvin^_people. 

Man's access to succor through Tiospitalization, treatment, communications, 
etc., would be meager, and thus the inroads of starvation would be accentuated 
by increased incidence and intensity of disease. 

The immediate physical effects (other than radiation) could be particularly 
catastrophic in such areas as the Los Angeles watershed, where the city is almost 
surrounded by vegetation susceptible to the inroads of fire. Those islands rela- 
tively free of radioactivity in the early stages would be increasingly contaminated 
as well by redistribution of radioactive materials by wind, water, biotic migration, 
and precipitation. Radiation effects are more adequately described elsewhere, 



842 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

but it seems necessary to point out that in a dynamic environment, no area can 
be regarded as completely isolated from contamination. Indeed animals that 
are able to move into the "clean" areas will be contaminated survivors from 
adjacent areas, and probably (both wild and domesticated) will be unfit for 
human food. 

I visualize those people unsheltered in heavy fallout areas after three months, 
to be dead, dying, sick, or helpless those sheltered, if they can psychologically 
withstand confinement for that period to emerge to a strange landscape. The 
sun will shine through a dust-laden atmosphere, the landscape in mid-January 
would be snow-covered or blackened by fire; at higher latitudes blizzards and 
subzero temperatures would add death and discomfort; both food and shelter 
would be inadequate and production incapacitated. Come then spring floods, 
and soon after, adding measurably to the disrupted pattern of human existence, 
are the weather events such as hurricane and tornado, for which there is no 
defense, and after which there will be little aid. 

Perhaps we have dwelled too long on the immediate effects, but it is these that 
trigger the long-time processes that result in environmental changes of long 
duration and therefore changes in the biotic composition of communities that 
can live under these changed conditions. 

But as I suggested at the outset, long-term ecological effects of nuclear war 
are difficult to assess, however, with the advent of that first spring, I would 
assume the beginnings of a gradual return to equilibrium of the biological en- 
vironment. I would anticipate that in springs and summers in the decades that 
follow biotic succession would continue, leading to full ecological recovery. 

The role of North American man in this long-term view of environment — his 
nationality, genetic constitution, psychological makeup, and creative potential, 
3, 10, or 100 generations later, I leave for others to predict. 

(Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., Thursday, June 25, 1959, the hearing 
was adjourned', to reconvene Friday, June 26, 1959, at 10 a.m.) 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



847 



Table 1. — Effects on individual 'metropolitan areas — Continued 

[In thousands] 



Target area and weapons 


Number 
of people 

in 

attacked 

areas 1 


Number 

killed 

1st day 


Number 
fatally 
injured 


Number 

surviving 

injured 


1 3-, 1 1-megaton weapon each: 

Bridgeport - 


504 
283 
246 
234 
219 
271 
287 
337 
235 
546 
250 
256 
205 
342 
230 
284 
355 
222 
269 
547 


105 
84 
85 
73 
54 
77 

124 

112 
54 

192 
84 
72 
84 
89 
41 

107 
59 
78 
77 

128 


84 
59 
77 
53 
42 
46 
66 

106 
51 

138 
54 
66 
53 
68 
80 
60 
58 
75 
76 

151 


54 


Canton -- 


42 


Chattanooga^- 


29 




53 


Erie - --- - -- -- 


42 


Flint - 


39 


Grand Rapids 


21 




38 


Lancaster __ _ - 


49 


New Haven (Waterbury) 


95 




28 




60 


South Bend ... 


34 




73 


Trenton 


97 


Utica-Rome 


2 


Wheeling . - 


46 


Wichita, * - - 


38 


Wilmington - - 


67 


Worcester - - 


97 






Subtotal. . 


6, 122 


1,779 


1,463 


1,004 






1 1-megaton weapon each: 

Binghamton 


185 
161 
184 
191 

152 

203 


58 
60 
69 
28 

42 

46 


32 
34 
41 
19 

25 

31 


17 


Evansville - - -- - 


23 


Fort Wayne - _ _ _. 


23 


Greensboro - - --- 


32 


New Britain (included with Hartford). 


25 


Waterbury (included with New Haven). 

York _-- _ 


17 






Subtotal 


1,076 


303 


182 


137 






City target area total — ------ 


68,460 
82, 239 


18, 556 
1,095 


16, 825 
5,354 


11,009 




6,182 






Grand total 


150, 699 


19, 651 


22, 179 


17, 191 







1950 population figures. 



13% 15% 11% 



Representative Holifield. In the case of those fatally injured, did 
you compute the time between injury and death ? 

Mr. Quindlen. These would be those dying within 60 days, sir. 

The number killed the first day was by far the heaviest in New 
York City with 3,364,000 killed in the first 24-hour period and an 
additional 2,634,000 fatally injured. Chicago, on the other hand, had 
545,000 killed and 447,000 fatally injured. 

There is a very important point here which I want to emphasize and 
I will use this second table to do it. This attack resulted in consider- 
able variation from city to city. In Boston, for example, 75 percent 
of the persons living in the area were killed, while in Chicago the 
figure was only 18 percent. In Chicago about 70 percent of the people 
were not injured at all and an additional 12 percent were injured but 
will survive. Let us look at Los Angeles. Sixty-five percent of the 
people in the area would eventually die from this attack, but most of 
these would not die immediately. This is a substantially different 
picture from that for some of the other large cities. 



848 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



Table 2. — Comparison of attack effects on 12 largest metropolitan areas 



Target area and weapons 



2 10-megaton weapons each: 

Boston. --- 

Chicago 

Detroit 

Los Angeles 

New York City 

Philadelphia 

1 10- 1 8-megaton weapons each: 

Baltimore 

Cleveland 

Pittsburgh 

St. Louis 

San Francisco 

Washington, D.C 



Total. 



Percent 


Percent 


Percent 


killed first 


fatally 


surviving 


day 


injured 


injured 


37 


38 


16 


10 


8 


12 


27 


20 


18 


16 


49 


19 


27 


20 


18 


35 


27 


21 


44 


35 


13 


27 


20 


22 


27 


30 


2 


44 


29 


12 


33 


34 


13 


39 


30 


16 


27 


26 


16 



Percent 

uninjured 



9 
70 
35 
16 
35 
17 

8 
21 
41 
15 
20 
15 

31 



Mr, Quindlen. Going down to the second group of cities, we notice 
that Cleveland did not sustain, for example, nearly as devastating 
an attack as did Baltimore. The point we should emphasize here is 
that this is the result for this particular attack with these weapons on 
this day, which happens to be a typical mid-October day. A variation 
even in wind patterns could affect these casualty figures. A different 
attack pattern, the failure of enemy aircraft, interceptions by our 
active defenses and many other factors could result in an individual 
city being spared or being less heavily damaged than this material 
indicates. 

Representative Durham. What are some of the reasons for that 
differential? Could you be specific? 

Mr. Quindlen. The reason primarily is that in any delivery of this 
sort, in any attack by air or by missile, there are many chance factors — 
the question of whether particular aircraft keep running during the 
attack, whether there is engine failure, the effect of our active defenses, 
and this matter of random bombing error. 

Representative Durham. Did you try to calculate it on the basis of 
our active defense against these missiles ? 

Mr. Quindlen. No, sir. We did not. But we do want to make the 
point that if we took this attack pattern and had a different wind 
pattern along, or we applied a second time the random bombing error, 
a weapon which landed on the north side of a city might land on the 
south side of a city, and this could result in a different number of 
deaths and a different number of injuries. 

Representative Price. I think you told the chairman you are going 
to be specific, now, on why the situation at Chicago is as you computed 
in your table, here. In other words, you have been general about 
what could affect the situation. But in your computation, what did 
you do as to the basis for the difference ? 

Mr. Quindlen. I will give you the specific information, Mr. Price, 
as to where the Chicago weapon landed as compared to where the 
New York weapons landed. 

Representative Holifield. I can understand your reasoning, that 
there would be different effects if there w T ere different wind paths. 
But I would like for Colonel Lunger to question you on some of the 
things you have said. It seems to me some things need clarification. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 857 

have made an honest and earnest attempt to be responsive to the com- 
mittee's request. Such variables as do exist in these formulas, and in 
the differences in population — are understandable. This can be taken 
into consideration by people who wish to pare this down to finer 
detail. 

(The following statement was subsequently submitted by Mr. 
Quindlen:) 

I. Method of Casualty Computation in NDAC Damage Assessment Program 

In computing casualties from a hypothetical nuclear attack on the United 
States, the National Damage Assessment Center computer program assigns each 
person in the Nation to one of a set of standard locations. 1 These standard 
locations vary in size from census tracts only a few blocks long in the large 
cities, through minor civil divisions in the suburbs, to whole counties in sparsely 
settled areas. To make the computation manageable, even with a high-speed 
computer, it is necessary to suppose that the entire population of each standard 
location is concentrated at a central point. Since the standard locations are 
small in the densely populated areas, this generalization is not regarded as a 
source of significant error. 

Computation of the casualty percentage from direct effects (blast thermal, and 
direct radiation) is based on the distance from the center of the standard loca- 
tion to the nearest ground zero. The distance associated with a given casualty 
probability is scaled according to the cube root of the yield. 2 The case where 
several weapons affect a standard location is handled by applying the largest of 
the casualty probability percentages caused by any of those weapons. The cas- 
ualty percentage tables Are basedj3_njhe Hiroshima-Nagasaki data/ * Percentages 
of mortalities and of nonmortal casualties are computed. "~7v2xS£££^*r#<W £ 

Another phase of the program computes the probable fallout dose at points 
on the map chosen so that no standard location is more than a mile and a half 
from a reading. The locations and yields of the weapons and the speed and 
direction of the winds are taken into account. The basic pattern of fallout 
distribution is taken to be a semicircle upwind and a half an ellipse downwind, 
with slight distortion from the effect of wind shear at low wind speeds. The 
downwind distance is scaled directly with the speed of the wind, and the amount 
of radioactive material is kept constant by dividing the dose rates by this wind 
scaling factor. Thus as wind speeds increase the contours grow longer and 
narrower, and the maximum dose rate in the pattern is reduced. For weapons 
of different yields, the size of the pattern is scaled according to cloud diameters.* 
This fallout contour model was developed with the advice and assistance of Dr. 
Lester Machta and Mr. Leo Quenneville, the special projects branch of the U.S. 
Weather Bureau. The lengths and areas of the contours, and hence the amount 
of radioactive material distributed, are those developed by the Physical Vul- 
nerability Division, Director of Targets, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, 
Headquarters U.S: Air Force. 5 The doses from all weapons near enough to 
affect a point are added together. 

The percentages of the population killed and made ill by the fallout dose are 
computed, taking into account the shielding of the homes, basements, and other 
places where the people might take cover. 6 The table of residual factors and 
poplulation distribution used in the June 3, 1959, computations for the Holifield 
committee were based on estimates by Mr. Gallagher and Mr. Horton of OCDM 
of the best protection that might be afforded by moving people into the available 
structures offering the best protection from radiation. The fallout casualty 
percentage are computed from the effective biological dose, a concept taking 



1 "National Location Code." Prepared for Federal Civil Defense Administration by 
Stanford Research Institute. January 1956. 

3 "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons." Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 39-3. May 
1957 : p. 96. 

3 "Vulnerability Functions for Civil JDgfgnge Damage Assessment Program." Prepared 
ror t eaer al tjivu Juerense*~3ffnOTtsTfatibn by Stanford Research Institute, April 1956 ; 

~PP-.-^JL 16-20. Secret. ""~" " ~""~ = " —————— 

4 "Close-Tn "Fallout!" W. W. Kellogg, R, R. Rapp, and S. M. Greenfield. Journal of 
Meteorology. February 1957. 

5 "Nuclear Weapons Employment Handbook." Air Force Manual 200-8. HQUSAF ; 
pp. 101-108. 

a "Effects of Nuclear Weapons," pp. 470-477. "Nuclear Weapons Employment Hand- 
book," p. 125. 



858 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

into account the ability of the body to recover from some of the radiation to 
which it is exposed. This dose was defined by a committee of leading radi- 
ologists meeting under OCDM auspices on February 20, 1959. 

The direct effects mortalities are computed first, then the fallout mortality 
rate is applied to those surviving. In this way the program avoids counting 
the same fatality twice. The same procedure is then followed for the nonmortal 
casualties from direct effects and from fallout. 

II. — The second question related to the average radiation dose to D+90 days. 
The average for all survivors was 110 roentgens, while the average for non- 
injured survivors was 60 roentgens. 

Representative Durham. Mr. Chairman, I want to express my ap- 
preciation, and I think the country at large should appreciate the fine 
work you people have done in trying to educate the public. 

I would like to ask whether or not we should continue to do some- 
thing like this on a yearly basis, to try to further bring to the public 
the important thing that we face. Do you think it should be done 
annually T semiannually, or how often ? 

Mr. Quikdlen. Sir, I think that the people of the United States cer- 
tainly at least annually would benefit by having the attention of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives devoted to this as a recogni- 
tion of the importance and of the facts of life which are here present; 
and that this is not a scare business but that this is a realistic problem 
to which all of us must devote a good amount of attention. 

Representative Durham. That is exactly what this committee has 
endeavored to do from the beginnings of the first radiation hearings 
all the way through, to put the facts in print so that the people can 
know what is before them. 

Representative Holifield. Mr. Quindlen, many of the members of 
this committee, all of them I would say, have borne a very heavy bur- 
den of responsibility in carrying figures like these and similar ones in 
our heads for a long time. Many of us feel it is time for the American 
people to help bear the burden of responsibility of the kind of world 
we live in and try to help solve the problems. They are difficult prob- 
lems. Maybe there are no solutions. But the composite understand- 
ing of the American people, it seems to me, is an adequate source of 
intellectual resource to solve almost any problem, provided we are 
given an opportunity. 

Mr. Quindlen. Sir, as I indicated in my first presentation on Mon- 
day morning, it is our firm conviction that if the public is fully in- 
formed, it will take the necessary action. This has been demonstrated 
many, many times in our history. 

Representative Holifield. Thank you. 



882 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Kepresentative Holifield. Now, we are going to change our order 
of witnesses a little. 

We have just received a phone call on Dr. Libby's airplane. It is 
en route between New York City and Washington Airport. So we 
are going to move up Mr. Herman Kahn, Center of International 
Studies, Princeton University, who presently is on leave from the 
Rand Corp. Mr. Kahn is a distinguished lecturer and educator and 
a student of this problem. He is one of the real experts of the Rand 
Corp., which has done many studies for the military departments. 

If I could get Mr. Kahn not to talk as fast as he usually does, maybe 
we can follow him. 

STATEMENT OF HERMAN KAHN, 1 CENTER OP INTERNATIONAL 

STUDIES, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY 

Mr. Kahn. I will do my best. 

Representative Hosmer. I think, Mr. Chairman, that Mr. Kahn and 
the people who have worked with him have given this subject the 
closest scrutiny that it has ever been given. I think we are fortunate 
indeed to have him before us. 

Mr. Kahn. Thank you very much. 

Representative Holifield. I notice that you have been here every_ 
day. _ You have" seen, a congressionarcommittee inltction over a lon g 
periocTof time now. 1 think you have a concept now of the laborious 
method by which we put things on recorcL 

Mr. Kahn. I am impressed with how fast yo u do it. We spent a 
year and a half; and you have covered about the~sa mg ground in 4T 
aavs of testimony?"" ~ " "" 

Representative Holifield. You see, you folks are not as expert as 
the committee. 

Mr. Kahn. I would like to make it clear that I am appearing here 
as an individual. While many of the points I make will be based on 
work I and my colleagues have done at the Rand Corp. in 1957 and 
further work done at the university, the formulation, presentation, 
and opinions are my own. Because of the controversial nature of 
some of my remarks, it is ver^ important to make this very clear. 

I recently had occasion to give three lectures on thermonuclear war 
in New York City. One member of this committee and several mem- 
bers of the staff atten ded these lectures. 1 have been aske d to sum-" 
mari ze those aspects of ffie"lectures which would be most appropria te 
to the function of this committee and in light of the testimony that" 
has been hearcL , 

"TKeTectures were long. They took about 7 hours to give and there 
were about 4 hours of discussion available to amplify the remarks I 
made. And, on the whole, the audience was an expert audience. The 
reason for emphasizing these points is that I am going to have to be 
very light today ; some of v the things I will say need many qualifica- 
tions, but for the sake of continuity of discussion and for the sake of 
just moving along, I will not be able to make all of these qualifica- 



1 Undergraduate work at UCLA., graduate work at California Institute of Technology. 
With Rand Corp. for 10 years, November 1958 to present. On leave of absence since 
January 1959 and now with Center of International Study, Princeton University. Was a 
consultant to the Gait her Committee : Scientific Advisory Board of the Air Force ; Techni- 
cal Advisory Board, ABC ; Office of Civil Defense Mobilization. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 883 

tions. This inevitably leads to misunderstandings but given the con- 
straints of time this cannot be helped. 

Let me start by making some remarks about quantitative computa- 
tions. The most important reason for being quantitative is because 
one may, in fact, be able to calculate what is happening. Many of the 
witnesses have emphasized the uncertainties of thermonuclear war but 
if we had raised Napoleon fro mth e dead, and had him listen to these 
Tiearings he would have been impressed with the exact opP9gfteno^ 
tion; he jwouloLjiave been impr essed wT tFT the relevance of quantity 
ti ve calculations; impressed, with the accurac y^ wi th which people pre-" 
"diet what a nuclear war is like.. One could not hav ejJ Bplied the prin- 
"ciplefi of physics, e ngine ering and biology to an ""Indian_war._ In other 
words, when one drops a bomb with a certain yiekt and CEP one can 
then say : "These cities will be destroyed, these bases will be put out of 
commission, and so on with at least moderate reliability. In par- 
ticular, one can have reasonably good lower estimates of the damage. 

This is of some real interest; before World War II, for example, 
" many of the staffs engaged in estimating the effects of bombing over- 
-estimated by large amounts. This was one of the mam reasons that 
at the Munich Confere nce and earlier ^ occasions theJB rjtish and the 
Fre nch cho se appeasement to Lstanding^ ffirnxOT_fighting. Incidentally^ 
TH^e~staff calcuIaSons were more lurid than the w or^jmjy^nations 
of ficti on. _ 

In our case, when we say a building falls down, it very likely does. 
When we say a person is killed with a thousand roentgens, he very 
likely does die. Our calculations are more likely to be underestimates 
than overestimates since the effects we have overlooked are obviously 
not in the calculations. This means that the picture of horror that is 
painted of a war today is in some sense reliable. It really may happen 
as described. 

On the other hand, one can still overestimate the horror. I would 
like to associate myself with the spirit of the last witness' testimony 
in emphasizing the importance of a nation surviving, and of looking 
at what survives in addition to what is destroyed. I do not like his 
analogy of the handicapped individual, because that gives the feeling 
of being crippled for the rest of one's life. One never really recovers 
from a handicap such as the loss of an arm. One can only adapt to 
the loss and live with it. This is, in fact, the picture most people have 
of a thermonuclear war — of a sort of permanent setback, if not a form 
of annihilation. I also would like to point out this is an expert pic- 
ture, just as in World War II, but more so. Most of the experts, 
whose duty it is to plan for wars or who write about the subject, do 
have a picture of a war which is even more lurid, than that which has 
been painted in the last 4 or 5 days. 

It is because of the enormous impact that the introduction of 
thermonuclear weapons has had on people's notions of what a war 
is like, that one has had the extreme, I might say almost 100 percent, 
dependence on the theory of deterrence. Thishas been coupled with 
an unwillingn ess LJjmd__an inability, a psyeTToToj^car in abilityT To^^ 
jyzjnvhaQS^ has^o~Her^nd[ 

on somethin g workinj^one_cann^ 

assumpti^niTT ^w^Mjfe too disturTnn^ if one did, too (HsturHng 
for oursel ves and for our alBes^if we raised questions that shocS^ur 
faith. in the notionsf" ~~~ ~~* 



884 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

In my testimony today, I am going to comment not only on the 
testimony given to the committee, but on the expectations raised 
by this testimony and some of the qualifications that should be made 
on these expectations. that might affect our actions, our allies' actions, 
and Soviet actions, and equally important, how the various ways in 
which a war could start would affect the kinds of calculations we 
make here today. That is, the calculations that have been presented, 
as has been emphasized, are a sort of average calculation, an average 
which, in fact, would probably never occur. If one only had to 
make one calculation, this is the kind one would make, it is the kind 
we have made in the past. It is worth noting tha„t these calculations 
are very similar to those the Rand Corp. did about 2 years ago, and 
that they were made independently. That is, the committee drew 
up the attack without any reference to what the Rand Corp. had 

done. 

So I am not trying to say that the assumptions are bad ones to 
use. I am saying they are bad assumptions as far as predicting what 
will happen m any actual case. Not only in the sense of statistical 
variation, but in the sense that any particular attack pattern is likely 
to be drastically different from the one that has been used. It will 
be either worse, or better. And it is very important to understand 
when it will be worse and when it will be better. 

Representative Holifield. This has been brought out time and 
again. This is a study, and we are not saying it will happen this 
way, and it might be either larger or it might be smaller. 

Mr. Kahn. The other reason for using quantitative calculati ojisas^ 
because one may want to communicate reasonably ^3£ a ^j^__^g^ 

"situation its elf may not alfowlSucE^pr^isi^ in the analysis, (to . 

— maTiite rally not be able to predic tjv hat will ha ppen, but still iiaE&_. 
strong " feeli ngs about wnat jnayjmp pen, and wish to communic ate^ 

"tfes^eelmg^ It is h otj roryusef of in such co mmunication .to Mgse_. 

— er ords lik rioTal desTructio n^ mihilatin^rretaliation, end o f civi li- 

-zation ;~anci so on. »uc li^wOT2Sjggul d be appr opriate rTWe taj gejT 
system were overdesTroye d ^r one has k illed a mah~b y~an a pproxi- 

-TMfe factor of five, nora^^S^^^w^ffi^gli]^^ or item J^eadT 
is dead. But m ■ soSTis one does not overkill the target system, as„ 

""■"soonaTittT^^ 

—S uTviyTtnH^ I h ope to^ explain what I mean 
^W ^nTo, sigriificanT^wiv 55 — th en on gjnust be a little more prec iseon,, 
o'ne 7 s~statenients. It is true~Ehat"some of the Wds oLd^truction 

^gg^^g^^ ^^ung^g^gr TCrTO^^g^^_js_^_uji^ 

limite d. These are quite different rem arks. 

'I would like mwtolu^^ to my using a 

debating trick which I have found very useful in the past to illus- 
trate a very important point. m 

The reason I have to use a debating trick is very simple. It is 
difficult in a period of a short hearing, even hearings of 4 days, to 
get people to take these problems seriously, and to do it one has to 
trick them a little bit. 

Let me give you a history of this debating trick, and you will see 

exactly what I mean. 

I had occasion recently to attent a conference on NATO problems 
at Princeton University. We had both Europeans and Americans 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 885 

present. Some of the Europeans raised the question : Would Amer- 
ican aid be on the way if the Russians seriously challenged us? 
Would we live up to our alliance obligations ? 

Using quantitative statements — particularly if they are presented 
in a detached and objective manner — has another disadvantage. It 
sometimes gives an impression of almost incredible callousness. In 
some ways this may be to the good. If you want a detached and ob- 
jective analysis, then you probably have to do it in a detached and 
objective manner. This doesn't, of course, imply that you approve 
of the subject being analyzed — only that you think it is important to 
understand it. For example if one says that it is not true that every- 
body, is killed but only 50 million people are, this does not mean that 
the speaker is implying that 50 million people are a small number, but 
that 50 million people are much less than 150 million. 

Now, one can today get up in front of any audience in the United^ 
States and make a remark to the effect that the credibility of the" 
"n uclear deterrent as a protection o l MKurope is dimi ms hing clojeTto the 
^va nishing poin t and noj5bdy_will get angry with yo u. If you make 

all almost ideffical iiina^ ^ 
"o ur aTtian ce obTigat ions, people will throw you out of the room. But 
the two"rema^s^r^nrTact ; almo st ldentlcalT^ you think aEout them 
a m o men t The difference is not that the first is a polite way of say- 
ing something which is very awful, but that people refuse to accept 
the immediate consequences of the things they believe. 

Most of the Americans at that conference, particularly those with 
official responsibilities, were horrified at the European notion. Such 
thoughts in fact almost do not enter any American's head today and 
possibly never will. And I should make it clear, I am not predicting 
that they will. How T ever, it is worthwhile pointing out to Americans 
that the issue is a serious one, one which must be faced, considered and 
discussed, and if necessary preparations made. If you are afraid 
to discuss the issue, you will certainly be afraid to meet the crisiswhen" 
and if it occurs. 

Representative Holifield. This principle is one which this com- 
mittee lias decided was the correct principle. In other words, if we are 
living in this kind of world, and if these weapons actually exist in the 
quantities in which we know them to exist, if the deliver ability is what 
our experts on both sides of the fence say it is, then it is time to face 
these problems and start discussing them, as you have just said. Start 
trying to find, or maybe accelerating our effort to find, some solution. 

Representative Dukham. How does that enter into the picture ? 
How would you calculate in figures, so that you would put it into the 
actual picture of a calculated attack, whether or not we would live 
up to our obligations when and if war were declared ? 

Mr. Kaii^. That is exactly the question I want to address myself to. 

To what extent will these calculations affect policy ? And I want to 
ask this question from three points of view. From the Russian point 
of view: Would thev believe we would live up to thesel^bliga tions? 
From the European point of view: Would they Hbelievelit from . tKT 
calculations they would make? From the American point of view:" 
Do we believe we will do it and would, we, in fact, do it? ~ "" 

You understand, any two of these questions can be answered yes and 
the third no, and one still has an unpleasant situation. All three must 



886 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

be convinced of the right answer, and let me repeat, M^doesnot coni 
~ vince the Europeans or the Russians by _beingl^^ 
" matter. J ustt jie opposite. Un esEaEes confidence ; if w ecannot face 

"even a verbal discussion, we certainly cannot face the reaTEhmg. 

Even though I believe this, 1 would not be in favor of rais ingtfas, 
Question in a public and officjf|^^ 

Things about the inadequacies of our p^tu reuTsttllicient ti me f (^Jhe rn. 
T o be corrected. In other words, if we hadpassed a pointofno return^ 
" X"xvmild jTr^Fer closing my eyes and just sailing ahea d. 1 do not 
believe we have passed that point, and that is why 1 think it is lmpor ^ 

Tant to discuss the problem. 

I am trying to demonstrate that things for which normally there is 
no price, one can sometimes set a price which one knows is big enough, 
and another which is not. In other words, one can establish a prin- 
ciple, and after the principle is established, one can then haggle over 
the price and try to reduce the range of uncertainty. 
Representative Durham. You mean the price of lives ? 
Mr. Kahn. In this case we are pricing both lives and honor. Now 
let me establish the principle, if I can, sir. 

Let us assume that the Russians had such a competent retaliatory 
force, and that our own defense, both active and passive, were so 
weak, that even if we struck the Russians first, in their retaliatory 
blow they could kill every single American, all 177 million of us. 
Now, we know this is not a condition which in fact obtains. They 
cannot do it But let us just assume it for the moment. Now let 
me ask every man in this room to put himself in the place of the 
President of the United States. Assume that the Rus sians have done 
snmpfhing very horrible, say dropped a bomb on London7on Rome. 
Paris, Berlin, the worst thing yo u can imagine, but havenot touched 
the United States. By some^mecTTan ism (1 will describe some ^possi- 
bilities later ifjjiaye the time) the Tresldent cannot react imme- 
diately. MelTaV^iTrours to t hink over whatTTe ynll do j at which 
point he has to d ecfde whetheFto pres s the button and punish the 
Kussians, but in Turn ac cej2Jjhe_e xtm ction of the United States of 
America. And I mea n complete extinction. 

JNow, if you have"24~hours to think about it, you are not going to 
think about it in isolation. You are going to call a meeting and 
talk about it. 

I do not know how the President would act, and I do not know 
how I would act under those circumstances. But T do kno w that one 
could not blame the Europeans or the Russians for believing that 
"we would not retaliate. Under the assumptions one just cannot blame 
them for so believing. And, in fact, it is very doubtful that we would 
retaliate. 

Now, if you believe this, then you have to ask : If that principlei s 
possible, what is the price ? Let us now haggle over the price. It 
is clear that we cannot establish an exact exchange rate between live» 
and honor, between current and future evils. We cannot say whether 
the Soviet retaliatory threat would be effective at exactly 5 or 30 or 
100 million dead. That cannot be done. But I have discussed this 
question with a number of Europeans and a number of Americans, 
and they do have feelings about the subject, and they can communicate 
their feelings. And I might say their feelings change. That is, in 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 887 



the first few minutes, if you just ask a man to react, many Europeans 
will say, "At no price will the Americans retaliate." He thinks it is 
just a bluff. Many Europeans do. On the other hand, the typical, 
American will say, "We cannot be bluffed or blackmailed at anv 



trice." 



tut if you think about it for a few moments, just 5 or 10, not 5 or 10 
days, but 5 or 10 minutes, it soon turns out that your price, if you are 
an American, tends to be in the 10 to 60 million range. And you get 
60 million by a very interesting process. 

Repre sentative Durham. Do you know any time of his tory w hen_ 
the Amen ca^gj were^ttacked that itheyjhaye not retaliatecTs 

Mr. Ka~5nTT know of no such o ccasion. AS3"T~dolioT "believe we^ 
"would not feflTiate lo day^ JS T ot only if the^^ 
TfThey attackedTEurope. I think we will retaliate. Tain not trying 
to cast doubt on the fact that we might retaliate today. However, I 
am doubtful /that we might retaliate 2 or 5 or maybe 10 years from 
now, if and when the counterthreat gets worse and we do nothing to 
meet it. I will cast doubt on that. 

Representative Holifield. Under what two conditions did you say ? 

Mr. Kahn. I would say that today the threatofji^RH^im^og^^" 
attack is not large enough to p revent us f rolrnHving up to our obliga- 
tions; 1 believe th at_ this may^otnBejhe case ma r elaSvely' shorty 
number of years, ^tho ugh I am not willing to say whether this is 2 or 
K^but well withinthe lifespan j" prospectiv e lifespan, of every man in 
JMSroojxL_ 

Representative Durham. You do believe, Mr. Kahn, that we will 
live up to our obligations, do you not % 

Mr. Kahn. I say we will live up to our obligations in the near 
future, as of today. I am not at all certain — in fact I rather think the 
opposite — as to living up to our obligations from 2 to 10 years from 
now, depending on technological progress, the military and nonmili- 
tary defense programs we have, and the progress the Russians make. 

Representative Holifield. In other words, you are anticipating 
technological increases which will make complete annihilation of both 
countries a matter of certainty as far as capability is concerned ? 

Mr. Kahn. Not complete annihilation. Just a third or a half the 
country is enough. In fact the attack that has been discussed in this 
room may be enough. But the attack that has been discussed in this 
room in the last 4 days is an unrealistic attack for these circumstances. 
And I will explain later why this is so. 

Let me for a moment discuss the opinions of the Americans and the 
Europeans that I have polled. 

The way one gets 60 million casualties as a price one cannot afford 
to pay is by taking roughly one-third of the population, In other 
words, I have yet to meet an American who, after he thought about 
the problem 10 minutes, was willing to sign his name to a statement 
that he believed the United States would go to war deliberately, in cold 
blood, on any issue short of a direct attack on the United States, if 
more than half the people in the United States were killed on the 
Soviet retaliatory blow. It has to be less than half. Some Amer- 
icans, as I say, argue that we would be blackmailed into acquiescence 
if we were threatened with only 10 or 20 million casualties. Those 
few Europeans I have talked to have a much weaker impression of 



888 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

American tenacity, American purpose. Their estimates lie between 
2 and 20 million. And it is important, you understand, that they have 
a proper opinion, too. I have no feeling at all what a Russian esti- 
mate would run. Absolutely none. I do know it might run very 
high. The Russians lost something like 10 percent of their popula- 
tion, and, they claim, about one-third of their wealth, in World War 
"II. And they know they recovered from that. While they are still 
appalled at the damage they suffered, they can think in these large 
terms. So the Russians might be very impressed with the U.S. capa- 
bility, and the United States might in fact have both the will and the 
capability, at a time when the Europeans did not believe it. This is 
a very possible situation, and in some circumstances, a disastrous 
situation. 

It is important, in other words, to differentiate very sharply between 
what I have called Type One Deterrence, which is trying to deter a 
direct attack on the United States, and what I have called Type Two 
Deterrence, which is trying to deter an extremely provocative action. 
In the first case, many things enter Russian calculations as to whether 
they should attack the United States or not. But one of the most 
important things which will enter their calculations is their estimate 
of what would happen to Russia if they struck the United States at 
a time of their choosing and we strike back, with a damaged force, 
in the teeth of an alerted air defense, and in some instances after the 
Russians have evacuated their cities. 

Type Two Deterrence, deterring extremely provocative actions, 
involves a quite different calculation. It is again a Russian calcula- 
tion. Only now the Russian asks himself : If I do this very provoca- 
tive thing, which is less than a direct attack on the United States, 
but which is still very provocative, will the Americans start the all-out 
war ? That must be influenced by whether or not the Americans think 
they can survive our counterattack. And that means the Americans 
must calculate that they strike first and Ave Russians strike back with 
a damage force. Things will be completely reversed from the Type 
One Deterrence calculations. 

I might point out that in both World War I and World War II 
it was Type Two Deterrence we were talking about. That is, the 
British declared war on the Germans, and not vice versa. 

Representative Durham. In those conditions you would not think 
we would strike back ? Is that true, Mr. Kahn ? 

Mr. Kahn. No, I believe, and I should make this very clear, that 
if the Russians did something very provocative in Europe today, we 
would live up to our alliance obligations and strike. 

Representative Durham. I was thinking about the 6, 8, or 10 years 
you were talking about. 

Mr. Kahn. I believe that under current programs we will not. 

Representative Holifikld. Now please define the current programs. 

Mr. Kahn. We have certain programs in the field of air and missile 
otf ense and air and missile defense, and civil defense. Add them all 
up, and it is hard to believe that we would be willing, and I do not 
wish to be specific in years, because this would get us into the class ified. 
held, but at some time in the future we will in fact be outbid, under 
current programs. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 889 

Representative Hosmer. That would include the consideration of 
whatever measures we take over and above what we have at the present 
time to reduce the effect in our own country of the attack ? 

Mr. Kahn. That is correct. There are many things to be done 
in both the civil and military field. I would prefer not getting into 
that at this time. 

Representative Hosmer. You say in plus X years our decision might 
be different, yet that decision not to engage might never be presented 
to us, because we would be in condition sufficiently to ameliorate our 
damages. 

Representative Durham. On your theory, Mr. Kahn, then we would 
not have any war? Is that your idea? That things will get so 
terrible in the future that even Russia would not take a chance on 
attacking some other nation ? 

Mr. Kahn. There are two separate questions. One, involves such 
things as, for example, a Russian attack on West Germany. In this 
case they have not started world war III. They have just started a 
small war. At that point it is up to us to decide whether to start 
world war III, not the Russians. I am just giving you a hypothetical 
example. In other words, we must not confuse the horror of world 
war III with that which is risked when the Soviets try a moderately 
violent action. That is a quite different thing. 

Second, the situation may not be symmetrical. It is conceivable 

that there are circumstances m which th e Russian s could strike the 

United States and accept our retaliatory blow, when we wou l d not^be^ 

willing to strike them and accept their retaliatory blow. This ha s 

to do partly with the intrinsic vulnerabilities of the two countriesT 

As you know, we are a much more concentrated country than the Rus-~ 

jians^ .but mainly it has to do with their attitude towanl w ar and tKgT 

jseriousness with which they pursu e^preparations. The Russia ns^ for^ 

"example, have a very large civil defense prognuhT" It happohsTas far" 

as we can tell, to have some inadequacies. The intellectual basis of 

the program is very bad. It was not until 1954 that Soviet civil 

defense authorities discussed 20 KT bombs, it was not until the last 

year or two that they dropped the 20 KT bomb for the 20 MT bomb. 

We have been 3 or 4 years behind the problem. They have been 7 or 

8/ But if you look at Russian manuals, you will notice an enormous 



increase in understanding, ability, and capability in the last few years, 
do not wish at this time to get into Russian programs. Mr. Holi- 
field's other committee in the House has put out a report on Russian 
civil defense which has most of the information in it. What I am 
saying is thftt jthe T yiissians in 1954 and 1955 had a great debate on the _ 
theory of the "minimum deterrent." Malenkoy said, the next war 
would mean the annihilation of civilization ", ^S^^K^efbr^we^ 
lucky Russians don't haveto have such a large force aswe usedTohaveT 

pj— — mmmm i i ■ ■ ' "'" 1 1 II I* ' 1 " V - • ■'-t-w j 1 " I 



because if it really is annihilat ion, nobody will sfarTa* war, and we 
can afford tg get a way~wit h aTm uch cheaper strategl cTSrce. WeTca n 
jjt art concentrating o n consumer goodi? 1 ^ — — 

He w as f orceH^tajretracrpu^Ecly on that argument. Khrushchev 
argued that wars weren't that bad and that the Sovie ts Tiad to be p re - 
pared to tight and win wars m addition "to being able to deterThem. 
This w a s one of the major debates that they seem to haveTiaS and 

EH|| pH**I^ ^Ml***K^^^^^^^^^^^M^^*^»**-i ' Wllhl 'lH ■ 1*11 MUliijtrtJ ii , | ^^ | iiiii ii j - - ■ ■ ml ^ _. . . , _ ■ ., , , „a. - , t| .,- 

Khrushchev seems to be th ejofficial winnerT~]Ss a result the Soviets 
have gone for a capability to win wars rather j hahto deter wars. 



890 EFFECTS OF NTTCLEAB WAR 

This is a deliberate choice on their part which involves them in great 
expense 



Whether they have carried through completely on that decision is 
not known in this country, in other w T ords, one often makes a decision 
and then does not carry through. There is some evidence to the con- 
trary, evidence that they have expanded the civilian sector of their 
economy at the expense of the military economy. But insofar as we 
can tell, they did make a decision in 1955 and 1956 to buy a capability 
to fight and win wars and have done some of the things they need to 
do to implement that decision. 

We are making the exactly opposite decision. We are making a 
decision to deter wars. Failing deterrence, we do not talk seriously 
about the consequences. 

And as I said earlier in the day, we do not analyze carefully what 
we mean by deterrence, because we have staked too much on the notion 
working to be able to analyze it objectively. There is too much that 
we are risking to be able to discuss the subject calmly, quietly, and 
objectively. Many of us feel we cannot afford to weaken our resolve 
by even thinking aoout possible weaknesses. 

I think, though, that it is important that we do think this problem 
through, and this is why I was delighted at these hearings being held. 

Kepresentative Durham. You have to think pretty seriously to 
spend $70 billion of the taxpayers' money which goes directly into the 
defense and security of the free people of the world. 

Mr. Kahn. Let me give you an example of what I mean. There 
is a great deal of criticism of the Federal Government today, to the 
effect that they are not spending enough money on defense. Never- 
theless, there was a recent decision to cut back on air defense. As far 
as I know, that decision was not criticized publicly by anybody. The 
only criticism which was made of that decision was that the cutback 
on defense against bombers did not go far enough. Yet some years 
ago, in 1956, when General Partridge testified on the state of our 
defenses, he made it very clear they were not adequate to defend our 
country and would not be adequate in the near future ; his testimony 
did not depend in any sharp way on large estimates of the numbers 
of Russian long-range bombers ; their TU-4's, and Badgers, and small 
numbers of Bears and Bisons, being sufficient. They did not have 
to have 500 or 1,000 Bears and Bisons to do the job. 

The reason why there is no criticism of the decision to cut back 
on air defense is that people believe we must deter allout war, we 
must be able to fight limited wars, we must have arms control and 
that is all. They do not really believe we have to be able to fight a 
general war, usually not because they are certain one cannot happen, 
but because they do not believe that anyone can survive a general war. 
They do not believe that there is a significant difference between 
victory, stalemate, and defeat. 

The testimony befo re this committee was I think InJhaJLseJlge^erY, 

Salutary. As far as I know, Frank Shelt onwas the first Government 

official to make the flat statement that the next war would not"9esfaroY 

" all human beings7worlo^id *k- 

This may strike those who know, in this committee room, as a rather 
silly view, held by maybe a few uneducated laymen. It is not like that. 
Very distinguished scientists hold that view. And I mean very 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 891 

distinguished. And a couple of years ago they would have been will- 
ing to argue with you numerically that they were right. In fact, 
in the 1957 fallout hearings before this same committee, when ques- 
tions were asked of the various scientists — unfortunately I do not 
have the exact quotations with me — but such questions as "What 
would happen if the Soviets dropped 100 5-megaton bombs on the 
United States?", the answer was generally to the effect, "I haven't 
made that calculation, but we couldn't take it." _ There was a recent 
debate in the New Leader magazine between Beftrand llussell and 
"Sidney H o ok on "Was it legitimate, or was it~not, to fisETafling a ll 
hnnrmri hftifip-s in the worfif in the attempt to resist communism!^ 



human beings in 

That was a serious debate. Nobody raised the question, that the de- 
bate was about a hypothetical subject which was not at issue. r One 
does not ki l l all h uma n beings, or even a majority of them, in a war. 
Today, in EngTarJdTm ^YanceTsenous^perts on war almostUways 
dis cuss the issue of war or peace in terms of world annihilation! 
"heve r in terms of "the damage is great." In terms of, "Is the damage 
"EooTarge to accept, or will we prefer accepting tha t damage rather 
than appeasing or surrendering?" That is never the question. The 
question is always debated in terms of world annihilation or no world 
^annihilation. This iu s pite of the fact that there is no scientific back- 
in g for that view fo r flpy practical kinds of wars t hat ma>v occur in the 
near future. __ 

Senator Anderson. When you say there was no objection to the 
cut back in the Air Force, are you really sure about that? Did not 
Senator Symington have quite a bit to say about it, and did not others 
in the Senate? 

Mr. Kahn. I believe they had a lot to say, but always in the direc- 
tion of wanting to cut back on air defense more. I would like to 
check it, but I believe that is correct. The statement was, "You peo- 
ple are still in the horse and buggy era. You are fighting ICBM's 
with chariots." The argument was always that we should shift more 
to defense against missiles, shift more to our deterrent force, shift 
more to limited war forces. As far as I know, and I am reasonably 
well read, though I did not expect this subject to be brought out to- 
day, so I did not check on it, there was no public voice raised in any 
of the standard large newspapers — I was curious, so I looked at all 
the editorials I could find — or any statement issued by any Member 
of Congress, that the cutback in active air defense Was too much. 
The argument was all on the other side, that the cutback was not 
enough, in the defense against manned bombers. I am almost certain 
I would remember if I am wrong. 

Kepresentative Holifield. You confine that to the defense against 
manned bombers? 

Mr. Kahn. Defense against manned bombers, that is, Nike, 
Bomarc, interceptors. I am not here making any comments as to Nike 
versus Bomarc or anythink like that. I am simply discussing the 
conceptual idea that people think the notion of defending against 
manned bombers is obsolete. This is a view that is widely spread, 
widely held in many places. Most people hold this notion as much 
because they think defense is obsolete as because they think bombers 
are obsolete. 



892 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

I hope later to get into the philosophy of the deterrent forces, and 
this is very much connected with this notion. 

I should make one other small point before I go into the systematic 
discussion, even though we are running out of time. And this is the 
question of the symmetrical character of what I call Type 1 Deter- 
rence. In order to make it easier to remember, let me use the same 
terminology the British used. The British refer to the t y pe 1 de- 
terrent as a Passiya JQeterreni^^ it takes no actof 

will. In other words, ifhes trikes you, you will str ike bac k. Itjioes_ 

not take any c ourage or anywilL They^ r efer To Type 2 Deterrence as 
an active deterrence, be cause it ta fosAn^actlrf ^ w ilLZ^ f ^Tiaye got 
to be willing to s trike the enemy wh en he provokes youl>y striking a 
third party, it is not auloniM cr~~"~~ 

Let us now consider Eussian Active Deterrence for a moment, and 
ask ourselves : Is it easy to deter the Eussians ? Can we afford to pro- 
voke them as far as we wish to go ? 

Let me give an example. In 1956, there was a revolution in Hun- 
gary which the Eussians suppresse d ^ There was at that time much 
pressure on the United States to intervene in that revolution to sup- 
"port the Hungarians. I myself fel t ratker strongly we should do _ 
something. However, 1 wish to ask the following question : Jf we" 
had intervened, would the Eussians have accepted that intervention, 
say in 1956? Would they accept ITm I960? These are different 
situations. It is possible that we did more than not intervene. There 
are rumors — I do not know if they are true or not — that we broadcast 
to the East Germans and the Poles not to rock the boat, that Amer- 
ican aid was not on the way if they did. There are reasons for worry- 
in g about a satellite revolt spreading and, if "we had intervened , it is 
quite clear that there would very likely have been a widespread ISfiF 
tite revolt. Particularly if the Eussians did nothing, if they just Jg fT 
us get awav with it After all, so meo f the satellites revolted witho ufP 
"any American intervention. 

A satellite revolt is a very big thing to the Eussians, and they might 
not be willing to stand for it. Much more important, the Eussians 
are greatly concerned with internal stability. Most Bussian experts 
that 1 Kjiow of think of the Eussians as having a very stable govern- 
ment, unlikely to be upset even by really quite catastrophic events. 
But it also seems to be true that the Eussians do not think of them- 
selves as quite that stable. They worry about internal revolution in 
Eussia more than we do,_ And tney might thmK of a successful satel- 
lite revolt as an intolerable event that might lead to the end of the 
regime. 

They would, I think, be under pressure to fight if we intervened in 
Hungary. If the fight was on a high explosive basis, I think we" 
" would lose. If t he fight was on an atomic basis, I think we wou ld 

f )robably still loseTbut now there would also be side effects. If the 
ightin ^_were limited to jTuhgary there would probably be wide ^ 
^prea^destruction within Hungary Because neither of us would wish 
to lose withoutmaEng a major effort. If we tried to lim it the dam-, 
^age by attacking supply lines in rear areas we would be getting into. 
•" Etigkian territory. Now, the Eussians might think at this point that^ 
'"at any mo ment the war could erupt either into a satellite revolt, of 
^into a lar ge scale at t ack on Eussia. They might be particularly "wig- 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 893 

ing to worry about the latter because they would find it very hard to 
believe that we intervened with the expectation of losing. In any 
case, it is a very large war being fought near Russia. They might 
then ask themselves the following question: Rather than wait for this 
war to erupt into a satellite revolt or into an American surprise at- 
tack on o ur s trategic force, maybe it is safer for us to hit the United 
States and thus at least assure our getting that all important tirST 
strike — at least if we hurry. 

In other words, they might argue that going to war is very risky, 
but possible less risky than not going to war. At this point we must 
ask the question : How risky is it for the Russians to go to war ? 
3Yell ? in late 1956, it was very risky for th em. We had a very large 




This situation may not, however, be as true in the future, for 
a number of reasons. 

I would like to make this one observation at this point. If the 
Russians can limit our attack on them to about the size of this attack 
on the United States, the n if they have made very modest prepara- 
tions , they do not su ffer a, /Treat deal of damage, _ 

" Wnat do I mean by this? I mean thaT if they can evacuate 
their civilians to places of safety, radiological safety; then we cai?F 
kill yftr y many Russians. Thfeffe ftlte lots -of places t o evacuate to in 
the Soviet Union. .Let me give some orienting numbers. There are" 
less than 50 million people m the largest 135 Kussian cities. As f gr_ 
as we can tell it is perfectly possible to evacute »0 percent offKIs 
urban population and have all vital functions in the cities performed . 
"This would leave only 10 million people at risk in 135 cities. Haying 
been alerted, these could evacuate on very sh ort noticer^TTTaddition 
it is very difficult to destroy 135 Soviet cities m a retaliatory blow. I 
am not saying we could not have done it. I think we could have^ in 
1956. But it is a difficult thing to do. You can see it is difficult. 
In any case it is a larger attack than this one. 

Even if it did not kill many people such an attack would cause 
a lot of economic damage in Russia. But th eRussia ns claim to -have, 
lost one-third of their wealth in World War 11, an d they re covered 
from it. In fact they recovered by 195.1. Andth ey know thy recov^ 
ered f rom such levels of damagepBecause tEey mention it. In othe r, 
words, the Kussians know that it can pa~y to accept very Targe amounts 
oi damajge^jg ffieFthan to surrend er, because th ey have actually jrone^ 
3^^^^^fe^^^^^I!^^SES^^IEiL^^SS[ way to leany 
it is also a very conv incing way to learn by having actuaLexperience,_ 
This doesn't meaiTtEey would be glad to repeat the ex periencfr ^nly, 
tha Lthey may be willing to uM^T^JIe^ ^^I^ ^^^^^BHISI 
willing to^ 

1 mention both of these cases, because I want to put the rest of 
my discussion in context. 

One not only has to ask himself what it costs us to go to war under 
certain circumstances, how do we feel about it, how do the Russians 
feel about it, how do the Europeans feel about it, but also the same 
set of questions about the other possibility — about Soviet willingness 



894 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

to go to war. All of these questions must be asked. As I said, it 
does no good to convince the Russians and the Americans if you do 
not convince the Europeans simulaneously. Otherwise, we may get 
into real problems. 

Representative Durham. Mr. Kahn, do you think that has anything 
to do with a man's will to fight for what he believes in? 

Mr. Kahn. I believe it is very possible for a soldier to die for a 
squad, a squad for a regiment, a regiment for a division, a division 
for an army, an army for a nation. I doubt that under most cir- 
cumstances it is possible for a Nation such as the United States to 
die for the world. It may be all right to fight to the last man, but 
most civilized nations will surrender or at least negotiate before 
fighting to the last woman and child. 

Representative Durham. I am talking about the fact, of course, of 
the recovery in Russia. And of course they know what it will cost 
them. 

Mr. Kahn. What I am saying is that I think both the United States 
and Russia will fight if sufficiently challenged, so long as there is at 
least a moderately good chance of their nation surviving the war; that 
if there is no chance at all of the nation surviving the war, they will 
not fight if only challenged. They will then only fight when they 
are in fact hit, rather than challenged. This remark is only reinforced 
if you believe the stakes are world annihilation. 

_ JWhat . Jt amounts to is that you ha ve to believe in life on other, 
p lanets, in order to fight. An3 ^tEe" e.vi denS " for that is scar ce. 
TTowV Actually, discussing this problem just in terms of casualties 
is very misleading, because if you ask: Why is it that most of the 
experts do not believe in recovery ? It is not because they are worried 
about the large number of immediate deaths. It is because they are 
worried about the medical, economic and social problems of the post- 
war period and the long-range genetic problems. I have listed here 
the eight phases of a war one has to look at if one is trying to analyze. 
I would like to discuss these backwards,/ because that is the order of 
importance. (The list is in the outline of lecture I in the prepared 
statement, p. 921.) 

Let me therefore start with the genetic effects as discussed at this 
hearing and as studied by our own people. 

The first thing one has to decide is: What are the standards by 
which one is to measure if the situation is tolerable or intolerable? 
Now, there are three kinds of standards one should look at. First 
there are the prewar standards, the standards by which we regulate 
our public health today. There are the standards to be used during 
the war and immediate postwar situation. What will you accept when 
fchings are actually happening? You will for example accept 5 
million casualties going without treatment and thereby dying, because 
there is no alterative ; there is no way to treat them. You will simply 
add these casualties to the total of the fatalities. Then there are the 
postwar standards. Now, this war is a horrible thing, and its horror 
lasts for some thousands, actually tens of thousands, of years. The 
environment is permanently more hostile after such a war, in the sense 
that anything over 1,000 years is permanent, as far as we are con- 
cerned. And it actually turns out that if you believe that in the post- 
war world you will not live in an area which is unsafe to live in by 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 895 

current peacetime standards, then you would abandon much of the 
country for decades. You will walk away from it. As you might 
guess, it probably won't be like that. We will both put in alleviating 
measures and adjust our standards. And the question that one has 
to ask oneself is not, "Will we abandon the country?" since there is no 
place to go, really, but how bad is it for us to use these alleviating 
measures and to readjust to reasonable postwar standards? Can I 
as an individual on the average hope to live a happy life i Can my 
descendants ? Can society function in a way which we like to think 
of western societies functioning? Or will we live as the savages live, 
as some of the Asiatic nations live, with life expectancies of 25 years ? 
When one asks the question this way, one may find situations "accept- 
able" in which the overall damage is really fantastically high. 

Let me now make a comment or two about the genetic damage. We 
had testimony earlier that there might be a billion individuals in- 
jured if the survival was only 40 million. It was estimated that 
between 1 and 4 percent of this toll is represented by live, seriously 
defective individuals. No man can deny that this particular legacy 
of a war represents human tragedies in the most extreme form. 
However, the rest of the defects, representing 96-99 percent of the 
total, have a much smaller impact. Something like a half to three- 
quarters were so-called prenatal death, or early miscarriages, or 
things of that sort. 

Now, while that may be an individual tragedy, it is not a social 
tragedy. In other w 7 ords, Americans have so much excess fecundity, 
that even if there are many early miscarriages, it does not affect 
society, though the individuals affected may be seriously perturbed. 

It should be pointe d out that many of these early miscarriages are 
ilQA- 6 -!^!!^ ^^^ by T3mT woman jbb isTlnvo^ e^ jecgjijge they occur^ 
very early. 

The rest of these genetic defects were described as minor defects 
which might affect the health, happiness, and vigor of the individual 
but which generally do not show up in a dramatic way. It is very 
hard to estimate the impact of such minor defects. In particular, I 
think that here the geneticists tend to be somewhat misleading in 
their estimates of the impact, because they do not think or talk like 
economists. For example, there is a theorem inj renetics which says 
something like the following : That almost anydef ectlve muta tion 
Ts just as bad as any other mut ation. because^atmosT eve ry defective 
mutation eventually causes a aeafli^^ 

In fact, sd7netimes"a geneticist says that insofar as two mutations 
do not cause exactly the same damage, the one that results in a 
minor defect may cause more damage. The reasoning goes as f ollows : 

The minor defect is carried along generati^ iafter_generation, 
affecting the health and happiness of each ofTts bearers TaHvefseTy7 
until finally it tips t he scale against an individuaL causing him to 
jlie, tCTifflimtmg that genetic line. So both the minor and the m ajor 
Imitation killed an individual, but the minor not only killed an m- ^ 
dividual Tut affected the health and happin ess of majry /oTIi^^ 
Hals in the process. And one ca^nTherefore argue th at t he minor 
mut ation caused more damage. 

TKeThebrem is misleading, yet it affects a great deal of thinking 
among geneticists. It is "mi sheading because, among other things, it 



896 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

ignores a fact that any economist is familiar with, that one has to 
discount the future. ? "~~ 

Let me give an example why this is proper if we are to use the 
words harm, damage, et cetera, properly. If I were asked to choose 
between three situations— a situation in which 100 percent of the peo- 
ple were killed immediately, or a situation in which 10 percent of each 
penerafion died prematurely, for 10 generations, or finally a situation^ 
in which 1 percent of each generation died prematurely for 100 gen- 
erations^- then the total number of individuals killed is exactly the 
same. f4ut 1 think there is no question which situ ation most people" 

..would rngf£E»~ 

In other words, if you can spread the damage over tens of tho u- 
sands of years, you have done something very useful, and if the 
spread occurs naturally one must take account of the distribution 
of damagft over time when one asks : How does it a tiect soc ie ty or the " 
average member of a society f One cannot just add up" arithmetically 
" oyer tens of thou sands of years, the total amount oi damage ITon^ 
"wishes to answer this question, From some moral points of view, 
the simple arithmetic sum may be the right way to think, but I have 
doubts even about that. It is true that "a human being is a human 
being." But, moral questions aside, from the viewpoint of how we 
as individuals view our personal expectations of happiness or our 
society's ability to function, the simple arithmetic sum is almost 
irrelevant. ' 

I am not, in other words, discussing the moral question: Is it worse 
to kill a man 10,000 years from now or to kill him today ?— not be- 
cause I am not interested in that question, but because it is irrelevant 
to what I am discussing right now. That kind of question typically 
will not affect calculations of deterrence. It just does not. 

I would like to tell a story to illustrate how strongly people feel 
about genetic damage, sometimes unreasonably strongly. At one 
point, I was induced, against my will — and I was sorry both before 
and afterward — to 'give a talk at UCLA to a mixed audience, on 
what a war might be like. I mentioned that in a typical war if one 
had taken modest preparations the survivors might get about 250 
"roe ntgens, that this dose might mean that for the next gener ation and 
some generations to follow 1 percent ot the children wouia^g~bor n^ 
with serious defects, who would not otherwise have been defective^ 
"such defects as idiocy, blindness, crippling, and so on. 



Then 1 added, miudiciousjy, that ^Unejmight be willing to accept 
that cost of a war, rather than give up Europe to the Soviets," or~ 
that under certain circumstances the Russians m ight be willing to" 
accept that cost of a war in order to eliminate us. _ .,A wom an got up 
m the audience and said. "I don't want t o live in your world where 
1 percent of the children are born defective/' She then made some 



otiier rather pointed remarks! 



I was outraged and answered, "It isn't my world." I have nothing 

"^special to do with it, I have to accept the saGrneHres^^ 

everybody else in this room, but no more. I then pointed to my 

chart, which said: "About 4 percent" of the ch ildren ara .currently 

T>orn defective.' Then a friend of mine "offereJ lhe ladyjTknmT 

Tie was pretty mad, too." 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 897 

The point of this story is th at p eace al so has its tragedies. I can 
easily imagine that if we Had lived in a world: hTlvhtch ho children 
were born defective and we were told that as a result of some action 
of the Government or of a war that 4 percent of the children would 
be born seriously defective we would consider such a world to be in- 
tolerable. We just wouldn't be able to believe that people would be 
willing to bear and raise children if the risk were about 1 in 25 of 
these children having a serious congenital defect. However, we live 
in that world now and we not only bear this relatively high rate of 
tragedy, we almost ignore it. While some women have a great concern 
about such possibilities during their pregnancy it is only in such 
" critical periods or when there is a tragedy in the iinme diate^Family 
that most people think about this burden of lif e. T^addTlSradgi-^ 
"Eional 1 percent to the burden would be a terrible thing to do, but 
it is clear that this additional burden is comparable to the kinds of 
risks with which we have become accustomed to in the peacetime world, 
and that most people will be able to live with such increased risks. 

In other words, war is horrib le. There is no qustion about it. 

B ut so ig peace. To some exte nt the horrors of war are only an in- 

ITfeaSeHor mtensTK^iion^oJ^some oFt Ke f am iliar horrors aLpeace Ljy^L 

ff you ]^eShT¥^overhmmt with a sufficiently unpleasant peace time 

latuafeffritrTna^ accept the 

"postwaFW with the peacetime problem. 

Thls^is^one^feason why it is useful to make The kinds of calculations 
we are making today, to compare the horror of war and the horror oL 
peace and see how much worse war is. This is an emotion-laden issue/ 
partly because it gets mixed up with the question of nuclear testing 
where many people have overdon e such comparisons or said, rather 
violently , that they are to tally irrelevant. 

It is perfectly possible, by the way, to feel that the nuclear tests 
cause too much damage but that the war does not, in the sense that the 
tests should be judged by peacetime standards and the war by wartime 
standards. These are not logically inconsistent views to have. 

In any case, as nearly as I can see, if you have a reasonable economic 
recuperation, the genetic effects resulting from one war cannot jeop- 
ardize overall standards of living. It is difficult, if not impossible, to 
give people much more than a thousand roentgens, in a war without 
killing them. Only the survivors have children. If current beliefs 
are true, 1,000 roentgens should at most double the normal burden of 
defects, probably less. 

Now, doubling the number of burdens of defects is an enormous 
thing to do, but it should be almost clear that the medical and social 
cost to society of the current burden is not so high that we could not 
accept a double burden without jeopardizing the functioning of either 
our system or the Kussian system. The individuals who are directly 
affected, of course, would feel involved in a tragedy. The rest of us 
would get along. 

I would like now to look at the long-term medical effects of the 
war, again in the same context. Can we depend upon such effects as 
providing an automatic and reliable deterrent? As always, I want 
to ask the question both ways. 

One problem which has raised much concern is the strontium 90 
problem. It is possible to make a technically respectable calculation 



898 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

which states that every time the Russians test a large bomb in the 
Soviet Arctic or we test one in the Pacific something like 1,000 to 
10,000 individuals now alive will get bone cancer or leukemia as a 
result of that test. Nobody really knows, but you could put out such 
a calculation and not be read out of the profession. You can print it 
in a professional journal. It is a respectable calculation. 

I think it is rather high, myself ,but I would not care to challenge 
it as being obviously wrong. L\f*G«fc } N* ~TVK£,llhL& *T#gb£Y . 

Many people have argued, both in the technical literature and in 
the literature of war, that if so few bombs so far away cause so much 
damage, would not a lot of bombs, very close, be annihilating ? 

Many "experts" have written that the backlash effect of fallout 
is itself a sufficient deterrent; in other words, that if the Rus- 
sians drop a lot of bombs on the United States, they would be wiped 
out by the worldwide fallout. The simplest kind of arithmetic indi- 
cates this is not correct. In this attack you drop 4,000 megatons, 
which produces, say, about 250 times as much worldwide fallout as 
testing a large bomb produces. If one takes the largest number, 
10,000 leukemias and bone cancers as resulting from testing a large 
bomb and multiplies that by 250, one gets 2,500,000 individuals af- 
fected by worldwide fallout. The Russians have less thaii 10 per 
cent of the population of the world, so if they received their prorata 
share of the backlash they would have to suffer 250,000 premature 
deaths over the next 30 or 40 years. That would not deter them 
from any action they badjjr wanted to take. 

Furthermore, as I saLt^ these numbers are probably overestimates. 
The backlash is not even an unreliable deterrent. 

In fact, we have had a lot of testimony in this last 4 days, to the 
other effect, testimony which is new in the sense that it is rare for 
anybody to publicly take a sober view of this unpleasant subject. 

Representative Durham. Mr. Kahn, do you think that kind of rea- 
soning has anything to do with the fact that of course they will not 
agree to any kind of a testing ban at Geneva, which has been going 
on since last October ? 

Mr Kahn . No, I think the test ban has the problem that the Rus- 
sians do not want a system which could be used to give us intel ligence, 
a nd we do not want a system which is so l oose the Kussians]^dd_ 
cheat, and those two desires meet headjon, I^ffiink we are both 
wjlling to have bans if we can compromiseTthese oth er desires.__ 

Representative Durham. You know, of course, that they are put- 
ting strontium 90 into the air every time they run those tests. 

Mr. Kahn. There are many reasons for stopping tests. 

Representative Durham. I was just basing it on what you assume 
they could take. 

Mr Kahn. The biological effects of testing are not an overwhelm 
ing reason, as governmental decisions go, for stopping tests. The 
tests very likely do a lot of damage. But almost anything you do in 
society causes damage. If you were willing to stop tests for this 
reason alone, you would stop a lot of other things. 

For example, there used to be a rule that every time you built a 
million dollars worth of construction you killed somebody. J "~ 

Representative Durham. I assume you are saying that wecan take 
the 2.5 million casualties and continue the testing, put the strontium 
in the air, and take those results. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 899 

Mr. Kahn. I am not predicting 2.5 million casualties as a result of 
testing. 

Representative Durham. If you keep on testing, we will have as 
much in the air as we have in a war. 

Mr. Kahn. With vigorous test programs you could get quite a bit. 

Representative Durham. Do you want to put it out all at one time, 
or in the next 50 years, in other words ? 

Mr. Kahn. I believe if the issue came to having a defense or not 
having a defense, both sides would be willing to continue testing and 
accept the biological damage. I do not think that is necessarily the 
right issue, but if that were the issue, both sides would continue 
testing. 

Mr. Chairman, I did get a little elaborate in my introduction. I 
am not sure how much more time I should take. 

Representative Holifield. What is the pleasure of the committee? 

Senator Anderson. He is doing fine. 

Go ahead. 

Mr. Kahn. Let us look at the strontium 90 in a bit more detail. 

Representative Holifield. Speak a little slower, please, and a little 
plainer. 

Mr. Kahn. It is believed today that about 10 millicuries of stron -„ 

"tium 90 per square mile would result in people living in tha t environ ^ 

ment having about one. sunshine unit in their body. If there is no 



fractionation, this corresponds roughlyTo one ten^'ousandfK oF a 
KT of fission products per square mile, Since we allow peopl eTo 
have no more than 100 sunshine unit s in their body , this woukTimpIy 



Jbhat the soil is unusable if it is contaminated by as little as one one- 
hundredth of a KT per square mile. 

Some of you may have seen statements recently that after a large 
thermonuclear war there would be no agriculture in the United States 
for 40 years ; the soil would be so badly contaminated one could not 
eat the food. This has come up several times in questioning by vari- 
ous congressional committees. If you feel, as our peacetime stand- 
ards indicate you should feel, that you would not eat food grown 
in soil contaminated by one one-hundredth of a KT of fission prod- 
ucts, then it is very easy to contaminate the whole United States. 
You grow food in about a million square miles in the United S tates 
"so it takes only 10 megatons of fission products" to contaminate T the 
United States to the point where"~^bu would not be^willlngTo eat 
food grro wn ont hat soil. ~ 

Senator Anderson. How many? 

Mr. Kahk. About 10 megatons of fission products spread uniformly 
over a million square miles of the United States. It would con- 
taminate the United States to the point where one would not today 
accept food grown on that soil as fit for human consumption. 

If we increase the contamination by a fac tor of 10, to take ac- 
count of deca y and weathering over the nex HSO^ears^aiid by anothex 
"factor o f 10 to take account of overlap, one gets that about 1,000 
megatonsare needed to contaminate U.S. agricultural lands. 

Representative Holifield. Of course, you are considering a mathe- 
matical even spread. You are not saying a 10-megaton bomb would 
do this. 



900 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Mr. Kahn. No. But I am saying that it is 10 megatons if uni- 
formly spread. Multiply by 10 to take account of decay and weather- 
ing. Multiply by another 10 to take care of nonuniformities. 

Now, the calculation is misleading. But it is persuasive. And 
you have to know why it is misleading. Otherwise, you will be 
persuaded. 

It is wrong for many reasons, one of the most important being _ 
that the peacetime standards are probably not legitimate for the post> 



war world, it is also wrong because it does not take d£££M£i of "the 



fact that we will do many things to alleviate the problem. 

i am not a medical doctor, and it would not be appropriate for me 
to suggest possible postwar standards. But just for the purpose of 
discussion, let me do exactly that, to give a feeling for some of the 
considerations which might come up. 

__L_ £uggest that w e would be willing to accept something likeJ KL 
Jo 100 isunshine units' in our children, in the postwar world, no tte-,, 
cau se we are happy about the idea but because it is a little difficult to 
"achieve much less Than that unless we make some preparations . 

Kepresentative Molifield. We have been using the tenn^s^ontiuni^ 
unit" rather than "sunshine/ 7 Some of us are allergic to this term 

""sunshin e ." We prefer the term "stronti um*!!- ~ ] 

Mr. Kahx. 1 could not agree witTTyou^more. Strontium 90 is 
manufactured by men. Sunshine is not. .Let us ^ keep it to a man 1 " 
made object. ~~~ 

Senator Axdersok. I think tha t term sunshine came bec au se the 
"first time they said if theTallout cam e down" ver y, very slowly "thaT 
was good for you. And then later they said if it came downver y 
fast, that ^ was goo d for you, we decided to take thejmnsh me, in 
view of evervffi mgr- ™ — — -' \ 

Mr. Kahn. 1 prefer not getting into that debate. I deal in a 
number of controversial subject s , but I try to keep the numbe r downT 
To continue, one might be willing tcTacoept 50 or niaybea mindred7 
even, strontium units in our children, if we had to. Let us call food 
that would result in this or lower levels an A food. The A food 
would be restricted to children and pregnant mothers. One might 
then also have a B food which might be about 10 times as contami- 
nated as the A food. This would be a high-priced food, available to 
everybody. There might then be another grade of food, a C food, 
which would have another factor of 10 more contamination. This 
would be a cheap food available to all. We are now talking about 
having up to 10 microcuries in new bone, which is quite a bit. 

JRnt T mip fot point out, no one has ever seeen a bone cancer directly 

-at tributable to Radioactive material in the bone at less than the equrv^ 

"""alent of 20 to 30 microcuries. JNow, we are reasonably sure that 

"" smaller amounts will cause bone cancers in a statistical sense ; but I 

would guess that at least an adult insurance company would not raise 

its premium very much if one lived on food with that amount of 

strontium 90 in it. JCanJtnicrx>curies of Sr 90 per kg. of calcium would 

mean a dose of about 20 roentgens a year in the bones. This would 

" probably cause less than a year's loss of life expectancy. The C food 

is especially acceptable if it is mainly restricted to adults who would 

pick up much less Sr 90 than children would. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 901 

Then I would suggest another factor of 10 for a D-f ood, which is 
not available to the general public but is restricted to people over 40, 
or maybe over 50. It is difficult to kill a man over 40 or 50 with 
fir P0 T People of this age group do not absorb very much, and it takes 
20 or 30 years to get bone cancer. One dies of something else before 
he does oi bone cancer. 

One reason why I am suggesting setting up tentative standards 
now is that we really have to have, before the war, some notion of what 
we are willing to live with, to guide research, to guide planning, and 
to eliminate hysteria in a crisis. 

There is another reason why it is important to set up in peace the 
war and postwar standards we think we may have to adopt. In addi- 
tion to determining these standards, the Government should formally 
publish them in a permanent looking form that will be available for 
at least postattack or postcrisis distribution. It is not really necessary 
to distribute all of the handbooks prewar as people can usually read 
them either during or after the crisis or attack, though they should 
be made available to all who are interested. It is, however, important 
to print them ahead of time, not only so that they will be immediately 
available, but also so that people will trust the information in them. 
In any such crisis many will be cynical of the integ rity of the Govern- 
"ment and will argue that the Government savs theae^stajidards ar*T 
acceptable because it must say so, that conditions are such that it 
ha-g no cEoica B5E that in fa^t tEj standards will EJjjJS 5QuJlI16jr 



level of casualties. The Jaiowledge ^th at the st andards wer e set up m 
peacetime after due care and debate should be reassuringT" 

I am not suggesting we should publicize the existence^ndcharacter 
of the postwar standards. I am not suggesting we should tell every- 
body they will get bone cancer. I am merely suggesting that the 
manuals be printed, stockpiled, and a small circulation made to those 
who are interested. 

I had a discussion with a rather senior official in the AEC suggest- 
ing this. He looked at me rather amazed. They aren't very happy 
at the thought of putting out anything that could be construed as 
suggesting they are underestimating the Sr 90 problem. 

Incidentally, this official asked me, "What do you think the differ- 
ence in price would be between the B and C foods ? 

I said, "About 5 or 10 cents a quart." 

He said, "You could not sell one for less than $50 a quart difference." 
__ If it is in fact true that people would not be willing to eat foods 
"contaminated with a microcurie^T so of strontium 90 per kJlogranT 
of calcium, then I think we are not going to recover very expeditiously 
from this war. 

It is only because, for a short time, we are willing to eat such food, 
that I believe our recovery would be rapid. If this is not true, then 
we are either not going to have food, or we will put much energy into 
obtaining food that should go into other reconstruction projects. 



In a relatively sh ort, period of time, if there is recovery^ the patterns 
of agriculture wil l adjust to the contamination, and while f ood may 
cost a little hit nrmrttj if, will not be excessive i n either price or 
contamination. " ~ — — — — 



902 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Therefore, in all likelihood, the Sr 90 problem is a short-term prob- 
lem, but it still must be treated objectively and soberly, without any 
unnecessary panic or hysteria for that first 3, 4, or 5 years. I should 
also mention that there are other alleviating measures that will help. 
I would like to repeat, it is really important that we treat this and 
other problems ahead of time, because if we do not, and wait until the 
crisis, we are going to find somebody raising this question, and we will 
not be able to answer it convincingly on that day. We must have 
thought this thing through long before the Russians ask us to think 
it through. Among other reasons, because it has to be debated. 

Representative Holifield. What you are advocating is to take these 
problems that are imminent and put them on the table, talk them 
through, and get the most authoritative information on each one now, 
so people will know what they face? 

Mr. Kahn. For this purpose I am not really so much interested in 
the people, though I have the same interest in fchem that you have. 
I am talking about the experts knowing what they face, the men who 
advise the Government during the crisis. You do not want them 
panicking. In fact, to be really frank, if there was any way of getting 
the initial discussion restricted to just 10,000 people, I would like to 
* do it that way. 

Representative Holifield. Why ? 

Mr. Kahn. I want to get as many technical arguments as possible 
out of the way before we fill the headlines with them. I prefer these 
technical arguments occurring not behind closed doors but in the 
technical arena. Unfortunately we cannot do it that way. 
Representative Holifield. In other words, you believe the scien- 
tists i " sho uld come forward with the scientific information and settle 
the fights a mong; themselves before submittnig the conclusions toTay 
peoplerwE oare not technically qualified to form judgments. IsTha jT 

Mr. Kahx. I don't think that is completely possible in our form of 
^society or even desi rable, so I am not recommending itT~ ~ .But if~itT 
""coulcHBe done a little frit like that, I would prefer it. 

You do gfet a lot of misinformation in the headlines, and people do 
^et overly scared, or underiy scared. They are entitleoTto this~Tn7^ 
tormation, they should have it, but they are not entitled to misinfor- 
mation or even~unsophisticated"no tiojis^ 

Representative Holified. YoiTare^not denying the right of any 
individual to make any conclusion on the basis of a moral or a philo- 
sophical or a spiritual conviction % 

Mr. Kahn. Absolutely not. 

Representativ e Holifield. But what you are saving is that the in- 
formation should be available tor those peo pl e who wish to make the 
"""Basic conclusion on the facts. Then let them apply them in any way 
they want to, morally, philosophically, or spiritually ? 

Mr. Kahn. Right. To give you an example of the difference, in 
the 1957 hearings on fallout, people were talking about things like a 
fraction of a roentgen. And yet they were using very cataclysmic 
language. In the current hearings, in reference to much higher 
amounts, witnesses are always adding words, to the effect, incredible 
as this is, the country can survive it. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 903 

Senator Anderson. Has the National Academy of Sciences done 
anything along this line ? 

Mr. Kahn. Yes, there is a great deal of information available today. 
And it is not the technical information that is in dispute, really. It 
is how yon feel about it. What is your attitude toward it ? People 
have not really evaluated this technical information in terms of rea- 
sonable postwar standards. This is not a technical decision in the 
sense of something one learns in school or even in a laboratory. These 
are things which Congressmen and the public must be involved in. 
But it is well to get the debate some distance among the experts before 
it is opened up. That is all I am saying. 

Senator Anderson. But when the Federation of American Scientists 
want to talk- ahont th^s j pe ople say. "Oh, maybe some of them are left- 
. wingers." That is the major difficulty, is it not I . 

Mr. Kahn. It is one of the major di fficulties. I have a paper listing 
52 Nobel laureates who signed a statement to the effect: "All nation s 
must come to the decision to renounce force as a final result o fpoKcy. 
"Tf they are not prepared to do this, they will ceas e to exist^l^ou 
look at that list of 52 of our most distingu ished ^TentistsTyou cannot 
dismiss them as just a bunch of left-wing raHIcals^ m^m^ 
treme statement. Most of them ar e |ust scie ntists wEcT ^^egMieF 
made or think they have made. seeiTortibiin k they have ^seen^^lcuTa- 
tio ns winch imply just what they said. But the state ment is extreme. 
"TT15ays7" A1] nati ons," ' and~says T "cease toTexT st." ZE ^^es h otsay 
"damage." Well, this is the kind of rem ark you get early in the dis- 
"cussion. It woul d be better if ^^^^^ CTT^H^h^^^^cg^^^ 
some before it was released. 

Now, there is an important point here. I am not saying that a war 
that occurred in the year 2000, or even in 1975, might not be almost 
as cataclysmic as this. It is getting worse on a year-by-year basis, and 
many of mv friends tell me, "Herman, you really sho uldn't go around 
saying that people can tight and survive wars, fiet^^lifi&FEK^O or 
20 yea rs from now you may be obsolet e, and it takes 10 or 20 years to 
exmainthings to people, so leTsstart now? ^"" 

That is a judgment which I think (a) they have no right to make, 
and (b) is wrong. These problems of ours must be met on a year-to- 
ye ar basis. We cannot g et t o 1975 if we do not get to 1960 and 1965. " 

Furthermore, no matter what your picture of a future utopia is, and 
we all have one, or you cannot live in this world, you have to get there, 
and getting there may be harder than drawing one up. 

In other words, we have to be able to meet the challenge as they 
come on a year-by-year basis. This means *we have to understand 
what the problem is on a year-by-year basis. Transition aiipjngements 
are just as important as final states. 

Representative Hosmer. Are you not to some extent making an eval- 
uation of what you would have in 1965, or be willing to accept in the 
way of a world in which to live; in one case if there was a nuclear war, 
and in the other case if you avoided it by accepting some other alter- 
native, which might produce some comparable situations that were less 
acceptable than those created by the war? 

Mr. Kahn. That is part of what I have been saying. But it is 
difficult to limit technological progress. Let me give you a feeling 
of what the future may hold. The public press has referred to bega- 



904 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

ton bombs, for example. I am not saying such bombs are possible 
or not possible, but there is no law of physics which says they are not 
possible. You just cannot limit man's technology, and therefore it 
might literally be possible for human beings to blow the world into 
little pieces at some date within our expected lifetime, well within it, 
maybe. And it is clear that when that instant arrives, if you are 
going to fight a war at all, you have to fight it carefully, or maybe 
you cannot fight at all. 

Unfortunately, war has had an important role in human institu- 
tions for many years now. The regulatory effect of the threat of 
force has also been important. It is a little hard to believe that ^ all 
of our problems are going to be solved. It is hard to believe that 
just because you cannot strike the other person any more, that he 
will then behave very well. 

I would like to emphasize : "Britain declared war on Germany in 
"1 514. Britain declared war on Ge rmany m 19&J. Ii they had not 
"Been able to declare war in eitlieTof those 2 years, they would have 
had to let the Germans do whatever they wanted to do. 

However, it may well be, though, that we will lace problems in 
the near future which are just not solvable by the techniques we have 
used in the past. In fact, that is true today to some extent. And it 
may well be that we should start on this new world right now. 
But it is a mistake to say that the new world has arrived today. It 
does not seem to be true. 

I have a book with me today which I recommen d to those who 
want to exaggerate the impact 01 thermonuclear war. It is called^ 
" "Muni ch : Prologue to Tragedy, 77 by Wheeler Bennet. Amon g ^otbir _ 
""F TvTngs Wheeler Bennet discusses why ChamberlaTn and lJaladief^ 
" Tolded. W hen they returned ^^^TOgg^CT^M]^^gIIS I. 
"Tnerr^people in Paris and Lo ndo n, because war ha d been avirfed. 
_ Over that weekend some peoplebegan to understond thatwar HacT 
HSem av erted by a sellout of the worst sort. And on Monday some 
~f ew wer lTprepared to criticize. JJut it yon read the debate, you 
^oticed_somethin g very sign ificant. Ti^rjeopie who ' criticized^ 

^^ciiF^enTlor not going to war; theysaid, "Hitlerwas bluffing, and 
^you shou ld have stood your ground. * ? 

_AsJ ar aswecan telL llifler was not bluffing. The men who were, 
"IrTQieroom withhim could see he was not bluffing. _JLwa s easy for 

the peo pIeHSack home to sayhe was bluffi ng, but not for the men who_ 
Jkad tKe decision to ^M _^E^^^^^^^^^£^^4^ 

The German Army^idjLot^want war. They literally threatened to 
"TEa^ea military reWutioii. Bat Hitler seems iifo hare been willing. 

We may T>e asked that same^quesHohT If the other man is not 
bluffing, and he may not be, then we have to ask ourselves, "Are we 
willing to fight or are we not ? Do we have an alternative to peace?" 
It is just that simple. 

Let me mention one more thing about the strontium 90 problem 
which gives one more reason why people are so concerned. 

If you had tried to predict the effects of this kind of contamination 
Hfefore we had carriedTiout these worldwide experiments, the testing 
2jn the Pacific and the Soviet Arctic, you ■ would have probably esti : „ 
" mated the concentration 55 new hone as about 10 times larger than ltis^ 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 905 

Jt turns out that the chain which brings Sr 90 into the hum an body 

from the fallout to thegrass, to the cow, to the milk, to the intestines, 

JgJJi&Jx me, discriminates against strontium 90 versus calciu^^This 

"^ p ur ely'fortuitous. JNlobody would have pr edi cted it ahead oftimeT 

If you nad been rather subtle in your calculations, you might have 

"realized this uncertainty existed anid taken a factor of 10 against you. 

That would have made the predicted pr oblem a hundred times worse 

"than it is, 

* Now, certainly if the problem came up very suddenly in a crisis, 

and you wanted to make a conservative calculation, you would have 

taken the 10 against you, and would have predicted a problem 100 

times worse than it is, and you would not be talking about A, B, and 

C foods, but about the abandonment of the country or at least of 

agriculture. We were just lucky, so to speak. 

If you look at the other problems which bother people, the carbon 
14 problem, for example, it is not so bad, but it has a similar char- 
acteristic. One of the problems that bothers people most about it is 
that 10,000 years after the war is over carbon 14 will still be causing 
genetic damage. That is a horrible thing to think of — you have a war 
today, and 10,000 years from now people are still suffering from the 
consequences of that war. 

But from our point of view that damage , though acceptable over 
10,000 years, is much less acceptable if it is taken in, say, 20 years. 
If carbon 14*Tiad a lifetime of only 20 years, you would be mucTT 
less willing to face the possibility of a, war and more willing to 
appea se. And if it was a really b ig war you could not face it, 
because you would be getting thousands of roentgens in one gen era- 
tion rather than, ML. $f$t,iF>c focfVWf &( [/(y&uf: Uf^) 

The point I am trying to make is that you cannot say, as people 
are sometimes tempted to say, that man has faced plenty of things 
in the past and therefore can face this also, that man always has 
and therefore always will rise to the occasion. No man can rise to 
the occasion with a thousand millicuries of strontium 90 in his body 
or a dos e of 3^000 roentgens, 

~_ The reason why I and my colleagues feel that the United States or 
^Russia can survive this war is because we have experimenta l jsuid^ 
"theoretical data and have made calculations. 

To put it in the words of the physicists, there is no conser vation 
theorem which states one can get tlirough"TEis~warrTt takes data 
and c alculati ons to show itT~ 

That is a very frightening thing, because that means you are de- 
pending on theory. And, as you know, theories have gone astray. 
Even bridges occasionally fall down. ■—— ~- 

Now, if you look at the kinds ofwars discussed in the last 4 days, 
there is such a large factor of safety present — and I think some of the 
testimony was pretty extreme, but most of it was very responsible— 
you can really feel that you can get through a war in the near future. 
Nobody today knows whether you could get through a war SO years 
from now, even if you spent tens and hundreds of billions of dollars, 
because the problem may get much worse. We estimate that just to 
answer some of the relevant questions would cost $200 million. These 
are complicated questions. 



901> EFFECTS OF ]STUCLEAR WAR 

Representative Hosmer. You did make some calculations, I believe ; 
what it would take in time and resources to achieve a return to prewar 
standards. 

Mr. Kahn. Let me do that in just one moment. 

I am not trying to say one cannot face wars in the more distant 
future. I am just saying we do not know. We should, find out. 

If you look at an attack such as the one this committee looked a t^ 
you will tind that more thanhalf of the wealth of the country survives 
the attack. You find that much more than half of the population" 
"survives. You find you have a great many resource sjejt over/^any_ 
jpeople think of this as a very misleading observation. ThatlsTtfiey 
jhink of a human society as being similar to hu man bodies^If you 
^destroy one vital organ, the body dies. TheTialr ceHsnugEt hngel 



rer on 



for a while, but eventually everything dies? 
Now 7 that is not our view of society. It is rather interesting that 

beforejj^rld War I, many experts had the same view of international 
Tr^5eT^TKeT^gued"TO at * wars had t o be short, because nations were 
~sol[epen^ trade thaElf it was cut off theywould 

"Hie. Today we know that this is not true and we use the same inter- 
n ational .analogy in .our study. 
J"^e TfmdTthecountry into two separate countries, an A country^ 

composed oi say, the largest 50 to 100 metropolitan areas. (A metr<> _ 
"pbl itan area includes neighboring suburbs.) Then we say there is a 
' B^bunt ryT the rest of the country, the me dium cities, small citig7 
"towns, rural are ^T^/ """"" 

We no ti ce thatthe B country has a large populatio n, w ell o ver 100 
"million pe o^l^thatltTias'a lot of wealth, that eveiTif^e^A^ountry ^ 
^wa¥compretely destroyed, th e B country could probably not onlTiuj^ 
"vive that destruction but 'rebuild the A country nT^metlS^ikej^ 



TNow^ we have no faith in that calculation. It is a calculation which 
nobody knows how to make. But we do not know whether the calcu- 
lation is optimistic or pessimistic. It is just the best we can do. 

My time seems to be running out, so let me finish by making some 
caveats. For this size of attack I do not know if these caveats are 
very important, though it would be important for a much larger 
attack. 

We believe that if one dusted the United States with the fallout 
from this kind of attack and did no other damage than if we had made 
cheap preparations for attacks of the size studied by the committee 
and expensive preparations for much larger attacks, we could handle 
all the radioactivity problems. We believe that if vou evacuated the 
A country and destroyed it totally, these 50 or 100 largest c ities, and. 

j fi3 nothing else, that we c ould rebuild these c itigsjn J0_years or so. 

__We also believe thatiiyou did nothing elseFut just kill one-third 
of the populat ion of the United Stato^u 16 other ;jtwo-thirc( s would 
not commit su icide^ They wouHTJurjJJ^ aperiodM . 

IS^^nTng, ajidt henTiTe^wouroTgo on. It is just that simple. 

Butffiere7s"a very important question which we never eveiii looked 
at. What if you do all of these things together and do many other 

things? 

Certain data were presented yesterday on ecological effects, these 
large fires and things like that. I think thaFdata is a little premature^ 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 907 

It probably does not correspond to a war of this sort r b utji war maybe 
IILiir JL£) J[ear^_Jrom now^ But still you are doingtHhgsTliKe that. 
You are burning Targe areas of the country. You are killing more 
insects tha n birds, and other th ings of that nature. 

Now, iFTs our belief, not~strongly~held, butlnoderately strongly 
held, that for an attack this size, these interacting and unlooked at 
effects will probably not be crucial. For a larger attack, we are cer 3 " 
tain they are very important and have to be looked at insof aF as they^ 
can be looked at. 

Senator Anderson. I asked a very able scientist one time what he 
thought the outcome of a nuclear war would be. He said, "Well, if 
you would give me one of the caverns in your State where I can hide 
one plane and put one bomb in it, I would wait 3 days after the war 
started, and then I would try to find the one remaining person in the 
world and kill him with that bomb." He felt it would be total 
destruction. 

You do not think it will be that way ? 

Mr. Kahn. It is not like that at all, so far as we can tell. 

Senator Anderson. At Sarajevo there was one little rifle shot, but 
before we got through there was quite a little shooting. 

Mr. Kahn. In the three lectures I try to discuss how wars terminate. 
This is a very complicated and uncertain subject. But, like anything 
else, one can conjecture and speculate. As near as I can tell, in most 
wars one side or the other gets a commanding lead very fast. In 
other words, you do not go down together. One side gets very much 
ahead. And then the only question that arises is a variation of the 
following. The side which is ahead can tell the side which is behind, 
"Unless you surrender or negotiate, I will physically destroy you. I 
will literally kill every point of resistance. I prefer you surrender- 
ing (a) because I am a humanitarian, (b) because you can hurt me 
while you are going down and I prefer that you don't hurt me any 
more than you have." The side which is behind has the choice of 
trying to use its remaining power of destruction to get a good bargain, 
but its bargaining position is weak. 

Now, if you look at this bargaining in detail, you notice that there 
is a great pressure of time, communications, control problems. It is 
a very bizarre world; it is not like an international conference at 
Geneva. One cannot propose complicated diplomatic formulae. The 
demands must be very simple. Whether they will be accepted or 
whether the war will be fought to the bitter end iyfi unpredictable. 
Once you get into this kind of thing, you can only conjecture what 
will happen. But one thing seems relatively likely, ^_war in which 
both sidg sjroj fown together and fight it out to the last plane an d so 
onjsjLYJIOLiji^^ look at exercises, maps, and 

TKe^effects of modern weaporisT Itjust does not seem to be like^that^ 
for most wars. The only one in^wm^lt iJ^^Qo be pj^QSTe is one 
where the war starts accidentally, whenT ncTsicte made any JE£&1 .. 
►reparations. 



But if one side gets in a very good first strike, it wi' 
ability, i n a yery real sens e, win the wai\_ 

Senator - Anderson. 1 am afraid that we are going to have to 
terminate here. 



908 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Representative Hosmer. Before we do go, I would like to call atten- 
tion that on page 8 ways and means are spoken of to ameliorate a 
thermonuclear war. They will be in the printed hearings. 

(The prepared statement of Herman Kahn follows :) 

Major Implications of a Study of Nuclear War 1 
Herman Kahn, Rand Corp. 

The general belief persists today that an all-out thermonuclear war would 
inevitably result in mutual annihilation, and that nothing can be done to make it 
otherwise. Even those who do not believe in total annihilation often do believe 
that the shock effect of the casualties, the immediate destruction of wealth, and 
the long-term deleterious effects of fallout would inevitably jeopardize the sur- 
vival of civilization. 

A study recently carried out by the author and a number of his colleagues at 
Rand, and privately financed by the Rand Corp., has reached conclusions that 
seriously question these beliefs. 2 While a thermonuclear war would be a catas- 
trophe—in some ways an unprecedented catastrophe — it would still be limited 
catastrophe. Even more important, the limits on the magnitude of the catas- 
trophe might be sharply dependent on what prewar measures had been taken. 
The study suggests that for the next 10 or 15 years, and perfiaps for much 
longer, feasible combinations of military and nonmilitary defense measures can 
come pretty close to preserving a reasonable semblance of our prewar society. 

As long as we think of a thermonuclear war as a sort offend of history, we 
may not feel acutely uncomfortable about placing all of our reliance either on 
deterrence or on measures to alleviate tension, as this seems to be all we can do. 
We may also feel that if war automatically means mutual annihilation surely no 
one would start one. However, as soon as we realize that it is technically and 
economically possible to alleviate the consequences of a war, then some of these 
psychological blocks to consideration of additional actions should disappear. 
The measures suggested by this study are not substitutes for adequate deterrent 
forces nor for sensible attempts to alleviate tension. They are insurance against 
the possible failure of these first priority measures and a complement to them. 

Our study was not a large effort. It was done by a team of about 20 pro- 
fessionals, drawn from various fields, who worked an average of four months 
on this problem. We tried to answer or define all the serious questions about 
nonmilitary defense. Obviously we could not examine these questions in great 
depth and detail ; thus, the numbers the study produced might well change with 
further investigation. The results, however, are plausible and should be far 
better than most intuitive feelings and preconceptions about this critical subject. 

DESCRIPTION of the possibilities 

Our analysis has brought forth the following results. While it is suggested 
that these be re-examined by a more complete study, we have sufl&cient con- 
fidence in them to suggest a $500 million program, described later. Roughly 
we decided that : 

There are a number of combinations of military and nonmilitary measures 
which could provide valuable levels of protection in a nuclear war. The level 
of protection depends on the size of the program and the nature and magnitude 
of the attack. Inexpensive measures designed to insure national survival in 
an all-out war of the early 1960's might be fairly cheap and relatively reliable — 
something of the order of a billion dollars or a fraction thereof should be suf- 
ficient. More complete programs, designed to protect more than the most easily 
protected people, would be more expensive. Because such programs cost in the 
tens of billions of dollars, they are automatically controversial. However, we 
believe that at least the inexpensive programs should be carried out — so that if a 
war should occur the majority of our population would not only survive the war 
but would be able to restore some semblance of prewar society quite rapidly. 
In a war of the early 1970's, even minimum measures to insure survival might 
be expensive (in the tens of billions) and probably less reliable. (Cost and 



1 This paper is a revised version of an article, "How Many Can Be Saved," that appeared 
in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. XV, No. 1, January 1959. 

3 "Report on a Study of Nonmilitary Defense," the Rand Corp. Kept. R-322-RC, July 1, 
1958. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 909 

performance change with time because the enemy threat changes.) However, 
at least a start should be made in preparing such measures. 

Oversimplifying a bit, one can say that during this 1960-70 period against a 
premeditated all-out surprise attack, moderate nonmilitary defense programs, 
if combined with reasonable military programs, should protect about half the 
population with high confidence, an additional one-fourth with medium con- 
fidence, and a final one-fourth with low confidence. A phased program might 
start with relatively cheap measures for 1960, develop into a minimum fallout 
program and then possibly later into a quite adequate or "luxurious" program 
which included blast shelters. While the planning should be done on this basis, 
there need be no irrevocable commitments to go ahead with the next phase if 
for any reason it seemed desirable to slow the program down or stop it. 

It should be noted that wars can start in a manner other than a premeditated 
program and then possibly later into a quite adequate or "luxurious" program 
might be very effective. Therefore, even if we are not willing to pay the cost for 
complete preparedness, we might be willing to initiate partial programs. These 
partial programs could be combined with prewar mobilization capabilities de- 
signed to put in an adequate program in a few years if the international situation 
deteriorates. It is plausible to consider such prewar mobilization capabilities 
because a country with a gross national product of about $500 billion and a con- 
struction industry whose capacity is close to $100 billion can contemplate doing 
things in a hurry if cheap but time-consuming preliminaries such as those in- 
volved in research, development, planning, analysis, design, programing, and 
legal hurdles have been eliminated. 

In addition to protecting people from the immediate effects of the war, it is 
necessary to insure their survival in the postwar environment and then to restore 
prewar standards of living if possible. Our study also indicated that : 

Shelters with long occupancy time and the use of known anti-contamination 
techniques should make it possible to handle the acute radiation problem (dur- 
ing the first 3 months) from even severe attacks. 

With only moderate preparations in the early period and more elaborate ones 
in the later, it should be possible to handle short-term (3-24 months) survival, 
patchup, and repair problems. 

Combinations of military and nonmilitary measures could protect enough cap- 
ital to enable the economy to be restored to about half the prewar levels in the 
first year. The recuperation to prewar levels might be much faster (5-15 
years) than has been generally supposed. In any case, if reasonable measures 
were taken the economy, on a per capita basis, would in all probability not drop 
below 1930-40 levels, except perhaps in the first postwar year. 

Long-lived radioactivity problems, while serious, could be alleviated to the 
extent that, in comparison with the direct effects of the war, they would have a 
relatively minor impact on the economy or personal life of the population. Sub- 
ject to uncertainties, the same should be true of the genetic effects. Bven though 
these may last for a thousand years, the burden on any single generation should 
only be a fractional increase over the current normal burden of congenital 
defects. 

IMPLICATIONS FOR DETERRENCE 

U.S. national policy rests on a deterrent strategy. Presumably, deterrence of 
Soviet attack depends upon Soviet calculations of their risks versus their chances 
of success. Our study distinguishes three types of deterrence in examining the 
implications of nonmilitary defense : 

Type I — Deterrence of a direct attack on the United States. In this case any 
calculation the -Soviets might make would assume they have the first strike and 
the United States strikes back with a damaged force. ( Calculations ignoring the 
eflects of the first strike and therefore based on the preattack inventory of forces 
can be very misleading.) The Soviets then ask themselves what damage they 
are likely to suffer before hostilities end. Here the Soviet Union's estimate of the 
effectiveness of their passive defense preparations may play a crucial role, and 
the United States should examine these to see what questions they raise. Pre- 
sumably since the Soviets can count on warning, and because they need only de- 
fend themselves against a damaged force, even moderate preparations might be 
considered effective under some circumstances. It is not that the Soviets could 
reliably expect to be untouched, but that a situation might arise in which the 
Soviets might feel that going to war was the least risky of the available alterna- 
tives. 



910 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

U.S. nonmilitary defense programs will probably have only a marginal effect 
on U.S. type I deterrence. Because the war will almost undoubtedly be short 
and fought with existing stocks, civilian production and morale are unimportant 
to the military course of events. The chief importance of U.S. nonmilitary 
defense in this case resides in more or less accidental byproducts such as pro- 
tected communications, survival of off-duty personnel, greater ability to im- 
provise and augment SAC-type forces for second and later strikes, and possibly 
most important of all, a resistance to post-attack blackmail tactics which might 
otherwise succeede in at least partially disarming our surviving SAO forces. 
. Type II — Deterrence of extremely provocative behavior. The Soviets now 
ask themselves if they can force the United States to accept peacefully the con- 
sequences of some extremely provocative action (say a large-scale attack on 
Europe or a Munich-type crisis). They presumably ask themselves, "What is the 
U.S. risk-gain calculation?"- — crediting the United States with the first strike. 
Under these circumstances, in which there has been a tense situation, the Soviet 
Union strikes second with a damaged force; and when U.S. warning problems 
have been simplified, even modest civil defense programs relying mainly on 
evacuation and improvisation might perform impressively enough to make it 
clear to the Soviet planner and to our allies that there is a good possibility, if 
not a certainty, that the United States would not accept the provocation peace- 
fully. If the Soviets were not deterred then the United States might actually 
carry out an evacuation to try to persuade them to desist. If the evacuation did 
not persuade the Soviets to desist, then in the last resort the United States might 
decide that it was less risky to go to war than to acquiesce. 

The ability and willingness of the United States to engage in type II deterrence 
activities will be strongly affected by our type I deterrence capabilities. Be- 
cause using type II deterrence automatically strains our type I deterrence (par- 
ticularly if we try the evacuation maneuvers), we now need more of it. Almost 
all of the remarks made about type II deterrence carry over to our ability to 
wage and limit "limited wars." 

Type II deterrence is, of course, symmetrical. There is an enormous difference 
in the bargaining ability of a country which can, for example, put its people in 
a place of safety on 24 hours' notice, and one which cannot. If it is hard for 
the reader to visualize this, let him imagine a situation where the Russians had 
prepared for exactly that and we had not. Then let him ask himself how he 
thinks we would come out at a subsequent Munich-type conference. 

Type III — Deterrence of moderately provocative actions. In this case it 
would be wishful thinking to expect deterrence to work most of the time. How- 
ever, Soviet calculations which contemplate provoking the United States might 
be influenced by the existence of a U.S. plan for a crash nonmilitary defense 
program. If a Soviet provocation touched off such a U.S. program, then the 
Soviets would probably be forced either to match this program, accept a position 
of inferiority, or possibly even strike immediately. In all cases, the costs and 
risks to them of their provocation are increased. If this possibility is made clear 
and probable, the Soviets should include these costs and risks in their calcula- 
tions. Our type III deterrence is also affected by Soviet nonmilitary defense 
programs because their willingness to be aggressive and their bargaining ability 
may be influenced by the risks they run. 

A converse effect may be an important additional bonus of even a modest start 
toward a realistic U.S. civil defense program. Such a program makes more 
"rational" a strong foreign policy (when a strong foreign policy might seem 
desirable) by decreasing the immediate risks. Making a stronger foreign policy 
more "rational" may or may not make it more probable, but at least it is made 
more credible. This should help in deterring some minor as well as extreme 
provocations. Even an explicit mobilization capability can be important because 
it should make it credible to our allies that we will at least be able to put our- 
selves soon into a position where we can rationally back them. 

IMPACT ON MILITARY MISSIONS 

The study made a superficial investigation of the components of nonmilitary 
defense and their relationship to complete and balanced defense and deterrence 
systems. For example, nonmilitary defense provides a new perspective for 
studies of active air defense and offense. Most air defense studies have tried to 
devise systems to protect the U.S. mobilization base — economic resources and 
population— with a high level of certainty. Actually, this goal can be made to 
seem attainable only if unrealistically optimistic assumptions are made. The 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 911 

result is either a dangerous over-optimism about the power of defense or an 
equally dangerous apathy and despair. Similar remarks can be made about our 
strategic offense insofar as it is designed only to deter and not to fight a war. 
Such viewpoints tend to ignore the very important role our defense and offense 
systems can have between these two extremes in alleviating the consequences of 
war. 

Because a nuclear war would be horrible, it takes an act of imagination to 
visualize one starting; but it should not take a further act of imagination to 
believe that such a war would end. As part of the study we considered various 
ways in which a war might terminate. If one or both sides were improperly 
prepared, such a war might end in a few hours by the almost total destruction 
of the military forces of one side by the other. If, however, both sides had 
made even moderate (but realistic) preparations to fight a long war — a war of 
at least a few days duration — then appreciably military forces should be left on 
both sides after the initial onslaught. And this in turn means that there are 
advantages to both sides in ending the war by negotiation. 

Certain tactics facilitate a quick and favorable end by negotiation. For ex- 
ample, one side can avoid some large fraction of the other side's cities and use 
the threat of destruction of these cities both as a hostage for the enemy's good 
behavior and as an inducement to negotiate. Similarly, the other side can adopt 
a similar tactic and use the threat of his surviving forces to compel the enemy 
to offer "reasonable" terms. As in classical warfare, the "reserves" may play a 
central role. 

No matter what sequence of events is imagined, the possibility that the offense 
and defense could survive for some days is important. Nevertheless, most dis- 
cussions of new strategic systems appear overly concerned with wars that last 
less than 1 day. If we are seriously interested in alleviating the consequences of 
a war, then we are interested in having military capabilities* — both offensive 
and defensive— on the second and third days of the war. In fact, sensible mili- 
tary planning would provide for wars lasting from 2 to 30 days, though the first 
day — or even hours — of the war is still likely to be of the utmost significance. 

INTERACTIONS WITH DISARMAMENT 

The most obvious effect of civil defense on disarmament is the reduction in the 
vulnerability of the civilian targets. This has only an indirect effect on the 
military situation of a potential defender since most civilians and their build- 
ings are not really military targets. However, a reduction in civilian vulner- 
ability may be of major importance in reducing the risk that a potential aggres- 
sor faces. Presumably he can contemplate accepting a larger retaliatory strike 
if he has a reasonable nonmilitary defense program than he could if he didn't 
have one. To this extent a civil defense program conflicts with some of the 
objectives of a disarmament program. 

There are, however, two very important ways in which civil defense programs 
may help a disarmament program. First, the civil defense programs make a 
nation somewhat less vulnerable to blackmail or a breakdown of the disarmament 
agreement. If a nation is totally vulnerable to an attack, then it is also totally 
vulnerable to blackmail and the fact that it might be able to destroy the black- 
mailing nation does not necessarily help. It is just not credible that a nation 
such as the United States will consciously and deliberately choose suicide while 
there is any hope of life. In other words, pure disarmament programs without 
any civil defense make no allowance for type II or type III deterrence. It is 
extremely wishful thinking to believe that such things will never be necessary. 
It may be positively dangerous deliberately to weaken our type II or type III 
deterrence to the point where it is an invitation to a potential aggressor. Fur- 
thermore, even a disarmament program will not completely exclude the possi- 
bility of accidental or unpremeditated war. Finally, even the best disarmament 
agreement might be repudiated or violated— possibly initiating a sequence of 
events which lead to war. It is, therefore, always necessary either to have capa- 
bilities to alleviate the consequences of a war or at least to be able to create 
capabilities in a short period of time. In general, adequate civil defense capabil- 
ities cannot be created in a short period of time unless extensive preparations 
have been made. 

A rather important and valuable effect of a realistic civil defense program 
(and one that is often overlooked) is a psychological one. If one is designing his 
military establishment to terminate a war, rather than just to deter one (by 



912 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

punishing the enemy with a retaliatory strike), one is much less likely to indulge 
in wishful thinking. Even today, without any disarmament schemes, Western 
military organizations and their governments have psychological and motiva- 
tional difficulties in maintaining a high operating state of readiness and ade- 
quate comhat capabilities. This is partly because many feel both that such 
weapon systems will never be used, and that if they were used they would be 
so destructive that you don't really care if they operate well or badly. If this 
attitude is combined with the moral onus on military preparations and planning 
that a disarmament agreement might hring one could almost confidently predict 
an. undue and possibly dangerous degradation of Western military capabilities, 
If one is emotionally committed to the belief that deterrence is foolproof, there 
is not much of a step from being satisfied with a system which is objectively 
capable of destroying the enemy in a rataliatory blow to a system which can 
only hurt the enemy, and from there to a system which might hurt the enemy, 
and finally to one for which there are circumstances in which it is conceivable 
that the enemy will be hurt. The capacity of Western governments and peoples, 
under propitious circumstances, to indulge in wishful thinking in the military 
field is almost unlimited. An official aim which calls for an objective capability 
to terminate a war in a reasonably satisfactory fashion might have a salutary 
effect in restraining fancies. ( W. W. Marseille has suggested to the author that 
"this is putting the cart before the horse. The psychological factors are what 
cause us not to have a realistic civil defense program in the first place." How- 
ever, the author has found — to his surprise — that once people start thinking in 
terms of alleviating a war it is possible to successfully make points which it 
should have been possible to make if one were only arguing deterrence, but 
which were not taken seriously in this latter context.) 

A PROPOSED CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM S 

Once one accepts the proposition that it is possible to alleviate, to some extent, 
the consequences of a thermonuclear war, one is faced with the question, "Is it 
worth spending money on such a capability?" 3 

1. The creation of incomplete but worthwhile capabilities by reorienting 
and strengthening the current civil defense program utilizing feasible evacua- 
tion measures, improvised fallout protection, damage control, modest prepara- 
tions for recuperation and, giving these other measures, the institution of a 
vigorous program of education and technical assistance to private parties and 
organizations. Some inexpensive measures might save from 20 to 50 million 
lives, limit the contingent damage to property, markedly facilitate our abil- 
ity to recuperate, and provide an environment in which private citizens could 
do sensible things on their own to increase their chances of survival. 

2. Research and development on all important aspects of the art of non- 
military defense. Unlike research and development on military matters, non- 
military defense has received comparatively little money and effort. In par- 
ticular, the little work necessary for this study indicated that imaginative 
work could not only result in large improvements in the effectiveness of de- 
fense measures, but could also uncover many unsuspected problems that would 
otherwise be very unpleasant surprises. 

3. Accompanying the research and development work should be a vigorous 
effort on the systems design of various combinations of military and nonmilitary 
defense. This effort should produce specification, including phasing, of many 
alternative programs. These specifications should be of sufficient detail to 
permit their costing and their performances to be caluculated over time and 
under many circumstances. Paper planning and design should be undertaken 
for a number of the alternatives specified so that any program finally adopted 



3 Most of the material in this section came from the Rand Corp. Report RM22045-RC, 
''Some Specific Suggestions for Getting Early Nonmilitary Defense Capabilities and 
Initiating Long-Range Programs," by, Herman Kahn et ai. !That report was originally 
prepared in the early part of 1958. and was circulated in a limited fashion to various 
individuals for information and comment. While I have made some minor modifications in 
the material to correspond to some changes in my viewpoint, there has been no thorough- 
going revision. !The dollar recommendations should be thought of as quantitative ex- 
pressions of intuitive judgments, However, I should also note that I probably have 
substantially more justification for my estimates than do many official proposals. In 
any case, these things are so uncertain, and for reasonable programs the overall perform- 
ance variations with minor changes in allocations are so small, that as citizen, voter, and 
taxpayer I am prepared to defend the numerical recommendations, even if as an analyst 
I have to concede that there is incomplete documentation. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 913 

would be less costly and have its leadtime reduced (by perhaps 3 to 5 years 
over conventional methods of proceeding). 

4. While it is technically feasible to start a large-scale program of nonmili- 
tary defense now, there are many uncertainties and gaps in our knowledge. 
After objectives 2 and 3 (research and development and leadtime reducing 
measures) have been accomplished, the proper balance between military and 
nonmilitary expenditures can be studied. The Government could then make 
wiser decisions, and some of the difficulties resulting from a combination of 
ignorance and uncertainty would be eliminated or decreased. The decision to 
go ahead or not go ahead with a multi-billion-dollar program should not be 
made until objectives 2 and 3 have been carried out. 

5. There seem to be many possibilities for inexpensive preparatory actions that 
could result in the creation of important capabilities in the 1965-70 time period. 
Again, irrespective of any decision to go or not go into a multi-billion-dollar 
program, these possibilities should be studied; if and when such actions are 
found desirable they should be put into practice. 

A possible allocation for the additional $500 million to be. spent on civil defense 

might go as follows: rfh'tS W*f yAwt K€W4&y d#4 M n C \?) 

1. Radiation meters. * *$100, 000,000 

2 . ^Utilization of existing structures for fallout protection^ ,— * 150, 000, 000 

3. Preliminary phase (including research and development) of a 

spectrum of shelter programs 75, 000, 000 

4. Movement, damage control, and anticontamination, etc__„____ 1 75, 000, 000 

5. Systems studies and planning ___ 20, 000, 000 

6. Other research and development * 20,000,000 

7. Prototype shelters _ ... 20, 000, 000 

8. Education and technical assistance 20, 000, 000 

9. Miscellaneous 20, 000, 000 

* Total * 500, 000, 000 

1 Indicates Federal expenditures that would likely be supplemented by non-Federal 
expenditures stimulated by the program. 

The above program can be divided into two parts : a short- and a long-range 
program, though there is a lot of overlap and joint use in the two programs, which 
is the reason why we do not budget them separately. 

About 60 to 70 percent of the above $500 million would be spent to purchase 
capabilities that would be useful if a war started in the immediate future. Be- 
cause the possible gains are so large, I do not believe that it is necessary to 
justify spending such a relatively small sum of money, even though there are 
some uncertainties about the performance of the program. The sum of $300 
million is very small if it can make the difference between a relatively expedi- 
tious recovery for the survivors of a war and one that might not only be slow but 
could conceivably not occur at all ; or if it could buy the kinds of capabilities that 
would make the difference between the Russians being able or not being able to 
blackmail us. 

About 30 to 40 percent of the $500 million in our proposed budget, or less than 
$200 million, is allocated to research analysis, development, planning, and design 
for a spectrum of civil defense programs. This may seem to be a great deal of 
money to spend on producing pieces of paper and prototypes. But I believe that 
$200 million is a reasonable sum of money to spend on finding out how best to 
secure the lives and property of the Nation, and J would regard the proposed 
research program as a mandatory precondition to the decision to spend or not 
spend any large sums on passive defense itself. 

Is $200 million really an unreasonably large sum? It costs from $50 to $100 
million to develop an engine for a military airplane. It costs $100 to $200 
million to develop an interceptor aircraft and $500 million to $1 billion to develop 
an intercontinental bomber. The IOBM development program cost between $1 
and $2 billion. The Department of Defense spends $5 billion every year on 
research and development. We are saying that a complete nonmilitary defense 
program is at least as complicated as an interceptor aircraft. 

We should also ask if $200 million is too little to be spending on long-range 
programs. Some people suggest the immediate initiation of large-scale passive 
defense programs that would cost in the neighborhood of $25 billion. It is 
improbable that very large sums could be spent efficiently on construction in 
the next year or two, and it is almost certain that if the attempt were made 



914 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

without a prior program of the sort we are suggesting that not only would 
the wrong sorts of personal protection be procured, but there would also be 
major, maybe disastrous, inadequacies and lacunse in the overall program. 

We should consider the initiation of some inexpensive measures during the 
course of, and based on the results of, the research program. For example, 
circumstances might suggest a large "Starter Set" — including procurement of 
such materials as appear most likely to cause bottlenecks in a larger program : 
reinforcing steel, corrugated steel, structural steel, cement, and other building 
materials. If this were done, there would be no lag in the completion date of 
even th,e largest programs even though no major construction were begun 
immediately. 

A decision to go ahead or not go ahead on a multibillion-dollar program 
should be made sepaartely from and subsequent to the completion of the pro- 
posed $200 million research program. 

Still addressing ourselves for the moment to the proponents of large programs, 
there is at least one good reason why the Government may now be loathe to 
make a commitment for shelters. The shelter program itself has been looked 
at in only a superficial way, and many of the other problems associated with 
preserving a civilization and a standard of living have not been looked at even 
superficially. While our study tried to look at these overall problems and, 
in particular, to ask the question, "How does the country look 5 or 10 years 
after the war as a function of our preparations?" we scarcely scratched the 
surface. We believe we have shown that it is plausible, at least in the im- 
mediate future, that with inexpensive measures the United States could be an 
acceptable place to live even a year after the war. However, we concede that 
the uncertainties are large enough to raise the question of sheer survival, and 
the problem gets more severe in the later time period. Until the feasibility of 
recovery and other long-term problems and their solution are settled, it will be 
hard to arouse real interest in attempts to alleviate the consequences of war- But 
it is possible to settle these questions relatively inexpensively and at the same time 
avoid delaying the completion date for a full program or the immediate acquisi- 
tion of moderate capabilities. The $200 million of our civil defense budget 
should be spent over a period of 2 or 3 years on what might be called the 
"cheap" starter set — the preliminary phases of a civil defense program — mostly 
on research, development, analysis, planning, and design. 

These preliminaries should not be restricted to any prechosen program. The 
scale of the final program will presumably be determined by the results of these 
investigations and the current international situation; it should not be fixed 
prematurely. It is also most important to consider explicitly time period in the 
late sixties and early seventies. Unless we start soon the long-range programs 
needed to ameliorate the effects of potentially very destructive attacks of this 
time period, we will find that we have irrevocably lost very valuable opportuni- 
ties. 

Our goal in allocating funds to projects was not that every dollar be spent 
economically, but rather to make sure that every subject be covered adequately. 
While we were generous, we tried to refrain from padding. Although our figure 
of $200 million is, of course, only approximate, it is as likely to be low as high 
if an adequate job of research, development, systems analysis, planning, and 
design is to be undertaken. Many of the potential civil defense programs are so 
expensive that it is worthwhile to spend some money speculatively if there is 
any chance at all of the overall program being helped by even a small per- 
centage. Therefore, the aim should not be to see that every dime is spent 
on the assurance that it will result in a successful project, but rather to see 
that all interesting avenues are explored. Otherwise, there may be disastrous 
inadequacies or even complete lacunae 4n the program that is finally adopted. 

Such a large and many-sided program of study, planning, and innovation 
require a strong monitoring effort of a sort that is not common in most Govern- 
ment agencies. This effort has to be much more than the ordinary B. & D. 
administration. The monitors must maintain a continuous and close observation 
of all the programs and constantly evaluate their direction and results. While 
they should be able to suggest the termination of fruitless programs, their main 
purpose should be to encourage the expansion of promising effort. Most impor- 
tant, they must be alert to identify gaps and inadequacies in the programs, and 
suggest remedial action. 

Because of their crucial role, the monitors must obviously be an exceptionally 
competent and well-informed group of people. However, the monitors do not 
need and should not have the authority to orient all programs toward prede- 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 915 

termined objectives. Experience has shown that attempts to conduct large and 
overcoordinated programs tend to create inflexibility and to stifle new, unproven 
ideas or independent approaches. Hence, the monitors should act as an ad- 
visory group rather than as a "research czar." But they must have the authority 
to make suggestions and offer criticism at all levels and have the right to eon- 
tact the researchers or planners in the field. 

The monitoring group could be located in the independent long-range planning 
organization, mentioned in chapter 2, part II, and act for the various Govern- 
ment agencies that will be principally concerned with the nonmilitary defense 
effort. Or, it could be a special group in OCDM or under the Presidential 
assistant for national security affairs. In order to maintain a good "feel" for 
the program as a whole and to foresee future requirements, the monitors should 
be closely associated with the systems analysis and operations research pro- 
gram. Perhaps they should also have direct access to funds for small studies 
or pilot projects. 

THE FUIX PROGRAM 

A superficial description of the $500 million program follows. Somewhat 
more detail (of a very similar program) can be found in the previously men- 
tioned Rand Corp. report, RM 2206-RC. 

1. Radiation meters ($100 million) 

Our program calls for 2 million dose-rate meters (at about $20 a meter), 10 
million self -reading dosimeters (at about $5" a meter, including an allowance 
for -chargers), and 20 to 50 million dosimeters (at about $1 to $2 a meter). 

Only a portion of the meters would be distributed before hostilities. The 
rest would not be distributed until a "national emergency'* occurred or until 
the postattack period, and they should be stored with this in mind. The final 
distribution of meters might go somewhat as follows: 500,000 dose-rate or 
survey meters to the large shelters (capable of sheltering more than, say, 50 
persons) ; 1 million to outdoor workers of various types, such as farmers, pros- 
pectors, foresters, construction workers, and so on; 250,000 to individuals and 
organizations in various towns and cities ;* and 250,000 to the working teams 
discussed below under item 4. 

The self -reading dosimeters would be distributed approximately as follows: 
2,500,000 to the work parties discussed under 4 below ; 2,500,000 to the shelters, 
schools, and other places ; and 5 million to the people who work out-of-doors in 
possibly uncontrolled environments. The $1 and $2 dosimeters would be issued 
to everybody who is in an even moderately hot area and is not working under 
completely controlled conditions. The total budget allocated above is more 
than $100 million, but we think the number of meters suggested could be ob- 
tained and distributed if the Government were to allocate only $100 million. 
The rest of the budget should be made up of stimulated expenditures for meters 
by local governments, private groups, and individuals. 

£. Utilization of existing structures for fallout protection ($150 million) 

We would expect about $50 million to be spent on identifying, counting, and 
labeling the various structures that either provide valuable levels of fallout 
protection as they now stand or that can easily be modified to do so. The 
rest of the money would be spent for such supplies as radios, minimal toilet 
equipment (such things as primitive as buckets), and possibly even minimum 
food supplies (candy bars, multipurpose foods and such), or materials for im- 
proving the protection of the shelter. The survey should include places that 
can be used as improvised fallout shelters with various amounts of advance 
warning — 1 hour, 2 hours, 4 hours, 8 hours, 16 hours, 2 days, 2 weeks, and even 
longer. We should hope to get detailed plans for the different kinds of im- 
provisations that are pissible as a function of the time which is available. 

S. Preliminary phase (including research and development) of a spectrum of 
shelter programs ( $15 milUon ) 

One of the most short-sighted things that OCDM has done is to reduce its 
expenditures on the study of blast shelters — just because it is not part of the 
current "national shelter policy" to have blast shelters. As I have tried to stress 
in these lectures, we just do not know today what we will want 5 or 10 years 
from now, and current programs and requirements should not overinfiuence 



4 Something like this is being done by OCDM. 



916 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

current research and development. We should not prejudge these unknown 
future desires of ours by not undertaking inexpensive preliminary work on 
many more things than we expect to procure. It is only by having a broad base 
of research and development that we can expected to understand our problems 
and be in a position to have a flexible procurement policy. 

These last remarks have special point for research and development and even 
preliminary programing in the shelter field. It is clear that if the inter- 
national situation had already deteriorated to the point where we felt there 
was a high probability that we would have to fight a war, we would be institut- 
ing a very luxurious shelter system, indeed. It may turn out that, given the 
possibilities for weapons development, a pure fallout system will not be adequate 
in the late sixties and early seventies. For these and other reasons, the shelter 
studies should investigate the many different levels of protection that would be 
compatible With programs of as low as $2 or $& billion to programs as high as 
$200 billion. . - 

A possible allocation for the $75 million we have allotted to shelters would be 
as follows : 

Theoretical work in the response of structures $1,000,000 

Theoretical work in design 1» 000, 000 

Basic designs ----. '■&> |W> J$0 

Experimental testing . 15 > 000, 00° 

Detailed study of : ^^ 

10 large cities 10, ^ °0u 

10 medium cities 5,000,000 

10 towns and rural areas - — 5, 000, 000 

Study of geology and underground possibilities 10,000,000 

Study of nonpersonnel shelters 10, 000, 000 

Special equipment — — 10, 000, 000 

Miscellaneous & » OOu, OUU 

Total _„ 1 75, 000, 000 

4. Movement, damage cqn\trol, antioontaminaiion ($15 million) 

The two main things we should hope to provide under this category are the 
capability to evacuate to improvised protection and the creation of a core of "re- 
servists" that would be organized to facilitate the evacuation, the improvisation 
of shelters either pre- or post-attack, and that would also be useful in the 
immediate postattack and longer run rescue, decontamination, debris clearing, 
continuity of government, housing, and repair problems. There are at least 5 
million people in the United States who have the proper skills for such work. 
We should sign up 200,000 of these people as part-time but paid cadres and many 
others as unpaid part-time cadres or just available volunteers. The 200,000 peo- 
ple might go through a 1-week or 2-week training course every year. In war- 
time, or in a tense preattack situation, we should plan to expand them by a factor 
of 5 to 20. Such an organization would probably cost about $500 per man per/ 
year, or about $100 million per year for 200,000 people. However, it would ^e 
practically impossible to spend more than $25 to $50 million in the first year or 
two when this group is being organized, and this is the amount in our budget 
This cadre might be supplemented (or replaced) by the military* reserves. 

Another $25 to $50 million would go for all the measures that are needed to 
create different kinds of potentially useful evacuation capabilities. What money 
is left, probably around $10 to $30 million, would be used to study and imple- 
ment the damage control measures that will be necessary to limit the bonus dam- 
age when cities, factories, and homes are abandoned, to control fires, and to 
provide some additional protection for some government or crucial commercial 
stocks. This last figure is very definitely an allotment and not an estimate. 

5. Systems studies and planning {$20 million) 

The program described to this point is composed mainly of interim measures 
that are intended to fill the gap until we can decide what our long-range plans 
should be. 

Among the first things to be studied and planned for are the different kinds 
of nonmilitary defense systems needed for various situations, and how we can 
build in our programs large degrees of flexibility. We must design systems to be 
in a position to exploit favorable circumstances and to hedge against unfavorable 
ones. Probably the worst defect of civil defense planning today is that it tends 
to concentrate on a single set of assumptions and circumstances (a surprise 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 917 

attack directed at civilians), a set that also happens to be the most difficult 
to handle. As a result, civil defense recommendations have not been tested 
against a large number of possibilities. The proposed plans should not only 
consider a large range of circumstances, they should also consider phasing 
problems so that we will get early capabilities and still be able to accommodate 
growth in the future — particularly growth required by either unexpectedly large 
threats or higher standards. Some of the situations that might be studied are 
listed below : 

(a) Movement of the population to shelters, considering warnings of minutes, 
1 to 3 hours, 10 to 20 hours, and strategic evacuation. 

( b) The various attack-response patterns ( suggested in the lectures ) . 

(c) Enemy tactics corresponding to three possible enemy target objectives: 
military, population, and recuperation — or mixtures of these. 

(d) Civil defense postures as influenced or determined by many things, in- 
cluding variations in our own or enemy objectives, budget levels and allocations, 
disarmament, degrees of tension, changes in NATO, Chinese developments, other 
Russian satellite developments, and so on. 

(e) Other strategic and tactical considerations; for example, sneak attacks 
and other unconventional tactics, unconventional weapons, reattacks, and various 
ways that war can be terminated. 

(/) Worldwide planning. 

(g) Basic technical uncertainties to be studied and allowed for include the 
performance and effects of weapons, carriers, air defense systems, medical 
unknowns, and so on. 

In addition, all studies should be conducted with an eye to understanding and 
exploiting interactions between military and nonmjlitary defenses. Some areas 
In which these interactions occur, and some proposed research projects, are listed 
below : 

(a) The circumstances in which wars can start should be examined to deter- 
mine what roles can be played by augmentation abilities brought into play in 
tense situations, on D-day, or even after D-day. For the starter set our military 
prewar mobilization capability is important. Lastly, and most important, we 
must reexamine our capability of fighting for days or weeks. 

( & ) Civil defense contributes to the overall problem by reducing the job of air 
defense and air offense to manageable proportions: by making large^niilitary 
budgets more acceptable (fighting and winning a war takes more military power 
than is needed for pure deterrence) ; by making safer use of nuclear weapons in 
air defense; and by protecting important elements of our air defense and air 
offense capabilities. 

(c) On the military side, air defense provides warning, increases the enemy's 
raid-size requirements (even for minimum-objective attacks), forces him to use 
expensive carriers and tactics, cuts down his force, decreases his bombing 
accuracy, and may provide time against ICBM attacks by killing the first few 
missiles so people can get into shelters. 

(d) Air offense (and effective civil defense) forces the enemy to buy expen- 
sive defenses (by making a U.S. first-strike credible), draws his attacks (partic- 
ularly his first strike) away from population and recuperation targets, ends the 
war quickly either by destroying the enemy or forcing him to negotiate, and 
complicates the enemy's job by being dispersed, hard, and alert. 

It might be appropriate at this point to comment on some of the characteristics 
of good analyses and plans. The following is quoted from RM-1829 5 "Tech- 
niques of Systems Analysis," by Herman Kahn and Irwin Mann. 

"An item of equipment cannot be fully analyzed in isolation; frequently its 
interaction with the entire environment, including other equipment, has to be 
considered. The art of systems analysis is born of this fact ; systems demand 
analysis as systems. 

"Systems are analyzed with the intention of describing, evaluating, improving, 
and comparing with other systems. In the early days many people naively 
thought that this last meant picking a single definite quantitative measure of 
effectiveness, finding a best set of assumptions, and then using modern mathe- 
matics and high speed computers to carry out the computations. Often their 
professional bias led them to believe that the central issues revolved around what 
kind of mathematics to use and how to use the computer. 



5 A Rand Corp. report, 



918 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

"With some exceptions, the early picture was illusory. First, there is the 
trivial point that even modern techniques are not usually powerful enough to 
treat even simple practical problems without great simplification and Realiza- 
tion. The ability and knowledge necessary to do this simplification and ideali- 
zation is not always standard equipment of scientists and mathematicians or 
even of their practical military collaborators. 

"Much more important, the concept of a simple optimizing calculation ignores 
the central role of uncertainty. The uncertainty arises not only because. we do 
not actually know what we have (much less what the enemy has) or what is 
going to happen, but also because we cannot agree on what we are trying to do. 

"In practice, three kinds of uncertainty can be distinguished : 
"1. Statistical uncertainty. 
"2. Real uncertainty. 
"3. Uncertainty about the enemy's actions. 

"We will mention each of these uncertainties in turn. 

"Statistical uncertainty.— This is the kind of uncertainty that pertains to 
fluctuation phenomena and random variables. It is the uncertainty associated 
with 'honest' gambling devices. There are almost no conceptual difficulties in 
treating it— it merely makes the problems computationally more complicated. 

"Real uncertainty.— This is the uncertainty that arises from the fact that 
people believe different assumptions, have different tastes (and therefore ob- 
jectives), and are, more often than not, ignorant. It has been argued by 
scholars that any single individual can, perhaps, treat this uncertainty as being 
identical to the statistical uncertainty mentioned above, but it is in general im- 
possible for a group to do this in any satisfactory way. 6 For example, it is 
possible for individuals to assign subjectively evaluated numbers to such things 
as the probability of war or the probability of success of a research program, 
but there is typically no way of getting a useful consensus on these numbers. 
Usually, the best that can be done is to set limits between which most reason- 
able people agree the probabilities lie. 

"The fact that people have different objectives has almost the same con- 
ceptual effect on the design of a socially satisfactory system as the disagreement 
about empirical assumptions. People value differently, for example, deterring 
a war as opposed to winning it, or alleviating its consequences if deterrence 
fails; they ascribe different values to human lives (some even differentiate 
between different categories of human lives, such as civilian and military, or 
friendly, neutral, and enemy), future preparedness versus present, preparedness 
versus current standard of living, aggressive versus defensive policies, etc. Our 
category, 'real uncertainty,* covers differences in objectives as well as differences 
in assumptions. 

"The treatment of real uncertainty is somewhat controversial, but we believe 
actually fairly well understood practically. It is handled mainly by what we 
call contingency design 

"Uncertainty due to enemy reaction. — This uncertainty is a curious and 
baffling mixture of statistical and real uncertainty, complicated by the fact that 
we are playing a non-zero-sum game. 7 It is often very difficult to treat satis- 
factorily. A reasonable guiding principle seems to be (at least for a rich coun- 
try), to compromise designs so as to be prepared for the possibility that the 
enemy is bright, knowledgeable, and malevolent, and yet be £ble to exploit the 
situation if the enemy fails in any of these qualities. 

"To be specific : 

"To assume that the enemy is bright means giving him the freedom (for the 
purpose of analysis) to use the resources he has in the way that is best for him, 
even if you do not think he is smart enough to do so. 

"To assume that he is knowledgeable means giving the enemy credit for 
knowing your weaknesses if he could have found out about them by using rea- 
sonable effort. You should be willing to do this even though you yourself have 
just learned about these weaknesses, 

"To assume that the enemy is malevolent means that you will at least look 
at the case where the enemy does what is worst for you, even though it may 



* "The Foundations of Statistics," by L.. J. Savage ; "Social Choice and Individual 
Values," by K. J. Arrow. 

7 The terminology "non-zero-sum game," refers to any conflict situation where there are 
gains to be achieved if the contenders cooperate. Among other things, this introduces 
the possibilities of implicit or explicit bargaining between the two contenders. The whole 
concept of deterrence comes out of the notion that the game we are playing with Russia 
is non-zero-sum. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 919 

not be rational for him to do this. This is sometimes an awful prospect and, 
in addition, plainly pessimistic, so one may wish to design against a 'rational' 
rather than a malevolent enemy ; but as much as possible, one should carry 
some insurance against the latter possibility." 

ff. Other research and development ($20 million) 

This is for miscellaneous research in the medical, biological, food, agricul- 
tural, anti-contamination, and fallout areas. The AEC currently spends about 
the allotted sum every year to study the inherently simpler problem of peace- 
time fallout from tests. The equally important special wartime problems are 
mostly being neglected. 

7. Prototype shelters ($20 million) 

We would suggest building about 10 million dollars' worth of large shelters 
which, if economically feasible, might include some peacetime functions. In 
addition to "customary" shelters, this program should include more elaborate 
shelters and high overpressure shelters. The other $10 million should go for 
private family-type shelters, running an average of, say, $1,000 , apiece. This 
should enable us to build 10,000 shelters, or 1 for every 20,000 people. This 
means that every town in the United States would have at least one prototype 
shelter. 

8. Education and technical assistance ($25 million) 

It is one of the major objectives of the above program to create an environ- 
ment in which private citizens and organizations can do sensible things on their 
own. The main way the Government can encourage this is to do enough on its 
own so that people will see that if they supplement the Government's efforts 
they will either improve their chances for survival or the style in which they 
survive. Many of the preceding suggestions are aimed at making it possible 
for the Government to furnish realistic technical information and planning as- 
sumptions. This will enable those that wish to, to do sensible things on their 
own. 

We feel that at least part of the present apathy in the United States is due 
to ignorance of what can be done or to doubt that anything can be done. This 
apathy is intensified by the inadequacy of official pamphlets. The problem does 
not result from security restrictions or inadequate releases of information ; offi- 
cial studies themselves are inadequate. Better studies and more definitive Gov- 
ernment programs are needed. Realistic long-range planning, such as we are 
proposing, would go far toward restoring public confidence in the meritis of 
Government plans and suggestions. Even' more effectively, the institution of the 
"cheap" program, which depends mainly on improvised fallout shelters* would 
encourage many to build more adequate shelters on their own. As long as 
there is no reasonable overall program, few will undertake private actions. 

In addition to general information, the Government should offer to share 
some of the private expenses. However, because of the small size of the pro- 
gram, the Government should not contribute anything toward private projects 
unless it gets a great deal of leverage for its money. One of the easiest ways to 
get such leverage would be for the Government to spend small sums of money 
on the preliminary phases of the private projects ; that is, it should be willing 
to go to a private company with a complete set of blueprints showing that com- 
pany what it would have to do if it participated in a serious way in such a 
program. This would enable the company, without spending any of its own 
money or much energy, to get very specific ideas of the cost and performance of 
its own program. It would help eliminate the inertia that might otherwise pre- 
vent companies from initiating any actions. The Government should do similar 
things for private persons, not only by furnishing complete blueprints for 
either the modification of existing buildings or for the incorporation of protection 
in new buildings but also by offering technical assistance in their construction. 
It should also furnish services to architects, engineers, and others. 

In addition to helping private companies and individuals, the Government 
should try to elicit as much help from the nongovernmental part of our society 
as it can. For example, once the research program has provided some indication 
of what a reasonable passive defense program should involve, the Government 
should enlist the help of private professional groups to expedite some of the 



920 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

necessary intellectual and technical developments. Some of the organizations 
whose aid might be solicited include : 

American Society for Civil Engineers. 

American Concrete Institute. 

American Bar Association. 

American Medical Association. 

American Institute of Architects. 

National Planning Association. 

Committee for Economic Development. 

Chambers of commerce. 

National Bureau of Economic Research. 

American Association of Railroads. 

American Society for Testing of Materials. 

American Society for Mechanical Engineers. 

American Society for Electrical Engineers. 

American Society for Heating and Ventilating. 

National Association of Manufacturers. 
In the past, private groups have sometimes put time and energy into studies 
for the Government, but a lack of adequate orientation has often meant that 
their studies were obsolete before they were started. It is important, both for 
the morale of the participants and the usefulness of their product, that realistic 
environments and planning assumptions be given to such groups. For example, 
the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) is reported to be considering 
a standard for the protection of buildings in large Cities on the order of 5 to 
10 pounds per square inch. Such buildings might not be useless in some situa- 
tions, but they would certainly be useless if bombs dropped nearby. We would 
propose that a much more useful activity for the ASCE would be to look at 
joint-use, blast-resistant construction for small cities and rural areas rather 
than for large cities. An even more useful thing, and one which we would urge 
be done with a high priority, would be to look at the possibilities for joint-use 
fallout protection, both with and without warning (hours or days). For ex- 
ample, buildings might be built to use sandbags or fillable shutters that could 
be put up at the last moment. Either of these would greatly decrease their 
vulnerability to radiation. We feel that the possibilities are so promising that 
an appreciable portion of an expensive fallout program might be saved (though 
only a portion). It is clear there are many other examples where private 
organizations could be useful. Universities and foundations, for example, could 
make major contributions. 

It is with some reluctance that I include education in the program. This is 
not because education is not a very important thing. In particular, in a pro- 
gram that depends a great deal on improvising existing assets, it is probably 
very important for many people to understand reasonably well what they should 
do. However, the Government has a tendency to try to depend upon education 
and paper^plans to do everything, rather than to spend even small sums for 
capabilities that would make the educational program realistic and useful. It 
is not going to be true that our society can be preserved in a war by individual 
action supplemented only by Government pamphlets and paper plans. I suspect 
that the major educational impact will come, not from the formal program of 
information or propaganda, but simply from the impact of the Government's 
allotting reasonably large resources to a program that it is willing to defend 
intellectually. This alone should make many people understand that the pro- 
gram is a serious effort and that one does not have to be a "crackpot" or "wishful 
thinker" to join in. Conversely, if the Government tries to accomplish this pro- 
gram by education alone, if it is unwilling itself to invest a few hundred million 
dollars and thereby shows that it has little confidence in the effort, then, I think, 
we should not be surprised if the program fails completely. 

It may, of course, turn out that the Government does not wish to engage in a 
program as ambitious as the one described, modest as it may seem to those of us 
in the planning field. In that case, we suggest that the Government try at least 
the following : 

1. Reorient Government planning, both military and nonmilitary, to the proper 
kind of short and long wars ; in particular, make explicit preparations for im- 
provising preattack and postattack capabilities. 

2. Reorient current stockpile programs to contribute to postwar survival re- 
cuperation. 

3. Reorient and strengthen civil defense programs to pay particular attention 
to those situations in which their capability is most applicable rather than try 
to handle all problems across the board. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 921 

4. Broaden the current programs of research, development, and systems analy- 
sis to consider in more detail the problems involved in recuperation and in the 
postwar period generally. 

5. Study and propose legislation now to facilitate postwar economic stabiliza- 
tion and recuperation. 

6. Initiate research and study in the use of mines as personnel and industrial 
shelters. 

7. Initiate a program of technical education and assistance to orient and en- 
courage private actions planning and research. 

8. Bo much more long-range planning in the field of nonmilitary defense and 
independent and dependent groups. In particular, we suggest that OCDM or 
the executive department establish a permanent long-range planning organiza- 
tion of the same type as Rand, ORO, or the like. 

Three Lectures on Thermonuclear War (1960-75) by Herman Kahn 
lecture i. the nature and impact op various kinds of thermonuclear wars 

This lecture asks the question, "Is it really true that only an insane man 
would initiate a thermonuclear war or are there circumstances in which the 
leaders of a country might rationally decide that war is preferable to any of 
its alternatives?" 

It is concluded that there are plausible, even probable, circumstances in 
which a country may rationally decide on war as its best alternative. In ar- 
riving at this conclusion it is convenient to examine eight distinct phases of a 
thermonuclear war. 

1. Various phased programs for deterrence and defense and their relations to 
foreign policy. 

2. Wartime performance with different preattack and attack conditions. 

3. The acute fallout problems. 

4. Survival and patchup. 

5. Maintenance of economic momentum. 

6. Long-term recuperation. 

7. Long-term medical problems. 

8. Genetic problems. 

LECTURE II. THE FORMULATION AND TESTING OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND WAB 

PLANS 

This lecture asks such questions as, "Why and how might a thermonuclear 
war be initiated? How might it be fought and terminated?" 

In discussing these questions it is desirable to distinguish at least three kinds 
of deterrence : 
Type I — The deterrence of direct attack (passive deterrence) 
Type II— The deterrence of extreme provocations (active deterrence) 
Type III — The deterrence of moderate provocations (tit for tat deterrence) 
The requirements for the three kinds of deterrence, their interactions, some of 
the strains to which they might be subjected, and the probability and possible 
consequences of failure are discussed. Finally, criteria are set up for different 
circumstances and objectives to be used in the design and testing of the com- 
position and posture of strategic forces. These are listed below : 
Seven basic situations: 

A. Nontense: 

1. Premeditated Soviet attack 

2. Unpremeditated war 

B. Tense: 

1. Premeditated Soviet attack 

2. Unpremeditated war 

3. Premeditated U.S. attack 

C. Mobilization and legacy 

D. Arms control and violation 
Attackers* objectives: 

A. Limit damage 

1. Counter force 

2. Postattack blackmail 

3. Civil and air defense 

B. in war 

C. in peace 



922 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Peacetime objectives: 

A. Type 1 deterrence 

1. Quality needed 

2. Second strike capability 

3. Attackers' defense 

B. Type 2 deterrence 

1. Necessity 

2. First strike capability 

3. Non-alert capability 

C. Not look or be too dangerous 

1. To us 

2. To allies 

3. To neutrals 

4. To enemy 
Defenders' objectives: 

A. Punish enemy 

1. Priority affected by damage accepted 
2. Population and recuperation targets 

B. Stalemate war 

1. Conflicts with punish enemy 

2. Requires staying power 

3. Feasibility varies 

C. Limit damage 

LECTURE nr. WORLD WAR I THROUGH WORLD WAR VIII 

Some characteristics of eight wars, real or hypothetical, are analyzed, partly 
to show relations between strategy, tactics, and technology ; and partly to illus- 
trate certain historical themes or possibilities. The eight wars, each a techno- 
logical revolution ahead of its predecessor, are assumed to have occurred as 
follows: 1914, 1939, 1951, 1956, 1961, 1965, 1969, and 1973. The historical 
themes associated with each war are listed below : 

1914 — An accident prone world miscalculates. Expectations are shat- 
tered. 

1939 — Type II and type III deterrence fail. Expectations are shattered. 

1951 — A militarily superior nation risks disaster. 

1956 — Type II deterrence wanes. 

1961 — The Soviet Union attains "parity." Type II deterrence disappears. 
Type I deterrence is marginal. 

1965 — The prematureness of "Minimum deterrence." 

1969 — Possibility and consequences of "Minimum deterrence." Arms con- 
trol or "?" 

1973 — Fourteen years of progress (or 50,000 buttons). 

Senator Anderson. I think it has been a most interesting discussion. 

We will resume the afternoon session at 2 p.m., in this room, with 
testimony from Commissioner Willard F. Libby of the Atomic Energy 
Commission on emergency protection measures. 

Following his testimony there will be a panel of the following in- 
dividuals who will discuss the strategic implications of deterrence : 
Dr. Willard F. Libby, Comissioner, U.S. AEC ; Mr. Eobert Corsbie, 
Director of Civilian Effects Test Group, AEC; Dr. Paul Tompkins, 
NRDL ; Mr. Herman Kahn ; Mr. W. E. Strope, NRDL. 

I hope you can be here at 2 o'clock. 

Mr. Kahn. Thank you, sir. 

(Whereupon, at 12 :30 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene 
the same afternoon at 2 p.m.) 

AFTERNOON SESSION 

Chairman Holifield. The committee will be in order. 
Just before the noon recess we heard from Mr. Herman Kahn, who 
testified in advance of his position on the agenda in order to accom- 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 923 



modate Dr. Willard F. Libby, U.S. Atomic Energy Commissioner, 
who will speak to us on the subject of emergency protection measures. 

After Dr. Libby 's testimony is heard and the question and answer 
period we will have a panel discussion on the strategic implications 
of deterrents. On that panel we will have Dr. Libby, Dr. Kobert 
Corsbie, Director of Civil Effects Test Group, Dr. Paul Tompkins, 
Naval Kadiation Laboratory, Mr. Herman Kahn and Mr. W. E. 
Strope of the Navy Radiological Defense Laboratory. 

At this time Dr. Libby, I think the Chair should say a few words. 
You have served as Atomic Energy Commissioner now since the 5th of 
October 1954. Your term is expiring on June 30 and you have told me 
that you are going out to my State of California and teach chemistry 
out there in the University of California at Los Angeles. 

Dr. Libby. That's right, Mr. Holifield. 

Chairman Holifield. This committee has had you before it many, 
many times. You have testified many hours. There have been times 
when some of the members at least have disagreed with you, but most 
of the time I think most of the members agreed with you. But 
whether it was agreement or disagreement, our exchange of views has 
always been pleasant. We realize it is your own desire to return to the 
atmosphere of the campus again. However, it would be remiss on my 
part if I did not express, and I believe I am expressing the feelings of 
all the members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, our thanks 
to you and our deep appreciation for the many years you have served 
in the position of Atomic Energy Commissioner, for the untiring 
effort and the many contributions you have made to the understanding 
of the American people in this highly complicated and technical field. 

So as you go into private life, the good wishes of this committee go 
with you. We wish you the very best and we are happy that we have 
had an opportunity to have you once again before us to testify on 
something which I know T is dear to your heart. 

Mr. Vice Chairman ? 

Representative Durham. Mr. Chairman, I want to concur first in 
the statement of the chairman of the subcommittee and also to say to 
Dr. Libby I think he has rendered valuable service to the American 
people over the years he has served as Commissioner. Certainly he 
has enlightened this committee. He is a great scientist. About the 
only exception I would take to your statement, Mr. Chairman Holi- 
field, would be that my desire would be that he go to my State and my 
own city of Chapel Hill to impart the information that he has in that 
great brain of his to students. Of course, I am sure that California 
will benefit from his presence there. We will miss you, Dr. Libby. 

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLAKD F. LIBBY/ COMMISSIONER, U.S. 

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 

Dr. Libby. Thank you, Mr. Holifield and Mr. Durham. I hope that 
if there is ever anything I can do for the committee you won't hesitate 
to ask me. 



1 Date and place of birth : December 17, 1908, Grand Valley, Colo. Education : Bachelor 
of science, University of California, 1931 ; doctor of philosophy (chemistry), University of 
California, 1933 ; Work history : Instructor of chemistry. University of California, 
1933-38 ; assistant professor, 19i39~43 ; associate professor, 1943-45 ; professor instructor 
nuclear studies, Chicago, 1945-54 ; member, General Advisory Commission, ADC, 1950-54 ; 
member AEC, 1954—. 



924 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Representative Price. Mr. Chairman ? 

Chairman Holifield. Mr. Price. 

Representative Price. If the other members fail to say anything 
Dr. Libby, it is only because they agree fully with the statement of the 
chairman and Mr. Durham. 

Representative Hosmer. I wish to concur in that completely. It 

foes almost without saying, our respect for your integrity, for your 
nowledge and for the wisdom of the advice that you have generously 
offered us. 

We all wish you the best of luck. 

Dr. Libby, Thank you, sir. 

Representative Hosmer. I am particularly delighted because you 
are coming out to my part of the country as well as Mr. Holifield's. 

Dr. Libby. Thank you, Mr. Hosmer. 

Chairman Holifield. You may proceed. Doctor. 

Dr. Libby. Mr. Chairman, in the testimony before this subcom- 
mittee you have been informed on the effects of a simulated attack 
on our Nation with nuclear weapons delivered by modern military 
methods. 

The things an attack like this can do to us, the extent and the nature 
of the effects on people, livestock, crops and on our educational, social 
and governmental institutions call for energetic leadership and 
action. 

A million of anything is a lot. When we estimate casualties in the 
millions, it is obvious that we face a possibility which requires priority 
attention. 

There are relatively simple things we can do in preparation for 
the time of disaster which will make a tremendous difference in our 
response as individuals and as a nation. 

The most effective way to reduce war casualties is to not have the 
war; and the national policy is to work continually toward condi- 
tions which lead to a lasting, just peace for all men. 

We are led, when we review the history of man, ancient and mod- 
ern, to the conclusion that it is wise to take out some insurance for 
our protection in the event that something goes w T rong and peaceful 
international relations com6 to an end. 

The nature of the effects of modern nuclear weapons and the ranges 
over which these effects can produce casualties may provoke the 
question : "Is there really anything we can do?" My answer to this 
question is, "Yes." 

Now I am not going to sit here and tell you that there is a simple, 
cheap way to protect the people who are in the center of a target 
at the time it receives a direct hit. 

If the weapon is large and accurately delivered, the closein results 
of the detonation are pretty well fixed. 

But let us talk of the people located beyond the range of the initial 
effects. These people live everywhere in the Nation, in large towns 
and small, on the farms in rural areas. 

We must remember that they also live in our large cities. All have 
available to them the courses of action which will increase the proba- 
bility of their surviving and decrease the probability of their becom- 
ing sick or being injured. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 925 

The committee will recall that we have announced that the fallout 
from the March 1, 1954, detonation, at Bikini Atoll would have created 
radiation casualties in an area estimated at 7,000 square miles if no 
protective measures were taken. 

Casualties, seriously injured, and dead from the initial effects of 
this bomb would have occurred in an area of perhaps 250 to 300 square 
miles. 

There is a great difference between the two areas and I should like 
to focus attention on the need for protection and the capability for 
protecting the people in the 6,700 square miles or more beyond the 
range of initial blast, thermal and nuclear radiation. We can save 
them easily. We can lose them easily. 

As a case in point we may think of an attack on a hardened mili- 
tary installation in a sparsely populated area. The initial effects may 
inflict heavy damage on the facility and military implements. 

The number of personnel casualties may be relatively low in num- 
ber. But for hundreds of miles downwind — assuming surface 
bursts — the residual radiation will injure or kill those who are 
unprepared. 

Thus a more densely populated area of little true military signifi- 
cance may find itself involved with the results of events occurring 
hours earlier many miles away. 

That fact that you don't live in or near a potential target no longer 
gives you the sense of security you might have had when only con- 
ventional explosives were used. 

And of course you have no control over the selection of targets. 

Now what can we do ? 

The first action for anyone who does not already possess the knowl- 
edge is to learn what these weapons effects are. No one can be ex- 
pected to act properly or at all for that matter on any problem un- 
less he understands what makes it. It is necessary for people to learn 
about fallout, about nuclear radiation about the effects of nuclear radi- 
ation on people, animals, plants, food, water : The things that are 
immutably linked to life. In a larger sense, this is a matter of getting 
up to date which is essential to good citizenship in any circumstance. 

The peaceful applications of nuclear energy and the use of radio- 
active isotopes will grow with the passage of time. An informed pub- 
lic must be ready to express its opinions on the new proposals. 

In the open literature there is a wealth of information on effects. 
The news media are making a regular contribution. The record of 
these hearings will add to the store. 

Nevertheless, more public information and education will be re- 
quired until we begin to reach the point where surveys show that 
Americans knoAv as much about nuclear effects as they do about such 
familiar natural phenomena as rain ? wind, floods, and electrical storms 
and the rather complex and sometimes hazardous equipment we use 
every day. 

So then first we must add to and reinforce the foundations of pub- 
lic knowledge on which will rest our survival and recovery actions. 

Second, we must teach people what to do to keep from being killed 
or injured by these effects in time of war. Actually this goes hand 
in hand with public education so that a man learns of the hazard and 
countermeasures essentially at the same time. 



926 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Third, we must be ready to back up and support these people with 
technological developments which will improve the effectiveness of 
their defensive preparation. 

This then is the defensive pattern : 

( 1 ) Tell the people what they may be up against. 

(2) Tell them what actions are to be taken before, during and 
after an attack. 

(3) Support their efforts with new information, new tools and 
devices and new techniques. 

We are all bound up in this together. People as individuals, as 
families, as heads of corporations, as governmental leaders from the 
smallest community on up. We cannot merely give this assignment 
broadly to our citizens and to their civil defense directors and walk 
off and forget about it. 

As with any job the people doing the work are going to need gen- 
eral support, outright assistance with difficult parts, and the stimulus 
that comes with knowing that someone else is interested and ready to 
pitch in. 

If we are to accomplish anything there will have to be a certain 
amount of initiative all around. We must surely progress further 
beyond the talking and planning stages, thereby setting a good exam- 
ple for those who look to us for guidance. 

The policy of providing fallout shelter in new Government con- 
struction is an example of a practice which may be observed and 
copied. 

It has been widely stated, and it needs to be said many times more, 
that for a man to be able to guarantee a high degree of protection for 
his family he must have a fallout shelter. This can be as elaborate 
as he likes and can afford. It can also be skimpy if he prefers to 
gamble with lives. But if heavy fallout is deposited in an area, the 
best use of the best available shielding against the radiation is an 
absolute must if the inhabitants are to avoid unnecessary radiation 
exposure, illness and death. 

While we ordinarily speak of this shielding as a shelter, and while 
we think that people are well advised to provide themselves with a 
suitable shelter, it remains a fact that many homes and buildings pro- 
vide a life-saving amount of shielding in their basements as they 
stand. It is a matter of learning where to go for the best pro- 
tection. 

In May 1958 in Operation Plumbob we conducted a study at the 
Nevada Test Site to improve our knowledge of the shielding, and 
thus the protection, which you might find in typical residences. 

I will say we, the AEC, OCDM and all of us working together. 
But the AEC takes a real interest in this study. 

We used about 400 small radioactive cobalt sources encased in a 
plastic hose and arrayed about and over the structures to simulate 
the radiation field of fallout. We learned of the great possibilities of 
this technique and we learned some interesting things about the shield- 
ing in typical residences. (See charts 1 and 2.) 



928 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



if) 

ui 



< 



Urn 

S ° 

Q M 



< 

Ik 




* 



5 

5: 



X 





EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



929 



Chabt 4 




■■*& 



Cellar window, two-story brick house 
Ohast 5 




Cellar window, two-story brick house, sandbagged 



930 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



For example, it proved out that the most effective shielding material 
is that which is in the direct line of radiation. 

On the first floor of a two-story wood building the average radia- 
tion was about one-half of that outside. On the first floor of a two- 
story brick building the average was about one-seventh. (See 
chart 3.) 

A good many basements have windows and other openings which 
let the radiation in. By closing the openings with dense material 
like bricks or sandbags, the radiation level in the basement is reduced 
by a significant amount. ( See charts 4 and 5. ) 

Kitchen and bathroom fixtures, bookcases, furniture, and closets 
cast shadows which give additional radiation protection. That is, 
these shadows are shadows of the fallout radiation. 

The location of the shelter area to take advantage of the shielding 
makes for a safer shelter. 

Dose rates behind masonry chimneys and inside fireplaces are ap- 
preciably decreased. 

The contribution of fallout on roofs of two-story houses to the 
dose rate on the first floor is less by a factor of 10 as you see from your 
second chart, than the contribution from the fallout on the ground out- 
side the house. 

In the Nevada experiments a shelter was improvised of a heavy 
table placed in the corner of a basement and covered with 7y 2 inches 
of solid concrete blocks. (See chart 6.) Or boxes lined with 

water filled plastic 
chart b bags (Kearny method) 




Seven and one-half-inch concrete over table to provide improvised shelter in 
corner of basement and arrangement of intergrating dosimeters to measure 
radiation 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 



933 



< 

w 




'." V' "■.'■ "::■■ '•■?.■■• "■': 



934 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

This was tested as a radiological shelter at the Nevada test site in 
Operation Plumbbob in 1957. It was located 1 mile from a detona- 
tion of about 20 kilotons, that is equivalent power of 20 kilotons, and 
was occupied by Mr. Corsbie and other people working on the project 
at the time of the explosion. 

Three times, three detonations. Now in 2 of these detonations the 
fallout patterns close to 100 r. per hour fell right across the shelter as 
we had hoped it would. The blast pressure was 4 pounds per square 
inch. Now that is important because it is to be noted that in Hiro- 
shima 35 percent of the casualties occurred at lower pressures than 

this. 

Earlier tests demonstrated that the basic shelter would provide 
protection against as much as 25 pounds per square inch. 

The radiation reduction factors was 10,000 or more, so it would 
seem that this shelter, that one could have a lot of confidence in this 
particular design. Now it may be described as a buried or mounted 
25 by 48 foot metal arc structure as shown by the panel in the easel 
and in the model cutaway. It will accommodate 100 people for 2 weeks 

we hope. 

I say we "hope" because we don't know as much about prolonged 
occupancy of a shelter as we do about providing fallout protection. _ 

Engineering work on modifications to the shelter is nearing 
completion. i ; 

Mr. Corsbie's model here shows in considerable detail the kind of 
thing that is underway. 

It is planned to make these changes to the shelter now in the ground 
at Nevada test site during the summer and then go to work on the 
matter of learning something about the problems of living in the 
shelter. I think we will all feel uncertain and uneasy about telling 
people to be prepared to stay in a shelter for a week or two until we 
know about what this means in terms of human habits and adaptation. 

These experts are in a way like those described by Mr. Strope 
yesterday. 

Representative Hosmer. Dr. Libby, has there been any analysis of 
the material the Navy acquired during its studies of confinement 
prior to the development of the Atomic submarine, the psychological 
matters run into? 

Dr. Libby. Yes, but I think the problem is rather unique here. The 
geometry, the way you sleep, the freedom of movement is different 
from a submarine to a certain extent and we ought to really check it 
out. We like this shelter. We think it is practical, it is economic and 
it is useful, but this is a big unknown. Maybe people just can't stay 
in there 2 weeks, but we think they can. 

During the tests of the shelter in 1957, we had personnel from vari- 
ous AEC operations offices come to the test site to participate in the 
experiment and to get some firsthand experience. ^ 

Thought is being given to similar participation in the human engi- 
neering experiments. In this manner we can inform the staffs in the 
field of the practical aspects of the program. 

Also working with AEC and contractor personnel in the field, we 
shall start using at Oak Ridge late in June a radiological survey ve- 
hicle, commonly called a fallout truck. 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 943 

ments for these are quite different. What is satif actory for one may 
not be satisfactory for the other. Second, I don't want to give the 
implication that we think that civil defense plays a role in mili- 
tary affairs in the classical sense of the word, by backing up the 
Armed Forces, supplying them with men, materials, and morale. In 
some real sense, civilians and cities are not much of a military target — 
this is oversimplified but you have to oversimplify. 

Cities do contain such military assets as communications, municipal 
airports, off-duty personnel, and so forth, but I would doubt that all 
of the military assets in all of our cities are equivalent in military 
capability to a couple of wings of B-52's. You don't protect civilians 
today because they fight wars. You protect civilians because it is the 
job of the military to do that and not the job of the civilians to protect 
the military forces. 

It is very important to realize this. Sometimes people forget it. 

Second, you protect civilians because unless you can do this you 
are vulnerable to blackmail, either before the attack, during the attack, 
or after the attack. 

Eepresentative Hosmer. How do you use the term "blackmail," Mr. 
Kahn? 

Mr. Kahx._ I use the word in the customary sense, where the other 
"side uses threats to influence your behavior and maybe even to make 
you pay off. 

We discussed earlier the possibility that if we cannot accept Ru s- 
jja n_reta"liatorv blows, and if it is clear to us, or the Russians, or the 
Europeans that we cannot accept them, then we may be in a very^ 
precari ous position. 

— TfrnTis, you have to persuade all three simultaneously. Then we 
asked ourselves what do we mean by accepting a retaliatory blow, and 
we noticed the rather different views Europeans and Americans seem 
to have of the credibility of our initiating actions leading to that pos- 
sibility. I have no information as to what the Russians would thank, 
none at all. 

This is preattack blackmail. The other kind of blackmail is a 
little too technical to discuss now but it is discussed in papers, as the 
so-called postattack blackmail. He can influence your behavior after 
the war is started. 

Dr. Libby. Of course, in World War II, I think we learned that 
the whole Nation has to fight the war. That is, industry was an in- 
tegral part of the effort, and certainly in that sense civil defense is 
part of it. 

It may be even more directly a part of the effort than the heavy 
industry was in World War II. 

But it seems to me not too extreme a position that civil defense is 
pretty closely related to our defense posture. 

Mr. Kahst. I would like to make a partial exception to Dr. Libby's 
remark Many people object to air and civil defense, not because 
th^_imder estimate the problem, but because theg_oy erestimate jtT 
^heyrthin^there ~is°nothi ng significant tha t can be done to alleviate 
theco nsequences of aTwarT 

~~ For Example, if you examine most air defense studies done in the 
United States, say until about 2 years ago, it almost always turns 
out that one of the objectives of the study was to defend the war 
mobilization base. 



944 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Now you can't do that job, therefore if you believe that this is 
the objective you come up with the position why spend money on 
air defense or civil defense? There is, however, another question 
which is also important : "How does the country look 5 or 10 years 
after the war as a function of the prewar preparation?'' For this 
question one does not ask, "Can we produce jet engines in the first 
year of the war?" 

Now the first task cannot be done, but the second can. Therefore 
you are actually hurting yourself if you try to overstate the im- 
portance of civil and air defense by saying that we need the output 
of these factories to fight the war because you are then setting up an 
inf easible objective which automatically leads to apathy. 

The problem is, "Can ^ou do the much easier j ob ? " 

Dr. Libby. Yes; I think that is a very reasonable point. There 
is a psychology of action that is necessary rather than a psychology 
or an attitude of hypothetical and theoretical consideration. 

If we could get citizens interested in a few things like basement 
shelters so that people had the feeling that they were doing something 
to improve their position, their attitude toward the civil defense 
operation might change, so that one of some hope might take the 
place of one of pretty general despair and hopelessness. 

Mr. Kahn, May I add something to that ? 

If you expect people to have faith in these moderate preparations 
you have a right to ask that the Goverment have some faith in them 
too. 

Chairman Holifield. Will you speak a little louder, please? 

Mr. Kahn. If one expects the average American citizen to have 
faith in modest preparation like simple fallout shelters, 2- week food 
supplies, and so forth, one also has the right to ask the Govern ment to 
have faith in these programs. 

Conversely, if the Governme nt shows that it does not bel ieve that 
these m odest meas ures_ wilTbe effective,~then how caiTwe expect th e 
citizens to believe in them "9 — 

The Government has obviously shown it does not believe in mod- 
erate measures because it supports them in a rather modest fashion to 
understate it. 

Now we have looked at this problem, we have asked ouselves what 
is the minimum task you can ask civil defense to do, and we come up 
w T ith two. 

The first one would be to prepare what I called the B country, that 
rural areas, small towns, anoTso forth, to survive and recuperate" 
from a w arj n which the A country, the largest 50 to 100 cities were 
destroyed. J """ — ~~ — * ~~ 

For at least the near future this is a relatively simple and feasible 
task and we don't think it costs very much to make these preparations. 
The second task that we think should be done is to have the capability 
TxT take the people of the A country and put them in places of pro- 
tection in the ±5 country on say 24 hours 7 notice. 1 am using the dirty 
word ^ ev acuation." It is not wishful thinking to think of 24-hour 
evacuation capabilities as being useful. 

L _ It has nothing to do with the belief that we have a secret agen tin 
Moscow to give us mtelligence^ It simply depends on the following: 
That as far asTheTRussians and the Europeans are concerned, they 



is, the 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 945 

will have a quite different attitude toward the resolution of the United 
States if they think that the United States can put its people in a place 
of protection given 24 to 48 hours' notice, than if they feel that even 
given a month's notice there is nothing we can do. 

In other words, imagine yourself going into a Munich-type c on- 
ference where the Russians haoTeyacuated. their ci ties and you had 
n ot. They may even have done it slowly , s ay over a Bgriodof Aweek, 
and now you have jto ba rgain with themTIJhtQhey are evac uated ajid 
you are not. You are going to haveTsome very tough~I>argaining to 
do. 

CKairman Holifield. Any comment, Mr. Strope, Mr. Corsbie? 

Mr. Strqpe. No. This was a point that I wished to be brought out 

and it has been brought out somewhat already. The concept of a 

country A and a country B is very useful. It is useful in civil _d e^ 

"fense because the problem s of defense are completely different intne 

two countries. 

Protecting country A is a very difficult p roblem. Protecting coun- 
try B is a very reaso nabTe_pm^mT7T Think the question which is 
most important righTaTthe moment is : Suppose we have made coun- 
try B impregnable in the face of a Kussian thermonuclaer threat. 
How does this change or how does this affect our general posture in 
deterring a war ? 

I think that Herman has considered this at quite considerable 
length. 

Chairman Holifield. Mr. Corsbie? 

Mr. Corsbie. I think in preparing our defenses, that we somehow 
or other must put the information which we now have into engineers' 
and architects' offices so that they can provide routinely the sort of 
protection which we know is needed. Dr. Libby mentioned in his 
remarks that this might cost very little. 

Now for too long we have known that some materials are function- 
ally equal to other materials and competitive in price, but from the 
point of view of providing protection against nuclear reactions are far 
superior. Also, we know it takes quite a while to make changes when 
one is affecting parts of our economy and ways of doing things. 

For i nstance, we have known fo r a lon g time that hard smooth 
"rnjXeHal^are mu ch better in the face of fallout contamination than 
rou gh materials" ~~ 

"weTmylHmowh for a long time that certain frailable, frangible 
building materials under blast conditions break into thousands of 
f ragments 1 each one a potential casualty producer. 

So we need to reorient our thinking somewhat to recognize that 
we are living in an atomic age, and if we never had to face a war — 
for instance, we should not expect to have lower radiation levels. So 
we need to recognize the materials that are useful to us, and we need 
also to recognize that changes in design of a thing as simple as a 
house can provide additional protection merely by leaving out base- 
ment windows. 

We have fori 




ago when our ^ , ^ ^ . _. . . ~-^- P v 
one ever turns off "alight today because the room has a wh ioIo^ZISq 
we could build a basement cheaper and probably ventilate it as effi- 
ciently without openings as with openings. 



946 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

Also, if as simple a concept as the fact that protection against 
radiation is closely related, almost proportional, to unit-area density 
of material between the contaminated area and the safe area could be 
put in the drafting rooms, then the people who are experts in design 
and selection of materials, might start substituting say concrete 
floors in typical residences for wood floors. By such means you 
might have as good a basement shelter in a one-story wood rambler 
house as you now have in a two-story house. 

Chairman Holifield. Mr. Durham ? 

Representative Durham. Referring to your statement in regard to 
this projected future, and of course you have made this study — you 
can prepare yourself to take so much destruction of human lives 
and human property. 

We have to assess it on that basis and then come up with some 
kind of an answer as to whether or not we could take a loss of 40 
million people and whether we could take a loss of 50 percent of all 
property, food, and everything else. 

I would like to have the panel comment on that. 

I think it would be very interesting in dealing with the approach 
as to what we may think of in the future. I believe you did approach 
it in the future, not presently. 

Mr. Kahn. Yes. 

Representative Durham. That is we are reaching the place here 
where we can't get enough money or we can't find enough funds unless 
we all do it individually in trying to portect ourselves, and there seems 
to be very little interest, with all the effort we have put out here and 
put out in the agency. 

If the panel would care to comment on that I thought it was a very 
intriguing and interesting point in the future picture of wars that we 
may face in the next 30, 40, or 50 years. 

Mr. Kahn. Or even less than that. 

Representative Durham. Less than that. 

Mr. Kahn. Right. The question of what you are willing to accept 
in the way "of a retaliatory blow depends a great deal on the provoca- 
tion. 

In other words, the Russians have done things to us and maybe we 
have done things to them which 30 years ago would have meant war 
but today does not. The balance of terror is delicate butii otJihat 
delicate. It is hard to overturn. However, if the Russians dropped a 
bomb on London just like that out of the blue 4 1 think they would find" 
bombs on Moscow, even if their retaliatory blow killed more than half 
of our country, simply because we would not even stop to think. 

We would just react. 

CM the other hand, if we had made no preparation to accept a re- 
taliatory blow and the Russians got us to a Munich-type conference sa y 
5 or 10 years from now after they had us put into a very tensxT per iocT 
and made us think about it and then relaxed us and then raised us again" 
to a peak of tension and then relaxed us — just the way Hitler dial he 
gave us a mod eL_ 

Kepresentative Durham. I understand you think, of course, under 
that circumstance that they are going to try to come up with an answer 
as to how much they are willing to take before they ever drop that 
bomb? 



EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 947 

Mr. Kahn. That is right. They can test you experimentally and 
find out gradually what you are willing to take, and they can probably 
do it reasonably safely. 

They can't do it completely safely. They run some risks. 

But there is another point to realize : It does not have to be down in 
black and white before our NATO relations get influenced. They 
can think just as Well as we can, in some cases they can think better 
because they are closer to the gun. 

In the past the Europeans have resolutely refused to look at this 
problems because it was too horrible. But it is getting closer and 
at some point you have to look even horror in the face. You are 
forced to. At that point when they start asking the question, "Will 
we give up New York for Paris, will we give up New York and 
Washington for London", you have to give them a story which sounds 
reasonable, at least to them if not to yourself. 

You have to because they are going to ask for it. Now you may 
give them a story which sounds reasonable to a certain percent of the 
people but to others it won't. It then becomes a political issue, and 
the more you argue this thing the less credible it comes unless it has 
a modicum of rationality in it. 

Representative Durham. With that kind of a plan what is the 
difference between that and a deterrence plan ? 

Mr. Kahn. What kind of apian? 

Representative Durham. A deterrence plan under which we are 
operating at the present time? 

Mr. Kahn. Let me be very careful. It is in a sense the old mas- 
sive retaliation that Secretary Dulles talked about in January 1954, 
but only in a quite different context. I do not believe that one should^ 
even in the most indirect way, threaten massive retaliation for such 
incidents as Korea and Indochina. 

These issues are just not big enough to justify world war III. In 
fact the less you talk about massive retaliation the better, up to the 
point where you get to really serious issues like all of Europe or even 
a piece of Europe, but where the principle involved is a really big 
issue. At that point you have two choices. You can try to defend 
it with limited war forces on the ground, or you can try to defend it 
by Strategic Air Command. 

For the last 4 or 5 years the Strategic Air Command has been a 
very credible defense of Europe. I personally think this defense will 
still be credible for some period in the future, though some critics 
have cast doubt on its credibility. In any case, our resolve to use 
SAC is rapidly diminishing in credibility. Furthermore, you have 
to take account of a peculiar human reaction which tends to anticipate 
trends and acts as if the future is already here. 

In other words, the Russians test a missile so some Europeans and 
Americans act as if they have 500 missiles in existence. This is a 
human reaction, to look at a trend and anticipate it arrival prema- 
turely. 

Eepresentative Durham. We are getting over the base, Mr. Chair- 
man. 

Mr. Kahn. My apologies, the only point I'm trying to make is that 
Type II Deterrence is a form of massive retaliation if you will, but on 
an issue which may be worth it. It has been credible in the past. It 



948 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

is credible now. It may not be credible in the future for just such 
reasons as given in the testimony we have had in the last 4 days. 

Dr. Libby. I think, Mr. Chairman, that by pursuing the program 
of hope and of citizen's individual action program, we may develop 
a knowledge of the realities which will make people better able to 
assess the factors Dr. Kahn has brought out. So I think we ought to 
encourage the kind of development that we have been talking about 
in the way of getting citizens to take action in the program. 

Some of these things cost very little money really, and examples 
were given during these hearings, but these are by no means the only 
things that individuals can do. There is the problem of food supply, 
for example. There is a problem of the recovery of farmlands. We 
need much more research on just how we can recover contaminated 
farmland and return it to usefulness. 

I must say that what little work we have done so far has not led us 
to believe that it is a very easy job. But there may be things we have 
not discovered, which can be done to help greatly. 

We have logistic problems in the case of an attack which need 
further analysis. We talk about country A and country B, but the 
country B is used to depending on the cities in its livelihood. And 
with the evacuees that Mr. Kahn mentioned from country A to coun- 
try B, it has a doubly difficult problem of just continuing to survive. 
In thinking about these ordinary problems from the point of view of 
the individual as well as from the Government point of view, a dual 
attack on it will lead to some increase in the public knowledge of the 
threat and then our democratic processes will operate to give us a 
national position which the people can back and understand. 

Chairman Holifield. The question has been asked the Chair why 
have we had testimony on post-protective measures? The Chair 
would like to state that, of course, this committee does not have civil 
defense under its jurisdiction. We felt that in presenting a picture of 
an attack like this to the American people, it was our obligation not 
to paint a picture which we believed is realistic even though it be 
black, and yet not say that there is some hope. 

We did not, of course, bring these protective measures into the 
hearing as an indication that we favored building a maginot line in 
America or any of those sort of things. 

It is very difficult to hold a hearing in which someone doesn't criti- 
cize the method of the hearings or the motives of the hearings. 

We felt that it was to balance the testimony, as nearly as the facts 
seem to be to people who have given a great deal of study to it, that 
this point should be brought into the hearings before we close. 

And that is the answer to that. 

I have also been asked the question why the detailed effects of this 
pattern of attack were applied to our own country and not to some 
country overseas. The obvious answer to that is we are primarily 
concerned with the safety naturally of our own inhabitants. There is 
also the corollary factor that we do not want to be accused of pro- 
posing a war plan against another country; this committee doesn't. 
Then, following that, the question has been posed, Why did the pat- 
tern contain 2,500 megatons on our overseas bases and on a post- 
attacking nation ? This was done on the same basis of reasoning as 
the original pattern, strictly for the purpose of obtaining the readings 



0^» ~*~- .EXPECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 953 

hearings if they have done nothing else have emphasized the necessity 
of very wisely proceeding with the business of minimizing those risks. 

Now that doesn't mean giving up because that bears a price tag 
that is greater in my mind than the risk of nuclear war. 

It does mean, however, going about in relaxing world tensions in a 
manner which will accomplish it, not in the pursuit of an illusion of 
peace but in a pure suit of a practical means or achieving it. And that 
often requires courage and wisdom and chance taking in and of itself. 

I think this* Nation is capable of doing that. We are not the first 
generation of Americans who have faced difficult choices. 

The choice between slavery and possible death. I think we are as I 
say capable of handling the situation, running the risk and avoiding 
the sad choices. 

Chairman Holifield. Dr. Kahn, let's plan to close the hearing in 
a few short minutes. 

Dr. Tompkins. I would like to put into the discussion if I may just 
a few personal views of my own as to what the nature of this prob- 
lem is. 

I had the experience of being on the Manhattan District in 1943. 
I am very familiar with the psychology of revulsion against the effect 
these weapons can produce. As a matter of fact, I was part of a 
group which shortly after 1945-46 attempted in our own minds to 
conceive of an attack just about the kind that you have laid down. It 
is entirely true that in the absence of experience, in the absence of 
information and in the absence of data, the impression that all of us 
have as to the consequences of such an attack were virtually of the 
complete and total saturation variety, namely there would literally be 
nothing left after such an event. 

Now this was 10 years ago. After that period it became quite ap- 
parent, at least to my mind, that an event such as we have examined 
here is not one that anyone would take willingly, but which we would 
be very smart to ask ourselves if it were imposed on us would we be 
able to come through it ? 

Now this is a different question. This is my view of the role of 
civil defense. 

I don't think any of us will accept this kind of result willingly 
unless the stakes were well beyond our individual choices. That 
isn't the role that nonmilitary defense plays in at least my life. 

With the passage of time, that is since the 1945^6 period, we have . 
examined the results of a very major attack. We have found in these 
hearings what from 10 years' experience I know to be true, namely, 
the results are catastrophic enough in their own right. They need 
no imaginary amplification. The facts themselves are bad enough. 
However, it is crucially important to look those facts squarely in the 
face if one is going to face the necessity for survival, if against your 
will or despite anything you can do about it, it is imposed on you. 
As far as I am concerned, if the chips ever go down and avoiding a 
conflict is not possible in the scheme of human events of the future, 
I for one do not propose to see this Nation come out the loser. 

And therefore, I think we should be able to take it if we have to. 

Now following up Herman's point of view, I think the technology 
is such that complete protection is absolutely out of the question. 

Therefore the concept that any protective measures that we take 
puts us in the position of adopting a maginot line concept behind 



954 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 

which we hide, or developing ourselves into fortress America is 
entirely false. That is not the role of the nonmilitary defense in 

the world of the future. _. , 

The world of the future is going to be dangerous, Ihe human 
capacity to inflict such damage will inevitably be there. Ihe threat 
of the employment of that damage is something with which we will 
have to live unless something very drastic changes m our interna- 
tional relations. We must know how to react to it. 1 personally 
never exiect to see consequences of the type displayed on these maps. 
If we really thought this, if we really thought that there was no 
hope of getting around it, then I think one would be entitled to 
\\ f\ discouraffed. 

As far as I am personally concerned, by looking at the problems, 
understanding what they are composed of, and by necessity being 
an incurable optimist, I never expect to see a war of this kind happen. 
It is possible that more limited engagements of a more sharply defined 
type will be fought under the sword of Damocles hanging over our 
heads some time in the future. If so, let us be prepared for that. 
So, that at least, is my personal view as to the role that the nonmilitary 
defense should play, and it will never be perfect. 

Chairman Holifieux Many of the witnesses who have appeared 
before this committee this week and the members of this committee 
have for many months and years been carrying a heavy burden of 
responsibility of knowledge of these things on their minds and m 
thftiT* hearts 

Some of us have felt that it is time to share this burden of responsi- 
bility with the American people. Before we adjourn I want to thank 
the reporters who have attended these hearings so patiently and the 
people on the TV and radio, the representatives in those media. I 
want to thank the members and especially I want to thank Mr. Hos- 
mer, because I believe he sat in his chair as many hours as I have sat 



in mine. 



I want to thank the staff, which has worked on this hearing some 6 
weeks. Particularly do I want to thank Colonel Lunger who has 
worked many nights to 2 and 4 o'clock in order to make these hearings 
possible the next day and also Dr. Carey Brewer whom we borrowed 
from another subcommittee, the Subcommittee on Military Opera- 
tions, for these past few weeks. . 

I want to thank the audience too that has attended these hearings 
and compliment them on the way they have listened, attentively and 
quietly, to the sometimes long, complicated, and technical testimony 
that has been given in some instances. m 

These long technical testimonies were necessary in order that the 
basic record might be presented in as fair a way as we know how. 

In conclusion I want to say the challenge of the nuclear age is 
enormous and inescapable. 

The facts of nuclear war and the effects of nuclear war once estab- 
lished will not fade away because they are unpleasant. If we are 
prudent we will not ignore them. 

They will not disappear. Each of us must accept personal responsi- 
bilities because the nuclear war is a personal threat to our survival. 

The problem is too large to leave solely in the hands of the diplo- 
mats and the generals. They need the collective thinking and advice 
of every thinking human being in the world.